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ABSTRACT 
European-imposed reforms in Ottoman-held Macedonia in the period 1904-1908 led 
to the diminution of Ottoman authority, the encouragement of Christian partisan 
activities and the consolidation of the Young Turk movement in the region. The 
Young Turk revolution of 1908 established a Constitutional and Parliamentary regime 
in the Ottoman Empire pledging institutional reform, equality and liberty for all 
nationalities. 
Between July 1908 and April 1909, it became clear that the Young Turk policies and 
the Macedonian aspirations of the Christian Balkan countries were incompatible. The 
Young Turks remained a predominantly Moslem movement committed to safeguard 
the territorial integrity of the Empire, prevent foreign interference in Ottoman affairs 
and counteract Christian Macedonian separatism. 
By contrast, following the withdrawal of European control from Macedonia, the 
Balkan Christians attempted to take advantage of the Ottoman Constitutional change 
to further their own political and national interests in Macedonia. Disillusioned by the 
Young Turk centralist tendencies and apprehensive of a resurgent Turkish nationalism, 
Bulgarian, Greek and Serb nationalists resorted -once more- to their original means of 
Macedonian propaganda: religious, cultural and revolutionary activity. 
During 1909-1912, the Committee of Union and Progress (C.U.P.) -the driving force 
in the Young Turk movement- initiated a policy of enforced denationalization on the 
non-Moslem ethnic groups. Implemented in a harsh manner in Macedonia, this 
practice irrevocably undermined any prospect of cooperation between Moslem Young 
Turks and Christian Macedonians. Its aftermath included the growth of the Albanian 
nationalist movement and the encouragement of rapprochement between the Christian 
Balkan states, which was to bring about the establishment of the Balkan Alliance and 
the collapse of European Turkey in the Balkan wars. 
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NOTE ON CHRONOLOGY AND TOPONOMY 
At the beginning of the 20th century, the western world was using the Gregorian (new) 
calendar while the Balkan Orthodox used the Julian (old). Thirteen days separated the 
two calendars. To facilitate the reader, the Gregorian calendar has been used in this 
study. A problem might occur however, for the reader who shall attempt to identify 
Greek archival documents, in which the Julian calendar was used. To avoid such a 
confusion, I have cited both calendars where reference is made to Greek archival 
sources. For example: 
lA.Y.E.l1908/File 118.lIGeneral Consulate of Salonica/12/25-9-1908/no.550/Consul-
General to Foreign Minister. 
[note: 12 September applies to Julian calendar while 25 September for Gregorian] 
Everything about Macedonia has been subject to controversy. Toponomy is no 
exception to this general statement. In a region where Slav, Greek, Turkish, Albanian, 
Vlach and Jewish populations left their mark, different names were used to identify a 
certain area or city. British documents provide a comprehensible system of identifying 
Macedonian and other places. Therefore, the toponomy used in British sources -
mainly in the British Parliamentary Papers. Accounts and Papers- has been used in this 
study with a view to standardization. A list is given below to enable the reader to 
identify places in Macedonia and elsewhere. 
Names used in this study Contemporary Names 
Constantinople Istanbul 
Salonica Thessaloniki 
Adrianople Edirne 
Dedeagatch Alexandroupolis 
Janina Ioannina 
Monastir Bitolja 
Uskub Skopje 
Scutari Skoder 
Argirokastro Gjirokaster 
Xl 
Koritsa Korce 
Diber Diber 
Ipek Pee 
Ishtip Shtip 
Jakova Djakovica 
Smyrna Ismir 
Djumaja Blagoevgrad 
Tepeleni Tepelene 
Valona Vlore 
Vardar Axios 
Struma Strimonas 
Vodena Edessa 
Maritsa Evros 
Novibazar Novi Pazar 
Philippopolis Plovdiv 
Timovo Tmovo 
.. 
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PREFACE 
The Young Turk revolution and the Macedonian Question have been subject to 
extensive historical research but only as separate topics. Turkish studies on the Young 
Turk revolution are abundant. However, most of them tend to examine the Young 
Turk phenomenon within the context of Turkish politics. Balkan historiography has 
dealt with the Macedonian question extensively but the vast majority of works dealing 
with Macedonia before the Balkan wars, except for Professor Dakin (1966), set the 
Ottoman Constitutional change of 1908 as terminus. 
As a result, the effect of the Young Turk revolution in the Balkan peninsula and 
specifically Macedonia -a region inextricably linked with the Young Turk movement 
and the Committee of Union and Progress- has not become the object of any scholarly 
study so far. The present study will attempt to fill in this gap. The principal aim of 
this work is to explore the impact of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 on the 
Macedonian policies of the Balkan states in the period 1908-1912. The researcher 
argues that there was a fundamental conflict of political interests between the Young 
Turks and the Christians in Macedonia. 
The study is divided into three parts. Part I deals with the emergence and growth of 
the Young Turk movement and the escalation of inter-Balkan rivalry in Macedonia, 
with particular reference to the years of Mace doni an reform (1904-1908). 
Part II constitutes the focus of the thesis, covering the period between the revolution 
of July 1908 and the counterrevolution of April 1909. The thesis emphasizes that, 
apart from Turkey'S Balkan entanglements following the Near East crisis of October 
1908, it was in these months that the incompatibility between the Young Turk policies 
and the Christians' Macedonian aspirations became apparent. Part II examines the 
C. U.P. 's attempts to establish its position in Ottoman politics, the attitude of the 
Powers most interested in Ottoman affairs and primarily the impact of the Turkish 
revolution on the policy of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia in Macedonia. 
Finally, Part III investigates the period from the counterrevolution of April 1909 until 
the outbreak of the Balkan wars in October 1912. It analyzes the mid-term effects of 
Young Turk policy in Macedonia: the Turkish strivings for the denationalization of the 
_______________________________ Xlll 
Macedonian Christians; the aggravation of the Albanian question and the establishment 
of the Balkan Alliance. 
The present work is mainly based on Greek and British archival sources as well as on 
the extensive use of published British documents. Pieces of information have been 
also drawn from certain memoirs and selected secondary sources. 
This study seeks to provide a well-researched, informative and comprehensive analysis 
of the Balkan dimension of the Macedonian question within the framework of the 
Young Turk Constitutional regime. 
INTRODUCTION 
Introduction 1 
-------------------------------------------------------
By the second half of the 19th century, the term Macedonia referred to the 
geographical region encompassing the Ottoman-held vilayets (provinces) of Kosovo, 
Monastir and Salonica. The existence of ethnically-mixed, polyglot and culturally-
heterogeneous populations -be they of Slav, Turkish, Greek, Albanian, Vlach, Jewish 
origin and Moslem, Christian or Jewish religion- in this area was one of the main 
characteristics of Macedonian controversy. Any attempt to identify the national 
affiliations, let alone identity, of the Macedonian communities in this "no man's land" 
had been painfully futile. Nevertheless, Slav, Greek and since 1878 Albanian 
nationalists laid claim to it. 1 
At its early stage rivalry over Macedonia became visible in the field of religion. Until 
1870, taking advantage of its truly privileged position within the Rum millet/ the 
Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate had extended its jurisdiction over the administration 
of Christian Orthodox religious and educational institutions, the collection of certain 
taxes and the communal justice system. 3 As a result, the Greek Church had obtained 
virtual control over the Ottoman Macedonian Orthodox communities. 
The decision of the Ottoman government to allow the establishment of an 
independent Bulgarian Church, the Exarchate, on 10 March 1870 however restricted 
the influence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate upon the Slav peasant communities in 
Macedonia. More importantly, it furthered the process of national awareness of the 
Bulgarian people and led to the growth of Bulgarian propaganda activities among the 
Slav Macedonians through religion and education. 
The rise of Bulgarian nationalism in the second half of the 19th century contributed to 
the emergence of the Macedonian question. During the Eastern Crisis of 1875-1878, 
the Bulgarian national programme for expansion in the southern Balkans and 
Macedonia came near to its full implementation. On 3 March 1878, following the 
Ottoman military defeat in the Russo-Turkish war of 1877-1878, the Russians 
imposed the Treaty of San Stefano on the Sublime Porte. This envisaged the creation 
of "Greater Bulgaria" whose new borders would stretch from the Danube river and 
Black Sea to the Morava valley, western Macedonia and the Aegean.4 
1 VLACHOS (1935, pp.28-32). WILKINSON (1951, pp.I-6) 
2 In the Ottoman Empire, all subject peoples belonged to administrative units which had been 
organized on the basis of religion (millet). 
3 KARDARAS (1996, pp.283-4) 
4 SUMNER (1937, p.4lO) 
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In the summer of 1878, the dream of the Bulgarian nationalists and their Russian 
Panslav patrons to create a powerful Slav country in Balkan peninsula was shattered 
in Berlin. The Berlin Treaty granted political independence to Serbia, Montenegro 
and Romania. Bulgaria, however, was divided into an autonomous Principality 
within her pre-war boundaries and the semi-autonomous province Eastern Rumelia. 
Macedonia and Thrace were to remain under Ottoman rule. 5 By overlooking the 
"principle of nationalities" the Berlin Treaty compromised the national interests of the 
small Balkan states and preserved Turkey-in-Europe thereby failing to settle not only 
the Macedonian but the entire Eastern Question. 6 
The Berlin settlement fostered Bulgaria's irredentism and eXpanSlOll1Sm. In the 
period 1878-1885, the Eastern Rumelian issue took precedence over Macedonia on 
the agenda of the Bulgarian political leadership. In order to lay the groundwork for 
the unification of Eastern Rumelia with the Principality, Bulgarian activists organized 
an underground revolutionary network in the former province, while Sofia was in 
search of foreign and indeed Balkan support. 7 
The Cabinets of Serbia and Greece were watching these developments with 
increasing consternation. Serb and Greek officials believed that the questions of 
Eastern Rumelia and Macedonia were inextricably connected and, if the Balkan 
power equilibrium was to be preserved, any Bulgarian aggrandizement in Eastern 
Rumelia should be dependent on sufficient Serb and Greek compensation in 
Macedonia. In this context, Greece and Serbia embarked on secret negotiations to 
reach an understanding about Macedonia. So long as the two states were unable to 
conclude an agreement regarding the delimitation of their respective "zones of 
influence" in Macedonia, these attempts stood little chance of success. 8 
The growth of a Bulgarian revolutionary movement in Eastern Rumelia and the 
failure of Greece and Serbia to work out an understanding in Macedonia opened the 
way for the unification of the two Bulgarian provinces. On 18 September 1885, a 
successful Bulgarian coup broke out in the major cities of Eastern Rumelia. Britain's 
diplomatic support to Sofia and the Serb military defeat at the hands of the Bulgarian 
5 The text of the Berlin Treaty is to be found in P.P.A.P. LXXXIII 1878. pp.368-381. For the Berlin 
settlement see: MEDLICOTT (1938) 
6 ANDERSON (1966, p.220) 
7 PERRY (1993, pp.72-4). See also ne:\.1 note 
8 KOFOS (1980, pp.48-52) 
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armed forces in Slivnitsa in November 1885, secured the formal unification of 
Eastern Rumelia with metropolitan Bulgaria on 18 April 1886. 
The geopolitical enlargement of Bulgaria and her geographical proximity to Ottoman 
Macedonia gave a great impetus to the Bulgarian nationalist programme. 
Furthermore, it rendered a future Bulgarian onslaught on Turkey-in-Europe a more 
clear possibility. In view of the expansionism of Bulgaria and the other Balkan 
Christian countries' bids to obtain territorial aggrandizement in Macedonia, the 
Ottoman administration realized that a revision of its traditional tendency to view the 
Macedonian question in the narrow context of local economic underdevelopment and 
inefficient provincial administration was necessary. 
Henceforth, to defend the territorial integrity of Macedonia -a key precondition for 
the preservation of Ottoman authority in Europe and the Straits- and protect the 
compact Macedonian Moslem populations against partisan attacks by the Balkan 
Christians, Constantinople took steps to strengthen its armies in the region. Ottoman 
policy-makers also began to examine the introduction of reforms in local Macedonian 
administration as the most pertinent way to make living conditions tolerable and 
frustrate any attempt on the part of the European Powers to intervene in the affairs of 
Macedonia -as they had previously done in 1867 in Crete- for the sake of the Sultan's 
Christian subjects.9 
Between 1886-1894, the Bulgarian Premier Stambulov strove to obtain reconciliation 
with Turkey. Under his leadership, the focus of Bulgaria's Macedonian policy was to 
promote the "Bulgarisation" of the Orthodox Slavophone populations by means of 
the religious and cultural propaganda of the Exarchate. Initiating this "evolutionist" 
practice of peaceful infiltration in Macedonia, the Stambulov Cabinet intended to 
elicit Ottoman concessions for the establishment of new Exarchist Metropolitan sees 
and the full implementation of article 23 of the Berlin Treaty in Macedonia providing 
for local administrative autonomy.lO Bulgarian officials were convinced that this 
9 TOKAY (1994, pp.31-8) 
10 VAKALOPOULOS (1999, p.52). According to article 23 of the Berlin Treaty, the Porte 
undertook to apply in certain Ottoman European provinces the Organic Law of 1856. which had 
been initially introduced in the island of Crete. The article 23 provided for the autonomous 
administration of the provinces, appointment of foreign Governors-General (Belgian or Swiss). 
provincial assemblies. reforms in Ottoman gendarmerie and militia with proportionate 
representation of the local Christian population in these security forces. The Ottoman 
administration however. had no desire to fulfill its political pledge to Europe and apply article 23 in 
its European dominions. For, as had happened in Crete. the implementation of this pr0\1sion would 
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would open the way for the autonomy of Macedonia and its future incorporation by 
the Principality. 
Indeed, Stambulov's tendency to pursue a rapprochement with the Sublime Porte 
gained for Bulgaria three new Metropolitan sees in the Macedonian centers ofUskub, 
Ohrid and Ve1es. 11 Unhappily for the Bulgarian Prime Minister and the Exarch Antim 
I, this discreet yet efficient strategy had failed to satisfy the refractory circles of the 
numerous Macedonian colony in Bulgaria and the young revolutionary intelligentsia 
in Macedonia proper. Encouraged by the Eastern Rumelian precedent, these 
Macedonian activists had embraced the militant concept of liberating Macedonia 
through clandestine and revolutionary methods. 
The breakthrough for the development of the Macedonian revolutionary movement 
came about on 3 November 1893. In Salonica, the capital of Macedonia, Grouev, 
Delchev, Tatarchev, Dimitrov and Hacinikolov founded the Bulgarsko Makedonsko 
Odrinska Revolutsiona Organisatsija (Bulgarian Macedonian Adrianople 
Revolutionary Organization) in order to "obtain full political autonomy for the 
Macedonia-Adrianople region. ,,12 Clearly, the liberal manifesto of the Organization 
for political autonomy and emancipation from the Turkish yoke by means of a pan-
Macedonian peasant revolution thrilled the local Macedonians, not least the 
Slavophone-Exarchists. Yet, it was the Organization'S strategy to employ terrorism 
as a political and nationalist tool that proved instrumental in rallying popular support 
and disseminating political propaganda among the sedentary Macedonian 
populations. 13 
Revolutionary tactics also had many ardent supporters in Bulgaria. In Sofia, the local 
Bulgarian Macedonian societies organized a Congress in December 1895. During its 
proceedings, the Macedonian representatives decided on the formation of a 12-seat 
"Advisory Council", which was hence to be known as Vrhoven Makedonski Komitet 
(Supreme Macedonian Committee ).14 The Supremacists envisaged the autonomy of 
amount to the diminution of Ottoman political authority and the establishment of political autonomy 
in those areas. On the content of the Organic Law of Crete: P.P.A.P. LXXIII 1867-8, pp.394-5 
11 VLACHOS (1935, pp.130-l) 
12 B.A.S. (1978, pA19) 
13 PERRY (1988, pA2), GOUNARIS (1996, pA 15) 
14 To avoid confusion between the Macedonia-based Organization and the Bulgaria-based 
Macedonian Committees, hereafter the former will be cited as Macedonian Revolutionary 
Organization (M.RO.) and the latter as Supreme Macedonian Committee (S.M.C.). 
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Macedonia as an interim stage in its annexation by Bulgaria and claimed superiority 
over all other Macedonian groups, including the M.R.O.IS From this point onwards, 
the Bulgarian Macedonian revolutionary organizations set out to organize armed 
bands and provoke disturbances in Ottoman Macedonia in order to elicit European 
intervention. 
The growing Macedonian agitation concerned the European Powers as the 
continuation of this perilous situation could destabilize the region and threaten the 
Balkan status quo. At the time, among the Powers, Austria-Hungary and Russia had 
the most vital, though conflicting, stakes in the Balkan peninsula. To avert a clash 
over their Balkan interests that might jeopardize European peace, in May 1897 
Austria-Hungary and Russia concluded an entente. The key element of this 
understanding was the Austro-Russian commitment to collaborate for the 
maintenance of the Balkan status quo. In case the regional status quo was disturbed 
however, the two Great Powers agreed to "secure a redistribution of territory 
amongst the Balkan states that would maintain the balance of power" rather than to 
seek aggrandizement for themselves. 16 
In the tum of the 20th century, the intensification of inter-racial rivalry in Macedonia 
generated explosive conditions in this Balkan sub-region. In October 1902, a 
Bulgarian Macedonian rising, organized by the Supremacists, broke out in the areas 
of Djumaja, Razlog and Petrich in north-eastern Macedonia but it was swiftly 
suppressed by the Ottoman forces. I7 In an attempt to reestablish order in the region 
and prevent a future Macedonian rebellion, the Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff 
met with his Austrian counterpart Goluchowski in Vienna in December 1902. 
The two Ministers drew up a conservative reform scheme for Macedonia. The 
Vienna Scheme provided for: the appointment of a Moslem Inspector-General in 
Macedonia with the rank of Grand Vizier for a five-years period; the reorganization 
of the Ottoman gendarmerie by European experts; provincial budgets regulating the 
revenues and expenditure of each vilayet under the control of the Imperial Ottoman 
Bank; the suppression of Albanian irregular activism; the deployment of Christian 
15 CRAMPTON (1983, pp.236-7) 
16 B.D. vol.1 pp.295-6, 298, B.D. \'01.5 pp.100, 102, B.D. vo1.9(l) p.39. BRIDGE (1990. pp.225-6) 
17 P.P.A.P. LXXXVII 1903, pp.561-4 
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rural guards in the Christian-dominated areas; and the reform of the tithe-collection 
system. 18 
However, the Vienna Scheme was too little too late for the Macedonian 
revolutionary committees. On 2 August 1903, the day of St. Elias (Ilinden in 
Slavonic), M.R. o. partisans incited a large-scale uprising in western Macedonia. By 
attacking Ottoman garrisons and Moslem civilians, the M.R. O. leadership aimed at 
provoking a massacre of Christians at the hands of Turkish troops and irregulars, 
thus inviting European political intervention. The end of the Ilinden uprising three 
months later found Macedonia in a state of utter devastation and anarchy.19 
It was less the deplorable situation in Macedonia and more the escalating 
revolutionary attacks on the Balkan status quo that induced Austria-Hungary and 
Russia to reactivate their diplomacy. On 2 October 1903, Austria and Russia 
announced a new Macedonian reform project. The main points of the Murzsteg 
Program, as it became known, were: the appointment of two special Civil Agents, a 
Russian and an Austrian, to assist the Inspector-Generaeo on the supervision of 
reforms and the assessment of the Ottoman authorities' performance; the 
appointment of a foreign General21 and European military advisers with a mission to 
reorganize the Ottoman gendarmerie; the restructuring of the Macedonian vilayets 
into new administrative districts on the basis of nationality; further judicial, financial 
and administrative reforms; amnesty for all political prisoners and relief for the 
Ilinden victims. 22 
Unlike the Vienna Scheme, the Murzsteg Programme injured Ottoman 
susceptibilities. The articles on the Civil Agents and the projected administrative 
reorganization placed the Ottoman Macedonian authorities "under strict European 
surveillance". However, even though the chief intent of the reform project was to 
secure the status quo by ameliorating the living and regional conditions for the 
Christian ethnic groups, article 3 added to Macedonian turmoil as it prompted the 
18 SOWARDS (1989, pp.25-6) 
19 During the uprising, 5,000 peasant Christians had perished. Among the soldiery. 1,000 M.R.o. 
men and 5.000 Turks had been killed. In addition, 200 Macedonian villages and 12.000 houses had 
been burnt or destroyed. See: PERRY (1988) 
20 Hussein Hilmi Pasha was appointed Inspector-General of Macedonia. 
21 The responsibility of reorganizing the gendarmerie rested "ith the Italian officer De Giorgis. 
22 The tex1 of the Murzsteg Program is to be found in P.P.A.P. CXXXV 1908. pp. 731-~ 
Introduction 
Christian Macedonian nationalists to intensify their racial strife with a VIew to 
creating ethnically homogeneous zones in Macedonia. 23 
Under strong European pressure, Sultan Abdul Hamid II reluctantly accepted the 
reform project on 25 November 1903. The period of European reform and 
condominium in the three Ottoman Macedonian vilayets of Kosovo, Monastir and 
Salonica had commenced. 
23 B.D. vo1.5 p.108. SOWARDS (1989. p.30), BRIDGE (1972a, p.265) 
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CHAPTER I 
EVOLUTION OF YOUNG TURK THOUGHT AND ACTIVITY 
1.1 Ottoman Politics in Transition: The Tanzimat and the Rise of the Young 
Ottomans 1839-1878 
In the Ottoman Empire, the political struggle against the autocratic rule of the Sultans 
and for administrative modernization and economic reform according to the western 
European model had commenced in the 19th century. The demand for reform in the 
ailing country and the need to imitate the west in areas like agriculture, industry, 
justice, education, the army, science, civil rights and the social and political system was 
so intense during the third decade of the 19th century that it could no longer be ignored 
by the Ottoman statesmen, many of whom shared liberal political ideas. 
The first serious attempt to introduce western institutions in Turkey was made by the 
Grand Vizier Reshid Pasha. On his initiative, with the Hatti-Sherif.f of 1839, collective 
reform decrees were instituted for the consolidation of elementary civil rights, regular 
army recruitment and the abolition of tax-farming. The most important element in the 
Hatti-Sheriff was the official abrogation of the discrimination between Moslem and 
non-Moslem communities, which was henceforth to highlight the reform process in the 
Ottoman Empire (Tanzimat). 1 
The process of internal reform in the Ottoman Empire continued and reached a decisive 
stage by the mid-19th century. In 1856, under pressure from the Powers to ameliorate 
the position of his Christian subjects, Sultan Abdul Mecid promulgated the Hatti-
Humayun. The Hatti-Humayun introduced significant reforms in the key fields of 
administration, taxation, the military, and the judiciary and reaffirmed the bid of 1839 
for equality and brotherhood of all Ottoman subjects (Osmanlilik). In this framework, 
the non-Moslem ethnic groups were to acquire the same status as Moslems in military 
service, the administration of justice, tax-payment and increased representation in the 
provincial government. 2 
1 LEWIS (1968, pp.107 -8) 
2 DAVISON (1963, pp.S4-7). VAKALOPOULOS (1988. p.179) 
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In the following decade, the reforming efforts of liberal Ottoman statesmen like the 
Grand Viziers Ali Pasha and Fuad Pasha intensified. To improve Ottoman provincial 
administration and discourage the separatist tendencies of the non-Moslem 
communities Fuad Pasha worked out the Law ofvilayets in collaboration with Midhat 
Pasha, provincial governor (vali) of Nish. The Law of vilayets, which was enacted in 
1864, defined the subdivision of an Ottoman province to a number of sanjaks, kazas, 
kariyes, nahiyes and extended the powers of the valis on local economy, financial 
matters, the execution of judicial decisions and provincial police. Mixed administrative 
councils were to be established in each Ottoman province to function "as deliberative 
and advisory bodies" on questions of local politics, economy and finance." 
It is certain that the inauguration of the Tanzimat period gravitated the Ottoman 
Empire towards the west. It is also true that the 'westerner' apologists of Tanzimat 
tended to believe that the future of the predominantly Moslem Empire lay not in 
Islamic Asia but in Europe. Although the concept of administrative reform and 
political modernization had a serious impact on the activity of certain forward-looking 
officials, the Ottoman political and religious establishment as a whole viewed the 
process of internal reform with reticence and utmost circumspection. 
Among the Moslem populations, the conservative Islamic clergy and the Palace, 
Europe was not popular. It was the irksome tendency of the Western Powers to 
interfere with Ottoman affairs, in part by means of the capitulatory system 4 and in part 
by exerting strong pressure on the Ottoman leadership to respect the rights of the 
Christian ethnic groups, that had led those Ottoman circles to consider everything 
European a threat to Ottoman sovereignty and political independence. 
Slowly but steadily, the Tanzimat managed to moderate somewhat the hostile Ottoman 
outlook vis-a-vis the west. The constant infusion of European ideas, goods, people 
and investment in the vast country, more regular during the second half of the 19th 
century, encouraged that process. In addition, an increasing number of Young Turks 
3 DAVISON (1963, pp.146-7) 
4 From 1535 onwards, when a French-Ottoman commercial treaty was signed, the Porte had been 
constantly granting economic and juridical privileges to foreign residents in the Empire. As the 
Ottoman Empire declined, the Western Powers, usually follo"ing a Turkish military defeat, e:\.1ended 
their capitulatory rights in Turkey. By the end of 19th century, the Great Powers enjoyed tax-
exemption, favorable regulations on custom duties and eventually. they obtained ,irtual control of 
Ottoman finance through the "Dette Public Ottomane", which was established in 1881. The 
Ottomans. on their part, saw the capitulatory system as a clear token of foreign interference in their 
internal affairs and evidence of Turkey's limited sovereignty. For details see: SOUSA (1933) 
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traveled to the west, studied in European schools whence they became acquainted with 
the principles ofliberty, parliamentary democracy, constitution and nationalism. 
The reform period and communication with Europe nourished the development of a 
western-educated administrative elite in the Empire. Its leaders, youthful bureaucrats, 
civil servants, ambitious administrators, students, low-ranking army officers, from the 
outset detested the autocratic and corrupt regime so carefully built around the 
sultanate. 
Those groups, called Young Ottomans, envisioned the institution of a Constitutional 
regime and the acquisition of a considerable share in Ottoman government. To achieve 
this there was but one way: a direct collision with the Ottoman political establishment 
namely the Monarch, his odious entourage (camarilla) and the ruling Ottoman 
oligarchy that supported him. 5 
Since 1865 enclaves of opposition by secret Young Ottoman societies had been formed 
in Constantinople, Paris and London with the branches in-exile becoming the most 
radical in outlook and activity. Their existence and deeds as well as their, often 
unclear, claims for economic rationalization, administrative reform and Constitution 
were known to Sultan Abdul Aziz. In the end, the personal-ideological cleavages that 
divided the leaders of the movement, not least Prince Mustafa F azil and the prominent 
theorist Ali Suavi and the shrewd attempts of the Sultan to intimidate, banish or take 
into his service many of them such as N amik Kemal, Mehmet Reshid, Ziya Pasha had 
kept the Young Ottoman movement in a state of impotence and stagnation for over a 
decade. 
In December 1876, during the emerging Eastern crisis, the new sultan Abdul Hamid II 
appointed the 'westerner' Midhat Pasha Grand Vizier. Midhat Pasha succeeded in 
correlating his brief period in office 6 with the elaboration of the Ottoman Constitution, 
which was proclaimed on 23 December. The Constitution did not materially affect the 
dominant position of the sultanate in the Empire. The Sultan had the right to appoint 
the members of the Ministerial Council, the senators, and to convoke and adjourn the 
Parliament. In order for a parliamentary bill to become state law, his Imperial lrade 
(Decree) was required. 
5 LEWIS (1968, p.150) 
6 Midhat Pasha was dismissed and sent to exile on 5 February 1877. 
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The Sultan remained the supreme ruler but his powers were absolute no more. The 
Constitution provided the institution of a Ministerial Council, an appointed Senate and 
a Chamber of Deputies, elected directly by the people. It also secured freedom of 
religion, press, commercial associations; guaranteed the minority privileges within the 
millet system; provided for respect on personal property and domicile; conformed the 
tax-system to state regulations and the individual income; called for an independent 
judiciary. The fundamental Constitutional provision however was the reaffirmation of 
the equal status between all Ottoman subjects, irrespective of race and creed. 7 
A product of the Tanzimat, the Midhat Constitution ended the absolutism of the 
sultanate and transferred powers to the Chamber of Deputies and the Ministerial 
Council. The concept of Osmanlilik had come again to the forefront of Ottoman 
political life but its implementation still remained a very complicated and controversial 
question. 
A constitutional-liberal political system however, was incompatible with Sultan Abdul 
Hamid's program of maintaining the Ottoman executive, legislative and administrative 
bodies under the absolute authority of the sultanate. F or the Monarch, the 
establishment and function of a Chamber of Deputies constituted a great threat to his 
personal regime within the Empire. 8 
Furthermore, the conservative circles within the country viewed those radical changes 
in political life with genuine consternation. In their eyes, such foreign-inspired reforms 
reflected the continuation of the derogatory European interference in Ottoman matters. 
They also believed that those changes, apart from humiliating Moslem popular feeling, 
ran contrary to Ottoman political tradition and threatened their own dominant status in 
the state mechanism. 
As an outcome, the first Ottoman Parliament proved short-lived. In February 1878, 
the Sultan dissolved the Chamber of Deputies and de facto nullified the Constitution, 
though it remained in force on paper. The abrogation of Midhat Pasha Constitution 
impeded, but did not frustrate, the development of the reform movement in the 
Ottoman Empire. 
7 DAVISON (1963, pp.386-90) 
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1.2 Reforming Attempts Under Abdul Hamid IT 
The Young Ottoman decline and the termination of the Constitutional period appeared 
to represent a victory of Ottoman absolutism over the rising reform movement. The 
success of the Hamidian establishment was nevertheless temporary and precarious for it 
failed to eradicate either the reforming forces in Ottoman society or the demand for 
modernization and change. 
Abdul Hamid II was aware that he had won a crucial battle but not the war. In fact, 
the young Monarch, who himself was not ignorant of the need for change, did not fail 
to realize that under the circumstances it would be beneficial for the sultanate to follow 
to some extent the Tanzimat policy of his predecessors.9 His main intent was to 
assuage the opposition inside and outside the Empire and improve the legislative, 
economic and administrative system without however causing any real damage to his 
authority. 
As an outcome, during the first two decades of his rule, Sultan Abdul Hamid 
introduced a series of reforms in education, the civil sector, the army, commerce, 
communications, press and legislation. 10 Certainly, Abdul Hamid II was determined 
not to sanction any radical change in the legislative or executive system that might 
imperil his primacy in Ottoman politics. More importantly, these efforts totally 
disregarded Tanzimat's most critical premise -the equality between Moslem and non-
Moslem Ottoman subjects. 
From 1878 onwards, the Sultan worked systematically to cement his personal regime in 
the interior. The key element in this campaign was his initiative to vest the religious 
institution of caliphate with real political power. In placing emphasis on the Islamic 
character of his rule, the Sultan as Monarch and Caliph, mustered around his throne the 
bigoted Moslem masses. 11 
Once he gained Moslem fidelity, Abdul Hamid II faced little difficulty in manipulating 
their religious fanaticism and numerical strength to counteract his major enemies: the 
internal constitutional movement, western interference and the nationalist separatism of 
the various non-Moslem ethnic groups. 12 
8 NISTAZOPOULOU-PELEKIDOU (1991, pp.261-2) 
9 LEWIS (1968, p.179) 
10 ZURCHER (1993, pp.78-9) 
II ZURCHER (1993, p.83) 
12 SHAW and SHAW (1977, p.260), LEE (1941-2, pp.279-80) 
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1.3 Genesis and Development of the Young Turk Movement 1889-1902 
The centralization practice of Abdul Hamid notwithstanding the Young Ottoman 
legacy did not entirely vanish. Far from it. In the Ottoman Military Academies, the 
only state institution not censored by the Hamidian propaganda, the concepts of liberty, 
fatherland and Constitution had found many supporters. In these schools Young Turk 
cadets were initiated in western political thought and secretly deliberated upon the 
Young Ottoman ideology and activities. 13 As a result, the military colleges developed 
into laboratories of ideological and political resistance against the supreme ruler and his 
regIme. 
In 1889, a small group of students in the Military Medical College in Constantinople 
set up a clandestine committee with the aim of deposing Sultan Abdul Hamid II. Its 
leading team consisted of Ibrahim Temo, an Albanian, the Circassian Mehmet Reshid 
and two Curds: Abdullah Cevdet and Ibrahim Sukuti. This society, known as Ittihat 
Osmanli Cemiyeti (Ottoman Union Society), was the first Young Turk Committee in 
the history of the Empire. 
In a short time, the subterranean organization succeeded in enlisting support and 
members among the imperial military institutions of the capital. The "Young Turks" 
initially were able to keep the existence of their group secret but they held no illusions 
that it was only a matter of time before Sultan's spies and police would uncover the 
association. Since Constantinople did not qualify as the ideal revolutionary center, 
their attention shifted to the Ottoman communities abroad, in which the Young 
Ottoman movement had found sanctuary a few decades ago. 
Indeed, already in 1889, the Constantinople society established regular communication 
and liaison channels with a section of the remnant Young Ottoman group in Paris. In 
the same year, members of the Paris Committee recruited Ahmet Riza Bey, a well-
known intellectual who was at the time director of education in the vilayet of Bursa. 
His accession to the Young Turks was a real turning point for the evolution of the 
movement for it was under his leadership that the Paris society Ittihat ve Terrakki 
Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress - C.U.P.) came into being. 
Ahmet Riza was of conservative disposition and ideology. He had no designs to attack 
the entire Ottoman social-political edifice. Riza was of the opinion that the removal of 
13 RAMSAUR (1965, p.l8) 
Young Turk Thought and Activity 14 
a certain number of corrupt and incompetent administrators and the introduction of an 
elaborated reform package into the state machine would suffice to stop the rot in the 
country. 14 
In the end of 1895, Ahmet Riza published the journal Meshveret (Consultation) which 
became the official organ of the Paris committee. Its most significant contribution to 
the movement was that it clarified the most essential elements of Young Turk ideology. 
According to its publisher those were: opposition to foreign interference in Ottoman 
matters, the reinstitution of Midhat's Constitution of 1876 and the Ottomanization of 
the Empire. IS 
In the ensuing years, the Young Turk movement became immensely popular amongst 
the "Ottoman diaspora". New branches were formed in Geneva, London, Naples and 
Cairo, but all compared unfavorably in authority and political activism with the Paris 
headquarters. However, it was certainly an irony, if not a tragedy, that the defects 
which had beset the Young Ottomans seemed to accompany their youthful successors. 
Once more, offering official high-ranking positions to leaders like Mehmet Murat, the 
Sultan managed to subvert and eventually divide the Young Turks. 
Adding to the gravity of the situation, quarrels among the leaderships of the Young 
Turk branches broke out. The most important was the dispute between the Geneva 
League of Sukuti, Reshid, Cevdet and the Paris Committee of Ahmet Riza for the 
management and leadership of the C.U.P. Understandably, these developments 
produced a demoralizing effect upon the rank and file of the movement. 16 
In 1899, an unexpected incident helped the movement-in-exile to regain momentum. 
After having fled Constantinople, Prince Sabaheddin arrived in Paris with his father 
Damat Mahmut Pasha and his brother Lutfullah. In the person of Prince Sabaheddin 
the Young Turks found a new, charismatic and influential leader whilst Ahmet Riza 
Bey met his main ideological and political opponent. 
Sabaheddin founded a separate society in Paris under the name Teshebbush Shahsi ve 
Ademi Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (Society of Personal Initiative and Administrative 
Decentralization). The political program of the association consisted of three pivotal 
points. The first, and most instrumental, referred to the critical provision of Tanzimat: 
14 SHAW and SHAW (1977, p.257) 
15 RAMSAUR (1965, pp.25, 72-3) 
16 LEWIS (1968, p.201) 
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the equality between Moslem and non-Moslem communities. According to 
Sabaheddin, the salvation of the multiethnic Empire lay in the institution of national and 
political egalitarianism between the various Ottoman ethnic groups: Turks, Greeks, 
Armenians, Slavs, Albanians, Curds and Arabs. Second, it defined that the Young 
Turk struggle for a Constitutional and Parliamentary regime would stand no chance of 
success unless it was backed by the Ottoman bureaucracy. 17 
Third, the Sabaheddin group envisaged the replacement of the centralized government 
by a devolved administrative system. Following the French model, it aspired to 
establish local councils in each province directly elected by the people. Their mission 
would be to oversee the execution of the provincial budgets, control the administrative 
cadres and work for the effective settlement of local questions. Within this context, 
even the most remote Ottoman municipalities, prefects and provinces were to obtain 
real executive authority, economic strength and political freedom. 18 
This last point nevertheless met with great opposition from many Young Turks. 
Ahmet Riza Bey and his followers criticized Sabaheddin because they felt that his plan 
for administrative devolution was essentially paving the way in the non-Moslem 
populated provinces for their political autonomy and ultimate secession. 19 Unlike 
Sabaheddin, Abmet Riza had no intention of conferring political power on peripheral 
and refractory ethnic groups which had been fostering secessionist aspirations against 
the integrity of the Ottoman Empire. Instead, he advocated the creation of a 
westernized, reformed and efficient executive center that would safeguard Ottoman 
territorial integrity and would frustrate any internal separatist movement. 20 
From the outset therefore, the status of the various ethnic minorities and their relations 
with the ruling ethnic group had created a rift between the two most influential Young 
Turk groups; the centralist-nationalist of Ahmet Riza Bey and the liberal-Ottoman 
under Prince Sabaheddin. Such was the situation in the Young Turk movement-in-
exile when Sabaheddin took the initiative and organized the First Congress of Ottoman 
Liberals in Paris between 4 and 9 February 1902. 
17 RAMSAUR (1965, pp.85-6) 
18 On Sabaheddin's administrative model: LA Y.E.l1908IFile 91.2/Contantinople Legationl4/17-9-
1908/no.890/Gryparis to Baltazzislenclosure no.1 
19 RAMSAUR (1965. pp.89-93) 
20 KARPAT (1959, p.18). LEWIS (1968. pp.204-5) 
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The Congress was attended by 47 Turkish, Armenian, Arab, Greek, Albanian, Jewish, 
Curd and Circassian representatives. During the proceedings of the Congress the 
ideological disagreement between Ahmet Riza Bey and Prince Sabaheddin came to the 
forefront. 21 In a series of sessions, after having clashed over the advisability of foreign 
intervention in Ottoman affairs, the majority of the delegates sided with Sabaheddin. 
Prince Sabaheddin argued that the Young Turks should invite European, even military, 
intervention to end the autocratic rule of the sultanate and ameliorate the position of all 
Ottoman ethnic groups. On the contrary, Ahmet Riza Bey dismissed the idea of 
foreign interference. For, in all occasions, he asserted, that the Western Powers had 
meddled with Ottoman matters the result was the encouragement of dissident ethnic 
nationalism or the extension of European capitulatory rights in the Empire. 
Finally, the program of Sabaheddin prevailed. However, it was the defeated centralist 
party of Ahmet Riza Bey that essentially directed and controlled Young Turk 
movement in Europe whereas Sabaheddin's ideology had found supporters only among 
the circles of the Ottoman administrative elite and the non-Moslem minority 
nationalities. 22 
1.4 Young Turk Growth in Macedonia 1895-1908 
Six years after the creation of the Constantinople group the Young Turk movement set 
foot in European Turkey. Between 1895 and 1896, two civil branches functioned in 
Adrianople and Rouschouk. The latter, under Temo, had been particularly active in the 
Bulgarian districts of Phillip opolis, Dobroudja, Varna and Vidin. The former, headed 
by Talat Bey, a director in the local Post and Telegraph branch, disseminated Young 
Turk propaganda across Bulgaria and Adrianople and collaborated with the Salonica-
Monastir groups enjoying considerable popularity amongst the young officers of the 
Salonica-based III Macedonian Army COrpS.23 
In September 1906, another, more influential, committee was founded in Salonica 
under the name Osmanli Hurriyet Cemiyeti (Ottoman Freedom Society). Its leading 
group consisted of Talat Bey, Tahir Bey, Naki Bey, Midhat Sukru, Rahmi Bey, Kazim 
21 ZURCHER (1984, pp.17-18) 
22 HANIOGLU (1995, pp.190-99) 
23 HANIOGLU (1995, pp.89-90), TOKAY (1994, pp.204-5) 
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Nami, Orner Naci, Hakki Baha, Edip Servet and Ismail Canbolat.24 The Young Turk 
Macedonian organization had set itself two objects: to establish itself in the province 
and infiltrate the Macedonian army and administration. To achieve its first goal, the 
Salonica group established links with the Macedonian Freemasonic lodges, the strong 
Salonica Jewish communiti5 and the Bektashi Dervish order. 26 
True, those groups contributed to the growth of the Young Turk Macedonian 
movement. It is clear that they had assisted the Young Turks to organize themselves 
by conferring shelter and manpower to those committees under the scrutiny of the local 
authorities. It is also important to point out that the Young Turk movement in 
Macedonia developed without external support from the emigre societies. The 
European headquarters ignored its very existence and it was not until September 1907 
that the Macedonian organization and the Paris C.U.P. branch merged. 27 
The Young Turk infiltration of the Macedonian army had been an elusive but efficient 
process. Poor military and regional conditions, irregular payment and prolonged strife 
against the Christian Macedonian bands had incurred the wrath of the soldiery and their 
junior officers against the old regime. The Young Turks were determined to capitalize 
on this mounting discontent. Under these circumstances, the Committee's main 
concern was to convert the strong anti-Palace sentiment into active support for its 
political and revolutionary struggle. In this undertaking, the Young Turks were very 
successful. 
During the period of the Macedonian reforms, Young Turk influence spread amazingly 
in the provinces of Mona stir and Kosovo. New branches were formed in Resna, Ohrid, 
Uskub Ferisovic Prizren Mitrovitsa, Ghevgeli. In the Albanian-inhabited districts, , , , 
collaboration between Albanian nationalists and Young Turks had become the norm. 
In the provincial capitals Monastir and U skub the Young Turk organs were dealing 
with local issues: the Macedonian reforms, the band activities and above all with the 
eroded and incompetent administration. 28 Meanwhile, Moslem dissatisfaction 
stemming from the inability of the Hamidian regime to reform the civil administration 
24 TOKAY (1994, p.209) 
25 MACFIE (1998, pp.33-6), KEDOURIE (1971, pp.91-3). In the beginning of the 20th century. the 
total population of Salonica was 150,000. Out of them, 90,000 were ethnic Jews. SHAW (199L 
p.205) 
26 RAMSAUR (1942, pp.1O-12) 
27 MACFIE (1998, p.22) 
28 TOKAY (1994, pp.217-9), SKENDI (1967. p.338) 
Young Turk Thought and Activity 18 
and improve living conditions in the region, the increasing partisan activities of the 
Macedonian Christians and European interference in Ottoman affairs, intensified. 
Therefore, Young Turk agents from the Monastir and Kosovo committees had little 
difficulty in disseminating propaganda and initiating new members among the Moslem 
civil servants and army cadres.29 The revolutionary campaign had not been confined in 
urban centers and army camps alone. Young Turk detachments, whilst being engaged 
in constant guerrilla warfare against the Christian bandits in Macedonian hinterland, 
worked indefatigably to instill their sociopolitical ideology in the Moslem, and later 
Christian, rural populations. 30 
The Young Turk attitude toward the European officers was contradictory and unclear. 
Understandably, they detested their meddling with Macedonian matters but they were 
also impressed by their superior military training and education. At the same time, they 
were aware that the European condominium in Macedonia had been responsible for the 
original diminution of the Ottoman authority in Macedonia: a development that had 
offered invaluable services to the growth of their Macedonian movement. As Sowards 
remarks: " ... the Young Turk success was built on a slow but thorough infiltration of 
the entire government apparatus, a process which could never have gone forward 
without the protective influence of the Macedonian reform program. ,,31 
Indicative of the popularity Young Turk ideas enjoyed in the high ranks of Mace doni an 
army and the administrative apparatus between 1906 and 1908, was the stance of two 
influential Macedonian officials towards the movement: the vali of Kosovo, General 
Mahmud Shevket Pasha and Hussein Hilmi Pasha, Inspector-General of Macedonia. 
The former, a senior German-trained officer, had been far more interested in military 
matters than politics. He had shouldered the demanding task of organizing the Turkish 
defense in Macedonia against the Bulgarian army. By 1907, he consented to support 
the Unionists only after receiving the reassurance that he would not be involved in 
political affairs. According to Shefket Pasha's views, only under a Constitutional 
~9 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/1912-8-1908/no.308IBaraklis to BaltazzislPolitical 
30 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 71.2/Serres Consulate/l/14-7-1908/no.276/Sahtouris to Baltazzis/Confidential 
31 Cited in SOWARDS (1989, p.95) 
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regime could the Ottoman military regain its strength to encounter a Slav aggression 
and the Empire could retrieve its long-lost position in European power politics.32 
The case of Hilmi Pasha is even more interesting. Following the old Porte tradition of 
producing capable high-ranking civil-bureaucrats he had proved himself a competent 
administrator during his term in Macedonia. His manoeuvrability in keeping equal 
distances from all Macedonian Christian ethnic groups and balancing the increasing 
reform demands of the European Commission with the Sultan's intransigence to yield 
to foreign pressure was truly commendable. Hilmi Pasha was aware of the Young 
Turk movement, its political ideology and secret activities. British sources suggest that 
his principal aide-de-camp was one of the most active Unionist members.33 
The chief contribution of the Macedonian Inspector-General to the Young Turk 
movement was that he did nothing to prevent, far less frustrate, its growth and 
eruption. During the dramatic days of the July revolution, he acted as honest broker 
between the Sultan and the Committee. Having correctly estimated the seriousness of 
the situation and anxious to avert a catastrophic and useless civil conflict, he 
admonished the Sultan to give way on Young Turk demands and reinstate the 
Constitution of 1876.34 By 1908, the largest section of the Ottoman Macedonian civil 
and military apparatus had adhered to the Young Turk movement. 
1.5. Young Turk Feelers to Bulgarians and Greeks 
Unlike the movement in-exile, in the first years of their Balkan saga the Young Turks 
encountered major problems in setting up committees and establishing communication 
channels with the European branches and each other. Therefore, in the absence of one 
coordinating center and recognized leadership, the scattered Balkan Young Turk 
enclaves often acted on their initiative and, in most cases, without any former 
communication between themselves. 
Young Turk leaders reasoned that the success of their movement was hardly attainable 
without the active participation or, at least, the benevolent neutrality of the Christian 
nationalities. Thus, among their primary objectives was the establishment of links with 
32 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/25/8-5-1908/no.170IBaraklis to Skouzes/ConfidentiaL 
LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/24/6-9-1908/no. 392IBaraklis to BaltazzislPolitical and 
ZANNAS (1960, p.53) 
33 P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.1007 
34 P.P.A.P. CV 1909. p.1006 
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the Christian Balkan groups, especially those possessing vital interests in Macedonia, 
where the future of Turkey-in-Europe was at stake. Given that a direct understanding 
between them and the official governments of the Balkan national states was out of the 
question, the underground Young Turk movement sought first to align itself with the 
Bulgarian and Greek revolutionary committees. 
1.6 The Young Turks and the Macedonian Revolutionary Organization 1895-
1908 
The Young Turk Committees attached great importance to establishing relations with 
the Bulgarians in Macedonia predominantly for two reasons: first, because they 
regarded the Bulgarian-Macedonians as the most militant element and second because 
they were supported by the most powerful and ambitious Balkan country: the 
Bulgarian Principality. 
The initial contact between the C.U.P. and the Bulgarian revolutionaries of the M.R.O. 
appears to have taken place in 1895 through a less known Young Turk group Balkan 
Teshkilati. To the satisfaction of Paris headquarters, Balkan Teshkilati managed to set 
up certain connections with the M.R.O. Ahmet Riza Bey seized the opportunity of 
using that branch as a liaison channel between the C.U.P. and the M.R.O. to influence 
the Bulgarian-Macedonian leaders to abandon their original aim of gaining Macedonian 
political autonomy and collaborate with the Young Turks to remedy the situation in 
Macedonia.35 
In 1902, Ali Fehmi Bey, one of the leaders of the Balkan Teshkilati, became the C.U.P. 
agent in Bulgaria. However, he also failed to render real services to the movement, for 
the Ottoman legation in Sofia was successful in obstructing his mission. A third and 
more significant, attempt to bring the Young Turks and the M.R.O. close took place in 
1905. To explore the prospects of mutual cooperation the Young Turks approached 
the leader of the M.R.O.-Left, Sandanski.36 Very little evidence is available about the 
actual conditions accompanying this original tentative contact. Apparently, it did not 
amount to any understanding but it seems that paved the way for a future 
collaboration. 
35 TOKAY (1994. p.206) 
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The Serres group had constantly maintained that it would not hesitate to work with any 
revolutionary group in Macedonia with which it shared common ideas and espoused 
similar tactics. From that perspective, the Young Turk manifesto for political equality 
between Christians and Moslems, reorganization of the peripheral administration and 
the institution of a Constitutional regime was not far away from the positions of the 
M.R.O.-Left.37 
Besides, the uncompromising rivalry between the Serres Regional Committee and Sofia 
had increased Sandanski' s operational independence in Macedonia. As Macdermott 
argues, it was during the Bansko Congress of 1907 that the Leftist leaders Sandanski 
(Serres district) and Tsernopeev, Delidarev (Strumnitsa branch) decided to work with 
the Young Turk Committees.38 
The Young Turks, for their part, had good reasons to desire an understanding with the 
Serres faction. Since 1904, Sandanski had established "a state within a state" in the 
northern areas of the Serres sanjak. He controlled the local tobacco trade and industry, 
the major source of income in the districts of Serres, Drama, and Xanthi; imposed 
regular taxation on the rural communities; intimidated and not rarely assassinated local 
Beys, landlords and notables; he had even set up local courts in which the Macedonian 
Christians ought to settle their legal disputes; finally, he did not hesitate to put to death 
all traitors, Moslems and Christians.39 Such was the policy of Sandanski; and the fact 
that his M.R.O. faction, albeit renegade, had agreed to support the Committee, raised 
Young Turk influence among the Bulgarian-Macedonians in the Salonica vilayet. 
A significant contribution to the development of this awkward cooperation between 
Christian Bulgarian-Macedonian partisans and Moslem Young Turk revolutionaries 
was made by the agrarian question: another key aspect of the Macedonian controversy. 
In Ottoman Macedonia, among the Christian tenants who had been compelled to 
cultivate the huge domains of the Moslem landlords under extremely harsh conditions, 
the demand for land had increasingly gained ground even before the 20th century. 
36 At the time, Sandanski was the leader of the Serres Regional Committee, the Leftist faction of the 
M.RG. In 1906, the Serres group seceded from the main organization and followed an independent 
policy. MACDERMOTT (1988, p.322) 
37 LA.YE.l1908IFile 21.1IGeneral Consulate of Salonica/30/12-8-1908/no.3915/Kanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis 
38 MACDERMOTT (1988, p.333) 
39 See for further details: LA.YE.l1908IFile 85.2/Serres Consulate/6119-5-1908/no.186/Sahtouris to 
Skouzes. LA. YE.I1 908IFile 85.2/Serres Consulate/22/4-6-1908/no.214/Sahtouris to Skouzes. F.G. 
881/9321 Constantinople Embassy to F.G. .l24-6-l908/no.354/Barc1ay to Grey/enclosure nO.l 
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Among the rank and file of the Serres Regional Committee, this trend was even more 
powerful since the vast majority of its members were poor Macedonian peasants 
sharing socialist views. Evidently, the Macedonian Young Turks exploited this very 
sensitive point. Without committing themselves, they allowed Sandanski and his group 
to believe that if they gained power in Constantinople, they would settle the agrarian 
. 40 questIOn. 
This Young Turk tactical manouevre paid dividends. Thus, when during the first half 
of 1908, Sandanski and his lieutenants launched a pro-Young Turk propaganda 
campaign in the districts of Melnik, Petrich, Nevrokop, Strumnitsa, Serres and Drama 
it was their promise of agricultural reform and land distribution that thrilled the rural 
Bulgarian-Macedonian communities. Soon after the revolution of July 1908 however, 
it became apparent that the Young Turks, who had done little to deter Sandanski from 
raising the land question, had no intention of colliding with the interests of the 
influential Moslem landowners to satisfy the claims of the Christian peasantry. 41 
In parallel, the Young Turk Committees had been striving to approach the Right wing 
of the M.R.O., which at the time represented the largest section of the Organization. 
In 1907, the Paris C.U.P. headquarters sent an invitation to the M.R.O.-Right to 
participate in its December Congress. Matov, a prominent M.R.O.-Right leader, who 
had viewed with increasing suspicion the developing understanding and collaboration 
between the Serres group of Sandanski and Macedonian Young Turks, declined the 
invitation. 
This cold shower however did not discourage the Young Turk Committee and after the 
Congress it made new overtures for joint activity. In March and April 1908, the 
Young Turk approaches were discussed at the Right wing Congress in Kjustendil. 
Finally, the Congress turned down the CU.P. proposals on the basis that the Young 
Turk bid to defend the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire contradicted the 
principal M.R.O. objective for the establishment of an autonomous Macedonia. 42 
40 1. A. Y.E./1908IFile 59.2lMonastir Consulatel2517 -9-1908/no. 934/Halkiopoulos to Baltazzis 
41 F.o. 88119531 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyI22-2-1909/no.20/Lamb to 
Lowther 
4~ 1.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 115.7/General Consulate of Salonica/8121-4-1908/no.321/Alexandropoulos to 
Skouzeslenc1osure no.lffelegram from Sofia Legation Respecting the Secret Macedonian Congress. 
F.O. 88119321 Sofia Legation to F.O.ll-4-1908/no.40IBuchanan to Grey and MACDERMOTT (1988. 
p.322). It is interesting that at the Kjustendil Congress, the M.Ro.-Right leaders decided to suppress 
their bands in Macedonia. except for certain districts where the Greek and Serb paramilitary activity 
was intense. At a time that the Powers were discussing a new reform progranl for Macedonia and 
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The Kjustendil Congress' resolution to diminish the M.R. o. band activity facilitated the 
Young Turk struggle for predominance in Macedonia and the Ottoman Empire as it 
averted the danger of Macedonian agitation at a crucial time for the evolution of the 
movement. 
1. 7 Greek-Young Turk Relations 1895-1908 
From its early stages, the Young Turk movement had set up links with the Greek 
factor. In 1895, Aristidis Bey participated in the editorial board of Ahmet Riza's 
Meshveret. He was a fervent advocate of the Young Turk ideology and after the 
revolution of 1908 he was appointed to various administrative positions as a reward for 
his services to the movement. 43 Apparently, Aristidis Bey was acting on his own 
initiative and there is no convincing evidence connecting his pro-Committee activism 
with the Greek state or the Greek emigre communities. 
It has been a widespread thesis in Greek historiography that the official inception of 
Greek-Young Turk contacts was the Paris Congress of the Ottoman Liberals in 1902. 
Three Greeks participated in the Paris Congress: Sathas, Ghikis and Adossidis. When 
the ideological rivalry between the Young Turk nationalist and liberal groups emerged 
the Greeks did not remain neutral. Fearing that a resurgent Turkish chauvinism could 
threaten the supreme economic position of the Ottoman Greeks and recalling that the 
centralist wing had not denounced the Armenian massacres of 1895-1896, the Greek 
delegates joined the minority non-Moslem ethnic groups in upholding the Sabaheddin 
party.44 Hence, firm opposition to Unionist nationalist group was to become one of the 
salient characteristics of the Greek attitude towards the Young Turk movement. 
During the Greek struggle in Macedonia the Young Turk Committees strove to 
establish close relations with the Hellenic Internal Organization and its leadership in 
Athens and Macedonia. Greek memoir material suggests that by 1905 a Young 
Sofia's policy was to elicit Ottoman concession on the projected Sofia-Kjustendil-Kumanovo railway 
li~ the Bulgarian government, which controlled the M.RQ.-Right, did not desire to provoke 
disturbances in Macedonia. LA. YE./1908IFile 91.2/Sofia Legationl1911-4-1908/no. 219/Zalokostas to 
Skouzes, LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 115.6/General Consulate of Salonica/7120-5-
1908/no.413/Alexandropoulos to Skouzes, VLACHOS (1935, p.509} 
43 TOKAY (1994. p.28). Aristidis Bey Yorgandjioglu (later Pasha) was elected deputy for Smyrna in 
the elections of 1908 and became Minister of Forests, Mines and Agriculture. In January 191 L he 
was appointed senator. KANSU (1997, pp.264. 310) 
44 PANAYOTOPOULOS (1980a, pp.87-8) 
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Turkish branch had been set up in Athens and communicated with low-ranking officers 
of the Greek army. 45 
As the Greek movement in Macedonia was going from strength to strength in the 
period 1906-1907, the contacts between Greeks and Young Turks became more 
regular. In the beginning, the Young Turks used the underground Greek -Macedonian 
organization to facilitate the secret infiltration and activity of their agents in the region. 
Subsequently, leading members of the Salonica Committee like Talat Bey, Haci Midhat 
Bey, Nazim Bey, Cavit Bey, Rahmi Bey held meetings with the Greek Consul-General 
Koromilas and the leadership of the Salonica community at the house of Dr. Zanas.46 
Following these first exploratory talks, the Greeks were disillusioned with those Young 
Turks "who were not so different from the old". As a consequence, the prospect of 
cooperation between the two groups diminished significantly.47 Not that the Young 
Turks themselves had been particularly keen to pursue the matter. For the time being, 
they were satisfied in finding sanctuary in the quarters of foreign citizens which offered 
immunity from the Ottoman authorities' inquisitorial methods and allowed them to 
organize their revolutionary activities. 48 
Clearly, the crucial year for the development of Greek-Young Turk relations was 1908. 
Having established themselves among the Moslem civil servants, bureaucrats and army 
officers serving in Macedonia, the Young Turk organization attempted to "recruit" the 
influential Greek-Macedonian element. This time, the Young Turk overtures had a 
more official connotation and, for the first time, an explicitly anti-Bulgarian character. 
In late February 1908, the vali of Kosovo Mahmud Shevket Pasha confided to 
Baraklis, Greek consul in Uskub: ''It has been regrettable that the Greek and Turkish 
people had lost the opportunity of forming a Dual Federation. The establishment of the 
Exarchate was a great mistake and it was in their common interest that Greeks and 
Young Turks join hands to repel the Bulgarian threat.,,49 
The Ottoman official expressed his disenchantment over the Greek reluctance to work 
closely with the C.D.P. so far. The Greek diplomat was apparently startled. Having 
no instructions to assent to such a proposal he refrained from giving any definite 
45 KARA VITIS (1994, p.848) 
46 ZANNAS (1960, pp.53-4) 
47 ZANNAS (1960, p.54) 
48 LEWIS (1984, p.179) 
49 LA. YE.119081File 90.31Uskub ConsulateI25/8-5-1908/no.170IBaraklis to Skouzes/Confidential 
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answer. When he telegraphed to Athens, the Greek F. O. kept silent. 50 Rumors of a 
forthcoming Bulgarian-Macedonian insurrection organized by the S.M.C. during the 
spring51 and the European intent to introduce reforms in the Macedonian Financial 
Commission, mobile units and extend the jurisdictional authority of the Inspector-
General52 alarmed the Young Turks and precipitated their activities. In vain in mid-
April, renewed and more intense cooperation proposals were put forward to the 
Greek-Macedonian Committee and the director of the General Consulate of Salonica , 
Alexandropoulos. 53 
The Greeks were very reticent about the true Unionist intentions. The Young Turks 
had failed miserably to make an impression, let alone win over, the Greek-Macedonian 
leadership. The latter inclined to believe that the ultimate Young Turk end was to gain 
Christian sympathy in an attempt to present this understanding as indisputable evidence 
to Europe that any foreign interference in Ottoman matters was no longer necessary. 54 
It also appears that the Greeks had become increasingly suspicious of the 
predominantly Moslem nature of the Young Turk movement. Many Greek officials 
shared the idea that the political activity of the C.U.P. would result in the national 
awakening of the Moslem populations. As soon as that process was concluded, they 
believed, the Moslems were likely to organize a strong anti-Christian national 
movement in order to counteract any infusion of Balkan interference in the Ottoman 
provinces and reassert their political supremacy over the Macedonian Christians. 
These were the views of Sahtouris, the Greek consul in Serres, who had served for 
many years in Macedonia. On 14 June 1908, he wrote to Athens: 
"In my opinion, the success of the Young Turk movement is incompatible with Greek 
interests. The Young Turk ideology is nothing else but the creation of a national 
consciousness amongst the Moslems. These declarations for liberty, Constitution and 
equality must be viewed with the most extreme circumspection for those principles are 
in open conflict with the religious and political institutions of the Moslem conqueror.,,55 
50 Ibid. 
51 l.A. YE.l19081File 71.1ISerres Consulate/23/5-6-1908/Sahtouris to SkouzesfTelegraphic 
52 P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.1002 
53 LA. YE.l19081File 87.11Elassona Consulate/18/1-5-1908/no.148IEnnyalis to Skouzes and 
LA. YE./1908IFile 87.lIGeneral Consulate of Salonica/I2/25-5-1908/no.4251 Alexandropoulos to 
Skouzes 
54l.A.YE.l1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/19/1-8-1908/no.308IBaraklis to BaltazzisIPolitical 
55 LA. YE.l19081File 71.1ISerres Consulate/1/14-6-1908/no.23 7/Sahtouris to Skouzes 
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The basic dilemma of the Hellenic administration and the Macedonian committees was 
apparent: either they would side with one of the two belligerent parties or they would 
avoid meddling with Turkish affairs and remain neutral. Athens, at the time ignorant of 
the large scale influence and power of the C.U.P. movement, opted for a cautious wait-
and-see policy. 
Its chief intent was to avoid jeopardizing the status of the three million Ottoman 
Greeks by engaging the Greek Macedonian element in a looming Turkish civil conflict 
with uncertain outcome. In addition, the Greeks, although fostering little sympathy for 
Abdul Hamid and his palace camarilla, were well aware that it was under the Hamidian 
rule that the Empire had succeeded in keeping the Slavs out of Macedonia for three 
decades. 
The disclosure of Young Turk power and influence in the III Army corps during June 
generated second thoughts in the minds of the Greek-Macedonian consular authorities 
and the Greek-Macedonian Committee. Critical questions now preoccupied the 
Greek-Macedonian leadership: should the Greek element remain aloof and indifferent 
to those who after a while were most likely to become the rulers of Turkey; to what 
extent could the Greek communities in Turkey benefit from such cooperation; and 
more importantly, in what way could a Greek bid to favor the Unionist movement 
influence future Greek-Turkish relations to Greece's benefit?56 
While the Greeks were poised between active participation and passive neutrality the 
conflict between the Young Turks and the Ottoman administration was about to reach 
its flash point. As a consequence, it was now the tum of Abdul Hamid II to seek 
Greek support against the Young Turk opposition. In early June 1908, Hakki Bey, a 
palace spy, arrived in Salonica in a mission to ascertain the extent of the Macedonian 
Young Turk movement. 
Hakki Bey met with the local Greek Metropolitan Alexandros and tried to persuade the 
Greeks to remain loyal to the Sultan. Again the Salonica committee refused to commit 
itself and professed its strict neutrality. 57 In substance, the whole attitude of the Greek-
Macedonian leadership pointed to keeping the Greeks away from the forthcoming clash 
between the C.U.P. and the Palace rather than engaging them in it. 
56 LA.Y.E./1908IFile 71.1/Serres Consulate/28/10-7-1908/no.275/Sahtouris to Baltazzis 
57 PANAYOTOPOULOS (l980a, p.92) 
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After the turn things had taken it rested with the Greek government to make the 
decision. Following a period of painful oscillation and considerable procrastination the 
Hellenic administration opted for non-interference. On 10 July 1908, the new Greek 
Foreign Minister Baltazzis (he had replaced Skouzes in mid-June) addressed a circular 
to the Macedonian consulates elucidating Greek policy concerning the Young Turk 
movement: "It is evident that with our interference only disasters for the Greek 
element would ensue and the violent overthrowing of the Turkish regime will evoke 
implications that will be at our expense. Having taken into consideration our national 
interests and the personal safety of our fellow-countrymen, it is advisable that the 
Greek element in Turkey continues to observe its law-abiding stance towards the 
sovereign, turning a deaf ear to other proposals ... ,,58 
In sum, the moderate Theotokis Cabinet could ill-afford estranging Constantinople by 
being implicated in a purely internal Ottoman affair. A good climate between the two 
neighboring states was a sine qua non not only for the welfare of the numerous Greek 
populations residing in Turkey but also for the settlement of two bilateral issues with 
vital importance for Greece: the Cretan question and the construction of the Monastir-
Salonica-Larisa-Pireaus railway junction; a geo-strategic project aspiring to connect the 
isolated Hellenic branch with the Ottoman-Macedonian and European systems.59 
In the decision of the Greek government to observe neutrality respecting the Young 
Turk movement, domestic political considerations had made a great impact. 
Diplomatically isolated, preoccupied with its efforts to accomplish financial 
stabilization and military reorganization, the Greek kingdom of 1908 was unable to 
embark upon an adventurous policy against the legitimate administration of the country 
which for many decades had been an invaluable barrier to Slavic expansion to 
Macedonia. 
58 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.1IAthens to Macedonian Consulates127/10-7-1908/no.3006/Baltazzis to 
Consuls 
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CHAPTER II 
INTER-BALKAN STRUGGLE FOR MACEDONIA 1904-1908 
2.1 Bulgaro-Turkish Relations and the Question of Macedonia 
After the end of the Ilinden uprising, the Stambulovist Petrov administration, having 
discerned the dangers of a premature military confrontation with Constantinople over 
Macedonia, gave precedence to normalizing Turco-Bulgarian relations. To persuade 
the Porte of its goodwill, Sofia would have to contain the Macedonian nationalists 
and defuse the Macedonian question. 
No matter how unpopular such a policy would be in the interior, the Bulgarian 
leaders felt that unless they gained some time to recover from the Ilinden tragedy, 
build an army strong enough to face the Ottomans and secure support from Europe, 
they could never advance their national program in Macedonia. 
In Constantinople meanwhile, following instructions from the Petro v government, the 
Bulgarian diplomatic agent Nachovich attempted to elucidate the Ottoman 
disposition respecting a bilateral understanding. To those overtures the Turks had no 
reason to turn a deaf ear. They knew that even if they defeated the Bulgarian forces 
and invaded the Principality, the Powers would never allow them to re-conquer 
Christian regions. The outcome of the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 had been an 
instructive precedent. l 
Under the circumstances, for Bulgaria and Turkey an understanding seemed 
preferable to war. On 8 April 1904, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire signed an 
agreement. Bulgaria assumed the obligation to suppress the S.M.C., refuse sanctuary 
to Macedonian activists and close her border to band-crossing and arms-trading. For 
its part, the Sublime Porte undertook to implement the Murzsteg program, facilitate 
1 Military observes however believed that in the event of a Turco-Bulgarian war in 1903 the Turks 
would face serious problems, in particular during the first days owing to the capability of the 
Bulgarian army to mobilize within a few days; a capability that the Turkish army was lacking. 
Before reinforcements could arrive from Asia Minor, the Bulgarians could have reached Adrianople. 
B.D. vo1.5 p.36 
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the repatriation of the Macedonian refugees and grant amnesty to all political 
prisoners. 2 
The Bulgaro-Ottoman agreement, which followed the secret Serbo-Bulgarian 
Treaties of Friendship and Alliance3 served the short-term needs of Bulgarian foreign 
policy. For some time, an armed conflict between the two countries had been 
averted. During this period, Bulgaria could promote her enormous program of 
military reorganization and retrieve her right to claim the implementation of 
Macedonian reforms. 
By the end of the year nevertheless, indications that the short honeymoon period in 
Bulgaro-Turkish relations was approaching its end were not lacking. In their attempt 
not to arouse public opinion, the Bulgarian leadership was extremely hesitant to 
suppress the Macedonian societies in the country as the Sublime Porte demanded. 
Furthermore, while the agreement was still in force, the huge Bulgarian military 
expenditure and the leaking out of the secret Serbo-Bulgarian Treaty of Alliance 
convinced the Ottomans of Bulgaria's warlike designs. As an outcome, it was from 
1905 onwards that the Porte began to investigate secretly to what extent the rest of 
the Balkan states were prepared to join Constantinople in forming an anti-Bulgarian 
bloc. In the meantime, the Ottoman authorities in Macedonia propped up the local 
Greek, Serb and Albanian bands against the Bulgarian revolutionaries.4 
During the years 1906-1907, Bulgaro-Turkish relations grew worse. Ostensibly, the 
rise of the Stambulovist Gudev to power in 1906 seemed to suggest a Bulgarian 
intention to improve relations with Turkey. Nevertheless, the Ottomans had sound 
reasons to be distrustful of Bulgarian national aspirations. In 1906, Bulgarian 
military officials like General Dimitriev had expressed the opinion that Bulgaria could 
not be satisfied unless she annexed the regions of Adrianople, Dedeagach and the 
2 B.D. vo1.5 pp.1 08-1 09 
3 The two Serbo-Bulgarian Treaties were signed on 30 March 1904 and ratified on 29 April 1904. 
The Treaty of Friendship dealt with economic and cultural issues, its most interesting point being 
the creation of a free trade zone between the two states with the abolition of custom duties and the 
mutual preparation for a Customs Union. The Treaty of Alliance had political importance. It re-
asserted the interest of the two Balkan states in the implementation of reforms in Macedonia and 
Adrianople. It also provided for joint military action in case of foreign action against the integrity 
of the signatory parties. VUCINICH (1954, pp.143-4) 
4 MACDERMOTT (1988, p.293), TOKAY (1994, pp.61-2) 
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territory located between the Maritsa and Struma rivers. The rest of Macedonia was 
to become autonomous. 5 
At this juncture, in frequent meetings with the Ottoman Commissioner in Sofia, 
Prince Ferdinand attempted to assuage Ottoman fears and persuade the Porte of 
Bulgaria's peaceful disposition. He informed the Ottoman representative that he was 
ready to make a goodwill move and visit Constantinople if the Ottoman government 
agreed to execute the Macedonian reforms fully, withdraw its support from the 
Greek bandits and abandon its discriminatory policies against the Bulgarian-
Macedonians.6 
The efforts of the Exarchate were also in tune with Royal House policy. The Exarch 
Antim I was an ardent exponent of an "evolutionist" policy in Macedonia. He did his 
utmost to assure the Grand Vizier Ferid Pasha of his intention to discharge all priests, 
teachers and schoolmasters who engaged themselves in revolutionary activity and 
propaganda in Macedonia, provided the Sublime Porte satisfied Bulgarian demands. 
The Ottoman Empire, for its part, had realized that it had nothing to gain from a 
conflict with Bulgaria. On the contrary, in the event of a Turco-Bulgarian conflict, 
the Sublime Porte would probably sustain significant losses in troops, funds and 
perhaps territory in the regions of Macedonia and Thrace. The Ottoman policy-
makers had steadfastly clung to the perception that the continuation of the politics of 
appeasement was the best strategy against the Bulgarian threat. In any case, it was 
this strategy that had allowed Constantinople to head off a Turco-Bulgarian war and 
had legitimized its demands to Sofia to curb the recalcitrant Macedonian nationalists 
so far. 
In the beginning of 1908, the climate between Sofia and Constantinople improved as 
the Court of Prince Ferdinand and the new ruling Democratic party of Prime Minister 
Malinov decided to follow a detente policy vis-a-vis the Ottoman Empire. It was 
foreign policy considerations that had necessitated this course of action. To elicit 
Ottoman concessions for the construction of a railway link between the Bulgarian and 
Turkish systems (Sofia-Kjustendil-Kumanovo connection) and facilitate the Anglo-
Russian negotiations on the new judicial and administrative reforms in Macedonia, 
5 F.O. 88119321 Sofia Legation to F.O./12-S-1908/no.S6/Buchanan to Grey 
6 B.D. vo1.S pp.llS-116 
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the Bulgarian administration should observe an "impeccable" attitude toward the 
Porte. 7 
For once, the Bulgarians were prepared to provide some evidence of good-faith to 
the Turks. By the end of April 1908, the Bulgarian government had made 
considerable efforts to contain the Bulgarian-Macedonian committees and had 
withheld all official allowances to Macedonian partisans.8 These conciliatory 
Bulgarian gestures were well received in Constantinople. In an attempt to contribute 
to the improvement of bilateral relations, the Ferid Pasha Cabinet appointed a new 
Bulgarian Bishop in Monastir and sent Kiamil Bey to Sofia to replace the anti-
Bulgarian High Commissioner Sadit Pasha, whose alarming reports had increased 
Ottoman suspicions of Bulgarian expansionism.9 
Eventually, it was to become apparent that the Bulgarian "attack of friendship" was 
merely a tactical move intended to serve the short-term needs of Bulgaria's foreign 
policy and gain European sympathy. In the long-term, the political establishment in 
Sofia was convinced that a confrontation with the Ottoman Empire was unavoidable. 
True, for the time being, the Bulgarians sensed that they should remain composed 
and alert, biding their time until conditions in the Balkans and international scene 
become favorable for a final solution of the Macedonian question. Even so, that the 
Bulgarian leadership had no real intention of reaching a viable understanding with the 
Ottoman Empire became clear in Jooe 1908. Ferdinand ignored the constant feelers 
of Kiamil Bey to visit Constantinople in order to dwell with the Sultan Abdul Hamid 
II upon the state in Macedonia and hopefully improve bilateral relations. The 
Bulgarian ruler excused himself by professing that at a time when the Great Powers 
were moooting pressure on the Sublime Porte to accept the new Macedonian reform 
package, his visit in Constantinople could entangle the situation and provoke the 
uproar of Bulgarian public opinion and press. 10 
In fact, senior Bulgarian politicians held no illusions that if their long-coveted dream 
of annexing Macedonia and Thrace was to materialize it would ultimately be a matter 
7 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 115.6/General Consulate of Salonical7-5-1908/no.413/Alexandropoulos to 
Skouzes 
8 F.O. 881/9321 Sofia Legation to F.O.l28-4-1908/no.50/Buchanan to Grey, F.O. 881/9353 Sofia 
Legation to F.O.l7-7-1908/no.63/Buchanan to Grey, Bulletin D' Orient 9-5-1908, p.1 
9 F.O. 881/9321 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l29-4-1908/no.225/Barclay to Grey 
10 F.O. 881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.O.l7-7-1908/no.63/Buchanan to Grey 
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for the Bulgarian and Ottoman armies to decide and certainly not a subject liable to 
diplomatic negotiation and political disposition. 
2.2 Seizing the Initiative: the Hellenic Factor in Macedonia 
The 1897 war was a humiliation for the Greek kingdom and a serious blow to its 
revisionist policy. Following the defeat of its badly-organized army in Thessaly, the 
Athens Cabinet was forced to yield to the Great Powers' intervention. A European 
Financial Control was established in Athens and the Greek administration committed 
itself to refraining from any revolutionary activity in Crete and Macedonia. 
As a consequence, the influence of Hellenism in Macedonia suffered a severe setback. 
With no forthcoming support from the metropolis, the Greek-Macedonian population 
attempted to defend themselves against the advancing Bulgarian-Exarchist 
propaganda by assisting the local Ottoman authorities against the comitadjis. After 
1903, the revelation of the M.R.O. power during the Ilinden uprising activated the 
Theotokis Cabinet. So intense was the menace of losing Macedonia to Bulgaria and 
the demand of Greek public opinion for a militant stance that the Athens Cabinet had 
to abandon its non-interference policy and engage in Macedonian affairs. 
Thus, the concept of establishing a Greek Internal Organization in Macedonia was 
put into implementation. The main characteristics of the Greek-Macedonian 
movement differed little from the Bulgarian-Macedonian and the Serb-Macedonian. 
The central administration cooperated secretly with private associations in its attempt 
to build an effective revolutionary apparatus in Ottoman territory, although officially 
it denied any allegation to that effect. 
Greek nationalists and militant Macedonian clergymen such as the Bishop of Kastoria 
Karavangelis and the Metropolitan of Drama Chrisostomos took steps to organize 
the underground network in the Macedonian vilayets. Furthermore, the vice-consul 
in Monastir, Dragoumis,11 succeeded in creating an effective defense network in 
western Macedonia. During 1904, a private Macedonian Committee (M.C.) was 
formed in Athens headed by the editor of the newspaper Ef.17rpo; (Forward) 
Kalapothakis. Its principal objective was to subsidize and coordinate the secret 
mission and military activities of the Greek bands in western Macedonia. Greek army 
11 Ion Dragoumis. His father, Stefanos, was a leading Greek politician. 
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officers like Melas, Exadaktilos, Mazarakis, Katexakis, Tsontos-Vardas, Gyparis 
infiltrated the Ottoman province and began to work for the formation of the first 
partisan bands in the vilayets of Salonica and Monastrr.I2 
The real centers of Hellenic propaganda in Macedonia however, were the diplomatic 
agencies, predominantly the General Consulate of Salonica under the guidance of 
Koromilas and the local Metropolitan sees.13 Funds, agents, army officers and 
trained personnel were sent from Athens to assist those official institutions in their 
struggle against the Bulgarian comitadjis, to recruit new members, to consolidate the 
Greek position and re-gain the lost political ground in Macedonia. In May 1906, in 
Salonica, a secret Greek terrorist organization came into being under the leadership 
of Souliotis-Nikolaidis, a lieutenant in the Greek army, to counteract the Bulgarian 
and VlachI4 propaganda in the city.IS 
In the period 1904-1906, under the tolerant eye of the Ottoman authorities the Greek 
movement in Macedonia grew beyond expectation in strength and militancy, evolving 
into the most influential national organization in the vilayets of Salonica and Monastir 
where the bulk of the Greek-Macedonian population resided. However, after 1906, 
the progress of the Greek-Macedonian propaganda altered the passive attitude of the 
Ottoman government and the Powers towards Greece. This change in Ottoman 
policy was partly reflected in the frequent complaints and representations of the 
Ottoman minister in Athens to the Greek F. O. respecting the Greek guerrillas and 
partly in the practice of Hilmi Pasha to abandon his benevolent neutrality towards the 
Greeks.I6 From 1907 onwards, the Macedonian Inspector-General began to mount 
surveillance around the Greek Macedonian consular institutions and the Patriarchist 
Metropolitan sees. He also began to direct Albanian and Vlach bands against the 
Greek partisans. Before the end of 1907, Hussein Hilmi Pasha successfully insisted 
12 DAKIN (1972, pp.163-5) 
13 DAKIN (1966, p.324) 
14 In the begjnning of the 20th centmy 200,000 Vlachs lived in Macedonia, Epirus and Thessaly. 
They resided in the Pindus range, Grevena, Kastoria, Moschopolis, Krushevo, Metsovo, Veroia and 
Thessaly. The Vlachs were divided into two major groups: the pro-Greek and the pro-Romanian. 
In 1905, the Ottoman Cabinet recognized the Vlachs as a separate nationality. Hence, the Vlachs 
obtained the right to establish their own schools and participate in provincial administration. The 
Vlach question, namely the issue of Vlach national allegiance and identity, became the source of 
tension between Greece and Romania as both countries strove to draw the Vlach communities in 
their own sphere of influence. WINNIFRITH (1987, pp.132-142) 
15 SOULIOTIS-NIKOLAIDIS (1993, pp.37-43) 
16 SOULIOTIS-NIKOLAIDIS (1993, p.42) 
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on removing from Salonica and Kavala the militant Greek diplomats Koromilas and 
Mavroudis. 17 
At the same time, the Great Powers made strong representations to Athens in 
February and October 1907. In the second instance the Austro-HlIDgarian, Russian 
and British representatives demanded the termination of the Greek-Macedonian 
revolutionary activity from Foreign Minister Skouzes. They went on to warn the 
kingdom that if it refused to comply with their demand not only would it obstruct the 
implementation of the ongoing reforms but it would estrange itself from Europe. 
Initially, the Greek government could do little more than deny the accusation that it 
supported the bands, stating that Greece was for pacification and the maintenance of 
the status quo in Macedonia. 18 Furthermore, Athens argued that the monitoring of 
the Greek-Turkish border for the prevention of band-crossing was also a 
responsibility of the Ottoman authorities. Questionably, Skouzes added that many 
Greek bands had been formed by local Macedonians who ahhough being ethnic 
Greeks were Ottoman subjects over whom the Greek government had no practical 
jurisdiction. The Greek reasoning concluded with the firm assertion that the Greek-
Macedonians had resorted to violence to defend themselves against Bulgarian-
Macedonian terrorism. By implication, it was the inability of the Ottoman 
administration to protect its citizens which should be held responsible for the 
deterioration of the situation in the Rumelian provinces rather than Greece's 
Macedonian policy. 
In the end the Greeks had to give way. Confronted with the danger of provoking a 
fatal rupture in its relations with the Porte and alienating the Powers, in the autumn 
of 1907 the Athens government took additional measures in the borders to prevent 
the band-formation and band-crossing from Greece to Macedonia. In addition, the 
Theotokis Cabinet sought to transfer the control and management of the Macedonian 
struggle from the military Salonica headquarters to the civilian Monastir branch in 
September 1907. What had urged the government to take that decision was its 
profound anxiety to assure the Powers that the official Hellenic consular authorities 
17 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.3/Grand Vizierate to General Administration of Salonica/13/26-5-
1908IFerid Pasha to vali of Salonica, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.3/Constantinople Legationl41l7-6-
1908/no.512/Gryparis to Skouzes, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.3/General Consulate of SalonicaJ26/8-6-
1908/no.481 / Alexandropoulos to Skouzes 
18 B.D. vol. 5 p.l21 
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in Salonica refrained from any propaganda activity. Therefore, Athens assigned the 
continuation of the Macedonian struggle to a private committee which was likely to 
attract minimum European protest. 19 
Implementing such schemes was far more difficult than designing them. The Greek 
army officers serving in Salonica headquarters, at odds with the Monastir Committee, 
were unwilling to abandon military leadership and fund management to local 
chieftains and civilian agents. 20 Personal animosities and reciprocal mistrust between 
the leaders of the two branches aggravated the situation. 21 Only when on 14 
February 1908, the Salonica officers' demand for the appointment of the Colonel of 
Artillery Danglis as head of the Salonica headquarters was met by the Theotokis 
government, did they agree to recognize the Monastir Committee as the new center 
of the Greek - Macedonian campaign. 
It was European and Ottoman pressure and the problems of coordination in the 
Greek-Macedonian movement that led to the diminution of the Greek activity in 
Macedonia. It is certain, however that by 1908 the Greek armed intervention had 
managed to alter the political equilibrium between the Macedonian ethnic 
communities. Summing up the aftermath of the Greek struggle in Macedonia during 
the period 1904-1908, Dimaras, the consul in Monastir, wrote: 
"It was not humanly possible during the few years of our armed struggle in 
Macedonia to establish a concrete and firm influence in the mainland amidst foreign-
speaking populations, devoid of national consciousness, who had been steadily 
threatened or lured by the Bulgarian revolutionary and not least political propaganda. 
The bands did all they could across the Macedonian mainland and in a large scale the 
majority of the communes that returned to us did so on account of the bands' 
impact." 22 
Even western observers like Oppenheimer, the Austrian agent in the province and his 
British colleague Bonham admitted that by 1908 the Greek movement not only was 
19 GOUNARIS (1984, p.114) in SOCIETY FOR MACEDONIAN STUDIES, ed., (1987) 
20 I.A.Y.E.lFile 84.3/Athens/16/29-3-1908/Letter from the Athens and Piraeus Macedonian 
Associations to Prime Minister Theotokis/without classification number 
21 G.S.A.ff.V.A.l1906-1910IFile 3/no.105/16/29-3-1908 
22 I. A. Y.E.l1908IFile 59.3/Monastir Consulate/26/8-1-1909/no.1400IDimaras to Baltazzis 
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the most powerful in southern Macedonian districts, but it was spreading in the 
northern departments as well as Thrace.23 
Altogether, by disseminating the Greek cause in the vilayets of Salonica and Monastir 
the bands did nothing else but to promote in the field the official policy of the 
Hellenic kingdom for the fmal resolution of the Macedonian question. This policy, as 
Skouzes presented it to Elliot, the British minister in Athens, was ''the division of 
Macedonia in zones of influence between the Balkan states rather than the creation of 
one autonomous province. ,,24 
In substance, the implementation of this ambitious policy entailed the dismemberment 
of Turkey-in-Europe and the division of spoils between the Balkan national states. 
Within this framework, having secured the Hellenic cultural, economic and political 
position in Macedonia, the Greek statesmen fancied themselves entitled to claim the 
incorporation of the Salonica and Monastrr provinces in Greece, leaving Kosovo to 
Bulgaria and Old Serbia to Belgrade.25 The Young Turk Macedonian revolution was 
however to postpone, if not countermand, the materialization of Greek nationalist 
aspirations in Macedonia. 
2.3 The Serb Struggle in Macedonia 
The remarkable diminution of Bulgarian-Macedonian revolutionary activity after the 
Ilinden uprising opened the way for the other major Slav-Macedonian revolutionary 
movement, the Serb, to gain momentum. On 29 September 1903, Sultan Abdul 
Hamid, in an attempt to thwart the Bulgarian advancement in Macedonia, recognized 
the Serb nationality in Macedonia with an Imperial Irade.26 
Heretofore, this lack of recognition had allowed the official Hellenic and Bulgarian 
institutions to gain considerable ground in the three provinces but the Serb 
23 I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 39.4/General Consulate of Salonica/6/19-7-1908/no.621IKanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 20.5Nice-Consulate of Kavala/12/25-6-1908/no.3841P0lixroniadis to 
Skouze and also F.O. 881/9353 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l30-6-1908/no.360/Barclay to 
Grey/enclosure no.l. For a detailed accOlmt of the Greek movement in Thrace during the first half 
of 1908 see the report of the Greek consul in Adrianople Gonatas to Greek F.O: I.A.Y.E./1908IFile 
21.2/Adrianople Consulate/20/3-7-1908/Gonatas to Skouzes/Report on National Activity in Thrace 
from 1-1-1908 to 15-6-1908/ pp.I-15 
24 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 94.1.1/Rome Legation/7120-4-1908/no.253IMitropoulos to Skouzes. See also: 
F.O. 881/9316 Athens Embassy to F.O'/12-3-1908/no.32IElliot to Grey 
25 F.O. 881/9321 Athens Embassy to F.O./8-5-1908/no.66IElliot to Grey 
26 DAKIN (1966, p.171) 
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nationalists were now afforded an opportunity to neutralize this defect. Belgrade, 
under pressure from nationalist elements at home to assume a more energetic role in 
Old Serbia and Kosovo, began to intervene more actively in Macedonian affairs.27 
From the outset, Serb aspirations for Old Serbia and Kosovo, where the Serb element 
could be found, was bound to collide with the overwhelming Austrian position on the 
implementation of Macedonian reforms on the one hand, and on the other, with the 
growing influence of the Bulgarian-Exarchist religious, educational and paramilitary 
propaganda. 
Austria-Hungary, the chief threat to the territorial ambitions of the Serb kingdom at 
the time, had succeeded, not without irritating Belgrade, in excluding the western 
districts of the Kosovo vilayet from the reform program. This disposition had 
isolated the indigenous Serb-Macedonian populations from the rest of the province. 
Furthermore, in assigning Austrian officers in the eastern districts of Kosovo, Vienna 
had added insult to Serb injury.28 To those actions, the Belgrade Cabinet could offer 
no practical resistance apart from reiterating to the Powers its fixed position that the 
Serb kingdom opposed Macedonian autonomy and that the question of Macedonia 
should be settled by a European Congress with the participation of all Balkan 
countries. 
If the Serb efforts to prevent Austrian penetration in Macedonia seemed a lost cause, 
that was hardly the case in regard to Bulgarian-Macedonian infiltration into the Serb-
Macedonian communities in the vilayet of Kosovo. With the M.R.O. in disarray and 
the Ottoman authorities bolstering up the other ethnic groups against the Bulgarians 
in Macedonia, conditions seemed favorable for the dissemination of Serb propaganda 
through the establishment of a Serbo-Macedonian revolutionary organization. Any 
last reservations the Serbs might have as to the advisability of such practice were 
dissolved in 1904. In the winter of that year, the M.R.O. leadership turned down the 
Serb nationalists' proposal to work jointly for the autonomy of Macedonia, refusing 
to accept the Serb suggestion that the two Slav communities be granted equal status 
in an autonomous Macedonia. 29 
2.7 VUCINICH (1954, p.126) 
28 VUCINICH (1954, p.127) 
29 VUCINICH (1954, p.131) 
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It is clear that the Serb revolutionary background in Macedonia compared 
unfavorably with the Bulgarian-Exarchist and the Greek-Patriarchist organizations. 
Only as late as 1902, a Serbo-Macedonian Committee was set up by Serb nationalists 
and members of the prosperous local Macedonian lobby in Belgrade. It was not until 
1904, that the first Serb partisan units took the field in the regions of Old Serbia and 
Kosovo, albeit with very little success. 
That development, though, stiffened the Serbs instead of discouraging them and to a 
certain extent precipitated the active involvement of their government. Since 1904, 
Belgrade although reassuring the foreign representatives to the contrary, 
clandestinely supported the cetnik bands by procuring them funds, war material, 
arms, intelligence services and reservist army officers. The government however, 
fearful of alienating European sympathies, or worse, provoking a war with Bulgaria, 
meticulously avoided putting the Serb-Macedonian revolutionary movement under its 
auspIces. 
Indeed, certain bands were formed in Serbia proper (mainly in the capital and Vranje) 
and several Serb army officers were engaged in band operations in Macedonia, but 
the main strength of the cetnik movement layaway from Belgrade, in the peasant 
Serb-Macedonian militia which had previously fought alongside the Bulgarian 
partisans owing to the lack of their own independent Macedonian organization. 30 
Progressively, the Serb bands muitipJied their manpower and bases in Macedonia and ;( 
by the end of 1906 they had arrested the BUlgarianir:th!"regions of Uskub, 
Prishtina, Prizren, Ishtip and had established their authority in Old Serbia. Apart 
from the Serb paramilitary build-up and the underground assistance of the 
government, the growth of the cetnik movement in Kosovo and Old Serbia between 
1904-1906 had its roots in two other important factors. On the one hand, in the 
genuine pro-Serb sentiment shared by many Slav-Macedonians, who resented the 
growing Exarchist interference in the region and looked towards Serbia as their 
natural homeland. On the other, in Serb strategy of providing pecuniary assistance to 
local Macedonian communities,31 thereby gaining immensely in popularity instead of 
imposing on them heavy taxes and forcible contributions. 32 
30 B.D. vo1.S p.116 
31 It is true that the Serb Macedonian Committee had been very effective in fimd-raising. In 1906 it 
received financial assistance from Serbs of Macedonian origin, from the Serb Intelligence Food, 
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In mid-February 1907, the Powers' representations to the rest of the Balkan states to 
restrain the partisan activity of their fellow-countrymen and contribute to 
Macedonian pacification were repeated in Serbia. In Belgrade, the British minister 
Whitehead sought to impress upon the government the need to refrain from 
sponsoring the cettrik movement by financial and military means. To the counsels of 
Whitehead, Serb Prime Minister Pashic reiterated the usual reasoning of the Balkan 
statesmen in analogous occasions. Pashic maintained that the Serb-Macedonian 
communities were defending themselves against foreign (meaning Bulgarian and 
Albanian) aggressiveness and the official Serb state had never supported paramilitary 
activities in Ottoman territory. He went on to emphasize that the government was 
neither accountable for the actions of certain Serb army officers on "leave of absence 
or in reserve" nor in any legitimate position to ban private contributions to the 
Belgrade Macedonian Committee?3 In the end, the Serb Premier went onto the 
offensive, arguing with good reason that Serbia had always supported a Serbo-
Bulgarian understanding in Kosovo. But it was Sofia's reluctance to accept the 
arbitration of an impartial Commission respecting the definition of two zones of 
influence in that Macedonian vilayet, based on linguistic and traditional criteria, 
which was primarily to blame for the increasing partisan activities and the recent 
deterioration in Serbo-Bulgarian relations.34 
In 1908, the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia became truly acute. The 
growth of Serb national and paramilitary propaganda in Kosovo at the expense of the 
Bulgarian-Macedonian communities had created a very strong anti-Serb climate in 
the Principality. In June 1908, under heavy pressure from public opinion and the 
press, the Malinov administration took an increasingly bellicose attitude toward 
Serbia. U sing menacing language, Bulgaria warned the Serb government to contain 
its Macedonian propaganda before the recrudescence of Serb band activity led to a 
Serbo-Bulgarian conflict. The explanations of the Serb Prime Minister Pashic to the 
Bulgarian representative in Belgrade Toshev, that Serbia did not support the Serb-
from private associations even from the Skupshtina, which on 3 November passed the "annual credit 
of 12,000 sterling for assistance to indigent persons in Old Serbia and Macedonia." It is equally 
true that only a very small portion of those allowances was eventually allotted in Macedonia. B.D. 
vo1.5 p.116 
32 SOWARDS (1989, p.76) 
33 B.D. vo1.5 p.118 
34 Ibid. 
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Macedonian bands and was anxious to establish good relations with Sofia did not 
satisfy the Bulgarians. 
If Pashic failed to calm Sofia down, the Russians were more successful. Russia, 
preoccupied with her process of economic stabilization and military reorganization 
after the Russo-Japanese war of 1904 and the revolution of 1905, opposed any 
change of the Balkan status quo. To prevent an armed collision between Serbia and 
Bulgaria, the Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky made clear to Belgrade and in 
particular to Sofia that the Imperial government was determined not to tolerate any 
attack on the status quo. If one of the two states embarked on an adventurous policy 
it would face the opposition of Russia. 
The Russian intervention made a serious impression in Bulgaria. On 28 June 1908, in 
the Sobranje, Prince Ferdinand declared that Bulgaria had the most pacific intentions 
for all her neighboring countries and carefully avoided any reference to the delicate 
"Serb question." By the time of the Young Turk revolution the tension between 
Serbia and Bulgaria over Macedonia had subsided. 35 
2.4 The Albanian Movement in Macedonia 
In the years after the Berlin Congress, the Albanian national program was to avoid 
the partition of the Albanian lands (the Albanian mainland, northern Epirus and the 
western districts of the Kosovo and Monastir vilayets) between the neighboring 
Balkan states and to achieve, through European intervention, if not complete political 
independence at least administrative autonomy within the Ottoman Empire?6 
That was a very demanding undertaking, the main obstacles being the lack of a 
separate Albanian church and language. Since religion determined education in the 
Ottoman Empire, the southern Orthodox Albanians had gradually fallen under the 
influence of the Greek-Patriarchate, while the Roman Catholic Albanians were linked 
with the Italian, French and predominantly Austrian cultural propaganda known as 
35 I.A.Y.E./1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade LegationlI5/28-6-1908/no.61/Argiropoulos to Baltazzis, F.O. 
881/9321 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./28-5-1908/no.33/Whitehead to Grey, F.O. 881/9321 Belgrade 
Embassy to F.O./8-6-1908/no.35IWhitehead to Grey, F.O. 881/9321 Belgrade Embassy to F.O'/23-
6-1908/no.39IWhitehead to Grey, F.O. 881/9321 Sofia Legation to F.O./24-6-1908/no.60IBuchanan 
to Grey, F.O. 881/9321 Sofia Legation to F.O./29-6-1908/no.13/Buchanan to Grey, F.O. 881/9353 
Belgrade Embassy to F. 0./8-7 -1908/no.44IWhitehead to Grey 
36 SKENDI (1953, p.226) 
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Cultusprotectorat.37 Furthermore, the Albanian Moslems, who fancied themselves 
Ottomans, had their own religious and educational institutions and had been on good 
terms with their Christian compatriots. To them, any change in the political status 
quo was considered a menace to their local political supremacy. 
In any case, in their struggle for self-determination the Albanians were not unarmed. 
For centuries Constantinople had used them in order to police, contain and not rarely 
oppress its recalcitrant Slav and Greek subjects. In return, the Albanian element had 
been allowed to obtain and establish a peculiarly privileged position in the Ottoman 
Empire. The Albanian provinces had become practically semi-autonomous and the 
Albanian clansmen were excluded from conscription, disarmament and tax-paying 
regulations. 
Albanian paramilitary detachments operating against the Christian partisans in Epirus 
and Macedonia evolved into the irregular military arm of the Ottoman administration 
often with ruinous results for the local Christian populations. 38 It is also interesting 
that for centuries a significant number 0 f Albanian Beys and Agas had been 
constantly employed by the Ottoman government thereby acquiring an increasing 
share in the administration of the Empire. 39 
Between 1904 and 1908, the Albanian-Macedonian movement was influenced by two 
key developments: the Austro-Italian controversy over Albania and the intensification 
of the Albanian struggle. At a time that the local Ottoman administration displayed 
symptoms of ineffectiveness, if not thorough paralysis, the European condominium in 
Macedonia provided the ideal opportunity for Austria-Hungary and Italy to advance 
energetically their political and commercial interests in Albania and Macedonia. 
To Italy, Albanian alignment was essential for maintaining the Otranto Straits and the 
Adriatic open to her ships whereas Austria-Hungary had been constantly looking 
upon this backward country as an invaluable bastion against Balkan Slav 
expansionism and a potential outpost of her influence in the south Balkans. 
Prompted by these geopolitical considerations, the Adriatic Powers had agreed in 
their conventions of 1897 and 1900 to respect the Albanian status quo. Yet, if, for 
37 SKENDI (1982, p.253) in BRAUDE, and LEWIS., eds., (1982). On Austria's Cultusprotectorat 
tradition and policy in Albania and Macedonia see: BRIDGE (1984, pp.33,35) in KENT, ed., (1984) 
38 P.P.A.P. LXXXVII 1903, pp.356-357. On Albanian irregular activism in Christian Macedonian 
areas see: B. C. (1914, Leaflet no. 13, pA) 
39 SKENDI (1953, p.231) 
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any reason, Turkey-in-Europe ceased to exist, they would support the establishment 
of an autonomous Albanian province. 
Between 1904 and 1907, Austro-Italian rivalry focused on the Cultusprotectorat 
policy whereas from 1908, it drifted to the railway question. In order to establish 
themselves in Albanian affairs, the two Great Powers sought to win over the 
powerful Albanian Beys and the Albanian Catholic clergy; namely, the native political 
and spiritual leadership.40 In the first place, utilizing the long Cultusprotectorat 
tradition, Austrian consuls, officers, clergymen and agents in Macedonia were partly 
successful in obtaining the allegiance of a considerable number of Albanian Catholic 
priests. In the second half of the reform period though, Austrian political influence 
diminished due to the increasing Italian propaganda in the province of Kosovo and 
the Moslem Albanian opposition to Austrian interference in Ottoman Macedonia. 41 
On 27 January 1908, the Austrian Foreign Minister Baron Alois Lexa von Aehrenthal 
launched his Balkan railway policy. The milestone of this ambitious enterprise was 
the construction of the Novibazar railway line which would link the European and 
Ottoman systems. The Nish-Uskub-Salonica system was to become the main line 
whilst a second link would connect Uskub with Austrian-held Uvac via Mitrovitsa. 
The railway scheme was seen by the Entente Powers and the Italians as an endeavor 
on the part of Vienna to advance her political and commercial interests in Albania, 
Macedonia and the Aegean sea.42 
In the period of Macedonian reform the Albanian nationalists did not remain inactive. 
Determined to construct a national identity and unify their tribes in their struggle for 
autonomy they continued to establish new committees, political clubs, associations 
and newspapers in Epirus and Macedonia. In 1906, the important initiative of the 
Albanian nationalist leaders in transferring the central headquarters of their movement 
from Koritsa to Monastir underscored their intention to assume a more active role in 
Macedonia. 
Under the direction of the Monastir center, societies and influential leaders such as 
the Topouli brothers, Midhat Frasheri Bey, Fehim Zavalani Bey, Hahl Bey, attempted 
to stir Albanian national sentiment and counterpoise the Greek and Slav propaganda 
40 LA. Y .E.I 1908/File 59.3/Monastir Consulate/12/25-9-1908/no.l 0 15lDimaras to Baltazzis 
41 I. A. Y.E.I 1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/15/28-2-1908/no.50/Baraklis to Skouzes/Politica1 
42 MAY (1938, pp.496, 504-5, 509-10) 
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in the Albanian-speaking districts of Macedonia and Epirus. Among the southern 
Orthodox Albanians, Mihail Gramenos, a chief Christian propagandist from Koritsa 
and George Kyrias, a founding member of the Albanian Monastir Committee, played 
an active part in the development and proliferation of the Albanian nationalist 
movement in the period under consideration.43 Here, it is important to point out that, 
although the Albanian struggle in Macedonia was mainly directed against Serb and 
Bulgarian activities in Kosovo and Monastir, the Greco-Albanian dispute focused on 
the Epirote question. 44 
Notwithstanding their struggle for political emancipation, the Albanians recognized 
that collaboration with the Sublime Porte was often the best means to further their 
political claims and fight their racial rivals. During the second half of the reforms, for 
example, using education and bands, the Albanian nationalist movement attempted to 
gain ground in the vilayet of Janina and southern Epirus to embarrass the Greeks and 
divert their attention from northern Epirus. 
At the outset, the Ottoman administration was not ill-disposed towards supporting 
that campaign. Albanian nationalism, it believed, could be useful for the containment 
of the Greeks. But when in the first months of 1908 the Albanian political activities 
reached as far as Preveza, near the Greco-Turkish frontier, the Ottomans took 
alarm. 45 Having no desire to sanction those extravagant Albanian claims, the Porte 
took steps to thwart the Albanian-Epirote activity but its containment policy was 
bound to encounter serious problems as "a large portion of the local Ottoman 
officials were ethnic Albanians themselves.,,46 
Indeed, Ottoman policy on the Albanian question had been steadily unimaginative. 
Only by 1908, did Constantinople begin to realize the magnitude of the simmering 
crisis. Having allowed the Albanians to infiltrate the Ottoman administration, man 
the civil administration and build-up a paramilitary network in the Macedonian, 
Epirote and Albanian vilayets the Sublime Porte was fostering Albanian nationalism. 
As early as September 1902, in attempting a comparative analysis of the Bulgarian 
43 SKENDI (1967, p.207). Refer also to chapters 7 and 9. 
44 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 59.2IMonastir Consulate/26/8-9-1908/no.943IHalkiopoulos to Baltazzis 
45 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/6-2-1909/Lamb 
to LowtherlMemorandum on Macedonian Events for 1908 and I.A.Y.E./1908IFile 97.3.1/Preveza 
Consulate/ 5/18-4-1908/no.25 7lKaritsis to Skouzes 
46 F.O. 881/9321 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/30-4-1908/no.51/Lamb 
to Barclay 
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and Albanian movement in Macedonia, Young, the British agent in Monastir, 
emphasized that in contrast to the Bulgarian movement, the Albanian political 
advancement in Macedonia had been the result of the inward infiltration of the 
Ottoman administration rather than the product of a militant secessionist nationalism: 
"The two movements ( ... ), though similar in origin and method, are contradictory in 
their immediate results and ultimate aims. Both originate in an assertion of political 
independence and of an exclusive title to territory occupied in common with other 
subject races and the method in both cases is resistance to administrative authority 
and coercion of the other reayahs. But the immediate result in the case of the 
Albanians has been the retention of a large measure of autonomy and the acquisition 
of an increasing share in the government of the Empire; in the case of the Bulgarians, 
an absolute exclusion from all local administration ( ... ). The reason for this 
difference lies in the divergence of the ultimate aims of the movements: that of the 
Bulgarians, from external racial and political attractions, is centrifugal and disruptive 
of the Ottoman Empire, whereas the Albanians aspire to securing and extending their 
privileges by means of their peculiar position in the Empire ... ,,47 
47 Cited in P.P.A.P. LXXXVII 1903, p.494 
PART II 
YOUNG TURKS AND BALKAN CHRISTIANS IN OTTOMAN 
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CHAPTER ill 
FROM OPPOSITION TO POWER: THE BEGINNING OF THE YOUNG 
TURK ERA 
3.1 Eruption of the Revolution 
From the spring of 1908, there were clear indications that the Macedonian army had 
been in a state of uneasiness. Initially, a number of mutinies among the soldiery of 
the Monastir camps occurred due to payment in arrears. In addition, at a time that 
the King of Britain Edward VII and the Russian Tsar Nicholas were meeting in Reval 
between 9-12 June 1908 to discuss the proposals of the British Foreign Minister Grey 
for the creation of a new Macedonian mobile force and the new enhanced powers for 
the Macedonian Inspector-General, the commander of the Salonica military police, 
Nazim Bey, was attacked and wounded by a Young Turk officer on 11 June. 1 
On 12 June 1908, the Salonica Young Turk Committee addressed a memorandum to 
the European Consuls. It declared that "the Macedonian question had been allowed 
to obscure the Ottoman question" and it was high time the Ottomans were left alone 
to put their house in order. Having made clear that they had no intention of deposing 
the Sultan the Young Turks pointed out that their movement 
"was directed against the Palace camarilla and that the reforming efforts of Europe, 
although well meant, had failed to eradicate the Macedonian evil.,,2 
Determined to oppose by all means a new round of European interference in the 
Ottoman Empire the Macedonian Young Turk Committees took action. 3 On 4 July 
1908, a military mutiny broke out in Resna. Young Turk detachments under Ahmet 
1 F.O. 881/9321 General Consulate ofSalonica to F.O'/12-6-1908/no.165ILamb to Grey 
2 F.O. 881/9321 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/12-6-1908/no.329/Barclayto Grey, F.O. 88119353 
General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/21-7 -1908/no. 91lLamb to Barclay and 
P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.974 
3 According to the original plan the revolt was to break out simultaneously in all major Macedonian 
cities on 1 September 1908, the anniversary of Sultan's ascendance to the throne. Unionist army 
units and initiated Moslem civilians were to occupy the local headquarters in which the Christian 
and Moslem religious and political leadership and the foreign consuls would assemble to 
congratulate the Ottoman authorities. Having established control over the local administration the 
Young Turks would telegraph to the capital for reinstitution of the Constitution. I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 
71.2/Serres Consulate/24/6-9-1908/no.34 7/Sahtouris to Baltazzis 
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Niazi Effendi and Enver Bey fled to the hills where they united with Albanian 
partisans and Moslem civilians. Soon the mutiny spread over across the Monastir 
region, the cradle of the revolution being the districts of Ohrid and Resna. It was 
from the hills of Resna, on 8 July, that Enver Bey issued a declaration demanding the 
reinstitution of the 1876 Constitution and the dissolution of the palace camarilla.4 
The revolution escalated rapidly. The insubordination of the III Army corps and the 
eventual accession of the II Thracian Army corps to the movement, notwithstanding 
that a large number of its senior officers remained loyal to the Sultan, dealt a severe 
blow to the Palace. Furthermore, in the Monastir vilayet, the Albanian Macedonians 
had reached a besa (honor) with the Young Turk Committees in an attempt to 
support the Unionist struggle. In the end, on 10 July 1908, when 8,000 Albanians 
gathered in Ferisovic threatening to advance against Constantinople unless their 
demands for Constitution and autonomy were met the Ottoman government realized 
the gravity of the situation. 5 
In the capital, ignoring the moderate suggestion of Ferid Pasha's Cabinet not to 
resort to violence, the Sultan initially sought to suppress the revolution by 
transporting armies from Asia Minor to Macedonia to fight against the Young Turks. 
However, as soon as the extraordinary military measures failed and the Asiatic 
contingents, which had been affected by Young Turk ideology, joined the revolution 
the Hamidian regime came under real military siege. 6 
To make matters worse, fear was rife in the Palace that the Constantinople Moslems 
might adhere to the Young Turk revolutionary movement and attack the Hamidian 
regime. 7 Under unbearable pressure from the Cabinet, the army and Moslem public 
opinion the Sultan's position became truly untenable. Eventually, on 24 July 1908, 
Abdul Hamid II issued an Imperial Irade proclaiming the implementation of the 1876 
Constitution in the Ottoman Empire. 8 The Imperial Irade stated: 
4 F.O. 881/9353 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/16-7-1908/no.392/Barclay to Grey and P.P.A.P. 
CV 1909, pp.953-954 
5 F.O. 881/9353 Uskub Consulate to General Consulate of Salonica/11-7-1908/noAO/Satow to 
Lamb, P.P.A.P. CV 1909, pp.958-959, 964. F.O. 800/50 Paris Embassy to F.O'/21-8-1908IBertie to 
Grey 
6 I.A.Y.E.I 1908IFile 91.2/Constantinople Legationll1124-7 -1908/no.I778/Gryparis to Baltazzis. 
BUXTON (1909, p.52) 
7 F.O. 881/9353 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/26-7-1908/noAI9/Barclayto Grey 
8 P.P.A.P. CV 1909, pp.969-970 
The Beginning of the Young Turk Era 47 ----~~~--~~~~~------------------------
"'Every individual subject, irrespective of ethnic ongm or religion is entitled to 
personal freedom and to an equal share in the rights and obligations of the country." 
The proclamation of the Constitution evoked general enthusiasm. All ethnic groups 
in the country hailed the end of Hamidian absolutism and welcomed the 
Constitutional and Parliamentary period. In Macedonia, the Young Turk leader 
Enver Bey declared the abolition 0 f racial, cultural and ethnic divisions between the 
'Ottoman subjects' and scenes of fraternization between Bulgarians and Greeks 
added to the atmosphere of optimism and rejoicing. As Miller observed, "Macedonia 
seemed to have become utopia". 9 
3.2 Facets of Unionist Political Activity in Macedonia 
The period of inter-ethnic enthusiasm and rejoicing in the country was short-lived. In 
the following few months, the Unionist disregard for the principles of Ottoman 
equality and Constitutional liberty became visible. First, the new C.U.P. program on 
education provided for the abolition of separate ethnic secondary schools and the 
establishment of uniform Ottoman public schools, which would be under the direct 
control of the state. In this way, the privilege of the non-Moslem nationalities to run 
their own educational institutions was attacked by the C.U.p.lO Secondly, by 
avoiding committing themselves on the proportionate representation of non-Moslems 
in the administration and refusing even to discuss the thorny agrarian question, the 
Young Turks exposed a lack of vision and will to introduce far-reaching institutional 
reforms in the administration and the society. 11 
Furthermore, between August and October 1908, a massive wave of strikes broke 
out in the Empire. It is interesting that although the Committee had initially 
supported the labor movement, when the strikes assumed disquieting proportions and 
the central government lost control of the situation, the Committee backed the 
suppression of the labor movement by legislative measures. According to Zurcher, 
this suggested that "the Young Turk Committee -the champion par excellence of 
Constitutional liberty- had sided unequivocally with the capitalists in suppressing the 
9 For a vivid account of the situation in Macedonia during the early days of the Constitutional 
change see: MILLER (1966, p.476) 
10 For details on the c.u.P. educational program refer to chapter 6. 
11 I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 59.2/Monastir Consulate/2517-9-1908/no.934IHalkiopoulos to Baltazzis 
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freedom, such as it was, of organized labor."12 From an early stage therefore, 
indications that the Young Turks were a socially immature and politically 
conservative movement were not lacking. 
Unionist centralizing tendencies were also revealed during the debate within the 
Young Turk movement on the important questions of administrative reform and 
provincial decentralization. Shortly after the Constitutional change, the disagreement 
between the centralist party of Ahmet Riza Bey and the liberal group of Sabaheddin 
over these issues resurfaced. In late August, the Salonica Committee made clear that 
it could support the "application of the principle of local government within such 
limits as are compatible with the administrative interests of the Empire". But it did 
not desire to sanction any radical reforms in provincial administration.13 The C.U.P. 
seemed to share the belief that the establishment of a parliamentary regime would 
suffice to secure the peripheral representation and promote the provincial interests in 
a system which intended to discourage secessionist aspirations and forge Ottoman 
unity. 14 
On the other hand, upon arriving in Constantinople, Prince Sabaheddin sought to 
reassure the Committee that the term "administrative devolution" did not provide for 
provincial independence and separatism from the central government but for the 
establishment of provincial councils with a mission to deal with local questions in the 
spirit of unity. On 17 September 1908, Sabaheddin delivered a speech in Pera, which 
made a positive impression on Unionist officials and European diplomats. The Prince 
declared: 
"Devolution does not mean political autonomy or transformation of the provinces 
into confederate mini-states. The system of administrative devolution, as we 
envisage it, aims at eliminating all sources of misrule that devastated the country, 
provoked the interference of the Powers in our internal affairs and in certain cases 
resulted in foreign occupation of Ottoman provinces. ,,15 
12 Cited in ZURCHER (1993, p.98). On more information on the strikes and the growth of the labor 
movement: B.D. vo1.5 p.289, MOSKOV (1978, pp. I 70-4) 
13 F.O. 881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.O.l24-8-1908/no.73/Buchanan to Grey 
14 KAYALI (1997, p.78) 
15 I. A. Y.E.I 1908IFile 91.2/Constantinople Legationl41l 7 -9-1908/no. 890/Gryparis to 
Baltazzis/enclosure no. 1 
_T_h_e_B_e~g~irum __ ·n~g~o_f_t_he __ Y_o_u~ng~T~u_rk~E~ra~ ____________________________ 49 
Sabaheddin's explanations did not seem to have fully persuaded the C.U.P. 
Following the issuing of the Unionist political program on 23 September 1908, the 
Committee began to organize its First Annual Congress. It was held in Salonica 
between 5 and 25 October 1908 with the participation of delegates from all European 
and Asiatic provinces. The overriding characteristic of the First Annual Young Turk 
Congress was the ideological dispute between the Committee and the party of Prince 
Sabaheddin over the questions of provincial decentralization and the interdependence 
between the Young Turk Committee and the Ottoman military. 
In regard to the first subject, soon it became apparent that the C.U.P. had no 
intention of subscribing to the main liberal concept of a devolved provincial 
administrative model. Thoroughly convinced that the establishment of strong 
provinces with semi-autonomous leaderships, independent economic sources and 
reformed administration might nourish secessionist tendencies and initiate the 
dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire into a number of federal states, the Unionist 
delegates passed 'conservative' resolutions on local government. 
Although a considerable number of incompetent and corrupt public functionaries 
were to be dismissed from the civil administration no structural reform was 
introduced into the state machinery and peripheral government. The system was to 
remain more or less intact. The Salonica Congress's decision provided only for the 
motivation of the bureaucrats-cadres and the extension of the valis' authority for the 
development of local education, commerce and industry.16 
On the issue of Unionist-army relations, Sabaheddin had demanded that the 
Committee should sever all connections with the armed forces. Probably to maintain 
an outward form of unity the Salonica C.U.P. Congress passed a resolution urging its 
members that "neither the Committee nor individual C.U.P. members should interfere 
with matters appertaining to the management of the army.,,17 This stipulation, 
important as it may seem, was in fact nominal for the Committee and the Ottoman 
military were, and continued to be, intimately connected. 
16 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/18-11-1908/no.787Lowther to Grey/enclosure 
no.2 
17 F.O. 88119492 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/lO-ll-
1908/no.149/Lamb to Lowther 
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Another significant element of the Young Turk Congress was its resolution to rally 
all Ottoman subjects around the Committee and its political program for the 
advancement of education, commerce, agriculture, industry and the improvement of 
living and regional conditions. Towards this target, the Unionist members assumed 
the task of setting up political clubs in every village, town and provincial center of the 
country. In each provincial capital, newspapers were to be published ''with the 
material and moral support of the C.U.p.,,18 Beneath these preparatory steps the 
C.U.P. intention was clear: the expansion of the Unionist network and its 
development into an Empire-wide organization. 
In the end, the centralist current emerged from the First Annual Young Turk 
Congress as the predominant force. In a secret convention, an eight-member Central 
Committee (C. C.) was elected. Its members were: Talat Bey, Midhat Shukru, 
Hussein Kadri, Enver Bey, Hayri, Habib Bey and Ahmet Riza Bey, who had recently 
returned from Europe. The composition of the C.C. of the C.U.P. proved that the 
liberals had been thoroughly defeated since all members were supporters of the 
centralist policy. 
In a short period of time, the C.U.P. committed itself to expand its political network. 
Prominently, the Macedonian committees were very active and apt in initiating new 
members and founding local clubs. By December 1908, the Salonica Committee had 
established 14 new associations in the Macedonian capital alone. Their avowed aim 
was to promote unity between the various ethnic groupS.19 New C.U.P. societies 
were formed in the major centers of Uskub, Monastir, Serres, Drama, Kavala, 
Adrianople and Constantinople. Each Unionist club was officially recognized by the 
authorities, it was directed by the local municipal council and supervised by the C.C. 
of the C.U.P. 
By October 1910, the C.U.P. had established an Empire-wide organization 
numbering 4,800 branches with 135,000 registered members. The bulk of those 
societies lay in the European provinces and only a few branches functioned in Syria 
18 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l18-11-1908/Lowther to Grey/no.787/enc1osure 
no.2 
19 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-NGeneral Consulate of Salonica/25/8-12-1908/Kanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis/General Regulations of the Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress/article 94. F.G. 
88119492 Drama to Constantinople Embassy/29-10-1 908/no. 98/Lieutenant-Colonel Bonham to 
Lowther 
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and Asia Minor. It is clear that in Arabia, Mesopotamia, Yemen and Tripoli the 
C.U.P. organization was more weak and fairly unpopular -an undisputed indication 
that even after the July revolution the European committees remained the virtual 
bases of Unionist power.20 
Following the Near East crisis the clubs gradually assumed a more distinctly Turkish 
and anti-Christian character. Under the new disposition, the Unionist clubs were 
manned almost exclusively by Moslems and Christian recruitment was restricted 
considerably. In their regular gatherings these Moslem associations promoted 
Turkish traditions and raised regular pecuniary contributions for the C.U.P. 
headquarters. Among their principal considerations were the counteraction of 
Christian nationalist trends which, they felt, threatened Ottoman territorial integrity 
and the Committee's political primacy.21 
Apart from these first political activities, the Committee gave precedence to securing 
its political position in the country. To achieve this objective, the Unionists sought to 
ensure a commanding majority in the Ottoman Parliament and deal with the Ottoman 
political establishment. 
3.3 Unionists, Macedonian Christians and the Question of Parliamentary 
Elections 
The Ottoman Parliamentary elections were a crucial political challenge for the C.U.P. 
In the electoral battle, the Committee's main objective was to man the Parliament 
with a large number of deputies sharing the pro-Unionist ideology. 
Of the difficulties and peculiarities of this struggle the Young Turks were aware. The 
Committee recognized that the divided and ill-organized Moslems were more or less 
unaccustomed to such procedures, whereas, the Balkan Christians were far more 
experienced owing to their earlier engagement in old local electoral campaigns.22 
The C.U.P. knew that in order to overcome those deficiencies it would be necessary 
that the elections be held with a suitable electoral law. Published in September, the 
20 P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassyl3-12-1910/Geary to 
M~Mg . 
21 See for further details: I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 118.1/General Consulate of Salomcal21l5-12-
1908/no.1141lPapadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis, E.A.l1908/KW13-11-1908/no.45/p.3 
22 AHMAD (1982, ppA07 -9) in BRAUDE, B., and LEWIS, B., eds. (1982) 
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new Ottoman electoral law established a representative system, which was used to 
favor the Moslem rather the non-Moslem populations. 
It stipulated that the electoral procedure should be conducted on two levels. In the 
first phase, a variable number of 250-750 voters in the local communes was to elect a 
second-degree elector: the representative of the kaza. At the second stage, a group 
of 100-300 second-degree electors would elect a deputy for the Parliament.23 
Having established themselves in the heavily Moslem-inhabited regions, the Young 
Turk Committee concentrated their political propaganda in constituencies where non-
Moslem ethnic communities formed the bulk of the population. In European Turkey, 
to avoid being defeated in the Christian-dominated districts, the Committee applied a 
simple yet instrumental political strategy. Capitalizing upon its political influence, it 
proceeded to reach local understandings with whichever group or faction was willing 
to support pro-Unionist candidates. Hence, the C.U.P. not only managed to turn 
potential opponents into political allies but attempted to playoff one Christian group 
against another with considerable results. 
In the predominantly Christian districts ofEpirus, Macedonia and Albania, the Young 
Turk Committee worked closely with the Albanians, the Vlach nationalist wing and 
the M.R.O. faction of Sandanski. In most of the cases, those local alliances were 
directed against the most dangerous Christian contenders: the Greeks and the pro-
M.R.O.-Right Slavs. In the Macedonian sanjak of Kastoria, for instance, the C.U.P. 
and the Albanians supported the Vlach community against the strong Greek 
element. 24 In Salonica vilayet, the Bulgarian candidates were unpleasantly surprised, 
when they found out that Sandanski, with the tacit consent of the local Young Turk 
Committee, had interfered with the ballot in an apparent effort to secure the election 
of Vlahov and Daltchev: two Macedonians who had been nominated by the M.R.O.-
Left.25 
On the other hand, the voting procedure had been anything but normal. Irregularities 
were common and in many cases the Committee had used the state administration to 
23 DAKIN (1966, p.391) 
24 The c.u.P. did not hesitate to seek help from foreign quarters. In September 1908, Ismail Kemal 
Bey secretly infOlmed the Greek consul in Avlona Verenikis that the c.u.P. had concluded a 
behind-the-scenes agreement with the local Austrian consular authorities to support the election of 
Moslem and Albanian nominees, at the Greeks' expense. I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 99.1.2/Avlona 
Consulate/22/S-10-1908/no.S338N erenikis to Baltazzis/Telegraphic 
25 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l17-11-1908/no.783/Lowther to Grey 
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prevent the Christian populations from participating in the voting. Once more, the 
Greeks and the Bulgarians had the most complaints, not all unwarranted. In the 
Epirote vilayet of Janina, for instance, more than 20,000 Greek peasants had been 
initially obstructed by the authorities from casting their ballot. The Ottomans argued 
with some reason that the vast majority of those ethnic Greeks had not provided 
detailed documentation of their Ottoman citizenship and consequently they had not 
been granted permission to vote. So strained became the relations between Moslems 
and Christians that the government had to allow them to vote.26 
In the province of Mona stir, the local Bulgarians boycotted the elections in the kazas 
ofFlorina and Sorovich. In doing so, they protested against the Ottoman authorities' 
practice of designating the constituencies in such manner as to divide the local 
Bulgarian-Macedonian electorate and thwart the proportionate election of Bulgarian 
deputies.27 
True, the Unionist attempt to win the parliamentary elections was facilitated by the 
ethno-political divisions between Greeks, Bulgarians, Serbs and Albanians. It was 
ethnic divisions and inter-racial distrust that did not leave real scope for inter-Balkan 
understandings on an electoral basis. The poll result in the vilayet of Kosovo was an 
instructive case. The Moslem Albanian element exploited the failure of the Serb and 
Bulgarian communities to reach an electoral agreement and gained 15 seats. On the 
other hand, the Macedonian Serbs elected 3 deputies while the Bulgarians none.28 
To aggravate the situation, political factionalism was rife in all Christian ethnic 
groups. In Macedonia, the local Bulgarian population had been divided between the 
supporters of the pro-Unionist group of Sandanski and the nominees of the M.R.O.-
Right. In the Greek camp, the situation was no different. In the Macedonian districts 
of Veroia and Naoussa, the uncompromising struggle between warring Greek 
factions weakened the position of Hellenism to the benefit of the local Vlach and 
Bulgarian communities. 29 
26 See: I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 99.1.2.1General Consulate of Janina/3/16-10-1908/no.584/Agonakis to 
Baltazzis, LA.Y.E.l190SlFile 99.1.2/General Consulate of Janina/l1124-10-1908/no.603/Agonakis 
to Baltazzis, LA.Y.E.l1908/File 99.1.3lPreveza Consulate/27/9-11-1908/no.6593/Antoniadis to 
Baltazzis, B.D. vo1.5 p.279. ABBOTT (1909, p.l08) 
27 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 99.1.1./Monastir Consulate/24/6-11-1908/no.6008/Dimaras to Baltazzis 
28 LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 118.11Uskub Consulate/12/25-12-1908/no.672/Barakis to Baltazzis. KANSU 
(1997, pp.245-7) 
29 I.A.Y.E.l190SlFile S5.3/General Consulate of Salonica!Kanellopoulos to BaltazzisIReport on 
Events and Conditions in Salonica District for the Year 1905/p.14 
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The bulk of Macedonian Christians had not been pleased with the process, far less 
with the result, of the Ottoman elections. Objectively, in many cases the electoral 
procedure did almost exceed the limit of outright misconduct and distorted the real 
ethnological composition of the local populations to Unionist benefit. 30 Moreover, 
the Committee's tendency to retain for itself the exclusive right to chose the second-
round nominees who would elect the deputies became an additional point of friction 
between Christians and Young Turks.31 
In the circumstances, Christian remonstrations against the Ottoman administration 
and the Committee were inevitable, particularly from Greek and Bulgarian quarters. 
On 22 October 1908, the Greek Patriarch Joachim III addressed a letter of strong 
protest to Kiamil Pasha against the new Constitutional regime: 
"Ces exces commis au cours des elections des Deputes prouvent manifestement que 
la Gouvernment constitutionnel s'est trace un plan secret en vue de persecuter Ie 
Patriarchat et la nation Grecs, plan bien pire que celui qu'on suivait sous la regime de 
I' absolutisme. ,,32 
A month later, Ottoman Greek opposition reached its peak when the influential 
Greek community of Constantinople organized mass demonstrations in the capital, 
which were dispersed by Turkish police.33 The Bulgarians also made strong 
complaints of their own. On 13 January 1909, during a session of the Ottoman 
Parliament, in the presence of the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha and the Minister of the 
Interior Hilmi Pasha, the Bulgarian deputy from Monastir Panche Dorev accused the 
government "of having cheated the Bulgarians in the elections".34 
Foreign observers however did not appear to fully sympathize with Christian 
protests. The British Consul-General in Salonica Lamb, although he accepted that in 
many cases the Greek and Bulgarian remonstrations were indeed well-founded, 
reported that in the Ottoman elections ''the principle of proportionate representation 
of all races and creeds has been adhered to.,,35 
30 B.D. vo1.5 p.290 
31 P.Ro. F.O. 19512328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/6-2-1909ILamb 
to LowtherlMemorandum on Macedonian Events for 1908 
32 F.O 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./2-11-1908/no.7291L0wther to Grey/enclosure no.2 
33 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./24-11-1908/no.80I/Lowther to Grey 
34 F.o. 88119503 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./25-1-1909/no.49/Lowther to Grey 
35 F.O. 88119492 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/10-1l-1908/no. 
149ILamb to Lowther 
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The result of the Ottoman elections gave the pro-Unionist parliamentary group a 
significant majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Out of 288 seats, the Turks gained 
147, the Arabs 60, the Albanians 27, the Greeks 26, the Armenians 14, the Slavs 10 
and the Jews 4. More significantly, the vast majority of those deputies were elected 
under the Unionist banner. 
The outcome of the Ottoman Parliamentary elections had a dual significance. First, it 
unveiled the fundamental conflict of political interests between the Committee and 
the bulk of Macedonian Christians. Second, in the context of internal Ottoman 
politics, it secured for the Unionists a strong influence on the Chamber thereby 
enabling the pro-C.U.P. parliamentary party to assume an important role in Ottoman 
political affairs. On 17 December 1908, the Chamber of Deputies held its opening 
convention. 
3.4 From the July 1908 Revolution to the April 1909 Counterrevolution: the 
Palace, the Porte, the Committee of Union and Progress and the Struggle for 
Power 
Notwithstanding the magnificent victory of the Young Turk Constitutional forces, the 
July revolution instead of clarifying the internal situation in Turkey, inaugurated a 
transitional period of political instability and conflict. Upon prevailing in Macedonia 
in July 1908 the C.U.P. became the most influential organization in the Empire. 
However, in order to establish its dominance in Ottoman politics the Committee had 
to overcome the opposition of two traditionally powerful political centers: the Palace 
and the Sublime Porte. 
3.5 The Palace and the Committee 
In Constantinople, the rivalry between the Court and the Unionist Committees was 
soon to reach its most decisive point. Many Unionists shared the conviction that 
Sultan Abdul Hamid II was capable of calling Bulgaria or Russia to occupy Turkish 
territory in order to exploit the absence of the army from the capital and abolish the 
Constitution. 36 The C.U.P. was right to suspect the Monarch. At the end of July, 
36 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 91. 1. l.1Constantinople Legationl20/2-9-1908/no.817/Gryparis to Baltazzis and 
TEMBERLEY (1934, p.187) 
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sensing that the age of his absolute hegemony was about to end, the Sultan made a 
last attempt to maintain his primacy in Ottoman politics. In contravention of 
Constitutional article 27, Abdul Hamid tried to acquire the right to appoint not only 
the Seikh-ul-Islam and the Grand Vizier but also the Ministers of War and Navy. In 
this effort the Monarch was unsuccessful, for the Young Turk Committee and the 
Sublime Porte formed a united front of opposition to prevent the Sultan violating the 
Constitution and increasing his powers.37 
When this last endeavor met with failure, Abdul Hamid II was left with no alternative 
but to admit defeat. The establishment of a Parliamentary regime a few months later 
dealt the most serious blow to the Sultan's authority. From this point onwards and 
up to the counterrevolution of Apri11909, the leader of the Palace had to abandon his 
energetic struggle against the Committee and hope that an internal anti-Constitutional 
movement or a foreign power would come to his rescue. 
Despite his internal embarrassments, the Monarch had not forfeited all his authority 
and prestige. The Hamidian establishment had ruled the country over the past thirty 
years. Its influence upon a considerable number of civil functionaries, governmental 
officials, army cadres, the conservative religious ulema class and the Moslem masses 
could not vanish overnight. The Anatolian Moslems and Curd tribesmen, for 
example, could hardly renounce their blind allegiance to the sacred person of Abdul 
Hamid II who, as Sultan and Caliph, had become the symbol of Ottoman national 
struggle against the European semi-colonial activities in the Empire.38 
That the Hamidian establishment remained an important political factor even after the 
July revolution became visible in October. A mutiny among the pro-Sultan 
praetorian guard of Yildiz in conjunction with the organization of two large 
demonstrations on the part of the conservative religionist groups in the capital proved 
that the Sultan's influence on the armed forces and the Moslem public opinion was 
far from negligible. 
In February 1909, a conservative religionist group under the leadership of Abdoullah 
Effendi formed the Ittihat Muhammendi (Mohammedan Union). Its main objective 
37 LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 91.2/Constantinople Legation/30112-8-l908/no. 741/Gryparis to Baltazzis and 
P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.997 
38 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.4/Constantinople Legation/I 9/l-9-l 908/no.790/Gryparis to Baltazzis, F.O. 
881/9811 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l17-2-1909ILowther to Grey/General Report on Turkey 
for 1908 and MANGO (1972, p.108) 
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was to "establish a regime for the protection and promotion of the Sheriat and 
Islam." The Mohammedan supporters embraced the concept that the only 
revitalizing force in Ottoman society was Islam rather than the westernized 
institutional reforms of the Committee. The Union was instrumental in rallying the 
anti-Unionist forces in the country. Its positions found expression in the newspaper 
Valkan of the Nakshibendi Dervish order.39 
Unquestionably, the masterstroke of the Mohammedan Union was the organization 
of the counterrevolution that erupted in the capital against the Young Turks on 13 
April 1909. Dismissed officials and army cadres, anti-Unionist deputies and a number 
of pro-Sultan Albanian soldiers took an active part in the counterrevolution. By the 
end of April 1909, these forces, which had temporarily taken over the capital, were 
utterly defeated when the Macedonian army under General Mahmud Shevket Pasha 
marched into Constantinople and restored the Young Turk Constitutional regime. 
The abortive counterrevolution led to the deposition of the Sultan and his 
replacement by his brother Mehmet Reshid V: a puppet of the Young Turk 
Committee. 
3.6 The Porte Connection 
The Young Turks were well aware of their political inability to administer the 
country. Therefore, they were very hesitant to form a Unionist Cabinet in order to 
fulfill their fundamental political bids and promote the necessary reforms in central 
government, administration and society. On the other hand, they had no desire to 
totally abandon the executive power to the politicians of the Sublime Porte. Such a 
step would nullify their right and tendency to control the affairs of the Empire. In the 
end, the Young Turk Committee decided to allow the bureaucrats of the Sublime 
Porte to hold the executive whilst it maintained the position of a ''watchdog'' of the 
Constitutional regime. 40 
Supported by the Committee, Kiamil Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier on 6 August. 
The new Grand Vizier, liberal and prO-British, had an admirable record of experience 
in statehood and political struggle against Abdul Hamid II.41 The rise of Kiamil 
39 ZURCHER (1993, p.l 00) 
40 AHMAD (1969, pp.15-8) 
41 FINDLEY (1980, p.300) 
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Pasha to power was an important development since it meant that, for once in 
Ottoman history, the traditional class of career politicians, bureaucrats and diplomats 
assumed control of the country free from the iron hand of the supreme ruler. 
The Kiamil Pasha government mainly consisted of well-known Porte politicians.42 
Tewfik Pasha became President of the State Council and Foreign Minister;43 Rejeb 
Pasha Minister ofWar;44 Ziya Pasha Financial Minister; Hasan Fehmi Pasha Minister 
of Justice and Cemaluddin Effendi Seikh-ul-Islam. Hakki Bey and Reshid Akif 
Pasha, who assumed the Ministry of the Interior and Public Instruction respectively, 
were supporters of Young Turk political positions. 
The chief undertaking of the new government was to reform and modernize the 
Ottoman Empire's civil-bureaucratic institutions. The Kiamil Pasha administration 
gave precedence to the fields of economy, taxation, army, education, judiciary, 
communications, railways. Special attention was also given to the reform of the 
Ottoman administration and public utilities by foreign technocrats. Steps were taken 
for the abolition of the capitulations: the irksome reminder to the Ottoman Empire of 
its semi-colonial status on international scene.45 
From the first month of the new Cabinet's period in office, the incompatibility 
between the policies of the Kiamil Cabinet and the Young Turk Committee's practice 
of interfering with the executive authority became discernible. 46 In reality, the only 
convergence point between the Kiamil Cabinet and the C.U.P. was the mutual desire 
to prevent the Sultan retrieving its absolute power. 
Kiamil Pasha did not hold any illusions that both groups espoused divergent tactics 
and served conflicting political interests. Hence, he never placed much confidence in 
the viability of this political collusion with the Committee, which he tended to 
consider a provisional and painfully unavoidable evil. The new Grand Vizier had a 
42 Following the Constitutional provisions and spirit, Kiamil included in his Cabinet two Christians: 
the Greek Mavrogordato Effendi as Minister of Mines and Forests and Gabriel Effendi, an 
Annenian, for the Ministry of Public Works. P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.1011 
43 Tewfik Pasha had been holding the Foreign Ministry portfolio since 1895. 
44 Rejeb Pasha died shortly after the composition of the Kiamil Cabinet and was replaced by Ali 
Riza Pasha. 
45 F.O. 881/9353 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l18-8-1908/no.494ILowther to Grey, P.P.A.P. CV 
1909, pp.l016-1017 
46 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l12-12-1908/no.855ILowther to Grey, F.O. 
88119858 Memorandum Respecting the New Regime in Turkey/16-5-1911IForeign 
Office/Knatcbbull-Hugessen to Grey 
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low opinion of Young Turk ability to run the country. Based on this perception, he 
failed to take into serious consideration the potential growth of Unionist political 
influence. 47 
In this latter point Kiamil Pasha erred. Porte officials were soon to understand that 
they would have a very difficult time in dealing with the C.U.P. In fact, from the 
outset, the Young Turks had been astute enough not to renounce their right to 
intervene in Ottoman politics. A few days after the Macedonian revolution, a 
European correspondent asked Enver Bey why the Ottoman military, instead of 
confining itself to its conventional tasks, was striving to introduce liberal political 
institutions in the Empire. "It was the duty of the army to do so for the Turkish 
officers were the most enlightened and best educated class in the country", the 
Young Turk official retorted instantly. 48 
Mutual mistrust soon grew further. Between late July and September 1908, the 
Unionist leaders Talat Bey, Enver Bey, Rahmi Bey, Nazim Bey and Ahmet Riza Bey 
had taken the initiative in holding negotiations with the Macedonian committees of 
the local ethnic groups respecting all issues emanating from the Constitutional 
change. The Committee had also invited the Macedonian Christians to submit 
memoranda with their political positions and aims. 
The Kiamil Pasha government construed the move as an explicit attempt on the part 
of the Unionist Committee to usurp the official state organs and demonstrate its 
intention to act independently in Ottoman politics.49 The period of polarization and 
political rivalry between the Kiamil Cabinet - the acknowledged Ottoman government 
- and the Committee - the most powerful body in the country - had commenced.50 
In his battle against the Unionist bid for political predominance, Kiamil Pasha could 
count on liberal support. On 14 September 1908, the Liberal Union party was 
formed (Ahrar Firkasi) under the leadership of Sabaheddin and the Albanian Ismail 
Kemal Bey. It favored administrative devolution and respect for the minority 
47 AHMAD (1969, pp.27-8, 31) 
48 F.O. 881/9353 St. Petersburg Embassy to F.O.l28-7-1908/no.339/0'Beiroe to Grey 
49 I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 39.4/Constantinople Legationl1911-9-1908/no.790/Gryparis to Baltazzis and 
F.O. 881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.O.l24-8-1908/no. 72/Buchanan to Grey 
50 For a lucid exposition on this system of 'dual leadership' in Ottoman politics see: SKOPETEA 
(1992, pp.165-6) 
The Beginning of the Young Turk Era 60 
----~--~------~------------------------------
nationalities' privileges. The Liberal Union party, despite its modest performance in 
the elections, became the center of the Unionist opposition and upheld Kiamil Pasha. 
During the Balkan crisis over the annexation of Bosnia and Bulgarian independence 
the dispute between the Kiamil Cabinet and the Young Turks was aggravated. The 
most partisan members of the Committee went as far as to accuse Kiamil Pasha of 
exploiting the questions of Bosnia and Bulgaria to cement his political position in the 
interior. 51 In the fIrst two months of 1909, however, the Ottoman Cabinet succeeded 
in coming to terms with Austria and forced the Bulgarians to give in to Ottoman 
demands for economic compensation. Encouraged by his success on the diplomatic 
level, Kiamil Pasha decided to deal with the C.U.P. opposition in the interior. 
Internal political conditions, for once, seemed to favor the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet. In 
early January, when a group of Arab deputies contemplated the formation of an Arab 
parliamentary party to claim proportionate representation in the administration and 
the Parliament, a breach occurred between the C.U.P. and the Arab deputies. 
Hussein Cahit, the influential Unionist editor of the Tanin, the Constantinople-based 
organ of the Committee, denounced this idea as an attempt to establish a monolithic 
Arab party on national grounds. 52 It appears that this development induced the 
Grand Vizier to believe that the Arabs would withdraw their support from the 
Committee and might side with his liberals thereby challenging the C.U.P. supremacy 
in the Parliament. 53 
The Grand Vizier nevertheless, realized that the C.U.P. power lay not only in the 
Chamber of Deputies but also in the military and in particular, in the II-III European 
Army corps. Following its controversy with the Arab party, the Committee's 
position in the Chamber had considerably weakened. At this juncture, it seemed that 
if Kiamil Pasha was able to isolate the C.U.P. from the Ottoman European Army 
corps he could defeat the Committee and suppress its strong opposition. 
To this effect, from January 1909, Kiamil Pasha began to remove selected pro-C.U.P. 
battalions from the Macedonian army. On 10 February 1909, the Grand Vizier made 
a bolder move. He replaced the pro-Unionist Ministers of War and Navy Ali Riza 
51 Refer to chapter 5. 
52 KA YALI (1997, pp.70-1) 
53 F.O. 881/9503 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./14-1-1909/no.29/Lowther to Grey 
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Pasha and Arif Pasha with the commander of the II Thracian army Nazim Pasha and 
the Vice-Admrral Hussein Husni Pasha.54 
By underestimating the Committee's influence on the Ottoman Chamber Kiamil 
Pasha committed a serious mistake. As a protest against Kiamil's 'unconstitutional' 
move in dismissing his Ministers without submitting the subject to the Ministerial 
Council, the Minister of the Interior Hussein Hilmi Pasha resigned. Tewfik Pasha, 
Ziya Pasha, Hasan Fehmi Pasha and Rewfik Bey followed him. On C.U.P. initiative 
the Cabinet crisis was discussed in the Parliament. During a vote of no confidence 
Kiamil Pasha was defeated when his parliamentary allies, many of whom had been 
intimidated by the Committee, abandoned him. Kiamil Pasha resigned on 14 
February 1909. 
Once again, the C.U.P. did not assume power and appointed Hilmi Pasha, the former 
Macedonian Inspector-General, new Grand Vizier. The downfall of the Kiamil Pasha 
Cabinet did not affect the elusive system of 'dual leadership' . As a consequence, the 
struggle between the legitimate central government and the occult C.U.P. continued 
to entangle Ottoman politics. 
54 F.O. 88119531 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./6-4-1909/no.249ILowther to Grey/enclosure no.l, 
F.O. 88119503 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/IS-2-1909/no.102ILowther to Grey and also F.O. 
88119503 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./19-2-1909/no.11 OlLowther to Grey 
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CHAPTER IV 
CONSTITUTIONAL CHANGE IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE AND THE 
ATTITUDE OF BRITAIN, AUSTRIA-HUNGARY, RUSSIA AND 
GERMANY 
The Constitutional change in the Ottoman Empire could not but impress the 
European peoples and their governments. Abdul Hamid's II autocratic regime had 
finally fallen after more than three decades in power and the Young Turks had 
committed themselves to reforming and modernizing Europe's "big sick man". 
Within this atmosphere of optimism, European agents confirmed from Macedonia the 
miraculous dissolution of the Christian bands and the hardly imaginable pacification 
of the most troublesome region in the Balkans. Under the new conditions and taking 
into account the Unionists' principal commitment to end foreign interference in 
Ottoman matters the Powers started to contemplate whether the continuation of 
European control in Macedonia was still advisable. l 
4.1 Great Britain 
In Great Britain, the Young Turk revolution caused public enthusiasm. Britain and 
the Ottoman Empire had a long tradition of political friendship and many circles in 
London believed, rightly, that British support to Constitutional Turkey would be 
useful for raising English prestige among the Moslem population of India. 2 
On the other hand, the new conditions in Turkey offered an ideal opportunity to the 
British government to disengage itself from the irksome Macedonian imbroglio and 
restore its influence on the Porte. Three months before the July revolution, the 
British Embassy in Constantinople was concluding that London's practice of 
propping up the Macedonian reforms had considerably weakened Britain's position in 
the Ottoman Empire and had damaged English commercial interests.3 Not less 
I P.P.A.P. CV 1909, pp.1012-1013 
2 F.G. 881/9422 Memorandum Respecting Turkish Revolution and Its Consequences/Foreign 
Office/I-3-1909ffilley to Grey 
3 In April 1908, Lord Fitzmaurice, the able translator of British Embassy in Constantinople. wrote: 
"During the last few years our policy, if I may so call it, in Turkey has been, and for some time to 
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embarrassing for Britain's position, the reform program had failed to ameliorate the 
Macedonian plight. As Grey admits in his Memoirs: 
"the efforts to improve Turkish government in Macedonia had little interest by 1908 
and no importance. In fact, they were intolerably wearisome, very disagreeable and 
painfully futile.,,4 
The British administration was somewhat perplexed when on 17 August the Austro-
Hungarian government announced its decision to withdraw the Austrian officers from 
Macedonia. However, the British F.O. was well aware that, in the 10ng-teI1Il, the 
establishment of a constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire could encourage the 
Moslems in India and Egypt, who were under British authority, to claim a 
constitution for themselves. According to a more ominous scenario, those 
populations were likely even to attempt to imitate the Ottoman revitalization and 
pursue their political and national emancipation from British rule. 5 
For the time being though, the British policy-makers sought to retrieve their 
paramount position in Constantinople, lost to Germany during the period of 
Macedonian reforms. The developments that gave a significant boost to Anglo-
Ottoman relations were the accession of the pro-British Kiamil Pasha to power and 
the Austrian coup in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Kiamil Pasha, apart from his British 
sympathies, was totally convinced that the policy of Ferid Pasha's Cabinet to grant 
large-scale commercial facilities to German firms in the Ottoman Empire was 
damaging to the interests of the Porte. 
In this, the Grand Vizier was correct since the steadfast tendency of Berlin to provide 
Constantinople with only limited political support in its Balkan problems by no means 
justified such important concessions on the part of Sublime Porte.6 In addition, the 
annexation of Bosnia by Vienna had generated Moslem hostility against the German 
coalition. As a repercussion, Ottoman public opinion and the Cabinet rallied around 
the British with the hope that their old friends would not allow Austria to dominate 
the Balkans and infringe Ottoman sovereign rights in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
come will be, to attempt the impossible task of furthering our commercial interests while pursuing a 
cause (in Macedonia, Armenia, the Turco-Persian boundary, etc.) which the Sultan interprets as pre-
eminently hostile in aim and tendency ... ". Cited in KENT (1984, p.178) in KENT, ed., (1984) 
4 GREY (1925, p.172) 
5 F.O. 88119422 Memorandum, LA YE.ll9081File 41.2/General Consulate of Alexadria/l6/29-9-
1908/no.4446lPolitis to Baltazzis, B.D. vo1.5 p.311 
6 LA. Y .E.I 1908IFile 91.2/Constantinople Legationl14/27 -8-1908/no. 741/Gryparis to Baltazzis 
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British policy during the annexation crisis should be examined in two respects: first, 
in favoring the formation of a Balkan League with the participation of Turkey in 
order to prevent Austrian political penetration in the Balkans; second, as regards the 
Concert of Europe, in reconciling the conflicting interests between the Powers 
themselves and preserving European peace by maintaining the existing power 
equilibrium between the two major coalitions: the Entente and the Alliance. 7 
Until the downfall of the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet, London enjoyed a paramount 
position in Constantinople. Following the April counterrevolution though the 
involvement of the pro-German military party in Ottoman politics was to detach the 
Ottoman Empire from the British orbit and progressively drive her close to the 
German zone of influence. 
4.2 Austria-Hungary 
Unlike Great Britain, the initial reaction of Austria-Hungary with regard to the 
Young Turk revolution was one of apparent scepticism and reserve. The cautious 
attitude taken by the Ballhausplatz, was justifiable on the grounds that Austria was at 
the time the Power possessing the most vital interests in the Balkan peninsula. For 
some time, the Dual Monarchy had been busying herself with more than one aspect of 
the Balkan tangle: Bosnia-Herzegovina, the sanjak, the complicated questions of 
Macedonia and Albania and since January 1908 the railway project. 
As soon as the Constitutional forces assumed power in Constantinople, Aehrenthal 
attempted to avoid any inopportune European interference with Ottoman affairs. He, 
therefore, discouraged the Russians and the British from putting forward their new 
Macedonian reform scheme.8 The Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister feared that if 
the Great Powers continued to exercise great pressure on the Sublime Porte to accept 
the Reva1 program it was possible that tension might resurface between the Powers 
themselves on account of their contradictory Macedonian interests. In addition, 
Vienna seemed to believe that a new round of European intervention could stir up 
7 HARDINGE (1947, p.169) 
8 P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.1012. According to Hardinge, the Reval meeting and its political product 
had worried Austria and Germany. The Central Powers were very apprehensive that the Anglo-
Russian understanding "on Asiatic questions might be extended to questions of European 
continental politics." HARDINGE (1947, p.157) 
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Moslem fanaticism against the Macedonian Christians and create explosive conditions 
in the three provinces.9 
Substantially, by mid-August, the Austrians could not find any perceptible interest 
and cause in continuing the pursuit of the Macedonian reform policy. On 17 August 
1908, Aehrenthal informed the Powers of his decision to grant the Austrian officers 
in Uskub province ''un]jmited leave of absence". The other Powers followed the 
Austrian example and by October 1908, save the Financial Commission, European 
control had been withdrawn from the three Macedonian provinces. 
The potential establishment of a liberal Parliamentary regime in Turkey which could 
foment Moslem popular agitation in Austrian-held Bosnia-Herzegovina for a similar 
constitutional disposition on a local basis seriously concerned the Vienna Cabinet. 
To eliminate the threat of future Moslem disturbances in Bosnia and secure the 
Austrian position in the province after the apparent Ottoman revival Aehrenthal 
decided to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina. lO 
On the other hand, the Ottoman Constitutional change did not seem injurious to 
Austrian interests. Unarguably, the Austrian policy-makers did not believe that the 
Unionist-Albanian understanding could endanger Austria's position and interests in 
Albania. Austria foresaw that this cooperation would be short-lived and unless the 
Committee was prepared to satisfy the Albanian demand for a greater measure of 
political autonomyl (which Vienna correctly doubted) Austrian influence in the 
Albanian lands was bound to remain strong. l2 The only issue on which Austria 
should expect some strenuous Ottoman resistance was the Novibazar railway 
project;13 but even there an accommodation was not totally ruled out, particularly in 
so far as the Ottoman military party supported an understanding with Vienna as the 
best means to check Balkan Slav expansionism. l4 
9 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 121.2Nienna Legation!8/21-8-1908/no.390/Manos to Baltazzis 
10 BRIDGE (I 972b, pp.106-7) 
11 SKENDI (1967, p.344) 
12 LA. Y.E.l1908/File I 21.2Nienna Legation! I 5/28-8-1 908/noAO llManos to Baltazzis and 
LA. Y .E.I 1908IFile 121.2Nienna Legation!27/9-9-1908/no.440/Manos to Baltazzis 
13 F.o. 88119811 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/17-2-l909/Lowther to Grey/General Report on 
Turkey for 1908 
14 It is important that the Ottoman military party, headed by Mahmud Shevket Pasha and his group 
of German-trained officers, canvassed the idea that the Ottoman Empire should conclude an 
understanding with Austria-Hungary to counteract the Slavs providing that Vienna did not lay claim 
on Ottoman territory. In this context, Shevket Pasha supported the construction of the Novibazar 
railway on the grounds that it would enable the Austrian armies to intervene in the south Balkans 
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From this perspective, Aebrenthal's decision to recall his Macedonian officers seems 
perfectly reasonable, if not imperative. It was not only political considerations that 
had propelled the Austrian good-will move toward Young Turkey. Marquis de 
Pallavicini, the Austrian ambassador to the Porte, espoused the opinion that Austria-
Hungary could take advantage of the constitutional change in Constantinople to 
pursue a renewed economic cooperation with the Ottoman Empire. In a few years' 
time, Austrian commercial firms could expect to acquire at least some of the 
extensive privileges that the Germans had been enjoying during the Hamidian 
period. 15 
The decision of Austria-Hungary to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina created a rupture 
between Vienna and the Sublime Porte. True, it undermined the Ottoman authority 
in the Balkans whereas it consolidated the Austrian position in the two provinces. 
The only real damage to Austrian interests accrued from the imposition of the 
Ottoman embargo on 11 October 1908 which injured Austrian commerce in the 
Ottoman Empire. 16 
The Austro-Turkish agreement of 26 February 1909 settled the question of Bosnia 
and brought bilateral relations back to normal standing. Nevertheless, the Sublime 
Porte never entirely abandoned its attitude of circumspection and fear of Austria's 
policy in Macedonia and Albania. Yet, as the Ottoman Empire gravitated towards 
the German coalition Constantinople attempted to correlate its Macedonian struggle 
against Slavic expansionism with Austria's anti-Slav tendencies. 
4.3 Russia 
In Russia's long history of Balkan entanglements rarely had an important political 
change in the Ottoman Empire generated good feelings in St. Petersburg. The 
Young Turk revolution, however, was a different and unique case. Certainly, the 
Imperial Russian government could be hardly displeased with the C.U.P. commitment 
to reform Ottoman administration and improve the position of the Christian 
and prevent Slavic expansion in case that Turkey-in-Europe was attacked by the Balkan Slav 
countries. From these views, the Ottoman military party did not move even after the annexation 
crisis. LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/24/6-9-1908/no.392IBaraklis to BaltazzislPolitical, 
LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/23/S-1-1909/no. 700IBaraklis to BaltazzislPolitica1 
15 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 121.2Nienna LegationiIS/28-8-1908/noAOllManos to Baltazzis and BRIDGE 
(1984, p.37) 
16 F.O. 881/9492 Vienna Embassy to F.O.l24-11-1908/no.192/Carnegie to Grey 
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nationalities in the Empire. Unionist success in pacifying Macedonia had convinced 
the Russians that the Young Turks deserved at least an opportunity to prove their 
po litical merit. 
In reality, the Young Turks had saved the Imperial Court from a great deal of 
trouble. Senior Russian diplomats acknowledged that in taking the reform burden off 
British and Russian shoulders the Turkish revolution had contributed to preventing 
the growth of tension among the Powers on account of their juxtaposing Macedonian 
policies and interests. 
Charikov, the assistant Foreign Minister, claimed that the Young Turks were far 
better qualified to reform Turkey than Europe itself, for they alone were capable of 
eliciting the cooperation of the Moslem communities in implementing the 
Macedonian reforms. The Macedonian Moslems were determined to oppose any new 
reform scheme unless they had tangible guarantees from the capital that such a policy 
would not affect their privileged position vis-a-vis the local Christians. The only 
decision-making body in the Ottoman Empire currently possessing the influence and 
power to provide those guarantees was the Young Turk Committee. 17 
Izvolsky, even though annoyed by Austria's inclination to assume unilateral initiatives 
in issues of general European interest with a view "to be one step in front of the other 
Powers and come to terms with the C.U.p.,,18 did not raise objections to Aehrenthal's 
proposal for lifting the Macedonian control. In so far as the C.U.P. was successful in 
accommodating the interests of the Moslems and Christians in the Balkans Russia 
would not interfere with Ottoman affairs. 
On the other hand, the Russians held no illusions that, in case the Young Turks failed 
to safeguard Macedonian welfare the Christian ethnic groups and their metropolitan 
states would resume their attacks against the status quo in the peninsula. Of this 
danger the Russian government was very apprehensive. Any ominous development 
in the Balkans could put European peace in jeopardy and hinder Russia's reform 
efforts for financial recovery and military reorganization. In the end of July 1908, 
Izvolsky addressed a memorandum to the European Powers suggesting that they 
17 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 92.1/St. Petersburg Legation/31/13-8-1908/no.335/Argiropoulos to Baltazzis 
18 F.O. 881/9353 Marienbad to F.O.l27-8-1908/no.114/Goschen to Grey 
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should reserve their right to intervene in Macedonia anew, should, for any reason, the 
position of the Macedonian Christians not improve under the Unionist regime. 19 
Furthermore, despite the first encouraging signs of the Young Turk revolution in 
Macedonia, many Russian officials viewed with overt circumspection Unionist efforts 
to establish a Constitutional and Parliamentary regime in the Ottoman Empire. Prince 
Urussov, Russian representative in Vienna, foresaw that "the Constitution would 
shortly degenerate into a comedy from which very little will be to the benefit of the 
Christians. ,,20 
The decision of the Ottoman government to impose the use of Turkish in all 
secondary schools and abolish the teaching of Slavic languages exacerbated Russian 
misgivings. Toward the end of August, Novoye Vremya (New Day) published an 
article under the title "Macedonia and Young Turks". The semi-official newspaper, 
which usually reflected the positions of Russian governmental circles, sent a clear 
message to the C.U.P.: ''New Turkey by attempting to harm the Slavic language, a 
question that even the old regime had not dared to touch, is running the risk of 
finding among the Slavs no more friends but sworn enemies. The Slavs will never 
acquiesce to their Turkification.,,21 
In the subsequent months, Russian fears that the Young Turks' policies would not 
satisfy Ba1kan Christian expectations proved well-founded. Between October 1908 
and Apri11909 nevertheless, Russia lost much of her interest in Young Turk-Ba1kan 
Christian relations. In that period, the Imperial government busied itself with the key 
Bosnian question and strove to frustrate Austrian strivings to dominate the Ba1kans. 
Russia's principal priority was now to bring about the establishment of a powerful 
anti-Austrian bloc between the Ba1kan Slav states and the Ottoman Empire to 
prevent a future Macedonian march on the part of Vienna. As an outcome, during 
the annexation crisis, the Russian government had to discourage Serb and 
Montenegrin expansionist aspirations in south Ba1kans and uphold Turkey-in-
Europe. 22 
19 LA. Y.E.l1908/File 92.lISt. Petersburg LegationJ26/8-8-1908/no.312/ Argiropoulos to Baltazzis, 
P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.1 003 
20 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 121.2Nienna LegationJ301l2-8-1908/no.364/Manos to Baltazzis 
21 LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 91.1.2/Constantinople LegationJ281l 0-9-1908/no. 85 5/Gryparis to Baltazzis, 
E.A.l1908/KH/5-9-1908/no.35/pp.8-9 
22 JELA VICR (1991, pp.222-3) 
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4.4 Germany 
During the Macedonian reforms, German policy vis-a-vis the Empire resulted in the 
intimate cooperation between the two countries and the substantial increase of 
Berlin's influence in Constantinople. Sultan Abdul Hamid II and his Moslem subjects 
had truly appreciated the fact that whenever the other Powers mounted pressure on 
the Porte to make further concessions in Macedonia, on most occasions the German 
government had remained aloof and often had refused to join the chorus of European 
intervention. 
In reality, Germany had no real motive to estrange the Ottomans for she had no 
material cause to pursue in the Balkans, far less in Macedonia. Besides, the German 
government of Chancellor von Bulow never placed much faith in the effectiveness of 
the reform scheme. The Berlin government believed that the sole product of the 
entire project had been the weakening of Turkey's Balkan authority and the 
encouragement of Slav aggressiveness.23 
Acknowledging German understanding for his Macedonian susceptibilities the Sultan 
had taken steps to promote the growth of German economic and commercial activity 
in the vast Ottoman market. The construction of the Berlin-Bagdad railway by 
German firms was the culmination of the Turco-German cooperation. At an 
extremely low political cost Germany had managed to become Turkey's most 
important partner in Europe.24 
Such in brief was German policy in Turkey at the time of the Unionist movement. 
The Constitutional change was received mildly in Germany and certainly the 
termination of Macedonian reforms did not disappoint Berlin. 25 That was hardly the 
case however, when the pro-British Kiamil Pasha was appointed Grand Vizier. The 
firm tendency of the new Ottoman Cabinet to re-kindle the old understanding with 
England evoked anxiety in the German embassy in Constantinople. German 
apprehensions grew further when in mid-August Kiamil Pasha stated to a European 
23 G.D.D. vo1.3 pp.257-258, F.O. 881/9316 Berlin Embassy to F.O.l25-3-1908/no.112/Lascelles to 
Grey 
24 For a general discussion on German influence in Turkey during the 1890s and early 1900s see: 
MACFIE (1998, pp. 99-100) 
25 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 94.31Berlin Legationl24/6-8-1908/no.654/Rangavis to Baltazzis 
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correspondent that "Turkish friendship with Germany did not benefit the country in 
any department". 26 
In return, the Germans made little effort to conceal their dissatisfaction with Kiamil' s 
policies. In September 1908, whilst the Ottoman Cabinet was struggling to control 
the increasing upheaval in the Empire stemming from the mounting wave of strikes 
and the revived Greek-Bulgarian controversy in Macedonia over the ecclesiastical 
question, the German embassy was joyous. Commenting on these abnormal 
conditions in Turkey, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the influential German 
ambassador, argued that this situation indicated that a vacuum of power existed in 
Constantinople and the Ottoman government possessed neither the strength nor the 
will to restore order and impose the law.27 
The Austrian coup in Bosnia-Herzegovina complicated Turco-German relations. The 
Germans were bent on supporting Austria but at the same time they strove to 
reconcile the two countries. They were well aware that an irreparable Austro-
Turkish breach could drive the Ottoman Empire away from the German sphere of 
influence. Such a development could only lead to the formation of an anti-German 
Balkan League under the protection of the Entente Powers. It was equally likely to 
undermine Germany's privileged economic position in the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, the German government advised Austria to reconcile Constantinople, the 
ongoing Ottoman embargo notwithstanding. On 5 December 1908, Baron Marschall 
wrote to Berlin: "Aehrenthal would therefore do well not to stick too obstinately to 
the principle of no negotiation before the boycott is removed; for he is making for an 
inevitable rupture (with the Porte) with incalculable complications.,,28 
In the first four months of 1909, Germany reestablished its position in the Ottoman 
Empire. Vienna and Constantinople settled their Bosnian dispute, Kiamil Pasha was 
no longer Grand Vizier and there were encouraging tokens of the Ottoman Empire 
moving close to the German coalition. General von den Goltz, a German officer, was 
entrusted with the reorganization of the Ottoman army and more importantly, since 
April 1909 the pro-Prussian Ottoman military party led by General Mahmud Shevket 
Pasha stepped forward to claim a share in Ottoman politics and government. 
26 LA. Y .E.l1 908IFile 91.2/Constantinople Legationll4/2 7 -8-190 8/no. 741 IGryparis to Baltazzis 
27 I .A. Y.E.l1908IFile 121.I/Constantinople Legationl411 7 -9-1908/no. 891 IGryparis to Baltazzis 
28 G.D.D. vol.3 pp.316-317 
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Such was in brief the reaction of the European Powers most interested in the affairs 
of the Ottoman Empire after the Young Turk revolution. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE QUESTION OF BULGARIAN INDEPENDENCE AND THE 
STRUGGLE FOR MACEDONIA 
5.1 Bulgarian Politics and Young Turk Movement 
The news that a revolution on the part of the Young Turks had taken place in 
Macedonia generated great agitation and mixed feelings in Bulgaria. The conjuncture 
was rather unfortunate for Sofia inasmuch as the Turkish revolution threatened to 
countermand a vital development for Bulgarian interests in Macedonia: the decision 
of Russia and Great Britain in Reval to introduce new reforms in the Macedonian 
judiciary, organize new mobile units and extend the powers of the Inspector-General. 
Hence, from the beginning of the movement the Bulgarians adopted a reticent stance 
towards the revolution and its possible aftermath. 
Governmental sources continued to discourage cooperation with the Young Turks 
even at the closing stages of the movement when the defeat of the Hamidian regime 
seemed inevitable. They rightly feared that a political change in Turkey could 
motivate the Powers to shelve the new reform project on the ground that the new 
Ottoman leadership should be given some time to prove its merit. 
The Young Turk political manifesto for political freedom, administrative devolution 
and proportionate participation of the Christians in the state machine had actually 
failed to make a major impact in Bulgaria. The Bulgarians were exceedingly 
reluctant to accept that a revolution could transform Turkey and alter the status 
between the Moslem ruling ethnicity and the Christian nationalities overnight.1 
Reasonably, Sofia did its utmost to persuade the Powers and especially the British, to 
continue the Reval policy and execute the new Macedonian reforms. On 22 July 
1908, Foreign Minister Paprikov reiterated to Buchanan that his country would avoid 
taking advantage of Turkish embarrassments out of consideration for the Powers' 
efforts to persuade the Sultan to accept the Reval program 2 A few days after the 
I LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 21.5/Sofia Legation/9/22-7-1908/Zalokostats to Baltazzis 
2 F.O. 881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.O'/23-7-1908/no.15/Buchanan to Grey 
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reinstitution of the Ottoman Constitution, the Bulgarian minister in London Stanciov 
expressed to Grey his pessimism for the potential of the Constitutional movement in 
Turkey. After having stressed that "soldiers do not make Constitutions and Turkey 
would never enter an era of improved administration and free government", he urged 
the British Foreign Minister not to abandon the Macedonian reform scheme.3 
The first official reaction from the administration of Premier ~alinov with regard to 
the Turkish revolution came on 29 July 1908. It was moderate in tone and cautious 
in content. After a marathon meeting the Bulgarian Cabinet had arrived at the 
conclusion that the Macedonian question was entering a new phase. Henceforth, the 
Cabinet predicted, the situation in Macedonia was to be influenced by two critical 
factors: the course of the Constitutional regime and the position of Christians in new 
Turkey. The government pledged itself to watch developments in the neighboring 
country closely, reserving its right to modify its policy, if necessary, until the opening 
of the Ottoman Chamber. 4 
Not that the entire political system and public opinion in Bulgaria had viewed the 
revolution in the Ottoman Empire with mistrust. In certain Bulgarian circles, such as 
the Progressive Liberal party, the idea that the Bulgarian-Macedonian element had an 
excellent opportunity to "develop politically and materially under an impartial 
Constitutional regime" had originally gained considerable ground. A numerous and 
prosperous Bulgarian element in Macedonia could become a bridge between the two 
states, diminishing the danger of an armed confrontation. 5 
According to Danev, the leader of the Bulgarian Progressive party, at the time, a war 
with Turkey could be detrimental to Bulgarian national interests. Although he 
believed that Sofia's chief preoccupation should be to remain on good terms with the 
Porte and the Powers, he did not fail to stress that the main threat to peace stemmed 
from the perpetuation of Macedonian misrule and anarchy. In other words, whether 
Bulgaria would strike or not was dependent upon the welfare of Macedonia. 6 
In addition, the same circles reckoned that the Ottoman Constitution could revive the 
role and activity of the Bulgarian Exarchate. Free from Greek and Serb harassment, 
3 F.O. 881/9353 Foreign Office to Sofia Legation/28-7-1908/noAO/Greyto Buchanan 
4 I.A.Y.E'/1908IFile 21.5/Sofia Legation/16/29-7-1908/Zalokostas to Baltazzis 
5 F.O. 88119353 Sofia Legation to F.O./5-8-1908/no.71IBuchanan to Grey/Confidential 
6 I.A.Y.E.l190SlFile 21.5/Sofia Legation/2S/1O-S-190S/Zalokostas to BaltazzislDanev's InteI"Yiew to 
Mir (peace) on Turco-Bulgarian Relations 
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the Bulgarian Church could now continue and complete its religious and cultural 
work in ~acedonia restoring its authority in many disputed villages which had been 
lost to Patriarchate due to band inroads during the ~acedonian struggle.7 
Yet, the most radical groups in the Principality took an opposite view on the political 
change in Turkey. ~acedonia, naturally, was the main cause. Unlike the Young 
Turks, the Bulgarian nationalists scoffed at the idea that the Turkish revolution had 
solved the ~acedonian question. The ~acedonian societies and the largest section 
of public opinion argued that the only satisfactory solution for the Principality was 
the institution of an autonomous status for Macedonia, similar to that of Crete. 
Reflecting this climate, anti-government papers like the Vechema Posta (Evening 
Post) and the Rets (Speech) openly accused the Malinov Cabinet of "inability and 
inertia for having lost a brilliant opportunity to advance Bulgarian rights in 
Macedonia for a second time after 1897." In many cases, certain papers went so far 
as to assert that the time had come for the army, Bulgaria's most formidable and 
expensive weapon, to take the field. 8 
The attitude of the pro-government press, though more sober, did not differ in 
substance from that of the opposition. In the end of July, Vreme (Day), the semi-
official organ of the ruling Democratic Party, came out with an editorial on the 
Constitutional change in Turkey. Its point was unequivocal and direct: "The 
Bulgarians are going to gain nothing from the Turkish Constitution. Still, our ideal is 
Macedonian autonomy.,,9 
When, on 27 July 1908, the Young Turks announced their new education program 
which abolished the use of other languages in Ottoman secondary schools on the 
basis that it encouraged dissident ethnic nationalism and undermined the internal 
coherence of the Ottoman Empire,lo Bulgarian suspicions turned to outright anger. 
Nachovich, a senior politician with experience in Ottoman affairs, warned the 
Committee through the columns of the Rets: 
7 LA.Y.E.l1908/File 88.1.3/General Consulate of Salonica/4117-8-1908/no.790IKanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis 
8 LA. Y.E.l1908/File 21.5/Sofia Legationl16/29-7 -1908/Zalokostats to Baltazzis 
9 LA. Y .E.l1908/File 21.5/Sofia Legationl18/31-7 -1908/Zalokostats to Baltazzis 
lOLA. Y .E.l1908/File 87 .1IConstantinople Legationl30-7 -1908/no. 742/Gryparis to Baltazzis. On the 
question of education however, Bulgaria had no right to protest. In 1906, the government had ~ade 
the use of Bulgarian language obligatory in the primary schools of the cOlmtry. As a result, this act 
led to the suppression of all Greek schools in the Principality. F.O. 88119353 Sofia Legation to 
F.O.l24-8-1908/no.73/Buchanan to Grey 
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"The Young Turks are bound to ascribe the rights not only to citizens but above all 
to nationalities. They have also to abandon the perception of homogenizing the 
ethnic groups under Ottoman identity: a notion opposed by Moslems and Christians 
alike who have repeatedly defended the maintenance of their distinct national 
consciousness and inheritance. ,,11 
Prince Ferdinand and Malinov's administration had sound reasons to believe that the 
establishment of the Young Turk regime ran contrary to Bulgarian interests. They 
were aware that a strong Ottoman rule could bury once and for all the Bulgarian 
expansionist program towards Salonica and eventually Constantinople. It would also 
deprive the Principality of its right to defend the interests of the Bulgarian-
Macedonians;12 a right that Sofia had been allowed to acquire and extend in the 
period of Macedonian reforms. 
What was more, many Bulgarian officials and a large segment of public opinion 
feared that after some years a powerful and modernized Ottoman Empire could 
attack and destroy the Principality.13 At a time however, that the Western Powers 
appeared to have favored or at least not openly opposed the ideas, goals and policy 
of the Young Turk revolutionaries, it was immensely difficult for Bulgaria to show an 
overtly hostile attitude towards the new Ottoman leadership without alienating 
herself from Europe.14 
5.2 Bulgarian Attempts at Re-gaining Momentum in Macedonia. The 
Macedonian Immigration 
In no position to exert real diplomatic or military pressure on the Porte, Bulgaria 
sought to exploit the situation in Macedonia politically whilst the Ottoman Empire 
was still in a state of domestic instability and political transition. Thus, Malinov's 
government initiated a propaganda campaign in Macedonia with a two-fold purpose: 
to strengthen the Bulgarian position in the province and to achieve the largest 
possible representation of the Bulgarian-Macedonian population in the Ottoman 
11 I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 21.5/Sofia LegationJ18/31-7-1908/Zalokostas to Baltazzis 
12 F.O. 881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.O.l5-8-1908/no.71IBuchanan to Grey/Confidential 
\3 F.O. 881/9422 Memorandum 
14 LA. YE.l19081File 92. liSt. Petersburg Legationl26-7-1908/no.312/ Argiropoulos to Baltazzis 
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Parliament. In this attempt, the Bulgarian F.O. relied on the Bulgarian-~acedonian 
element. ls 
Between August and September 1908, several thousand native ~acedonians who had 
fled to the Principality before and during the ~acedonian struggle gradually began to 
return to their homes. This repatriation movement was facilitated by the initiative of 
the Bulgarian government to provide the refugees with leave of absence or 
allowances and the Turkish decision to supply them with all necessary papers for 
their unhindered transportation.16 
Although the majority of the ~acedonian population in Bulgaria was fairly unwilling 
to abandon its safety and go back to Turkey, many doctors, artisans, craftsmen, 
teachers, journalists, scientists, lawyers and even high-ranking S.~.C. cadres like 
Ivanov and Nikolov finally traveled to ~acedonia. It is also true that in their effort 
to augment the immigration movement the Bulgarian authorities did not hesitate to 
use force and threats of imprisonment against those who refused to return to 
~acedonia. 
The product of this campaign was by no means negligible. For the provincial capital 
of Salonica alone, Greek reports calculated the number of ~acedonian settlers to 
5,000.17 Apart from strengthening the ethnological basis and hopefully the political 
influence of the Bulgarian population in ~acedonia, the repatriation movement 
suggested that the Bulgarian government was determined to retain, defend and even 
extend its vital interests in the province even after the Ottoman Constitutional 
change. 
5.3 Quest for Independence 
Undeniably, the most important short-term corollary of the Young Turk revolution in 
regard to ~acedonia had been the termination of the reform period in the three 
vilayets. In Sofia, that development had stirred up considerable disenchantment and 
bitterness. It was felt that, in doing so, the Powers not only gave credit and a rare 
15 LA. Y .E.l1908IFile 121.1/Sofia LegationJlI14-8-1908/no.662/Zalokostas to Baltazzis, 
LA. Y .E.I 1908IFile 85.3/Monastir Consulate/26/8-9-1908/no.941IHa1kiopoulos to Baltazzis, 
LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 59.2/Monastir Consulate/2517-9-1908/no.934IHa1kiopoulos to Baltazzis and F.O. 
881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.O.l5-8-1908/no.71IBuchanan to Grey 
16 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 21.5/Sofia LegationJ31-7-1908/Zalokostas to Baltazzis, LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 
99 .1.2/Constantinople LegationJ29-8-1908/no. 863/Gryparis to Baltazzis/Confidential 
17 E.A.l1908/KH/21-8-1908/no.33/p.8 
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chance to the new Ottoman leadership to establish itself in Turkey but also de facto 
nullified the right of Bulgaria to intervene in ~acedonian matters, causing irreparable 
damage to Bulgarian interests in this Balkan sub-region. 
The Bulgarians were determined not to give way and accept defeat easily. Not, at 
least, without taking something in return that would partly offset Young Turk 
success and secure the future position of their country. From this point onwards, the 
acquisition of an independent status for the Principality took precedence over the 
~acedonian question in the hierarchy of political objectives of the Royal House and 
the Malinov Cabinet. Only if the Principality became a kingdom, the Bulgarians 
argued and some western diplomats in Sofia agreed, could the balance of power 
between the two countries be restored; the Macedonian nationalists would be 
appeased and the possibility of a Turco-Bulgarian conflict would diminish. 18 
In the end of July 1908, the situation in the Principality had become very critica1. 
Soon after the Young Turk revolution, popular agitation had turned to outright wrath 
against the political leadership for its inexplicable passivity towards Turkey. Yet, it 
was not the government of Malinov which received the most criticism and venom but 
the Royal House. Unfortunately for Ferdinand, his absence from the country in the 
crucial days of the Turkish revolution (His Royal Highness was on holiday in 
Hungary) had ignited the harsh attacks of the vociferous Bulgarian press. 19 
Adding to Royal embarrassments, during the first weeks of August, the Geshovist 
nationalists and the refractory Macedonian associations joined the campaign against 
Ferdinand's Macedonian policy. Assuming that the decision for non-interference 
with Turkish matters had been taken on Ferdinand's suggestion, those groups held 
the Prince personally responsible for having squandered a unique chance to annex 
~acedonia to Bulgaria. Such was the discontent in Sofia and elsewhere that in 
August the popularity of the Prince reached its lowest point ever. 20 
The Royal House was in an embarrassing position. Clearly, unless in no distant time 
Sofia received adequate compensation for observing a "correct" attitude towards the 
18 F.O. 88119353 Sofia Legation to F.O./5-8-1908/no. 71/Buchanan to Grey and F.O. 88119353 Sofia 
Legation to F.O'/19-8-1908/no.72/Buchanan to Grey 
19 F.O. 88119353 Sofia Legation to F.O'/19-8-1908/no.72/Buchanan to Grey 
20 I.A.Y.E./1908IFile 121.1ISofia Legationl1l14-9-1908/no.667/Zalokostas to Baltazzis and F.O. 
88119422 Memorandum 
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apparent regeneration of Turkey, Ferdinand's personal regime would most likely 
collapse under the general outcry. Gaining independence therefore was not any more 
solely a matter of political rehabilitation and national vindication of the country. For 
Prince Ferdinand, it had unhappily developed into an inexorable struggle for rule or 
deposition. As an outcome, even the notoriously indecisive Prince had realized that it 
was high time Bulgaria abandoned the detente policy towards the Porte and resorted 
to militant measures. 
By implication, it was not long before the Bulgarian resolve to provoke a rupture 
with Constantinople took a more unequivocal and official character. Indeed, the 
Young Turk decision to impose a uniform education system and suppress the 
Bulgarian-Macedonian secondary schools offered an ideal opportunity. On 19 
August 1908, while briefmg the European representatives in Sofia about Bulgaria's 
attitude on political developments in Turkey, Foreign Minister Paprikov attacked the 
Young Turks: 
"The Young Turks, he declared, are twice Turks, seeking to subdue everything, to 
assimilate all other ethnic communities. They carry out nationalist Turkish policy. 
The Bulgarian government has not been deceived by the initial declarations about 
equality and fraternization between Moslems and Christians. The Turkish 
educational program indicates that by the term equality the Committee of Union and 
Progress implies that the Christians should share the same obligations as the Moslems 
but by no means equal rights ... ,,21 
Henceforth, bilateral relations were to follow a steadily deteriorating course. That 
the Bulgarian government had designated the nascent Turkish regime as 
"assimilatory" and "nationalist" was indicative that the clock had started to tick 
towards collision time. Convincingly enough, the Malinov government had already 
turned decision-making into state policy. The M.R.O. and Exarchist agents were 
instructed to rouse agitation in Macedonia. By activating the M.R.O. militia and 
inciting the Macedonian population to resistance against the new Young Turkish 
regime, the Sofia government "reminded" the Ottoman Empire and the Great Powers 
21 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.4/Sofia Legationl20/2-9-1908/no.535/Zalokostas to Baltazzis 
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that in so far as Bulgaria remained unsatisfied ~acedonia could be neither pacific nor 
secure.
22 
The change in Bulgaria's stance did not pass unnoticed by the Turks. By the end of 
summer, Ottoman officials reported that large quantities of arms and ammunitions 
had been distributed to the Bulgarian-~acedonian population in ~onastir vila yet and 
the activity of Bulgarian provocateurs pointed to the instigation of a general 
~acedonian insurrection: a prelude to more decisive action on the part of Bulgaria. 23 
On 25 August 1908, the vali of ~onastir Fahri Bey wrote to General Administration 
of Salonica: "Bulgarian provocative activity in ~acedonia intends to countermand 
everything the Constitution has achieved so far." 24 
The C.o.P., in no position to enter into a conflict with Bulgaria, was indeed reluctant 
to take preventive, far less punitive, measures against the Bulgarian ~acedonian 
agitators. The C.U.P. knew that Turkey's economic and military situation compared 
unfavorably with that of Bulgaria. Furthermore, in a period that the Young Turks 
needed time to establish their internal position, a Bulgarian-~acedonian insurrection, 
or even worse, a Bulgarian onslaught could destroy the actual bases of Unionist 
power: the Macedonian Committees of Salonica, ~onastir and KoSOVO.25 
Therefore, notwithstanding Paprikov's outburst and the Bulgarian-~acedonian 
agitation the Salonica headquarters continued negotiations with the ~.R. 0., turning a 
deaf ear to Greek remonstrations in regard to Exarchist strivings to usurp Patriarchist 
churches and coerce the Greek-~acedonian communities to adhere to the Bulgarian 
Exarchate.26 
Where the Young Turks hesitated, the Grand Vizier proved bolder. The provocative 
attitude of the Bulgarian government had irritated Kiamil Pasha but it was the Young 
22 I.A.Y.E.l190SlFile S5.3lMonastir Consulate/26/S-9-190S/no.941/Halkiopoulos to Baltazzis, 
LA.Y.E.l190SlFile S5.3/General Consulate of Salonica/5/1S-9-190S/no.S69IPapadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis, LA.Y.E.l190SlFile 122.3/General Consulate of Salonica/ll/24-9-
1905/no.S92IPapadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis, I.A.Y.E.l190SlFile S5.3/Serres Consulate/30/13-10-
1905/Sahtouris to Baltazzis 
23 I.A.Y.E.l190SlFile 39.5lMonastir Consulate/20/3-1O-190S/no.442IKaimakam of Giannitsa to Ali 
Danish Bey, LA.Y.E.l190SlFile 59.2lMonastir Consulate/23/5-9-190S/no.92S/Halkiopoulos to 
Baltazzis 
24 LA.Y.E.l190SlFile 59.2IMonastir Consulate/26/S-9-190S/no.936/Halkiopoulos to 
Baltazzis/enc1osure no. 1 
25 LA. Y .E.I 1905IFile S 7 .1IConstantinople Legationll 7/30-7 -190S/no.694IPotten to Baltazzis and 
LA. Y .E.I 1905IFile 91.1.1 /Constantinople Legationll 0/23-S-190S/no. nO/Gryparis to Baltazzis 
26 Ibid. and P.P.A.P. CV 1909, pp.101S-l019 
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Turk passivity that had turned his irritation into real indignation. In all probability, he 
was tbjnkjng of teaching the Bulgarians - and indirectly the Young Turks - a lesson 
on 14 September 1908, when he declined to invite Geshov, the Bulgarian agent in 
Constantinople, for a diplomatic dinner on the pretext that Bulgaria was still a vassal 
entity of the Ottoman Empire and His Majesty the Sultan. 
Had Kiamil known what was to follow he would have definitely invited Geshov. This 
time the Bulgarians meant business. Instantly, Malinov recalled Geshov to Bulgaria 
and on 15 September 1908 Sofia interrupted her diplomatic relations with the 
Ottoman Empire. On 22 September 1908, Bulgarian forces took control over the 
Rumelian section of the Orient Railway: a property of the Ottoman government. 
Ottoman fears that Bulgaria had been laying the groundwork to proclaim its full 
independence grew further between 23-24 September 1908 when Prince Ferdinand 
was warmly accepted in Budapest by Aehrenthal. 
The Ottoman leaders were justifiably suspicious of those Austro-Bulgarian talks. 
Admittedly, the ambitious Balkan policy of Austria-Hungary seemed to coincide with 
Bulgarian national aspirations. In her crusade to revise the Treaty of Berlin and 
consolidate her position in Bosnia-Herzegovina Vienna had been in search of a 
Balkan ally. With good cause, Austrian policy-makers qualified Bulgaria as the most 
suitable candidate. It was not only that during the reform period Austria had 
followed a "policy of sympathetic benevolence" toward Ferdinand and Bulgaria, 
notably in regard to the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia.21 The Austrians 
were almost convinced that given Bulgaria's resolve to become a sovereign state the 
political establishment in Sofia would find it immensely difficult to turn down the 
invaluable diplomatic support of Austria-Hungary. 
Aehrenthal's designs for Bulgaria were indeed not modest. He was aspiring to use 
the declaration of Bulgarian independence as a tool for diverting European and 
Ottoman attention from the Austrian coup in Bosnia to the Bulgarian question. 
Having succeeded in this, he could then assist Sofia to reconcile with the Porte in 
order to "drive Bulgaria close to the Austrian sphere ofinfluence.,,28 
27 F.O. 88119492 Sofia Legation to F.O./9-11-1908/no.92/Buchanan to Grey 
28 SCHMITT (1937, p.125) 
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Therefore, in their meeting, Aehrenthal probably alluded to Ferdinand that it was in 
the intentions of the Austro-Hungarian government to announce the formal 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina. This move the British F.O. at least had been 
expecting since the Turkish revolution and the Russian Foreign Minister Izvolsky had 
learnt about it in Buchlau in mid-September. The Bulgarian ruler, reticent about 
Austria's Macedonian policy, kept his cards close saying nothing about Sofia's plans. 
There is no convincing evidence that when he left the Hungarian capital an Austro-
Bulgarian understanding for joint action had been concluded or even agreed on 
principle.29 
That Ferdinand became aware of Austrian plans for the annexation of Bosnia proved 
instrumental in the question of Bulgarian independence. The key development was 
that Bulgaria would not struggle alone to countermand the Berlin Congress. 
Unarguably, the trip to Austria convinced Ferdinand that Vienna would look 
favorably on a Bulgarian coup thereby precipitating his decision to cross the Rubicon. 
In any case, he could not take further action without consulting his government. 30 To 
discuss these developments and decide on a future course of action the Prince 
summoned the Ministerial Council and a small number of eminent Bulgarian 
diplomats at Rouschouk on 4 October 1908. 
Very little is known about the actual circumstances and content of that crucial 
conclave. From the Bulgarian perspective, the chief objective was to force the 
Ottomans to accept independence without war. Tzokov, the Bulgarian representative 
in St. Petersburg and a participant in that crucial meeting, intimated later to his 
British counterpart Nicolson his account of events at Rouschouk. According to 
Bulgarian diplomat, Sofia knew that in the not too distant future the Dual Monarchy 
would annex Bosnia. 
The indecisive Prince still had certain reservations but when his Ministers threatened 
to resign unless he declared Bulgaria an independent state and himself King 
Ferdinand I he stipulated.31 In the end, Ferdinand although aware that the annexation 
29 That no Austro-Bulgarian agreement for common action was reached in Budapest was 
corroborated later by Malinov in the Sobranje. F.O. 88119492 Sofia Legation to F.O./18-11-
1908/no.971Buchanan to Grey, F.O. 88119492 St. Petersburg Embassy to F.O'/29-11-
1908/no.551 !Nicolson to Grey. BRIDGE (1972b, pp.l 06-112) 
30 F.O. 88119492 Sofia Legation to F.O'/29-1 0-1 908/no.90IBuchanan to Grey 
31 In Rouschouk, the chief Bulgarian dilemma was whether the declaration of independence should 
precede or follow the Austrian move. The Bulgarians inclined to believe that if they waited for 
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of Bosnia-Herzegovina would place Austria-Hungary in a dangerously advantageous 
position in the Balkans decided that the risk was worth taking.32 
Another important factor in Bulgaria's decision to align herself with the Austrian 
policy in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the decline of Russian influence in Sofia. By 
October 1908, Sofia had finally come to terms with the idea that Russia, the 
protector of the Slavic race, was for the time being unable to support a Bulgarian 
attack against the Balkan status quo. It is true that on all occasions that the 
Bulgarian government had attempted to raise the independence question the Russian 
Imperial government and Izvolsky had advocated "prudence and moderation" until 
Russia had put her house in order?3 Russia's prolonged inability to uphold Bulgarian 
national aspirations had displeased Ferdinand and had distanced Sofia from the 
Imperial Court. As a leading member of the Bulgarian government had aptly 
remarked during the visit of Russian Grand Duke Nicholas in Sofia in summer 1908: 
"Sofia's policy would be to sow dissension between Austria-Hungary and Russia and 
finally side with the power which will pay the largest price to Bulgaria. ,,34 
On 5 October 1908, Prince Ferdinand declared Bulgarian independence in Turnovo 
and mobilized the army. One day later, the Austro-Hungarian government 
proclaimed the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and announced the withdrawal of 
Austrian garrisons from the sanjak of No vi bazar. 
5.4 Heading ofT the War in the Balkans: The First Phase of the Bulgarian Crisis 
On an international level, the proclamation of Bulgarian independence and the 
annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina amounted to a grave diplomatic crisis. 
Great Britain and Russia, supported by the French and the Italians, declared their 
strong opposition to the Austrian annexation of Bosnia whereby the Protocol of 1871 
Aehrenthal to strike first they would give the impression in Constantinople that they had acted 
spontaneously and on their initiative thus inviting Turkish attack. On the other hand, should 
Bulgaria moved first and the Austrians followed in all probability Turkey would assume that Vienna 
had been in collusion with Sofia. In that case, the Porte would certainly t:1llnk twice before taking 
the war path against the Principality fearing Austrian military intervention. To those calculations 
the Bulgarians were to prove right. F.O. 881/9492 St. Petersburg Embassy to F.O'/29-11-
1908/no.551/Nicholson to Grey. See also F.O. 881/9456 Sofia Legation to F.O'/14-10-
1908/no.515/Buchanan to Grey 
32 F.O. 881/9492 Sofia Legation to F.O./4-11-1908/no.75/Buchanan to Grey 
33 F.O. 881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.OIl2-5-1908/no.56/Buchanan to Grey and F.O. 881/9353 
Foreign Office to St. Petersburg Embassy/7 -7 -1 90 8/no.198/Grey to 0' Beirne 
34 F.O. 881/9492 Sofia Legation to F.O./9-11-1908/no.92/Buchanan to Grey 
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and the Berlin Congress were countermanded. Russia, in particular, believed that the 
Austrian coup consolidated Vienna's position in the central Balkans and made 
Austria the dominant factor in the region at the expense of the small south Slav 
countries. Izvolsky, therefore, insisted that all aspects of the Ba1kan crisis should be 
discussed at a European Conference which would revise the Berlin Treaty, 
compensate Serbia and Montenegro and re-examine the Straits question.35 
On a Ba1kan level, the situation was equally complicated and difficult. The Austrian 
and Bulgarian blows had seriously undermined the geopolitical position of the 
Ottoman Empire. Adding to the gravity of the situation, the Cretans declared their 
union with Greece on 7 October 1908. 
As expected, the initial counter-attack from Constantinople was spontaneously 
hostile. Strong reinforcements were transported to Macedonia and Thrace to 
strengthen the local armies and within three weeks the Ottoman military build up in 
the European front produced more than 200,000 men. Moreover, on 11 October 
1908, the Ottoman Empire imposed economic war on Austro-Hungarian and 
Bulgarian merchandise. 36 
Nevertheless, Contantinople's two-fold undertaking to deal concurrently with 
Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria was hardly an easy one. As far as the question of 
Bosnia was concerned, the Porte was practically unable to prevent their incorporation 
into the Dual Monarchy. Despite the Ottoman mobilization and the embargo from 
the early stages of the crisis it had become discernible that the Kiamil Pasha 
government had neither the power nor the inclination to embark on war with Austria-
Hungary over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In fact, these two provinces had been lost to 
Austria-Hungary since 1878. In Kiamil Pasha's opinion, the best possible solution to 
the dispute with Austria-Hungary would be the establishment of Bosnia as an 
independent "buffer" state separating the Dual Monarchy from Turkey-in-Europe. In 
subsequent months, the Ottoman strategy on Bosnia was to avoid a conflict with 
35 On Russia's policy on the Straits question see: JELA VICH (1991, pp.157, 205-206, 217) 
36 F.O. 88119492 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/26-10-
1908/no.142/Lamb to Lowther, F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy/27-10-1908/no.49/Colonel 
Suutreesto Lowther 
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Vienna and adopt a wait-and-see policy anticipating the Entente and Italy to vitiate 
the Austria's Bosnian COUp.37 
If Austria-Hungary represented a mid-term threat for Ottoman rule in the Balkans 
that was not the case with Bulgaria. Here, the situation had become critical. At the 
time of the proclamation of independence Bulgaria seemed to have the upper hand. 
The speedy mobilization of the Bulgarian army and the paramount impression that 
Vienna had been backing Sofia's coup initially put the Ottoman government in a very 
difficult position. The Sublime Porte however, using military and political means, 
managed to overturn this situation in the next three weeks. 
The Young Turks played a critical role in this remarkable recovery. The militant and 
experienced Macedonian Committees were instrumental in rapidly reorganizing the 
II -III Army corps thereby enabling the Ottoman administration to strengthen its 
diplomatic position against Bulgaria.38 Furthermore, to create a popular resistance 
front against a possible Bulgarian attack the Unionist societies distributed large 
quantities of arms and ammunition to the Macedonian Moslems. 
In mid-October, the Salonica headquarters sent Faik Bey and Fethy Bey, two eminent 
members, on a tentative mission to Sofia. During their negotiations with the 
Bulgarian leaders the Young Turk deputation agreed that the independence issue 
should be settled between the two countries without foreign interference. According 
to Faik Bey, the Unionist mission was successful in ascertaining that, for the time 
being, the Bulgarian leadership did not seem to harbor warlike tendencies against the 
Ottoman Empire.39 
37 F.O. 88119492 Sofia Legation to F.O./5-11-1908/no.76/Buchanan to Grey/Telegraphic, F.O. 
88119492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./3-11-1908/no.21/Whitehead to Grey/Telegraphic and F.O. 
88119492 Foreign Office to Vienna Embassy/4-11-1908/no.175/Grey to GoshenlTelegraphic. In 
fact, in the last days of October Kiamil Pasha insinuated to Lowther that he contemplated a 
settlement of the Bosnian question after the Conference. If the Entente Powers and Italy supported 
Turkey, he claimed, in her effort to establish Bosnia-Herzegovina as an independent Constitutional 
state under a Protestant Prince nominated by Turkey and elected by the Powers, Austria would have 
no alternative except to give way. F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l26-10-
1908/no. 71 O/Lowther to Grey 
38 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 21.2/Adrianople Consulate/20/2-11-1908/noA08IXydakis to Baltazzis and 
LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 21.3/Dedeagach Vice-Consulate/26/8-11-1908/no.4611Souidas to Baltazzis 
39 On Unionist mission see: I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of SalonicalI8/31-10-
1908/no.1007/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of 
SalonicalI4/27-1 0-1908/no.1053/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 21.I/General 
Consulate of SalonicalI8/31-1 0-1 908/no. 1 026/Papadiamantopulos to Baltazzis 
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By November 1908, the activation of European diplomacy and the situation in 
Turkey managed to avert the danger of a general Balkan conflagration. Indeed, for 
the Entente coalition a Turkish-Bulgarian war would be sheer calamity. Russia and 
Great Britain believed that such a conflict would considerably weaken the most 
powerful states in the region thereby facilitating Austrian designs for political 
penetration in the Balkans. 
At this juncture, the British decided to intervene and shoulder the onus of restraining 
the Turks. When shortly after the Bulgarian coup the Ottoman minister in London 
Rifat Pasha tried to investigate whether England would support the Ottoman Empire 
in a war against Bulgaria, Grey strongly discouraged such an assumption on the part 
of the Ottoman administration. However, Grey reminded Rifat Pasha that the Porte 
still retained the right to claim and obtain economic compensation from Bulgaria. 40 
British policy, supported by the Triple Entente, set as its principal priority not only 
the prevention of a Turco-Bulgarian armed conflict but also the encouragement of an 
understanding between the two countries. This development would be the first and 
most decisive step towards the formation of a Balkan League as a barrier to Austrian 
advance to the Aegean.41 
Happily for the Entente, the Ottomans refrained from provoking Bulgarian 
aggression. Despite the original outburst neither ~oslem public opinion nor the 
Ottoman political leadership was for war against Bulgaria. It is clear that, except for 
an insignificant number of maltreated immigrants from Bulgaria and certain 
reactionary militarists, the majority of ~acedonian ~oslems had no desire to take 
arms against the Bulgarians. 42 
Even among the militant Unionist Committees of Salonica and ~onastir which saw 
the Bulgarian coup as a severe blow to their commitment to safeguard Ottoman 
integrity the idea of launching an attack against Bulgaria had been visibly losing 
ground, if only for reasons of military expediency. Last, but certainly not least, the 
Kiamil Pasha government, owing to its moderate political disposition and its strong 
pro-British tendencies was even less warlike. 
40 GREY (1925, p.1 77) 
41 BRIDGE (l972b, p.l25) 
42 F.O. 800/51 Paris Embassy to F.O'/11-1-1909IBertie to Grey 
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Ultimately, when the Grand Vizier's last reservations concerning the alleged 
Austrian-Bulgarian pact were dispersed the way opened for a separate negotiation 
and eventual settlement with Vienna and Sofia.43 For the Sublime Porte, only one 
conceivable alternative was now available: to settle for pecuniary compensation. As 
developments were to show the Ottomans would be far more successful in this aim. 
5.5 The Road Toward the Turkish-Bulgarian Settlement 
In the flIst two weeks of November 1908 therefore the Ottoman Empire had plucked 
up enough courage to attempt turning some of her Balkan embarrassments into 
advantages. The chief question for the Turks now was not whether they would fight 
or negotiate but with which country they should negotiate first and on what basis. In 
that policy-making process the Unionist factor was to influence Ottoman strategy. 
Since the outbreak of the Balkan crisis the Kiamil Pasha government had given 
precedence to the settlement of the Bulgarian question. That was rather a reasonable 
option, for at the moment Sofia seemed to represent the most perceptible threat to 
Ottoman authority in the Balkans. 
However, the Young Turk Committees questioned the advisability of this strategy. 
The C.U.P. supported the opinion that Turkey should first come to terms with 
Austria over Bosnia and afterwards devote all her energy and power to work out an 
accommodation with Bulgaria favorable to Ottoman interests. In order to compel the 
Grand Vizier to change his attitude and to conform to their Balkan outlook the 
Young Turks launched an anti-government propaganda campaign in the interior. 44 
On the other hand, Ottoman policy in regard to the Near East crisis had also to take 
into serious consideration developments in the other Balkan states. True, Turkey 
was not the only Balkan power which had suffered from Austria's Balkan coup. 
Serbia was in a far more perilous position since the incorporation of Bosnia-
Herzegovina by Austria posed an indisputable menace to her economic and political 
independence. 
As an outcome, since mid-October 1908, secret negotiations had been carried out 
with Serbia for the conclusion of a trilateral military alliance between Turkey, Serbia 
43 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./5-11-1908/no.386/Lowtherto Grey 
44 LA. Y.E'/ 1908IFile 91.1.1 /Constantinople Legationl24/6-11-1908/no.l 065/Gryparis to Baltazzis 
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and Montenegro. The Ottoman Empire had agreed to hold talks with the Serb 
Cabinet with the sole purpose of checkmating Bulgaria. The Ottoman leadership _ 
here the Porte and the C.D.P. were in complete accord - was fully convinced that in 
the end Serbia would not be attacked by Austria and a Serbo-Turkish-Montenegrin 
pact could be utilized as lever pressure against isolated Bulgaria. 45 
The intensity of Young Turk pressure and the prospect of understanding with Serbia-
Montenegro altered the priorities and the policy of Kia mil Pasha's Cabinet respecting 
the management of the Balkan crisis. Notwithstanding the fact that Bulgaria 
remained the vital issue for Turkey, by November 1908 the Grand Vizier decided to 
bide his time and not pursue a premature settlement with Bulgaria pending the 
problem of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the outcome of talks with Serbia-Montenegro. 
In the meantime, Bulgaria was experiencing serious internal difficulties. A month 
after the proclamation of independence, Sofia was aware that the time for military 
action had lapsed because the Ottomans had strengthened their Macedonian defenses. 
In addition, following the October talks with the Young Turk deputation in Sofia 
Prince Ferdinand had put the Bulgarian army on a peace footing. 46 On 26 October 
1908, Geshov rebuked Ferdinand and the Malinov Cabinet "for having betrayed 
Bulgaria by not declaring war twenty days ago.,,47 
As soon as things seemed to take a rather unpleasant turn for the Principality political 
contention and public convulsion reemerged in the interior overshadowing the elation 
of independence. In the Sobranje, the leaders of the Geshovist and Tsankovist 
parties, backed by the left-wing Agrarian group, lashed out against the Cabinet. 
Their criticism focused mainly on two points: the controversial occupation of the 
Orient railway which had stirred great dissatisfaction in Europe and the 
"irresponsible" act of the government in interconnecting the independence of 
Bulgaria with the annexation of Bosnia. 
45 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/26-10-1908/no.710ILowther to Grey and F.O. 
881/9492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./13-11-1908/no.24IWhitehead to Grey 
46 The above initiative of the Royal House met with heavy criticism in Bulgaria. However, 
Ferdinand's decision to comply with the Powers' advice and demobilize the army was correct. First, 
it did not seriously affect the fighting capability of the armed forces since the nine Bulgarian Army 
corps could mobilize within a few days and were far better prepared for a winte~ campaign th~ the 
Ottomans. Second, in doing so Sofia gained significant credit in Europe for Its peaceful attltude. 
F.o. 88119422 Memorandum 
47 F.o. 881/9492 Constantinople Embassy/27-10-1908/no.49/Colonel Surtrees to Lowther 
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Yet, the main storm came from the usually refractory quarters. Those anticipating 
that the declaration of independence would appease the Macedonian nationalists 
erred. The Macedonian societies suspected that Prince Ferdinand had been planning 
to play down the Macedonian question in order to soothe the Young Turks and 
safeguard his new title as "King of the Bulgarians". To dissipate any illusions about 
their true intentions the Macedonians addressed an open letter of protest to the Court 
warning the Prince in the most explicit manner that: 
"If His Royal Highness wishes to live to enjoy his new dignity, he had better not 
purchase his crown at the price of our (Macedonian) interests.,,48 
In the first days of November, the political leadership in Sofia had recognized that the 
continuation of this anomalous situation could undermine the position of the 
government and destabilize the country. Therefore, the sooner the dispute with 
Turkey was settled in a peaceful manner the better. On 2 November, Stanciov 
presented to Grey a Memorandum announcing Bulgaria's decision to begin 
negotiations with the Ottoman Empire for pecuniary compensation. In parallel, the 
Malinov government dispatched Liaptchev, the Macedonian Minister of Commerce, 
to Constantinople with instructions to investigate the Ottoman economic claims and, 
if possible, lay the groundwork for an amicable understanding with the Ottoman 
leadership. 49 
Signs that the indemnity was most likely to evolve into a painfully long-lasting, 
delicate and thorny question were not however lacking. The Porte argued that the 
declaration of independence had raised the entire question of Bulgarian obligations 
and status towards the Ottoman Empire as those defined in the Berlin Treaty. 
Therefore, they fancied themselves entitled to an enormous compensation: roughly 28 
million Turkish pounds. That sum included the capitalized tributes of Eastern 
48 I.A.Y.E'/1908/File 118.l/Sofia LegationlI3/24-11-1908/no.878/Zalokostas to Baltazzis and F.O. 
88119492 Sofia Legation to F.O'/10-11-1908/no.93/Buchanan to Grey. Indeed, the Bulgarian-
Macedonian organizations were right to suspect that Ferdinand had decided to play down the 
Macedonian question but they were wrong to believe that he did so to protect his new title. In fact, 
Ferdinand seemed to fear an Austrian advance in Macedonia in spring 1909 and in his anxiety to 
prevent such a development he planned to reach an understanding, and even allian~e, ~th ~e 
Ottoman Empire. Toward this goal, the Bulgarian ruler considered it necessary to aVOId alienatmg 
the Ottomans by "raising unnecessarily the Macedonian question." F.O. 88119492 Sofia Legation to 
F.O'/4-11-1908/no.75/Buchanan to Grey 
49 F.O. 88119492 Foreign Office to Sofia Legationl2-11-1908/no.67/Grey to Buchanan and F.O. 
88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./13-11-1908/no.768/Lowtherto Grey 
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Rumelia and Bulgaria for the period 1879-1908; the Ottoman debt for Eastern 
Rumelia; the indemnity for the Orient railway and for the numerous Moslem vakoufs, 
mosques and lighthouses left in Bulgaria; and the construction of the strategic Sofia-
Kjustendil-Kumanovo railway. 50 
Sofia could not afford to pay such a vast indemnity and the Porte knew it. The 
reasoning of the Ottoman government that Bulgaria's economic position was better 
than Turkey's and by gaining her independence Sofia could save large sums by 
reducing her military expenditure does not seem a plausible explanation. The 
extravagant Ottoman claims should be ascribed to internal political considerations. 
Throughout the Balkan crisis, the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet sustained the vitriolic attacks 
of the Constantinople C.U.P. on the question of independence. Sensibly, Kiamil 
Pasha felt that if the price for renouncing the Sultan's sovereignty in the Principality 
was not satisfactorily high the Young Turks would once again exploit the opportunity 
to accuse his Cabinet of failure in all aspects of the Bulgarian question. 51 In 
extracting a huge compensation from Sofia the experienced Grand Vizier anticipated 
to benefit in two respects: first, he could silence the tumultuous Young Turk party 
and second, he would increase his own political influence amongst the Ottoman 
public opinion and the Chamber of Deputies. 
Bulgaria, naturally, had no intention of negotiating under those onerous terms. The 
rift was admittedly unbridgeable and Liaptchev had to return to Sofia with empty 
hands. In the ensuing three months it seemed that the issue had been put in cold 
storage. The Turks, well aware that time was running in their favor, did not rush to 
come to terms with Bulgaria in so far as the question of Bosnia remained open. 
Finally, on 11 January 1909 Austria and Turkey reached an agreement. Vienna 
would pay 2 Yz million Turkish pounds to the Sublime Porte in exchange for Ottoman 
recognition of the annexation. A bilateral protocol on 26 February 1909 made the 
Austrian-Turkish pact official. 
Unlike the Turks, the Bulgarians had many reasons to pursue a swift settlement. In 
the achievement of a honorable and equitable solution to the crisis with 
50 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.lll-11-1908/no.390ILowther to Greyffelegraphic 
and F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l4-12-1908/no.834ILowther to Grey 
51 F.O. 881/9491 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.lll-11-1908ILowther to Grey/no.390ffelegraphic 
and F.O. 88119503 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l14-1-1909/no.29ILowther to Grey 
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Constantinople, the ~alinov Cabinet and the Court of Prince Ferdinand discerned the 
instrument for neutralizing the intense internal pressure and countering the Sobranje 
attacks against the independence policy of the Royal House. Furthermore, the 
exclusion of Bulgaria from the Serbo-Turkish negotiations had put the political and 
military officials in Sofia on the alert. 
The specter of Sofia's Balkan isolation had thus emerged and the likelihood of seeing 
Austria marching into ~acedonia in spring of 1909 forced Prince Ferdinand to tum a 
more sympathetic eye to the formation of a triple Serbo-Bulgarian-Turkish alliance. 52 
Therefore, in the last two months of 1908, the Bulgarian leadership strove to 
reconcile itself with the Sublime Porte. In November, ~alinov and Paprikov 
repeatedly stressed in the Sobranje the enduring will of Bulgaria to reach a 
compromise with the Ottoman Empire and Prince Ferdinand, in a personal telegram 
to the French President Fallieres in early December "committed Bulgaria to 
compensation". 53 
Developments in Constantinople however frustrated Bulgarian expectations. In the 
first two months of 1909, the focal issue in Ottoman politics was not the Bulgarian 
question but the uncompromising rivalry between the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet and the 
Committee for dominance in internal political affairs. The Kiamil Pasha Cabinet crisis 
of mid-February in conjunction with the subsequent "introversion" of the Ottoman 
political leadership deterred the negotiation process with Bulgaria and postponed the 
settlement of the Turco-Bulgarian dispute. 
In the meantime, in early February 1909, the Great Powers apprehensive of the 
unforeseeable complications that could arise from the continuation of Bulgarian 
imbroglio intervened to salvage the situation and prevent a general conflagration in 
the Balkans. Inasmuch as the Porte remained unshakable in its enormous economic 
demands, the Entente and the Alliance were competing in rendering their services to 
Sofia to settle its dispute with Constantinople. Each coalition reckoned that if 
successful in reconciling Turkey with Bulgaria it would maximize its influence on the 
Bulgarian government thereby laying the groundwork for a political alignment with 
Bulgaria. 
52 F.O. 881/9492 Sofia Legation to F.O.l4-ll-l908/no.75IBuchanan to Grey and F.O. 88119492 
Belgrade Embassy to F.O.l25-ll-l908/no.9llWhitehead to Grey/enclosure no.l 
53 F.O. 881/9492 Sofia Legation to F.O.l9-l2-l908/no.102IBuchanan to Grey 
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In the end, it was Russian diplomacy that achieved the breakthrough. In an attempt 
to retrieve their privileged position in Bulgarian affairs the Russian government 
reached an agreement with the Malinov Cabinet on 2 February 1909. Russia 
shouldered the burden of satisfying Turkish economic claims; in return Bulgaria 
would compensate St. Petersburg. 54 
The rise of the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet to power in mid-February did not materially alter 
Ottoman foreign policy on the Bulgarian question. The Russian economic package 
had satisfied Constantinople and a direct understanding with Sofia seemed more 
likely than ever. But even when an agreement looked almost certain the new Hilmi 
Pasha Cabinet was reluctant to close the issue. This time, Ottoman procrastination 
was not due to the indemnity sum or domestic political feuds but to the Macedonian 
question. 
The Ottoman F.O. contemplated exchanging the recognition of Prince Ferdinand's 
new royal title with an official commitment on the part of Bulgaria that she would 
respect the political status quo and the territorial integrity of Ottoman Macedonia. In 
order to elicit this vital concession Constantinople intended to postpone Ferdinand's 
recognition at least till its endorsement by the proposed Conference.55 
Eventually, the April counter-coup in Constantinople and the increasingly threatening 
attitude of the Bulgarian government forced the Porte to give way. 56 On 19 April 
1909, the Ottoman administration, on the instigation of Germany and Austria, 
informed Sofia of its decision to recognize Bulgarian independence. On 26 May 
1909, a Turco-Bulgarian Protocol was signed in Constantinople settling the pending 
problems between the two countries. Bilateral relations were fully restored shortly 
after. 
54 SCHMITT (1937, pp.135-140). On the initial reaction of Bulgaria and Turkey to Russian 
proposal see F.O. 800/51 Paris Embassy to F.O./ 3-2-1909IBertie to GreylPrivate . 
55 F.O. 88119531 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/22-3-1909/no.94/Lowtber to Grey/Telegraphic 
56 For details on Bulgaria's threatening stance see: F.O. 88119531 Sofia Legation to F.O.l13-4-
1909/no.52/Buchanan to Grey, F.O. 88119351 Sofia Legation to F.O.l18-4-1909/no.57IBuchanan to 
Grey 
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5.6 Politicizing the Committees. The M.RO. and the Bulgarian Constitutional 
Clubs under the Young Turk Regime 
The Young Turk revolution and the question of Bulgarian independence did not only 
affect inter-state relations between the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria. It had a major 
impact on the position of the Bulgarian-Macedonian populations as well as on its 
revolutionary and religious organizations: the M.R.O. and the Exarchate. 
In order to investigate the political outlook of the various Christian Macedonian 
ethnic groups respecting the Young Turk movement the directorate of the Unionist 
Committee Talat Bey, Enver Bey, Rahmi Bey, Nazim Bey called their leaderships 
into negotiations a few days after the proclamation of the Constitution. In the 
discussions, the Bulgarian-Macedonian population was represented by the M.R.O.-
Right leaders Matov, Panchev, Christev, Chuskov and by the Left wing of the 
Organization under Sandanski, Panitsa, Tsernopeev, Delidarev. 
Discussions between the M.R.O. Right and the Salonica Committee lasted till the end 
of August and were carried out without agenda in the capital of Macedonia. From 
the outset, it seemed that the likelihood of a bilateral understanding was exceedingly 
slim. Since the early stages of the negotiations the president of the M.R.O. Matov 
informed the Young Turks that the Organization had no intention of abandoning its 
firm objective: the establishment of political autonomy in Macedonia. 
Equally radical were the M.R.O. proposals on the question of administrative reform 
and devolution of executive power to the periphery. The C.C. of the M.R.O. 
supported the establishment of provincial Councils (Diets) in each commune, sanjak 
and vilayet in order to deal directly with local matters. In these bodies, which would 
be based on the Swiss and American patterns, all nationalities should have 
proportionate representation and equal rights. 
The M.R.O. political program provided for the creation of a national militia on the 
model of the French National Guard; the admission of ethnically-formed Christian 
units to the army; freedom of press, association, education, religion; and the 
convention of a pan-Ottoman Congress with delegates from all revolutionary 
committees to elaborate a common parliamentary pro gram. It is interesting that in 
case the Young Turks failed to establish a liberal and modem regime in the country 
the organization threatened to re-activate its militia and resume the armed struggle. 
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These were the positions of the M.R.O. as officially communicated by Panchev to the 
Salonica C.U.P. in the form of a Memorandum in the end of August 1908.57 
The Unionists, for their part, were far from willing to satisfy the far-reaching political 
and administrative demands of the M.R.O.-Right. On the key question of 
Macedonia, the Young Turks believed that if an autonomous status was established 
in the province the latter would either become independent or would unite with 
Bulgaria. Nor were the Macedonian officials more favorably disposed towards the 
decentralization politics of the M.R.O. Granting provincial autonomy to Macedonia 
was unthinkable for the C.U.P. and ran contrary to its fundamental bid to defend 
Ottoman integrity. 58 
The M.R.O.-C.U.P. disagreement over the status and the administration of 
Macedonia did not discourage the Bulgarian-Macedonians. Following the spirit and 
trend of the Constitution they took steps to establish Bulgarian-Macedonian 
"Constitutional" clubs based on article 108 respecting free association. That decision 
was taken by the C.C. of the M.R.O., with encouragement from Sofia, during a 
lengthy and heated convention held in Salonica in the second week of August. 
According to the secret program of the conference which was issued on 12 August 
1908 and leaked out to the local press after considerable delay, the M.R.O. instructed 
each Provincial Committee to set up a local political society, following the example 
of the Salonica headquarters. The new branches would have a two-fold mission: to 
carry out the political struggle of the M.R.O. with the aim of gaining local self-
government for each province, and to support the M.R.O. underground revolutionary 
work. 59 Having received assistance from Bulgaria in cadres, funds and material 
support in September the M.R.O. managed to establish Constitutional associations in 
Uskub, Monastir, Kavala, Serres, Adrianople and Constantinople. 
In addition, the M.R.O. convention resolved to discontinue its armed activities till the 
opening of the Ottoman Chamber but the Macedonian militia and the local leaders 
were ordered to remain in their positions ready to take the field. In doing so, the 
M.R.O. leadership reaffirmed its determination not to terminate the revolutionary-
57 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 85.3/General Consulate of Salonica/12/25-9-1908/Papadiamantopoulos to 
BaltazzisIPanchev Memorandum 
58 F.G. 881/9353 Sofia Legation to F.O'/19-8-1908/no.72lBuchanan to Grey 
59 E.A.1l908/KH1no.371l7-9-1908/p.7 and DAKIN (1966, p.388) 
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paramilitary struggle in so far as the Young Turks refused to sanction the autonomy 
of ~acedonia. 60 
The Bulgarian-~acedonian Constitutional clubs held their first Congress between 20 
and 26 September 1908 under the presidency of Dimitrov to elect their leadership, 
outline their political platform and coordinate their activities under the new regime. 
It was attended by 84 delegates from 70 ~acedonian and Thracian societies. During 
the preliminaries three commissions with distinct tasks were elected: the first 
commission would organize the proceedings; the second would set up the statutes 
and regulations of the clubs and the third would work out a program with economic, 
social, political, and cultural proposals regarding the position of the Bulgarian 
communities in Turkey. 61 
Altogether, the recommendations of the three commissions were keenly accepted by 
the delegates. The statutes and rules of the clubs provided that for the creation of a 
new association a minimum emollment of 10 members was required. The new 
district and provincial clubs were to be directed by the Salonica branch and were 
obliged to grant 1/3 of their revenues to the central club. In return, the Salonica 
headquarters would be responsible for the normal operation of the peripheral clubs 
and their representation to the Ottoman authorities.62 
The political program of the Congress recognized the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire providing that the provinces obtained a status of local self-
government in accordance with their national composition. The Bulgarian Congress 
however, did not diverge from the fixed ~.R.O. positions. It put forward the 
demands for the creation of provincial Diets; appointment of 1/3 of the Senate by the 
Sultan and 2/3 to be elected directly from the people; freedom of religion, education, 
press, association and trade; conscription of non-~oslems; universal and secret 
suffrage; respect for the privileges of the Christian religious and educational 
institutions; obligatory elementary instruction and official recognition of the language 
of the minority nationalities in education. 
60 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 59.4IMonastir Consulate/17/30-8-1908IHalkiopoulos to Baltazzis/Report on 
the Status of the Provincial and Regional Committees of the M.Ra. and E.A./1908IKH/no.34/29-8-
1908/pp.8-9 . 
61 P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.l047 and I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of Salorucal 1 0/23-9-
1908/no.893lPapadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis 
62 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of Salonica/11l24-9-1908/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/without classification munber 
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Although the political outlook of the Congress was rather moderate, its social 
proposals were remarkably radical and progressive. For example, the Union of 
Bulgarian clubs requested the institution of a general tax proportionate to the revenue 
and property of each citizen. Furthermore, as far as the important agrarian question 
was concerned, the program provided that the ~acedonian tenants should obtain the 
ownership of the lands they cultivated and be eligible for agricultural loans at very 
low interest. Finally, the government was called on to enact a law for the protection 
of labor rightS.63 
The Congress concluded its proceedings with the establishment of a Salonica-based 
permanent Central Bureau: the supreme executive body of the Bulgarian-Macedonian 
Union. Karayovov, an ex-official of the Bulgarian F.O., became president. The first 
task of the Bureau was to communicate the program of the Congress to the C.U.P. 
and prevent the closing of the disputed Bulgarian churches and schools in 
~acedonia. 64 
In contrast to Panchev's Memorandum, the omission of any explicit reference to 
Macedonian autonomy from the Congress resolutions and the Bulgarian-Macedonian 
commitment to conduce toward the cultural advancement of the Ottoman people 
irrespective of ethnicity and religion had pleased the Ottomans. On 26 September 
1908, Kiamil Pasha wrote to the General Administration of Macedonia that with the 
exception of the articles referring to local governments the political program of the 
Constitutional clubs was not far away from the original positions of the C.U.P. 
representing a good basis for a Bulgaro-Young Turk understanding. 65 
Ottoman elation was fairly short-lived. The declaration of Bulgarian independence 
ten days after the conference and the ensuing Bulgarian-Turkish crisis rendered any 
kind of cooperation between the Constitutional associations and the Young Turks 
impossible. From this point onwards the C.U.P. was to tum an increasingly hostile 
eye towards the Union of Constitutional clubs, regarding them as plot centers of 
Bulgarian nationalist propaganda in Macedonia. 
63 P.P.A.P. CV 1909, pp.1048-1049, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of Salonical3/16-
1 0-1908/no. 914/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis 
64 P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.l048 
65 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/Grand Vizierate to General Administration of Salonical13/26-9-
1908/Kiamil Pasha to Danish Bey/enclosure no. I 
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To what extent Young Turk suspicions concenring the relations between the 
Bulgarian government and the Constitutional clubs were justifiable is a moot point. 
There is little doubt that the League of clubs had been connected with Bulgaria and 
the Sofia-based M.R.O. External Delegation. It is almost certain that a significant 
part of the clubs' expenditure was covered by Bulgarian allowances and cadres of the 
new organization received their payments from Sofia.66 Greek sources suggest that 
on 19 March 1909, the Bulgarian administration assigned Rizov, a former secretary 
of the Bulgarian Legation in Athens, to organize the Bulgarian societies in Monastir 
vilayet while Karayovov was to act accordingly in the province of Salonica. 67 
On the other hand, the firm tendency of the Bulgarian government to assert its 
control over the new apparatus did not seem to entirely coincide with the political 
aspirations of the Bulgarian-Macedonian associations or at least their current 
leadership. In fact, under Karayovov, the clubs managed to maintain a significant 
degree of independence from Sofia. The leading group of the Macedonian 
Constitutional societies was far from willing to allow the Organization to degenerate 
into a mere political instrument of Sofia. That became apparent for the first time 
during the Congress when the Union decided to ignore the behind-the-scenes advice 
of the Bulgarian government to sever its relations with the Young Turks. 68 
On the contrary, the Central Bureau sought to establish certain links with the C.D.P. 
It believed that the interests of the Bulgarian people in Macedonia were better served 
by the meticulous execution of the Constitutional principles of liberty, equality, 
justice and the promotion of inter-ethnic unity and brotherhood in Ottoman Empire. 
Nevertheless, Karayovov's consecutive overtures to the Young Turk Committees of 
Macedonia and Constantinople for cooperation in the elections found no willing 
ears.
69 In the autumn of 1908, at a time that a Turco-Bulgarian armed conflict 
looked unavoidable and the anti-Bulgarian sentiment of the Macedonian-Moslems 
was about to reach its peak it was unthinkable for the Young Turks to consent to a 
rapprochement with the Bulgarian-Macedonian associations. 
66 F.O. 881/9717 Sofia Embassy to F.O.l14-1-191 O/no.6/Findlay to Grey 
67 LA.Y.E.l1909/File AAKlSofia Legationl6119-3-1909/no.157/Zalokostas to Baltazzis 
68 LA. Y.E.l1908/File 118.2/General Consulate of Salonica/11/24-9-1908/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/without classification number 
69 LA.Y.E.l1909/File AAK-NGeneral Consulate of Salonica/1911-9-1909/Papadiamantopoulos to 
KallergisiSecond Congress of Macedonian and Thracian Constitutional Clubs-Annual Report of 
Central Bureaulpp.19-20 (Hereafter cited as Second Congress) 
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Nor did the situation in the Macedonian mainland leave any room for more sanguine 
thoughts. There, the Young Turk Committees were faced with the growing agitation 
of Macedonian activists on whom the influence of Bulgaria remained as strong as 
ever. By November, a considerable amount of arms and ammunition had been 
distributed in Monastir, Kilkis, Krushevo, Serres, Salonica whilst certain M.R.O. and 
S.M.C. bands were re-activated in the vilayets of Sa Ionic a and Monastir.7o 
It was not only the Young Turks who suspected that the League of Bulgarian clubs 
had been implicated in the underground activities of the M.R.O. Western observers 
seemed to espouse similar views. On 9 February 1909, Satow, the British agent in 
Uskub, reported that in view of the crisis with the Porte the Bulgarians had 
apparently taken steps to establish a 'war organization' in Macedonia: 
"According to my information, there is a secret Bulgarian organization active in 
Macedonia aiming at creating a diversion in case a Bulgarian-Turkish war break out. 
Three classes of leaders existed: voevodas, sergeants and corporals. Arms had 
already been distributed to the members of the organization and it is alleged that this 
movement was directed through the Bulgarian political clubs. The clubs are the ideal 
places for meeting between those members, while it is also true that quantities of 
arms concealed in surrounding villages were brought in on market-days and 
concentrated in Uskub.,,71 
However, there is no concrete evidence that Karayovov's group had taken an 
energetic part in the Bulgarian armed struggle in Macedonia. It is far from certain, 
however, that the same assertion can apply to the rank and file of the League as well. 
British archival sources concur that during its period in office the Central Bureau had 
maintained a responsible and "correct" attitude towards the C.U.P. Karayovovand 
other Macedonian cadres, for example, had frequently visited Constantinople in order 
to come to terms with the local C.U.P. whilst the leadership of the Clubs had taken 
70 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.5/Ministry of the Interior to General Administration of SalonicaJlO/23-10-
1908/no.999/Hakki Pasha to Danish Bey, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 59.4/Monastir ConsulateIl1l4-11-
1908/no.1210IDimaras to Baltazzis, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 21.1/General Consulate of SalonicaJ61l9-
1 I-I 908/no.1072/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis. See also: F.O. 881/9492 Monastir Consulate to 
Constantinople Embassy/24-1 0-1908/no.60/ Acting-Consul Edmonds to Lowther 
71 F.O. 881/9503 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of SalonicaJ9-2-1909/no.lllSatow to 
Lamb 
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energetic steps to prevent its members from re-organizing new Bulgarian-
Macedonian bands. 72 
In addition, when the counterrevolution broke out in the Ottoman capital on 13 April 
1909 against the Young Turk regime, the Bulgarian Constitutional clubs rebuked the 
"reactionary" movement and supported the Committee. In the fIrst place, the Central 
Bureau sent telegrams to all Macedonian branches instructing them to remain pacillc. 
Subsequently, responding to a Unionist request, it appointed Roumenev to negotiate 
with Carasso, a high-ranking Jew of the Salonica Committee, the participation of 
Bulgarian-Macedonian volunteers in the army ofMahmud Shevket Pasha.73 
In any case, a year after the revolution the Unionist failure to settle the acute 
agrarian-ecclesiastical questions, promote inter-racial unity and ameliorate the living 
conditions in Macedonia stirred signifIcant discontent within the League of clubs. It 
was not long before this popular dissatisfaction developed into an influential political 
current within the local Bulgarian branches. Its leaders, outstanding members like 
Christev, Guerov, Mirtchev, Domev, Risov, Filippev rebuked the futile persistence of 
the Central Bureau in working with the Committee for the political and cultural 
development of Macedonia. Disillusioned with the Unionist practice, this nationalist 
group envisaged establishing underneath the club mechanism a "powerful Bulgarian 
national organization" in order to promote more energetically the Bulgarian national 
aspirations in Macedonia. 74 
Such was the situation in the Bulgarian-Macedonian clubs in the period under review. 
5.7 The Serres Faction and the Creation of the Bulgarian National Federal 
Party (B.N.F.P.). 
The proclamation of general political amnesty in Macedonia afforded the opportunity 
to the leaders of the M.R.O.-Left factions Sandanski, Panitsa, Katardjiev (Serres) and 
72 P.RO. F.O. 195/2329 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyI26-5-1909/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/24-11-
1909lLamb to Lowther, I.A.Y.E.l1909!File AAKlSofia Legationl1911-11-1909/no.820/Simopoulos 
to Mavromihalis 
73 LA. Y .E.l1909 !File AAK -AlGeneral Consulate of Salonica/ 1911-9-1 909/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Kallergis/Second Congress-Annual Report of Central Bureaulp.19 and P.RG. F.G. 19512328 
General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyI24-4-1909/Lamb to Lm,ther 
74 LA.Y.E.l1909!File AAK-AiGeneral Consulate of Salonica/1911-9-1909/Papadiamantopoulos to 
KallergisiSecond Congresslpp.1-25 
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Tsernopeev, Delidarev (Strumnitsa) to visit Salonica.75 Whilst in the capital of 
Macedonia, they busied themselves with the elaboration and laying out of their 
political positions respecting the future function of Ottoman administration and 
society. Following a short negotiation period with the Salonica Unionist Committee 
the M.R.O.-Left published its political program in the Bulgarian newspaper Kambana 
(Bell) on 19 August 1908. It is significant that in the introduction of the program the 
Serres Regional Committee expressed its opposition to the "secession of Macedonia 
and Adrianople" from the Ottoman Empire. 
The bulk of the M.R.O.-Left program consisted of a considerable number of political 
and social-economic proposals. The political part demanded: the Ottoman 
Parliament to become the supreme legislative body in the Empire with authority to 
control the Ministerial Council; establishment of self-government in communes, 
provinces and prefectures based on the principle of national freedom while the central 
administration was to control all key civil sectors: defense, foreign policy, economy, 
army, railways, communications, customs and posts; in particular, with regard to 
Macedonia, the Serres group suggested the division of the three vilayets into small 
administrative regions with self-government according to the system of Swiss 
cantons. 
Furthermore, the institution of universal and secret ballot and proportional electoral 
system; respect for personal rights and freedom for the press and unions; general 
conscription and gradual replacement of the conventional armed forces by a people's 
militia; abolition of ethnic, religious and class privileges; full political amnesty and 
termination of foreign interference in the internal affairs of the Ottoman Empire. 
Not less important were the social-economic provisions of the M.R.O.-Left. Here, 
the influence of socialist ideology was more than obvious. Their principal objective 
was to ameliorate the position and living conditions of the lower social strata in the 
Empire. Thus, the Leftists called for the immediate abolition of the out-of-date 
feudal system, the confiscation of the Sultan's domains and Christian or Moslem 
75 It should be noted that at the time of the YOlmg Turk revolution Sandanski's authority extended 
through the northern Serres sanjak (Melnik, Nevrokop, Petrich) whereas Tserno~ev's group 
preponderated in the central regions of the sanjak (Stnunnitsa, Tikves, Veles). According to Lamb, 
this breach was not due to a conflicting ideological-political outlook but it was rather a question of 
personal and local rivalry between the two Macedonian leaders. F.O. 88119351 General Consulate 
of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/ 16-2-1909/no.18/Lamb to Lowther 
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vakoufs, the immediate expropriation of the large private estates (chiftliks) and their 
distribution to the peasantry. 
Moreover, the state should take steps to protect workers' rights by law, abolish the 
numerous direct-indirect taxes and decree one 'progressive tax' on individual income 
and property. The social proposals of the M.R.O.-Left attached great importance to 
the obligation on the government to set up uniform education for all nationalities and 
"create the best conditions for the cultural advancement of the country.,,76 
Taking advantage of its presence in Salonica the Left leadership tried to disseminate 
its positions respecting the Young Turk revolution and Macedonian politics to the 
people. Sandanski reiterated to Young Turk officials his commitment to uphold and 
defend the Constitutional regime against any internal or external enemy, including 
Bulgaria. The Macedonian leader advised the Bulgarian-Macedonians to turn a deaf 
ear to insidious counsels from the Principality to continue the armed struggle, urging 
them to counteract the influence of the Sofia-sponsored Constitutional associations. 
Though opposed to the continuation of armed struggle the Serres Committee had 
little desire to suppress its peasant militia. 
The decision of the M.R.O. Left to support the C.D.P. was to no small measure due 
to its inherent antipathy towards the Bulgarian government and its Macedonian 
policy. In its program, the M.R.O.-Left went so far as to demand from the Young 
Turks the abolition of the Exarchate' s secular privileges and called for the ending of 
Bulgaria's interference in Macedonian matters. Delidarev, a prominent theorist of the 
M.R.O.- Left, did not hesitate to assert that "all the problems of the Bulgarian 
population in Macedonia are products of the chauvinist and warlike policy of 
Bulgaria." In a similar tone, during a speech in Veles in early August, Tsernopeev 
openly accused the Bulgarian government and the Exarchate "of having become the 
cause of Macedonian bloodshed.,,77 
In the opinion of those M.R.O. socialist visionaries, the Macedonian struggle instead 
of being a conscious campaign for the economic, social and spiritual development of 
the people had degenerated into a bitter inter-ethnic strife between the various 
76 See: I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 85.3/General Consulate of Salonica/12/25-9-1908/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/Sandanski Memorandum and MACDERMOTT (1988, pp.353-~) 
77 I. A. YE.I 1908IFile 21. 5/Sofia Legation/10/23-8-1908/Zalokostats to Baltazzis. I. A. YE.l19081File 
71.2/Uskub Consulate/ 16/29-8-1908/Baraklis to Baltazzis/Telegraphicll7 .00 and E.A.I I 9081KH1 1 4-
8-1908/no.32/pp.2-3 
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nationalities resulting in the economic and physical destruction of the Macedonian 
communities. For this deplorable situation, capitalist and nationalist Bulgaria, Serbia 
and Greece were to blame. 
For its part, in the long-run, the Left-wing of the M.R.O. envisioned the 
transformation of the Ottoman dominions in Europe and Asia Minor into a united 
Eastern Federation. The advocates of this political project believed that once free 
from Moslem and Christian bourgeois dominance and Balkan nationalist aspirations 
the Federation could reconcile the internal social forces to bring about the eventual 
solution of the national question in the Ottoman Empire and lead the nationalities to 
economic and cultural development. 78 
Following the lapse of the ftrst months of the Constitutional regime, the M.R.O.-Left 
had lost much of its faith in Young Turk political ability and potential. Indeed, till the 
Bulgarian crisis the policy of the new Ottoman administration seemed to follow the 
old Porte tradition. Even worse, the Unionist failure to deal with important questions 
like agrarian reform, provincial decentralization and local government showed overt 
symptoms of social immaturity and political conservatism. 
By the end of the autumn, the disenchantment of the M.R.O.-Left with C.D.P. 
political practice was reflected in the Macedonian press. On 26 November 1908, 
Sandanski's Salonica-based organ Konstitutsiona Zarya (Constitutional Dawn) 
published an article on Ottoman attitude toward the Bulgarian-Macedonian element. 
It stated: "The Ottoman Bulgarians, as Turkish actions show, are regarded with 
peculiar distrust and contempt by the higher ruling spheres. The Turks treat the 
Bulgarians even worse than they treat the other nationalities in Macedonia.,,79 
The Ottomans, whose apprehensions about the destabilizing role of the Macedonian 
revolutionary organizations had revived after Bulgarian independence, accepted the 
challenge. In the second week of December, the editor of the Turkish journal Yeni 
Asr (New Times) Fezli Necib Effendi80 referred to a speech that Sandanski had 
allegedly delivered in the Bulgarian village of Melnik in mid-November. 
78 LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 71.2IUskub ConsulateIl6/29-8-1908IBaraklis to Baltazzisffelegraphicll 7.00 
and Narodna Volia ,17-1-1909 cited in B.A.S. (1978, pp.591-2) 
79 Konstitutsiona Zarya, 26-11-1908 cited in B.A.S. (1978, p.566) 
80 Fezli Necib Effendi was also second secretary of the Salonica vilayet and political supporter of 
Hussein Hilmi Pasha. 
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According to Necib Effendi, the Macedonian leader declared that the establishment of 
a free government was impossible in the Ottoman Empire. The Ottoman official also 
maintained that Sandanski had urged the local people to renounce its allegiance to the 
Young Turk regime and rally around the Bulgarian Macedonian committees, "the real 
representative and administrative bodies of the Bulgarian population in Macedonia. ,,81 
In the first months of 1909 it was evident that the understanding between the C.U.P. 
and the M.R.O.-Left did not seem workable, although both groups were ill-disposed 
to burn all bridges between them. The gradual alienation between the Left-wing of 
the M.R.O. and the Young Turks had however a very important repercussion. It 
brought about the reconciliation of the rival factions of Sandanski and Tsemopeev. 
In January 1909, the two leaders, who shared the principles of socialism and 
provincial self-administration, decided to work for the establishment of a Bulgarian 
National Federal Party (B.N.F.P.). 
On 17 January 1909, the new party issued its organ: the Narodna Volia (Popular 
Will) which emerged after the merging of Konstitutsiona Zarya with the paper of 
Tsemopeev Edinstvo (Union). Through Narodna Vo lia , the new party made clear 
that it rejected the policies of the Unionist Committee and the Bulgarian 
Constitutional clubs as serving the interests of the Turkish and Bulgarian capitalists. 
It declared that the main aim of the B.N.F.P. would be to "rally all democratic forces, 
irrespective of national allegiance or class-rivalry, into a wide, popular movement for 
the institution of far-reaching social reforms in the country." 
On an organizational level, the founders of the party held that its nucleus should be 
formed by nationally-based sections in every communal and urban Macedonian 
center. Each local association was to undertake to elect an executive bureau of no 
less than three members and set up links with the Salonica B.N.F.P. central branch. 
The Party statutes and regulations would be outlined in the B.N.F.P. founding 
Congress. At a subsequent stage, after having established themselves among the 
entire Macedonian people, those dispersed political components were to unite and 
form a federal party. 82 
81 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.lIGeneral Consulate of Salonica/14!27-12-1908/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/without classification number, P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Vice-Consulate of Serres to 
Constantinople Embassyl 18-1-1 909/Greig to Lowther 
82 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/16-2-1909/Lamb 
to Lowther 
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Recognizing that at present its aim to enlist support from all Macedonian nationalities 
stood very little chance of success the M.R.O.-Left set as its primary objective the 
organization of the Bulgarian-Macedonian section of the party. The first move 
towards that direction took place on 6 February 1909 when 1,000-1,500 B.N.F.P. 
supporters met in Melnik. In Melnik, the B.N.F.P. passed its Resolutions which were 
communicated to the Grand Vizier, the Serres deputies and the Macedonian press. 
The B.N.F.P. Resolutions called the Ottoman Parliament to deal with the granting of 
lands to the peasants and ameliorate living conditions through the improvement of 
the Macedonian infrastructure: the establishment of communications roads railways , , , 
schools and regional hospitals. Additional provisions referred to the need for reform 
in the tax-collecting system, the abolition of the heavy military tax bedel-i-askeri and 
requested the dismissal and punishment of corrupt and incompetent local officials.83 
Two tendencies were apparent in the party leadership regarding the B.N.F.P. 
relations with the Young Turks. The first, favored by Sandanski, stood against the 
continuation of the cooperation with the Young Turks. Sandanski had been 
disappointed by the conservative and pro-bourgeois policies of the c.u.P. Therefore, 
he had embraced the concept that the only perceptible way for the final resolution of 
the Macedonian question in consonance with the interests of the peasant population 
was by means of a pan-Macedonian revolution and the establishment of an 
independent Macedonian state. 84 
The second current was represented by Dr. Vlahov, a well-known intellectual 
socialist from Kilkis who had initially sided with the Young Turks and was elected 
deputy in the Ottoman Parliament. Vlahov, even though in the original stages of his 
political career he had attempted to take advantage of Sandanski's influence in the 
northern areas of the Serres sanjak for his own ends, now repudiated the 
revolutionary practice of Sandanski. In his opinion it would be in the best interest of 
the B.N.F.P. to remain law-abiding and work closely with the Young Turks. 
83 F.O. 88119531 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l26-2-1909/no.128/Lowther to Grey/enclosure no.2 
84 Already, since early March 1909, the Ottoman authorities were in possession of revolutionary 
letters and proclamations issued by Sandanski and addressed to the people of Serres sanjak. Those 
documents called the local population to place no more confidence in the Young Turks and prepare 
itself for a general Macedonian insurrection. In retaliation, the Ottomans had proceeded to banish 
in Bulgaria three of Sandanski's chiefs: Vladov, Stojanov and Kotsarev. See: I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile 
AAK-A/Serres Consulate/61l9-3-1909/Sahtouris to Baltazzis/Telegraphic, F.O. 881/9717 
Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l28-12-1909/no.998IMarling to Grey. See also next note 
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Eventually, the majority sided with Vlahov, who became President of the party 
triumvirate and remained the indisputable leader of the B.N.F.P. until its dissolution 
in 1910.85 
5.8 Bulgarian Exarchate and Young Turks 
After the Turkish revolution, the Bulgarian Church pursued three main goals: to 
challenge the ecclesiastical status quo in Macedonia, to gain an equal po sition with 
the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate and to reform itself to meet the demands of the 
Constitutional era. 
Based on the perception that the ecclesiastical disposition of 190386 was insufficient 
to meet the current demands of the Macedonian people the Exarchate sought to 
impress on the Ottoman administration the need to allow every Macedonian 
commune to chose whether it would be under Patriarchist or Exarchist authority. To 
influence the Porte to reconsider the issue, the Exarchate did not hesitate to resort to 
extreme measures. In the fIrst weeks of August 1908, Exarchist agents, supported by 
M.R.O. partisans and Macedonian immigrants, traversed the areas of Monastir and 
Salonica. 
Using forceful means they attempted to encroach on Patriarchist churches and 
schools and present them as institutions of "undefIned" jurisdiction. In creating 
contested zones of religious and educational authority in Macedonia the Bulgarian 
Exarchate intended to re-open the church question and undermine the position of the 
Patriarchate in the central Macedonian districts.87 
The Exarchist campaign provoked the strong opposition of the Greek-Patriarchate. 
The Ecumenical Patriarch and the Greeks complained to the Ottoman government 
but with no practical result. In the ensuing months and after having failed to 
85 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate ofSalonica to Constantinople Embassy/l0-2-1910/Lamb 
to Lowther. DINGAS, and APOSTOLIDIS., (1989, pp.64-6, 74) 
86 Trying to avoid the confusion created by the frequent conversion of the Macedonian communities 
from Exarchate to Patriarchate and vice-versa, in August 1903, the Inspector-General and the Civil 
Agents had decided to accept as a fixed point the ecclesiastical status quo that existed in the 
beginning of 1903. Any transfers from one creed to other occurring after that terminus were not 
recognized by the Ottoman authorities. P.P .A.P. CV 1909, p.1 0 18 
87 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 20.4IElassona Consulate/l9/l-9-1908/no.464IEnnyalis to Baltazzis, 
I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.4IMonastir Consulate to General Consulate of SalonicaJ2811 0-9-
1908/no.946/Halkiopoulos to Alexandropoulos, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 59.2IMonastir ConsulateI14/27-
8-1908/no.906/Halkiopoulos to Baltazzis and P.P.A.P. CV 1909, p.1 0 19 
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reconcile the two camps the Ottoman regime decided to close down the disputed 
ecclesiastical and educational institutions in Macedonia. The question was referred 
to the Parliament and it was not settled until the summer of 1910.88 
In July 1910, the Ottoman Cabinet passed a bill on the issue of Macedonian churches. 
According to it, out of 256 churches the Bulgarians were to take possession of 150 
and the Greeks 106. However, this law never really applied in Macedonia for by that 
time Greeks and Bulgarians had come to terms and had begun to settle local disputes 
between themselves. 89 
As far as the second aspect of the Exarchist program was concerned, after the 
Turkish revolution the Bulgarian Exarchate exploited the opportunity to reiterate its 
old claim for acquisition of an equal status with the Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
Specifically, on 15 August 1908, the Bulgarian Church through its organ Tserkoven 
Vestnik requested the new Young Turk regime to sanction the institution of a 
Bulgarian Holy Synod and National Council.90 The Bulgarian demand was in full 
accord with article 11 of the Constitution wherein the religious rights of each ethnic 
group were secured. It was also in tune with the Unionist bid to grant complete 
freedom of religious beliefs. 
In any case, soon after the revolution the Exarch Joseph I took the initiative to form a 
Bulgarian Synod composed of 4 Suffragans, anticipating official recognition by the 
Porte. Although from the Constitutional point of view the Exarchist claim was 
sound, the criteria that were to influence and determine the Ottoman decision were 
political rather than ecclesiastical. 
It was no secret that the Sublime Porte had constantly viewed the Exarchate as a tool 
of Bulgarian national propaganda in Turkey-in-Europe. From this standpoint, the 
Ottoman political leadership viewed any measure that could increase the Exarchate' s 
Macedonian authority with profound suspicion. The declaration of Bulgarian 
independence did little to dissipate Ottoman fears and disentangle the situation. On 
the contrary, it provided the Kiamil Pasha government with an excellent pretext to 
88 LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 59 .2lMonastir ConsulateIl8/31-8-190 8/no. 911lHalkiopoulos to Baltazzis, 
LA.Y.E.l1909IFile Consular Reports-5/Salonica Special Office to Foreign Office/Report on Events 
and Situation in Salonica Region during the First Four Months of 1909/p.1, V AKALOPOULOS 
(1988, pp.321-2) 
89 F.G. 881/9811 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l14-2-1911lLowtber to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 1910/enclosure no.1 
90 E.A.11908/KH/1O-1O-1908/no.40/pp.4-5 
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put the Exarchist request on ice. The Porte now went onto the offensive contending 
that in the light of the new political situation in Bulgaria the Exarch should transfer 
his see to Sofia. The sole concession the Ottomans were prepared to make was to 
permit a subordinate Exarchist representative to remain in Constantinople to serve 
the religious needs of the Ottoman Bulgarians. 
The Kiamil Pasha Cabinet was disposed to allow the continuation of the Exarchist see 
in the Ottoman capital only on the condition that the Exarch would be an Ottoman 
subject and he would undertake to sever all his links with Bulgaria. 91 In the end, the 
Bulgarian Exarch Joseph was forced to abandon the demand for equality with the 
Patriarchate and retain his see in Constantinople. 
In its last objective, the 1908-1909 strivings for reform, the Bulgarian Exarchate was 
no more successful. Here, it is important to remember that to a great extent the 
prestigious position that the Exarchate enjoyed among the Bulgarian-Macedonian 
rural populations lay in its intimate cooperation with the local communal Macedonian 
leaderships. In the period of Macedonian struggle this understanding was further 
developed. It was within this context that the Exarchate had allowed the communal 
leaderships to participate in the administration of the local Bulgarian-Macedonian 
educational institutions. 
However, the Young Turk revolution and the apparent termination of the 
Macedonian struggle had induced the Exarchist leadership to change its Regulations 
and attempt to reform its organizational structure to adjust to the new conditions. 
The new Regulations provided for mustering power and jurisdiction around the local 
Exarchist bureaus in the Macedonian urban centers, thereby stripping the peasant 
societies of their educational privileges. Furthermore, the Exarchate retained for 
itself the exclusive right to appoint schoolmasters in Macedonia. Most of the new 
teachers came now from Bulgaria with little or even no knowledge of Macedonian 
affairs. Adding insult to Macedonian injury, the Exarchate promoted cadres from 
Bulgaria, instead of Macedonia, to the high-ranking positions of its administrative 
bodies, alienating the local communities from their natural leadership. 
Even more unpopular had been the nascent Exarchist tendency to set up Macedonian 
schools based on the Bulgarian educational pattern. It was partly due to this 
91 F.O. 881/9503 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./II-I-1909/no.18/Lowther to Grey 
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innovation that a large number of educated Macedonians left their homeland and 
went to Bulgaria. The new centralist policy of the Exarchist leadership found 
expression in its decision to establish the Theological School in Constantinople rather 
than Macedonia. This move increased the Faculty's annual expenditure from 40,000 
francs to 300,000 but failed to increase its membership. 
In sum, the organizational experiment of the Exarchate met with relative failure. 
While the Macedonian struggle seemed to enter a new phase, the strong bonds 
between the Exarchist hierarchy and the Bulgarian-Macedonian communities, forged 
in the common battle against the Turks and their Macedonian rivals, began to weaken 
and evidence of mutual disappointment came to the forefront. 
In all probability, a section of the indigenous Macedonian intelligentsia feared that the 
Exarchist program for structural reform was the cloak for the 'Bulgarization' of the 
Macedonian religious and communal institutions: a strategy that ran contrary to its 
own aspirations for emancipation and political self-determination. 
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CHAPTER VI 
GREECE'S MACEDONIAN POLICY 
6.1 Greece's Political Considerations After the Unionist Revolution 
It has been already pointed out that the entire Hellenic national pro gram had been 
dependent on the future of the Ottoman Empire and therefore, the Young Turk coup 
was bound to exert an important influence on Greek affairs and foreign policy. In the 
Greek kingdom, the majority of the people warmly welcomed the revolution. 
Initially, public opinion had been confident that political developments in the 
neighboring country served the interests of Hellenism. 
The prevalent concept was that within a liberal and progressive Young Turk regime 
the inter-racial struggle over control and power in the Ottoman Empire would 
necessarily drift to the fields of economic competition and political development. It 
was precisely in those departments that the three million Greeks in Turkey had been 
traditionally superior to all their racial contenders. At the time of the Turkish 
revolution, had it not been for the Armenians and the Jews the whole of the economic 
and commercial activity of the Ottoman Empire would have been exclusively 
controlled by Hellenes. 1 
In the circumstances, many Greeks shared the opinion that the kingdom should 
attempt to "Hellenize" the Ottoman Empire by means of economy, culture and 
religion. To this end, Athens should proceed to form an alliance with the 
Constantinople Cabinet and contribute to the political preservation of European 
Turkey. Souliotis-Nikolaidis, a prominent Greek, who had served in Macedonia and 
was currently the leader of the Greek organization in Constantinople, was an 
exponent of this theory. 
He argued that Greece's primary objective should not be territorial expansion at the 
expense of Turkey-in-Europe but the evolution of Ottoman Hellenism into the 
dominant element in the neighboring country by means of infiltrating Ottoman 
1 F.O. 88119353 Athens Embassy to F.O'/12-8-1908/no.117/Young to Grey, DAKIN (1966, pAOO). 
AHMAD (1982, ppA05-6) in BRAUDE, B., and LEWIS, B., eds., (1982) 
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administration and society. The driving force in this elusive process of "Hellenizing" 
the Ottoman Empire could be neither the Ecumenical Patriarchate nor the Greek 
consular institutions but the numerous and prosperous Ottoman Greek communities.2 
Pan-Hellenism, however, had thus far failed to rally the sympathy of the entire nation. 
Among a section of Greek public opinion, the political community and the military 
there were many advocates of an aggressive policy towards the Porte. The 
apologists of this nationalist group stood for Greece's aggrandizement in the 
Ottoman provinces of Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, Aegean and Asia Minor. Their 
ultimate intent was to bring about the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the 
unification of the entire Hellenic nation within the ethnic boundaries of a robust 
Greek kingdom. 
During the initial joyous stages of the Turkish revolution, the forward-looking idea of 
Hellenization could not but gain considerable momentum. This current was 
illustrated in the Greek press. Athenian papers with large-scale circulation like 
AKPOiCOAl; (Acropolis) and even the nationalist IIaTpl; (Fatherland) and EpTfpo; 
(Forward) adopted a benevolent attitude toward the Young Turk revolution. The 
XpovlKa (Annals) maintained a mild stance respecting Macedonian events. This 
Greek newspaper however, did not fail to point out that ultimately the key 
determinant of Hellenic policy toward the Young Turk regime would be the position 
and welfare of the Greek element in the neighboring state.3 
Young Turk sympathizers were not to be found among public opinion and the press 
alone. The Unionist manifesto had even succeeded in influencing a part of the Greek 
political community. The Turkish Constitution had been only a few days old when 
the Opposition Liberal party rushed to declare its support to the C.U.P. Rallis, the 
party leader, was initially of the opinion that the establishment of a free Parliamentary 
system in the Ottoman Empire would immensely benefit the economical-political 
development of the numerous Hellenic element. 
On 1 September 1908, he embarked on a tour in Macedonia and Constantinople. 
While meeting the Young Turk officials in Salonica, Rallis without having consulted 
2 PANAYOTOPOULOS (I 980b, pp.337-43) 
3 The only Greek journal that openly rebuked the pro-Unionist trend was the AB'lva (Athens). ~et, 
its different attitude must be primarily ascribed to its tendency to combat the present Greek Cabmet 
rather to an original opposition against the c.u.P. PAPADOPOULOS (1986, pp.131-2) 
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the Athens government or the local Greek organization announced the withdrawal of 
the secret Greek officers from Macedonia and spoke fervently in favor of a long-term 
Greek-Turkish political understanding and cooperation.4 
Contrary to the initial pro-Unionist stance of the Parliamentary Opposition - Rallis 
was to change his mind after his Macedonian tour and uphold the continuation of the 
armed struggle5 - the Greek Patriarch Joachim III stood firm in his conviction that the 
Turkish revolution was in conflict with the interests of Hellenism. In His Holiness's 
opinion, in a new Ottoman Empire in which all nationalities would enjoy the same 
religious rights and political status the millet system would be jeopardized. 
Here, it is important to remember that the foundations of the Patriarchate's religious, 
educational and communal authority lay in the autonomous existence of the millet. 
The Ecumenical Patriarch and the supreme ecclesiastical bodies Great Council and 
Holy Synod, therefore, were determined to strenuously oppose any attempt on the 
part of the new political leadership to introduce structural changes in the millet 
system which would threaten their privileged position in Orthodox religious and 
educational affairs. 6 
The Greek government on the other hand believed that the best way to promote the 
interests of Hellenism was by reaching an understanding with the new regime. Unlike 
the Bulgarian administration, the moderate Theotokis Cabinet did not seem to fear a 
revived Ottoman Empire. The establishment of an entente between the governments 
of Athens and Constantinople could avail Greece in two respects. First it would be 
the best political guarantee for the protection of the Greek populations and their 
interests in the Ottoman Empire. Second, it could lay the groundwork for the 
conclusion of an amicable agreement for the settlement of the Cretan question and 
the railway junction in accord with the desires of Greece. 
The Theotokis government was well aware of the divergent national approaches in 
Greek society and leadership respecting the new Ottoman regime. As an outcome, 
the Ministerial Council embraced a sober and rather circumspect view of the situation 
in the neighboring country. Greek policy-makers knew that for the time being the 
4 ZANNAS (1960, p.56) 
5 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.3/General Consulate of Salonica/8/21-9-1908/no.887/Kanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis 
6 ZANNAS (1960, p.56). CLOGG (1982, p.199) in BRAUDE, and LEWIS., eds., (1982) 
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political situation in Constantinople was, and for the foreseeable future would 
continue to be, unstable. 
The Greek leadership inclined to believe that if the Young Turks were truly 
committed to strengthening their relations with the Greek kingdom and the Hellenic 
populations of the Empire they should first officially recognize and respect the 
educational and religious privileges of the Greek Patriarchate. Furthermore, the new 
Ottoman regime should also take steps to safeguard the position of the Greek 
populations in Turkey and secure their welfare by elevating them from the level of 
reaya to the status of Ottoman subjects and grant them an equal share in the fields of 
civil administration, politics and culture. 
It was within this context, that many Greek officials tended to consider the question 
of parliamentary elections as a political "test case" for the Young Turks. According 
to their reasoning, whether or not the minority Christian ethnicities were 
proportionately represented in the Ottoman Parliament would indicate whether the 
C.U.P. commitment for equality between Moslems and Christians was to be 
implemented or remain a dead letter. 7 
6.2 The End of the Hellenic Armed Intervention in Macedonia and the 
Beginning of the "Peaceful Propaganda" Activity 
In the first days after the Turkish revolution the Greek political leadership had failed 
to decide whether the revolution served Greek interests in Macedonia or not. From 
the Greek standpoint, the situation in the three provinces seemed very complicated. 
Admittedly, the C.U.P. commitment to prevent the implementation of the Reval 
program and the eventual suspension of the new British-Russian reform scheme for 
the alleged appointment of a Christian General Governor had caused relief in Athens. 
Ignoring the real content of the Reval discussions, the Greek administration was led 
to believe that the Young Turk intervention had frustrated the appointment of a 
Bulgarian Governor General in Macedonia and had prevented the three provinces 
from suffering the fate of Eastern Rumelia.8 
7 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.4/Athens to General Consulate of Salonicail/14-8-1908/no.3917IBaltazzis 
to Papadiamantopoulos, LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 122.2/Athens to General Consulate of Salonical2/15-8-
1908/no.735IBaltazzis to Kanellopoulos, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.4/General Consulate of 
Salonical 15/28-7 -1908/no. 718/Kanellopoulos to Baltazzis 
8 LA. Y .E.l1908IFile 91.1.2/Constantinople Legation/30/ 12-8-1908/no. 742/Gryparis to Baltazzis 
Greece's Macedonian Policy --------------~~----________________________ 112 
On the other hand, the Macedonian developments after the July revolution resembled 
a political avalanche from which the Greek-Macedonian movement was unlikely to 
escape. The Albanian, Serb, Vlach and above all Bulgarian-Macedonian bands had 
already begun to dissolve.9 The Great Powers had also initiated the withdrawal 
process of European control from the three provinces. As for the peasant 
Macedonian population, exhausted as it was from the prolonged inter-racial strife, it 
vehemently opposed any idea for the continuation of the armed Macedonian 
struggle. 10 
In these conditions, the moderate Greek government could do little but comply with 
the Unionist demand calling for the end of the Christian armed intervention in 
Macedonia. By the end of July, upon receiving orders from the Greek F.O. the 
Greek-Macedonian bands operating in Salonica and Monastir vilayets retired across 
the Greek border while only a small number withdrew to local resorts. The vast 
majority of the military and civilian agents, who had been employed in the "special" 
Macedonian Offices, were also recalled to Athens.II 
The decision of the Hellenic government to suspend its revolutionary activities in 
Macedonia was interconnected with Greece's foreign policy considerations. Since 
the beginning of the year, it had become clear that the Macedonian question had 
ceased to dominate Greek politics. The Cretan question and the construction of the 
Salonica-Larisa railway link were now on the top of the Greek Ministerial Council's 
agenda. In addition, in case the Greek revolutionary bands remained in Macedonia it 
is certain that Moslem hostility would descend upon the local Hellenic populations. 
By withdrawing its partisans from Macedonia Athens sought to avoid stirring up 
Moslem animosity and display its support to the nascent Unionist regime with a view 
to attaining a favorable settlement in Crete or, alternatively, the railway connection. I2 
9 In fact, the dissolution of the M.RO. bands was to a certain extent devoid of particular 
significance, for the M.RO. militia was composed by the local Macedonian peasantry and always 
maintained its operational capability to take the field, whenever required. That was not the case 
with the Greek-Macedonian bands. Most of them had been formed in Greece and a possible re-
activation after their dissolution was bound to encounter far more serious difficulties. 
LA. Y .E.I 1 908IFile 59 .2/Monastir Consulate/ 1/ 14-8-1908/no. 77 OlHalkiopoulos to Baltazzis 
10 F.O. 881/9353 Berlin Embassy to F.O.l18-1 0-1908/no.335/Lascelles to Grey/enclosure no.l 
II LA.Y.E.l1908/File 39.4/ Athens to General Consulate of Salonica/l9/l-9-1908/no.825/Baltazzis to 
Kanellopoulos 
12 LA. Y.E.I 1908/File 88.1.3/General Consulate of Salonica/4117 -8-1908/no. 790lKanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis/Report for July/pp.l. 3-4 
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On the other hand, those Greeks with long experience in Macedonian affairs were 
particularly hesitant to embrace the belief that the end of armed intervention and the 
return to the methods of "peaceful propaganda" could benefit Macedonian Hellenism. 
Those circles felt that during a period in which the Greek movement enjoyed 
undisputed supremacy in Macedonia any change in the local affairs could only imperil 
its position. 
The Greek-Macedonian consular authorities had in time advised the government to 
take into serious consideration the possible implications stemming from the abrupt 
discontinuation of the revolutionary "national work". Their main argument was that 
the abandonment of the major reinforcement tool (i.e. the band activity) far from 
conferring any perceptible advantage upon the Hellenic cause in the three vilayets, 
could deprive the Greek-Macedonian communities of the profits of their national 
struggle. Kanellopoulos, secretary of the General Consulate of Salonica and perhaps 
the most active Greek diplomatic agent in Macedonia, wrote to Athens on 4 August 
1908: "Following the dismantling of the bands there was no essential guarantee that 
the Macedonian ground and the Macedonian popUlations gained all these years by 
force, blood and funds were to remain loyal to Greece.,,13 
Those fears were not totally ill-founded. In August. as soon as the bulk of the Greek 
partisans evacuated the three provinces, Bulgarian-Macedonian and Vlach 
nationalists launched a series of attacks against the Greek-Macedonian populations 
under the often indifferent eye of the Young Turk Committees. The short-term 
effects of this renewed inter-racial violence were the emergence of the Greek-
Bulgarian Macedonian dispute over the ecclesiastical question and the growth of the 
Kutzo-Vlach influence in the southern districts of the Salonica vilayet. 14 
The new social-economic conditions were also likely to create additional problems 
for the Greek-Macedonian organization. The withdrawal of the Greek-Macedonian 
bands, for example, had allowed the backward mountainous Bulgarian populations of 
the north to move unhindered into the southern Macedonian districts in quest of 
13 Ibid. p.13. The Greek consuls in Kavala, Dedeagatch and Monastir held similar ~ews., ,See 
LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 20.51Kavala Consulate/21/3-8-1908/no.498/Polihroniadis to BaltazZlS/Poliocal, 
LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 21.3/Dedeagatch Vice-Consulate/2517 -8-1908/no.248/Souidas to Baltazzis and 
LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 59.2/Monastir Consulate/21 15-8-1908/no. nOlHalkiopoulos to Baltazzis 
14 LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 85.3/General Consulate of Salonica/Kanellopoulos to Baltazzisl Report on 
Events and Situation in Salonica District for 1908/p.9 
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work and better living conditions. Bulgarian settlements were thus established in the 
main cities across the Macedonian coastline such as Salonica, Kavala, Serres, 
Dedeagach challenging for the first time ever the indigenous Hellenic ethnic and 
political dominance. Is 
On the political level, in order to satisfy the Unionist request for the presentation of 
the political platform of the various Macedonian communities, the Greek F.O. 
instructed the General Consulate in Salonica to form a civilian commission whose 
main mission was to analyze the C.U.P. program and elaborate the Macedonian 
Greek Memorandum. A second commission undertook to establish links with the 
Young Turk Committee and work for the advancement of Greek political claims in 
Macedonia. 16 
Nevertheless, apart from such preparatory steps, it was on the establishment of Greek 
political associations in the urban centers of the Macedonian mainland that the Greek 
government had heavily relied for the advancement of its new Macedonian policy. 
These societies were to replace the special Macedonian offices and develop into the 
principal centers of the Hellenic political struggle in Macedonia. In the ensuing two 
months, utilizing the well-organized network of the Internal Organization and the 
pecuniary assistance from the local Greek consular authorities, a significant number 
of political clubs was formed in the vilayets of Salonica, Monastir, Kosovo and in the 
Orthodox districts of Albania and Epirus. 
The clubs' fundamental aim was to defend the gains of the Macedonian struggle and 
contribute to the dissemination of the Hellenic propaganda in the three provinces. 
Their most urgent assignment had been to act as electoral propaganda lobbies, 
around which the Greek -Macedonian agents anticipated enlisting support and 
members for the electoral battle. Unhappily for the Greek nationalist aspirations, the 
new organization failed to spread in the three vilayets. The formation of a Greek 
National Association in Uskub under Goudos and Kommatis and the attempts to set 
15 Among the class of the local Greek merchants and businessmen there were many who did not see 
the Bulgarian immigrants as racial rivals but as cheap labor force from which they anticipated to 
profiteer on economic terms. That is why, when the Greek-Macedonian Committee called the local 
Hellenic communities to thwart at any cost the Bulgarian immigration, its appeal fell on deaf ears. 
I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 88.1.3/General Consulate of Salonica/4117-8-1908/no.790/Kanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis/Report for July/p.14 
16 LA. YE.l190SlFile 9l.l.1I Athens to Constantinople Legationl26/S-S-190S/no.3655IBaltazzis to 
Gryparis, LA. Y .E.I 1908IFile 39.4/General Consulate of Salonica/ 1 11'+-8-1908/no. 71 7/Kanellopoulos 
to Baltazzis 
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up branches in the remote districts of Diber and Veles for the promotion of the 
material and cultural interests of the local Greek population were bound to meet with 
little success. For in the vilayet of Kosovo, the scattered ethnic Greek enclaves were 
incapable of forming an assertive ethnic majority even in a single district. 17 
In the provinces of Salonica and Monastir the Greeks were likely to find more scope 
for the development of their new political current. Prominent amongst the 
Macedonian Greek societies was the Monastir political club under the leadership of 
Valavanidis. Since mid-August, the local Greek organization, supported actively by 
the Greek consul Dimaras and the Metropolitan of Monastir, Stephanos, had busied 
itself with the designation of the club's internal structure, the drawing of political 
statutes and the recruitment of new members. The ostensible goal of the Monastir 
society was to strive for the political advancement and cultural development of the 
Macedonian people in conformity with the spirit of the new Ottoman regime. Its 
secret objective though was to replace the local special office in its underground 
activities and carry out the Hellenic national propaganda "by all means available". 
The club's statutes provided the establishment of Educational, Press and Commercial 
departments. IS The Educational section undertook to secure the normal function of 
the Greek schools in the province and oversee the needs of the local schoolmasters, 
while the Press department assumed the mission of "enlightening" the local 
population about Greek political theses in Macedonia. Unarguably, the most 
important division of the association was the Commercial. Its cadres, many of whom 
had served in the Greek-Macedonian revolutionary organization, were instructed to 
establish an information-communication network throughout the hinterland. 
Recruitment of professionals such as merchants, civil agents, businessmen was to 
take place as an instrument for influencing local public opinion and retaining the 
majority of the Macedonian peasant communities in the Greek-Patriarchist camp. 
17 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.21Uskub Consulate/18/31-10-1908/no.570IBaraklis to Baltazzis and 
I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of Salonica to Uskub Consulate/14127-10-
1908/no.56INational League to Baraklis, I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 39.4/ Athens to Uskub Consulate/18/31-
8-1908lBaltazzis to Baraklis/Telegrapbic. NIKOLAlDOU (1996, pp.l17 -20) in SOCIETY FOR 
MACEDONIAN STUDIES, ed., (1996) 
18 The Monastir club had its own premises in the city, its services, its library, its reading-room and 
administrative council. 
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Furthermore, independent groups of armed men, initially 40, would traverse the 
countryside on the pretext of hunting; the club's secret paramilitary force. 19 
The legacy of the Greek struggle in Macedonia however became an onerous burden 
for those political associations. Soon, it became evident that the Greek political clubs 
in the Macedonian and Epirote centers of Salonica, Monastir, Kavala, Serres, Uskub, 
Janina and Koritsa were unable to compete in numerical strength and political activity 
with the thoroughly-organized and sophisticated Bulgarian-Macedonian 
Constitutional League. Their political isolation and modest performance in the 
Ottoman elections disillusioned the policy-makers in Athens and their local Hellenic 
agents as to their capability to operate as the political wing of Macedonian Greek 
organization. 
It is indisputable that, at the time of their formation, the Macedonian Greek clubs had 
to survive and develop under extremely unfavorable conditions. The local 
Macedonians, including the ethnic Greeks, could not overlook the fact that the 
ruthless Macedonian struggle had impaired their economic resources and had 
devastated a large part of their communal infrastructure. After the pacification of the 
region, the Macedonian Greeks were much more interested in working for their 
economic rehabilitation and individual prosperity rather than engage themselves in the 
new political structures of the Greek nationalist centers.20 The Greek community of 
Salonica, for instance, instead of striving for the growth of the local National 
Association sought to outdo its Jewish commercial rivals and cement its commanding 
position in the Macedonian economic affairs. To this aim, it did not hesitate to take 
advantage of the cheap Bulgarian labor availability and even set up joint ventures 
with Bulgarian-Macedonian businessmen notwithstanding the strong opposition on 
the part of the Macedonian Greek civilian authorities. 21 
Another deterrent to the development of the Greek political clubs in Macedonia was 
the internal divisions of the Greek-Macedonian leadership. Since the second half of 
the Macedonian struggle, the Greek nationalist agents and a group of ultra-
conservative Macedonian Patriarchist officials headed by the Metropolitan of 
19 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 59.2/Monastir Consulate/18/31-8-1908/no.909/Halkiopoulos to Baltazzis 
20 G.S.A.lA.T.V.l1909IFile 3/Monastir Consulate/2/15-4-1909/no.173/Modis to Tsontos-Vardas 
21 LA.Y.E.l1909IFile D-4.l/General Consulate of Salonica/May 1909/Special Office to General 
ConsulatelReport on MacedoniaJpA. See also note 15 
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Salonica Alexandros and his colleague of Veroia Apostolos had been at odds. Apart 
from the existence of conflicting personal strategies and their implication in local 
party feuds, the main point of dispute between the two rival groups lay in their 
tendency to control the educational and communal institutions of the Macedonian 
Greek populations. As a consequence of this anomalous situation, certain 
Patriarchist clergymen like the Metropolitan ofVeroia Apostolos were instructing the 
Macedonian Greek communities to avoid participating in the new political 
associations and distance themselves from the Hellenic nationalist propaganda 
activities. 22 Such was the discontent of the Greek Macedonian consular authorities 
that, in August 1908, Kanellopoulos requested Athens to intervene with the 
Ecumenical Patriarch to replace the Metropolitan of Salonica for he had failed to 
provide even elementary assistance to the Hellenistic movement in Macedonia. 23 
Last, but not least, the Theotokis Cabinet recently-formulated policy to concentrate 
its efforts on the settlement of the Cretan and railway questions impeded the growth 
of the Greek Macedonian political societies and undermined Greece's position in 
Macedonia. 
Altogether, the Young Turk revolution had materially altered the entire context of 
the Macedonian conflict as the dismantling of Christian revolutionary bands put an 
end to the "politics of terror" in the region. The Greek leadership in Macedonia and 
Athens rightfully estimated that from this point onwards the racial struggle for the 
acquisition of national ground and the advancement of political claims in Macedonia 
was to shift to the fields of economy, religion and politics. What the Greek 
leadership had failed to understand was that the transition from revolutionary 
activities to the novel practice of peaceful propaganda could endanger the supreme 
position of the Greek-Macedonian movement in the provinces of Salonica and 
Monastir. 
The Greek authorities' failure to establish an influential organization of Macedonian 
political clubs indicated that the economic and political conditions in the region had 
undergone profound changes. Developments in the region and the accentuation of 
22 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile D-4.lIGeneral Consulate of Salonica!May 1909/Special Office to General 
ConsulatelReport on MacedoniaJpp.9-12. See also: I.AYE.l1908IFile 39.4/General Consulate of 
SalonicaJ23/5-9-1908/no. 751/Kanellopoulos to Baltazzis 
23 Ibid. 
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political factionalism within the Greek-Macedonian movement had also undermined 
the Greek decision-making centers' capability to formulate and put into 
implementation a new and effective Macedonian policy. Furthermore, taking into 
consideration that the focus of Greek policy shifted from Macedonia to Crete and the 
railway connection, one has a clear picture as to what led to the inability of the Greek 
administration to meet the new Macedonian challenge of the Young Turk era. 
By the end of summer 1908, there was indisputable evidence that the Turkish 
revolution had injured the Greek national movement in Macedonia. Gone entirely 
was the concept of a Hellenic offensive policy for the further dissemination of the 
Greek national and political program in the Macedonian provinces of Salonica and 
Monastir. Hence, the official Hellenic administration and the Macedonian Greeks 
would strive to defend the gains that they had obtained during the armed Macedonian 
struggle against the resurgent attacks of their rival Macedonian ethnic groups under a 
new and unknown Young Turk regime. 
6.3 The Negotiations Between the Unionist Headquarters of Salonica and the 
Greek-Macedonian Commission. Early Tokens of Bilateral Suspicion and 
Disenchantment. 
The Greek political leadership was indeed anxious about the outcome of the political 
discussions with the Committee. The Theotokis government held that the negotiation 
process afforded an excellent opportunity for an in-depth investigation and analysis of 
Unionist political intentions on two important subjects: the future status of the Greek 
communities in the Ottoman Empire and the attitude of the Ottoman leaders 
respecting the "national question" in the country. 
The Greek-Unionist discussions began in early August 1908 and lasted until the end 
of September. A four-member commission, composed by Hatzilazaros, Dr. Zannas, 
Dingas, Theodoridis was appointed to represent the Greek-Macedonian population. 
Rahmi Bey, Cemal Bey, Nazim Bey, Enver Bey were the representatives of Salonica 
C.U.P. headquarters. In theory, the entire Young Turk political program was on the 
agenda but soon the discussions focused on the most controversial questions. These 
were the educational independence and privileges of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the 
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admission of non-Moslems to the Ottoman armed forces and the parliamentary 
elections. 
From the outset, it became discernible that the two delegations held divergent 
opinions on the first two subjects. On the question of education, the new Young 
Turk program accepted the maintenance of nationally-formed schools but subject to 
private and not public status. The article 18 of the new Unionist educational program 
stated that all public schools were to receive obligatory instruction in the Turkish 
language and accommodate Moslem as well as non-Moslem pupils. The key element 
of the Unionist project though was to be found in its provision to transfer the control 
and administration of the entire Christian educational network from the national 
Churches to the Ottoman state.24 
In the minds of the Unionist leaders the segregated ethnic Bulgarian, Greek, Serb and 
Albanian schools functioned as hotbeds of dissident ethnic nationalism. 
Consequently, the Unionist argument went on, in their current status the Christian 
schools constituted an elusive threat to the internal coherence of the Ottoman 
Empire. The chief objective of the Committee's new educational policy was to win 
over the Christian schools from foreign nationalist attractions and establish 
homogeneous Ottoman primary-secondary schools in conformity with the 
constitutional spirit of national and political unity of the Ottoman people.25 
In vain Enver Bey and Nazim Bey tried to dissipate Greek apprehensions that the 
Young Turk Committee was striving to put an end to the educational jurisdiction and 
independence of the Ecumenical Patriarchate. By the end of the bilateral discussions, 
the Greek-Macedonian commission was convinced that underneath their liberal 
declarations the Young Turks had been consistently working for the advancement of 
a new Turkish nationalist outlook respecting Ottoman educational matters. The 
substance of this policy was absolute control of the public educational institutions by 
the central Ottoman administration and the abolition of the Ecumenical Patriarch's 
. il 26 pnv eges. 
24 E.A.I 1 908/KH1no.34/29-8-1908/p.5 
25 LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 87.lIConstantinople Legationl30112-8-1908/no.742/Gryparis to Baltazzis. 
LA. Y .E.I 1908/File 87.1 /General Consulate of SalonicaJ20/2-9-1908/no.799/KaneUopoulos to 
Baltazzis and E.A.l1908/KH1no.34/29-8-1908/p.5 
26 VLACHOS (1954, pp.l13-4, 117), ZANNAS (1960, p.55) 
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Nor were the positions of the two commissions on Christian conscription any closer. 
In fact, both bodies had found the issue painfully subtle and disagreeable. The 
Unionist perspective on non-Moslem military service had been influenced by political 
rather than purely military considerations. The C.U.P. proposals stipulated that the 
Christian detachments should have mixed ethnic composition and serve in the same 
barracks with the Moslems 
The Young Turks held that in doing their military service in the army the Christians 
would provide evidence that they were law-abiding Ottoman subjects conscious 
enough not only to claim their Constitutional rights but also to shoulder the 
responsibilities stemming from their Ottoman "citizenship". 27 It is interesting 
however, that among the Moslems there were many who reacted with alarm to the 
idea of Christian emollment in the army. These Moslems were apprehensive that the 
well-educated Christian recruits were likely to occupy the high-ranking positions in 
the armed forces and dislocate the backward Moslem veterans.28 
The ideas of the Young Turk representatives were in open conflict with those of their 
Greek-Macedonian counterparts. It is unquestionable that the entire subject had 
caused serious embarrassment to the Hellenic commission. Certainly, the Greeks had 
no desire to see their recruits being consumed within the predominantly Moslem 
army. Having been obliged to comply with the Constitutional provisions 
nevertheless, they finally agreed "in principle" with Christian participation in the 
Ottoman armed forces. The Greek delegates, following instructions from the Greek 
government and the Patriarch, did not fail to raise certain objections on the project. 
Like the Bulgarians, they supported the opinion that the Christian military units 
should be formed on a purely national basis, avoid any interaction with Moslem 
troops and serve in their native province.29 The Young Turk inability to sanction the 
27 The system of enrolling recruits from various ethnic communities in a multi-national army was 
not novel. For example, in the Austro-Hungarian army many independent Hungarian, French, 
Polish and in cases even Slavo-Hungarian battalions were in service for years. In the Ottoman 
Empire, this military practice was also familiar. During the:first centuries of Ottoman expansion in 
Europe, separate Serb, Albanian and Greek contingents served in the Ottoman army. See 
LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.2/General Consulate of Salonical17/30-8-1908/Kanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis/without classification munber, LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.2/Constantinople Legationl29/l1-
9-1908/noA75lKontogiannis to Gryparis, ABBOTT (1909, p.93) 
28 Refer to chapter 8. . 
29 LA. Y.E.I 1908/File 39041 Athens to General Consulate of Sal onical 1/l-+-8-1 908/no.39 1 7 IBaltazZls 
to Kanellopoulos. See for additional information: I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.2/Constantinoplc 
Legationl8/21-9-1908/noA81IKontogiannis to Gryparis, VLACHOS (1954. pp.205-6) 
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fIrst two Greek amendments affirmed the existence of a cleavage between the two 
bodies. As an outcome, the bilateral discussions resulted in deadlock. Both sides 
decided to shelve the matter and entrust Parliament with its settlement. 
In the negotiation process, certain tentative attempts were made for electoral 
cooperation between the C.U.P. and the Greek-Macedonian element. During their 
August meetings, Dingas, Theodoridis, Dr. Zannas and Hatzilazaros discussed the 
issue with Rahmi Bey and Cemal Bey in the Unionist headquarters in Salonica. It 
was in these meetings that the Greek representatives formulated the idea that the 
Young Turks were pretending to be indifferent in the parliamentary elections. Rahmi 
Bey and Cernal Bey attempted to assure the Greeks that, from their point of view, the 
pivotal issue was not the electoral battle itself but the common activity of the 
numerous Turkish and Hellenic element for the strengthening and unity of the 
Ottoman Empire.3D 
The Greeks, for their part, had good reasons to question the sincerity of the Young 
Turk declarations. The Athens administration was aware that a few days after the 
revolution the Unionists had proceeded to form joint committees with the Albanians 
in Epirus and the nationalist V1achs in Macedonia in order to counterpoise the 
Hellenic organization. Furthermore, allowing the Bulgarians to appropriate the 
Patriarchist churches in Macedonia and failing to settle the Greek-Bulgarian dispute, 
the Unionists had damaged Greece's interests in Macedonia. 
The Greek authorities had no perceptible alternative but to denounce the 
Committee's lack of administrative competence and political will in dealing with 
these important questions. In the end, the Greeks began to suspect that the Unionist 
factor seemed to add to the accentuation of the perennial Macedonian controversy 
rather contribute to its eventual resolution?! 
The conclusion of the negotiation process left a deep-rooted feeling of 
disenchantment and bitterness to the Unionist and Greek commission alike. On the 
one hand, the Young Turk Committee realized that any Ottoman action destined to 
30 LA. Y.E.l1908/File 88.1.lIGeneral Consulate of Salonica/ 15/28-8-1908/Kanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis/without classification number 
31 LA.Y.E.l1908/File 91.1.11 Athens to Constantinople Legationl26/8-8-1908/no.3655/Baltazzis to 
Gryparis, LA.Y.E.l1908/File 99.1.2/Avlona Consulatel22/5-1 O-1908/no.5338Ner~s to 
Baltazzis, LA. Y.E.l1908/File 90.3/Uskub ConsulateI24/6-9-1908/no.392lBaraklis to 
Baltazzis/Political. See also previous note. 
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result in the restriction of the Patriarchate privileges or any scheme aspiring to force 
the Greek communities to embrace a collective Ottoman identity would face the 
adamant opposition of Hellenism. 
On the other hand, underneath the liberal C.U.P. manifestations, the Greeks began to 
discern the initial illustrations of Turkish chauvinism The new Young Turk political 
practice of establishing homogeneous educational and military institutions with a 
view to "Ottomanize" the non-~oslem nationalities, put the Greek leadership on the 
alert. In the following months the Athens government was to come to terms with the 
idea that not only the current status and traditional rights of Hellenism but the ethnic 
identity of its ''unredeemed brethren" residing in the Ottoman Empire were at stake 
under the new Ottoman regime. 
6.4 Attempts at Reaching a Greco-Turkish Understanding 
The negotiations between the Unionist and Greek representatives in Salonica had not 
been concluded when on 15 September 1908 the Ottoman Empire and Bulgaria 
broke off diplomatic relations. For the ensuing six weeks a Turco-Bulgarian armed 
conflict seemed almost inevitable. In the Hellenic kingdom, the mounting crisis 
between Sofia and Constantinople had revived the Slavic nightmare. The age-old 
scenario that one day a powerful Christian Slav country, presumably Bulgaria or 
Serbia, would dislodge the Ottomans from Europe and occupy Macedonia was 
anathema to the Hellenic nation and its leadership. 
From the Eastern crisis of 1878 onwards, successive Greek governments and the 
Court of King George I had religiously clung to the perception that so long as Greece 
had not completed her economic development and military reorganization she had no 
real alternative but to prop up Ottoman rule in the southern Balkans as a formidable 
bulwark to the Slavic menace. Only when the Hellenic kingdom would be adequately 
strong to claim and obtain its ~acedonian stakes through military might should it 
abandon its "impeccable" attitude and embark upon a "forward" policy against the 
decaying Ottoman Empire. 
Sensibly, almost overnight, the idea of a Greek-Ottoman understanding on the 
Balkans gained considerable momentum in the Cabinets of Athens and 
Constantinople. As soon as Turco-Bulgarian relations deteriorated in mid-September 
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1908 the Theotokis Cabinet took the initiative to sound out the Ottoman leaders over 
a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. Estimating, correctly, that an 
understanding with the Ottoman Empire was an impossibility without the support of 
the Committee, the Greek government assigned Petropoulakis (deputy in National 
Assembly and member of the Macedonian Committee )32 with the delicate task of 
exploring the Ottoman disposition on the subject of Greco-Turkish entente. 
On 16 September 1908, the Greek representative started his mission from Salonica. 
The Unionist Committee received the Greek emissary warmly. The Young Turk 
leaders assured Petropoulakis of their honest will to collaborate with Greece against 
Bulgarian expansionism. They went on to add that in the event of a Turco-Bulgarian 
conflict, the C.U.P. had plans to distribute arms and ammunition to the Macedonian 
Greeks and allow the influx of 20,000 Greek irregulars and reservist officers into 
Macedonia.33 
Following this flTst sangume contact the Greek ennssary proceeded to 
Constantinople. In the Ottoman capital, he met with the Young Turk leadership and 
the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha. These talks however had not made much progress 
when the Cretans declared their union with Greece on 7 October 1908. The 
complicated situation in the island and the October crisis was to develop ill an 
insurmountable impediment to the attempted Greco-Turkish understanding. 
The Ottoman political leadership and Moslem public opinion were strongly against 
any Greek fait accompli in the island that would infringe the rights of the local 
Moslem community and result in Cretan annexation by the Greek kingdom. 34 
Although furious with the Cretans and their patrons in the Greek capital the 
Ottomans were exceedingly hesitant to withdraw from the negotiation process. The 
mandarins of the Sublime Porte believed that, at this juncture, the question of 
Bulgaria was far more important to their Balkan geopolitical interests than semi-
independent Crete. 
32 Apart from the official Ottoman administration, Petropoulakis was to hold discussio~ with the 
c.u.P. Since the YOlmg Turk Committee still remained a non-political body, the HellenIC overtures 
should have a semi-official instead of a purely official character. 
33 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.5/General Consulate of Salonical2115-1O-1908IPetropoulakis's Report to 
F.O. The Greek representative inclined to believe though that for the time being. the chief concern 
of the Committee was to reconcile with Sofia rather than work for a Greek-Ottoman understanding. 
I.A.Y.E.I 1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of Salonical 17 130-9-1908/no.1 023lPetropoulakis to 
Baltazzis 
34 F.O. 88119398 Memorandum on the Affairs ofCretelForeign Office/l-1-19091KiImarnock to Grey 
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In fact, during the crucial first half of October, the Ottoman leadership strove to 
investigate on what basis Greece would enter into a military alliance with the Sublime 
Porte. To this effect, on 2 October 1908, the leading member of the Salonica 
Committee Haci Adil Bey went to Athens. In his meeting with the Greek Prime 
Minister Theotokis the Unionist official was informed that Greece would support the 
establishment of a Greco-Turkish alliance "on the basis of a general agreement with 
the Porte and the cession of Crete." 
The Greek Prime Minister assured the Young Turk envoy that within the framework 
of a honest Greco-Ottoman understanding the kingdom would immediately extend 
political and military support to the Ottoman government should Turkey-in-Europe 
be attacked by the Bulgarian army. Theotokis confided to Haci Adil Bey that in the 
event of war Greece could assist the Ottoman armies with a force of 30,000 men. 
The Greek Prime Minister promised to augment this contingent with 60,000 men 
next year and if Crete was granted to Greece with an extra force of 10,000 men.35 
On 11 October 1908, the Ottoman minister in Athens Naby Bey sounded the Greek 
government anew and this time officially about the conclusion of a Greek-Turkish 
military alliance eliciting the same answer that was given to Haci Adil Bey.36 
Meanwhile in Constantinople, the negotiations between the Ottoman leadership and 
the envoy of the Greek administration seemed to take a new turn. Stiffened by the 
mission of Faik Bey and Fethy Bey in Sofia and the demobilization of the Bulgarian 
army since mid-October the Young Turks had embraced a different view respecting 
the question of entente with Greece. On 16 October 1908, Petropoulakis held a 
meeting with Ahmet Riza Bey, Talat Bey, Enver Bey and Rahmi Bey in which the 
Unionist leaders inquired the Greek emissary whether the Hellenic government would 
conclude an alliance with the Ottoman Empire on an "unconditional basis". 
The Greek deputy replied that the Athens government was fully prepared to form a 
political and military alliance with the Porte providing that the questions of Crete and 
the Macedonian railway junction were solved in consonance with the Greek 
desiderata. The Young Turks, for their part, professed that the Committee did not 
raise substantial objections to the final settlement of the Cretan question but being a 
35 F.O. 88119492 Athens Embassy to F.O.l22-1 0-1 908/no. 1 37IElliot to Grey/Most Confidential 
36 Ibid. 
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non-governmental body it was unable to assume any lcind of political responsibility 
towards Greece. 37 
The Greek deputy's communication with Kiamil Pasha was equally counter-
productive. The Grand Vizier was indeed very anxious to secure Greek military aid. 
He canvassed the idea that even though the negotiations between Athens and 
Constantinople failed to come to fruition the Macedonian Committee should exert its 
influence upon the Greek government to extend military support to the Ottoman 
forces in Macedonia, if needed. 
Nevertheless, when the Greek emissary made an effort to raise the question of 
Greece's compensation in Crete Kiamil Pasha avoided to bind his government. The 
experienced Ottoman statesman was well aware that, under the circumstances, it was 
unthinkable for his Cabinet to commence negotiations on the thorny Cretan problem 
without running the risk of resignation due to the hostile reaction on the part of the 
Moslem population and the nationalist Young Turks. 38 Kiamil Pasha shared the 
opinion that only after the end of the Balkan crisis and the European conference 
could the Hellenic and Ottoman government, through direct negotiations, reach an 
agreement over the island. 39 
In late October 1908 the Greek representative left the Ottoman capital re infecta. 
From his point of view, it was the visible Bulgarian threat and the need of 
strengthening its military position in Macedonia that had forced the Ottoman political 
establishment to seek an understanding with Greece. On the other hand, the Kiamil 
Pasha Cabinet and the Young Turk Committee were disinclined to enter into serious 
talks on the questions of Crete and the railway connection, at least before the end of 
the Balkan crisis. In this conjuncture, both Ottoman decision-malcing bodies were 
reluctant to shoulder the heavy political cost of losing Crete to Greece. 
37 Commenting on the Unionist reply that the c.u.P. would not oppose the Greek claims on Crete 
and the railways, the Greek Consul-General in Salonica Papadiamantopoulos wrote to Athens: "The 
YOlmg Turk bid is most suspect, not honest and unreliable." I.A.Y.E.l19?8IFile 118.lIGene~al 
Consulate of SalonicaJl1124-1 0-1908/no.991/Papadiamantopoulos to BaltazZlS, I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 
39.S/General Consulate of SalonicaJ17 /30-1 0-1908/no.l 026/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis, 
I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.5/General Consulate of SalonicaJI0/23-1O-1908/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/without classification number. 
38 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 39.5/General Consulate of SalonicaJ2/15-1O-190S/Petropoulakis's Report to 
F.o. 
39 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./26-1O-190S/no.71O/Lowther to Grey and F.o. 
881/9492 Foreign Office to Paris Embassy/20-11-1908/no.264/Grey to Bertie 
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For its part, the Ottoman adnllnistration tended to consider that Greece's attitude to 
its alliance feelers was "ambiguous". 40 British and Greek sources however do not 
appear to support this perception. It is almost certain that, had Crete been ceded to 
Greece, the Theotokis Cabinet would have reached an understanding with the 
Sublime Porte even in opposition to the Greek public sentiment which resented a 
collusion with the hereditary enemy. In fact, so intense was the resolve of the Greek 
Cabinet to facilitate the process of rapprochement between the two countries that the 
Greek Foreign Minister Baltazzis intimated to Elliot, the British minister in Athens, 
that Greece was willing to make a goodwill gesture toward Constantinople by 
abandoning her expansionist aspirations on Epirus. 41 
It is true that an element of ambiguity had been present throughout the course of the 
Greco-Turkish negotiations. It is equally clear that it featured far less in Greece's 
foreign policy and much more in Ottoman practice. Apart from the removal of the 
Bulgarian threat since mid-October and reasons of strategy it was the 
uncompromising rivalry between the Unionist Committee and the Kiamil Pasha 
Cabinet and their open disagreement on the Cretan issue that undermined the 
negotiation process with the Athens government. 
Notwithstanding their verbal assurances to the Greek officials to the opposite effect 
the C.U.P. had no intention of granting Crete to Greece in exchange for an alliance. 
Such a concession would constitute a violation of the Committee's fundamental 
political commitment: the protection of the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire. On the other hand, the stance of Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha was more 
moderate and realistic. The Kiamil Pasha government believed that Slav 
aggressiveness and the presence of numerous Greek populations in the Ottoman 
Empire were sound reasons for working out a political understanding between 
Athens and Constantinople. As we shall see below, the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha 
had certain ideas about the resolution of the Cretan imbroglio.42 But as soon as the 
Cretan crisis broke out the Ottoman adnllnistration was trapped between growing 
Moslem agitation and the Unionist opposition to any territorial concession to Greece 
40 AHMAD (1969, p.24) . 
41 F.O. 88119492 Athens Embassy to F.O./22-10-1908/no.137/Elliot to Grey/Most ConfidentIal and 
F.O. 88119492 Athens Embassy to F.O'/19-11-1908/no.152/Elliot to Grey 
42 Refer to "Accentuation of Cretan Question". 
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on the one hand and the urgent need for foreign military support to strengthen its 
Macedonian defense on the other. 
The gradual diminution of the Bulgarian danger since mid-October allowed the Porte 
to revise its attitude on the issue of a pact with Greece; a pact that, had it been 
implemented, would have stirred great turmoil in Ottoman politics and could have 
made the position of the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet untenable.43 
6.S The Politics of Estrangement 
The unsuccessful outcome of the Greek-Ottoman negotiations and the de-escalation 
in the strained relations between Sofia and Constantinople since November 1908 
diminished the likelihood of a Greek-Ottoman agreement; but these new 
developments did not entirely discourage the Theotokis administration. Greek 
officials espoused the idea that even though at present the prospect of an Ott 0 man-
Bulgarian conflict seemed more remote, a Greek-Ottoman entente was bound to 
maintain its political value. The Greek Prime Minister Theotokis was of the opinion 
that in so far as three million Greeks continued to reside in the Ottoman Empire the 
establishment of friendly relations between the two countries served their mutual 
interests. According to his reasoning, the reforming efforts of the new Young Turk 
regime would stand greater chances of success if they were supported by the 
Ottoman Greek communities. On the other hand, there was no better official 
guarantee for the protection of the Hellenic economic-political stakes in the Ottoman 
Empire than the building of an amicable understanding between the Cabinets of 
Constantinople and Athens. 44 
The Greek administration was truly determined to come to terms with the Porte. On 
I November 1908, in his meeting with the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha the Greek 
agent in Constantinople Gryparis renewed the Greek feelers for an understanding 
between the two countries. Meanwhile, providing evidence of its good-faith the 
Hellenic government mounted surveillance on the Epirote border to prevent arms-
traffic and band-crossing in the province of Janina. Athens, moreover, gave 
instructions to its consular authorities in Epirus to retain "the closest relations with 
43 F.O. 88119398 Memorandum on the Affairs of Crete /Foreign Office/l-1-1909/Kilmamock to Grey 
44 F.O. 88119492 Athens Embassy to F.O.l2-11-1908/no.151IElliot to Grey 
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the local Ottoman authorities, to restrain radical elements and encourage the people 
to work for the success of the C.U.p.,,45 
In Constantinople, the trend for alignment with Greece had lost its momentum. The 
gradual removal of the Bulgarian threat had unveiled how little faith the Ottoman 
political leaders had in the advisability of establishing an entente with Greece. They 
inclined to view a rapprochement between the two countries exclusively in the 
context of maintaining the existing Balkan power equilibrium and containing the 
expansionism of Bulgaria. 
In one of his November reports to Athens, Gryparis estimated that although Greek-
Ottoman relations had gone through a very friendly period during the initial stages of 
the Near East crisis, later, owing to the implications of the Cretan question and the 
British tendency to work out a Turco-Bulgarian understanding, Greece's political 
position in the negotiations with the Ottoman leadership had considerably 
weakened. 46 Understandably, the Sublime Porte chose not to bind itself to the 
renewed cooperation overtures of the Hellenic government. Kiamil Pasha informed 
Gryparis that before the final settlement of the outstanding Cretan question the 
Ottoman administration could not take the matter into consideration. 
It was however among the Unionist circles that Greece's conciliatory attempts were 
to meet with the most determined opposition. Anxious to reassert its fundamental 
role as the sole undisputed guarantor of Ottoman integrity and Sultan's suzerainty, a 
role which had been strongly challenged during the Balkan crisis, the Committee 
decided to pursue an aggressive policy against the Greek kingdom. 
In confronting a Christian Balkan country and maintaining an unyielding attitude on 
the irksome Cretan question the Young Turks sought to prove that they were still 
capable of defending Ottoman national interests against Christian encroachment. In 
doing so, the Unionist committees anticipated retrieving at least a part of their lost 
popularity among the Moslem public opinion and the consolidation of their internal 
political position vis-a-vis the moderate Kiamil Pasha Cabinet.47 
45 LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 87.11 Athens to Constantinople Legation/25/8-12-1908/no.7949/Baltazzis to 
Gryparis, F.O. 88119492 Athens Embassy to F.O.l19-11-1908/no.152IElliot to Grey . . 
46 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.3/Constantinople Legation/12/25-11-1908/no.10911Grypans to BaltazZls 
47 LA.Y.E.I 1908IFile 88.1.3/ Athens to Constantinople Legation/26/9-11-1908/no.654 .. VBaltazzis to 
Gryparis, LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 88.1.3/Constantinople Legation/301 12-11-1908/no.l 099/Grypari~ to 
Baltazzis, LA.Y.E.l1908/File 87.1IGeneral Consulate of Jallina/10/23-11-1908/no.680IAgonakis to 
Baltazzis and F.O. 88119492 Athens Embassy to F.O.l19-11-1908/no.152IElliot to Grey 
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6.6 Deterioration in the Macedonian vilayets 
The Unionist tendency to alienate both the Athens government and the Ottoman 
Greeks was visible from the second half of November 1908. To the Young Turk 
Committee, Greece was the perfect opponent. Unlike the Slavic countries, Greece 
was totally incapable of threatening the Ottoman Empire by military means and 
lacked diplomatic support from Europe. As a pretext, the Unionists could easily 
justify their decision to sever their relations with Greece by pointing to Greek 
disturbances in Crete and Epirus. 
The carelessness of certain Greek politicians further stimulated Ottoman aggression. 
Undermining the efforts of the Athens government to create and maintain a good 
climate in Greco-Turkish relations, the leader of the Opposition party Rallis, whilst 
touring in Epirus during November, made certain anti-Albanian statements with a 
view to inciting the local Greek communities. This unfortunate move was deemed by 
the Ottomans as an official Greek encouragement to the Epirote partisans. Finally, 
Rallis's Epirote tour ended up in failure. Its only product was estrangement between 
the local Moslem and Greek populations.48 
When the Greek-Ottoman controversy drifted from the Epirote convulsions to the 
acute Macedonian question the situation became infinitely worse. Since the outbreak 
of the Cretan crisis it had been rumored in the Rumelian provinces that the Greek 
element was countenancing the organization of a local Macedonian insurrection 
against the Ottoman administration as a diversion for Crete. On 14 December 1908, 
the Monastir Unionist Committee made representations to the Greek Consulate to 
take preventive measures to avert the imminent, according to the Young Turks, 
outburst of Greek-Macedonian agitation.49 
Furthermore, throughout the last month of 1908, the publication in the Turkish press 
of several articles referring to the revolutionary activity of the Macedonian Greek 
Metropolitans inflamed Moslem public opinion. 50 As expected, the Greek papers in 
Turkey defended the Patriarchist officials and in the subsequent weeks a "press war" 
48 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/8-3-1909ILamb 
to Lowther, F.O. 88119503 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l31-12-1908/no.962/Lowther to Gr~y 
49 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.3lMonastir Consulate/3/17-12-1908/no.1326/Dimaras to BaltazZls and 
LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 87.1 /Serres Consulate/5/ 1 8-1 2-1 908/no.614/Sahtouris to Baltazzis 
50 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 1 22.3lMinistry of the Interior to General Administration of SalonicalI3/26-12-
1908!Hilmi Pasha to Danish Bey 
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broke out between the Turkish and Greek newspapers. As usually happens on such 
occasions, the press recriminations did not confine themselves to the Macedonian 
attitude of the Greek Metropolitans but spilled over into more controversial issues 
like the Cretan dispute. 51 
In late December 1908, the Unionist organ of Salonica lttihat ve Terrakki published 
an article concerning the Macedonian policy of the Hellenic clergy. The Young Turk 
journal attacked the Patriarchist hierarchy arguing that: 
"The Bishoprics have been centers of anarchy and turmoil. The religious authorities, 
in acting as instruments of the Greek consuls and the army officers sent by the Greek 
General Staff had the largest share of responsibility for the disasters in the 
Macedonian provinces. ,,52 
Since the reciprocal press attacks were likely to arouse Moslem hostility and add to 
the escalation of the Hellenic-Ottoman tension the Theotokis Cabinet deplored them. 
The attempt of the Greek government to put a restraining hand on the Greek papers 
in Turkey came too late however. 53 The Ottoman government had been determined 
to capitalize on the mounting tension by attacking the bases of the Greek movement 
in Macedonia: the Patriarchist Metropolitan sees and the Greek consular institutions. 
In mid-December 1908, the Minister of the Interior Hussein Hilmi Pasha threatened 
the Ecumenical Patriarch Joachim III that if the collaboration between the 
Macedonian Metropolitans and the Greek consulates continued the Sublime Porte 
would have to resort to punitive measures to terminate this unacceptable situation. 54 
At the tum of the year, the Ottoman administration went from words to actions. The 
first move of the Sublime Porte was to banish the militant Metropolitan of Drama 
Chrisostomos from Macedonia before the end of January. Second, having received 
new instructions from Constantinople since mid-January, the vali of Salonica Ali 
Danish Bey increased the military measures on the frontier with Greece in an effort to 
51 LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 122.3/Ministry of the Interior to General Administration of SalonicaJ2517 -1-
19091Hilmi Pasha to Danish Bey and also I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.3/Constantinople Legationl20/2-
1-1909/no.1311/Gryparis to Baltazzis 
52 AAT/f}&za, 16/29-12-1908, p.1, LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.2/General Consulate of SalonicaJI5/28-
12-1 908/no. 1 I 59/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis/enclosure no. 1 . 
53 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.l/Athens to General Consulate of Salonical22/4-1-1909/no.1189IBaltazZls 
to Papadiamantopoulos . . 
54 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.lIConstantinople Legationl41l7-12-1908/no.125I1Grypans to BaltazZlS, 
LA. Y.E.I 1908IFile 88.1.2/Constantinople LegationlI2125-12-1908/no.1281/Gryparis to Baltaz7js 
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obstruct the transportation of arms and war material from the Greek kingdom to 
Macedonia via commercial routes, railways and steamers. 
Third, the Macedonian General Administration put the Greek-Macedonian activists 
and the Hellenic consular authorities under strict surveillance. The Greek consuls 
were prevented from communicating with the Macedonian Metropolitans, notables or 
schoolmasters in case those individuals were Ottoman and not Greek SUbjects. The 
Ottoman gendarmerie and the army were ordered to carry out extensive searches in 
the Greek-Macedonian villages with the task of uncovering hidden arms or potential 
plot centers. 55 
In the first two months of 1909, relations between the Moslem communities and the 
Greek element in Macedonia became strained as both ethnic groups seemed to 
prepare for a new round of racial confrontation. Adding to the seriousness of the 
situation by February 1909 the Ottoman provincial administration organized a 
Macedonian Moslem militia and it distributed roughly 20,000 rifles to civilian 
Moslems in the two provinces of Mona stir and Salonica. 
The Ottoman authorities argued that the mission of the Moslem militia was to 
operate as an auxiliary military force for the protection of governmental buildings, 
bridges, roads and other strategic points in case of war. In fact, the original 
undertaking of these Moslem armed groups was to frustrate the resurgence of 
Christian Macedonian revolutionary activity. 56 
If the Ottoman authorities' ultimate intent underneath these administrative and 
military precautions was to prevent Christian agitation and defuse tension in the 
region they failed miserably. Although in December 1908, the Ottoman III Army 
Headquarters reassured the Macedonians through the columns of the Yeni Asr that 
there were no Greek bandits in Macedonian territory,57 by the beginning of 1909, a 
number of Greek bands were resuming their revolutionary activities in the 
departments of Salonica, Kas sandra , Monastir, Florina, Morihovo, Kastoria and 
55 LA. Y.E.I 1909IFile AAK -NMinistry of the Interior to General Administration of Salonica/ 13/26-
1-1909/Hilmi Pasha to Danish Bey and LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.2/General Consulate of 
SalonicaJ 14127 -1-1909/no.1194/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis 
56 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/8-2-1909/Acting-Consul 
Edmonds to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Vice-Consulate of Serres to Constantinople 
Embassy/14-2-1909/Greig to Lowther and P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to 
Constantinople Embassy/15-2-1909/Lamb to Lowther . 
57 LA. Y .E.I 1908IFile 121.3/General Consulate of Salonica/no.7800/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzisl 
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Grevena under Volanis, a lieutenant of Pavlos 11elas, captain Jannis, Manos and 
Karapanos. It is clear that the practice of the Greek partisans was not to engage in 
guerrilla warfare against the superior Ottoman detachments but to disseminate 
political propaganda by intimidation and coercion. Owing to their small numerical 
strength and mild partisan activity the Greek bands did not represent any real threat 
to the Ottoman position in 11acedonia. Nonetheless, their mere presence produced 
an intimidating effect upon the 11os1em 11acedonians. The partial reactivation of the 
11acedonian Greek bands, reminiscent of the terrible period 1903-1908, was seen by 
the local 11os1ems and many Unionists as a prelude to a second Christian partisan 
struggle amounting possibly to another round of European interference. 58 
In particular, fears were running high among the 11acedonian 11os1ems living close to 
the borders with Greece. In early February 1909, a deputation of ulemas and leading 
Turks from the vicinity of Kassandra requested the vali of Salonica Danish Bey to 
take precautionary measures to prevent the impending Greek revolt and Moslem 
massacre. 59 
Unarguably, the situation in the 11acedonian provinces during the first months of 
1909 bore little resemblance to that of the previous July, the Greek-Ottoman tension 
being only one aspect, not the least apparent, of the simmering crisis. Reporting to 
the F.O., on 29 January 1909, the British Consul-General in Salonica Lamb noted: 
"The state of feeling that unfortunately again exists throughout Macedonia is one of 
extreme anxiety; the general effect produced upon impartial observers is that all 
parties anticipate a speedy return to the old internecine strife and are now each doing 
their best to propagate the belief that the others are the aggressors and themselves the 
justly provoked. ,,60 
58 G.S.A.lA.T.V.l1909/File 3/24/9-3-1909/no.l67/Modis to Vardas, P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Monastir 
Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/8-2-1909/Acting-Consul Edmonds to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 
195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/8-3-1909ILamb to Lowther, 
F.O. 88119503 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/26-12-1908/no.169/Lamb 
to Lowther, F.O. 88119503 Athens Embassy to F.O.l8-1-1909/no.8/Elliot to Grey, F.O. 88119531 
Athens Embassy to F.O.l27-2-1909/no.28/Elliot to Grey, I.A.Y.E.l1909/File AAK-NGeneral 
Consulate of Salonica/261 11-3_1909/no.140IPapadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis 
59 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyIl5-2-1909ILamb 
to Lowther 
60 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Sa Ionic a to Constantinople Embassyi24-1-1909/Lamb 
to Lowther. See also: F.O. 88119531 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l20-2-1909/no.l1-l/Lowther to 
Grey 
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6.7 Accentuation of the Cretan Question61 
Another decisive factor in the Greco-Ottoman estrangement was the complicated 
Cretan question. On 7 October 1908, a serious political crisis broke out on the island 
when the Greek Cretan majority declared the union of Crete with Greece. Five days 
later, the Cretan Assembly, without the participation of the Moslem deputies, ratified 
the Cretan union with the kingdom. On 14 October 1908, whilst the Greek High 
Commissioner Zaimis was in Athens, the Greek Cretans formed an Executive 
Committee to assume the administration of the island until its formal union with 
Greece. 
The impact of the Cretan coup in Athens was immediate. Although the Ottomans 
were convinced that the Cretan action could have never taken place without the 
secret encouragement of the Greek government, the fact is that the declaration of 
union took the Theotokis Cabinet completely by surprise. Indeed, there is no 
substantial evidence in Greek sources that Athens had been aware, much less 
supportive, of the Cretan plan for achieving unification with Greece by provoking a 
fait accompli on the island amidst the escalating Balkan crisis. At a time when 
Athens had been striving to come to terms with Constantinople and diplomatic 
initiatives from both quarters were in progress to that effect,62 the Greek 
administration knew that any premature attempt to raise the Cretan question would 
61 The Cretan question had emerged as a Balkan problem long before the Macedonian controversy. 
Throughout the 19th century, the history of Crete was one of periodical revolts of the Greek majority 
against the Ottoman authorities which were followed by reprisals on the part of the Cretan Moslems. 
The Cretan revolts of 1841, 1857 and 1867 led to European intervention. The Western Powers 
forced the Sultan to institute the Organic Law of 1868 in the island. Under the Organic Law, the 
executive authority in Crete was transferred to a Governor-General (Moslem or Christian), who was 
appointed by the Porte. A General Assembly, in which Greeks and Moslems were to participate, 
would assist the work of the Governor General in areas such as provincial administration, tax-
collection and local finances. Yet, inter -communal violence and hostility did not cease even after 
1878, when, as a result of the Eastern Crisis, new reforms were introduced in Crete in the form of 
the Haleppo pact. It provided for the appointment of a Christian Governor -General for the island 
and the deployment of foreign officers to reorganize the Ottoman gendarmerie. Conditions in the 
island, however, did not improve and the Greco-Turkish war of 1897 over Crete brought the Powers 
on the stage again. Europe forced the Ottomans to withdraw their forces from the island and 
establish an autonomous government in Crete. The Sultan lost his political and financial hold over 
Crete which now came under the protection of the four Powers (Austria and Germany withdrew 
their contingents in 1898). The Governor-General, a Greek, and the mixed Cretan Assembly would 
take over the administration, finance and internal affairs whilst European troops assumed to restore 
peace and order in the island. Therefore, since 1898, the island of Crete, except for its nominal 
allegiance to the Porte, had become practically independent. On the content of the Organic Law: 
P.P.A.P. LXXIII 1867-8, pp.394-395. See also: F.O. 88119398 Memorandum on the Affairs of 
Crete/Foreign Office/l-1-1909/Kilmamock to Grey and EAcv8&po BT//-Ja, 1-1--2-1909 
62 Refer above to "Attempts at Reaching a Greco-Turkish Understanding". 
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only alienate the Ottoman Cabinet and undermine the prospect of a Greek-Turkish 
rapprochement. 
Moreover, the eruption of the Cretan crisis placed the Theotokis government in an 
extremely difficult position internally. Athens feared, with good reason, that if the 
political turmoil in the island continued to run high public opinion in Greece would 
increase pressure on the government to take under its auspices the Cretans and ratify 
the declaration of union in the National Assembly. Greek political circles believed 
that a possible failure on the part of the Cabinet to comply with the public demand for 
a more forward Cretan policy would direct the Greek public against the Theotokis 
Cabinet. In such a possibility, it was questionable whether the Hellenic government 
would manage to remain in power. 63 
In these critical circumstances and with the Bulgarians ready to embark upon their 
legendary Macedonian campaign the Greek administration decided to avoid a rupture 
with Constantinople over Crete and conclude an alliance with the Ottoman Empire to 
repel the Slav threat. It is clear that the Greeks desired to see the Cretan issue settled 
within the framework of a Greek-Ottoman understanding, not confrontation.64 
In mid-October 1908, Athens advised the Cretans to refrain from further disturbances 
in Canea. At the same time, the Greek legation in Constantinople sought to persuade 
the Sublime Porte that Greece had no connection with the Cretan coup. When the 
Greek government realized that the October negotiations were unlikely to produce a 
bilateral agreement on the fate of the island it decided to allow the Protecting Powers 
to deal with the issue. 
The Greek leaders anticipated that if the question of Crete, which had developed into 
an expensive nuisance for the four protecting Powers, was discussed in the European 
conference, Greece would stand very good chances of gaining the island by virtue of 
a European resolution. Toward this end, the Greek government began to concentrate 
its activities and press the Powers for the inclusion of Crete on the European 
agenda.65 
63 F.O. 881/9398 Memorandum on the Affairs of Crete /Foreign Officell-1-1909IKilmamock to Grey 
64 F.D. 881/9492 Athens Embassy to F.O'/22-1O-1908/no.1371E1liot to Grey/Most Confidential. 
I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 118.2/Foreign Office to General Consulate of Salonica! II /24-1 0-
1908/no.l 0 1 OlBaltazzis to Papadiamantopoulos 
65 F.O. 88119398 Memorandum on the Affairs of Crete /Foreign Office/1-1-1909IKilmamock to Grey 
and AJorning Post, 2~-5-1909 
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On the other hand, the Ottoman attitude on the Cretan issue had been very 
complicated. Notwithstanding the first hostile reaction of the C.U.P. and Moslem 
public opinion as a response to the Greek Cretan coup, the idea of reaching a direct 
understanding with Athens over Crete was beginning to gain ground within the 
Kiamil Pasha Cabinet. The Grand Vizier held no illusions that Ottoman authority in 
the island was bound to wither day by day and that, in the end, the Empire would lose 
Crete to Greece. After the end of the Balkan crisis, Kiamil Pasha seemed willing to 
negotiate with the Athens government the cession of Crete to Greece on the grounds 
of securing fiscal compensation and a possible rectification of the Ottoman border in 
Thessaly.66 
The C.U.P. was in open disagreement with Kiamil Pasha's conciliatory tendencies. 
For the Unionist Committee the preservation of Crete within the Ottoman Empire 
had become a question of national pride and political credibility. The Committee, 
which had risen to power with the bid and mandate to guarantee the territorial 
integrity of the Empire and defend Ottoman sovereign rights against any foreign 
encroachment, had no intention of undermining its own political position by 
sanctioning Cretan union with Greece.67 
At the beginning of the Cretan crisis the only reason that had forced the Unionists to 
adopt a somewhat mild attitude towards Athens was Greece's strategic importance as 
Turkey's most likely ally in the event of a Bulgarian attack. When, since mid-
October, it became conspicuous that Bulgaria would not move against Macedonia 
and therefore the Greek factor was no more indispensable to Ottoman security the 
C.U.P. felt free to embrace an uncompromising stance on Crete.68 
In December, seeking to repudiate the "accommodating" Balkan policy of Kiamil 
Pasha and present itself as the champion of Ottoman integrity against Christian 
aggression, the Constantinople C.U.P., through the Tan in , "warned the Cabinet that 
it dare not let Crete be annexed to Greece. ,,69 On the other hand, it also seems that 
the Committee's Cretan policy had been influenced by Ottoman strategic 
66 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l26-1 0-1 908/no.7 I O/Lowther to Grey . 
67 I. A. Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.3/Constantinople Legationl30112-11-1908/no.l 099/Gryparis to BaltazZlS 
and F.O. 88119624 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l3l-l-191OILowther to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 1909/enclosure no. 1 . 
68 I. A. YE.l19081File 118.lIGeneral Consulate of Salonicall1l2~-1O-1908!Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/without classification munber . 
69 F.O. 88119398 Memorandum on the Affairs ofCretelForeign Officell-1-19091Ki1mamock to Grey 
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considerations in north Africa. The Unionists were well aware that the Ottoman 
control of the key port of Sud a Bay was an essential precondition for the defense and 
maintenance of the Ottoman possessions in Libya. Consequently, if Young Turkey 
lost Crete she would be unable to defend and maintain her African dominions. 70 
In the following months and until the fall of Kiamil Pasha on 14 February 1909, the 
Cretan question fomented political rivalry between the official government and the 
Committee. The Unionists stood firm in their thesis for a hard-line policy in Crete 
and repeatedly emphasized their resolve to uphold the Sultan's sovereign rights in the 
island. Kiamil Pasha's views on the Cretan question were more pragmatic. Aspiring 
to avoid an unnecessary complication in Turkey's relations with the four protecting 
Powers over an essentially semi-independent island and secure economic and indeed 
territorial advances from Greece, the Grand Vizier contemplated suggesting "une 
solution de l' affaire de l' lie de Crete qui correspondait aux droits des habitants de 
cette lie at aux desirs des quatre Puissances. ,,71 
The resignation of the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet in mid-February and the consolidation of 
the Unionist power in Ottoman affairs prevented the Grand Vizier from promoting 
his ideas and led to the indefinite postponement of the Cretan settlement. 72 The new 
Hilmi Pasha government espoused the Young Turk thesis placing the Cretan problem 
on another basis. The new Ottoman position provided that the status quo in the 
island should be maintained at any cost and the Sultan's suzerainty be respected. 
On 2 April 1909, having recently returned from a tour in Europe the Ottoman 
Foreign Minister Rifat Pasha stated to Tanin that "for Turkey there was no Cretan 
question. Turkey had made clear the importance she attached to the island and the 
Powers had shown by the non-withdrawal of their troops that they meant to uphold 
Turkish rights.,,73 
The Ottoman aim underneath the new position on Crete was clear. In designating 
Crete a "question of national importance" for Turkey, the Ottoman administration 
warned the four Powers that any European intervention which could compromise the 
status quo on the island would have negative repercussions on relations between the 
70 F.o. 88119624 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./31-1-1910/Lowther to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 1909/enclosure no. I 
71 F.O. 88119531 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./6-4-1909/no.2-t9/Lo\\ther to Grey/enclosure no. 1 
72 B.D. vol. 9 p.l1 
73 F.o. 88119531 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./6-4-1909/no.246/Lo\\ther to Grey 
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Protecting Powers and the Ottoman Empire. In tbis way, Constantinople challenged 
the Powers to align themselves with either Greece or Turkey. The new Ottoman 
leadersbip reckoned that, [mally, when faced with that dilemma the Powers would 
favor the Ottoman Empire as the country with the greater geo-strategic and 
economic importance for Europe. 74 
To understand the Cretan imbroglio better one has to examme the European 
connection with the island. It is interesting that during the Cretan crisis all the 
European Powers, save Great Britain, seemed to agree that the question of Crete was 
ripe for a [mal solution.75 Such a settlement could take place after the proposed 
European conference on the basis of a Powers' resolution whereupon the nominal 
Ottoman suzerainty would be abolished and Cretan union with Greece would be 
sanctioned as Greece's reward for her responsible stance toward Young Turkey 
during the Bulgarian and Bosnian crises. 
However, the stumbling block for the resolution of the Cretan problem was the 
attitude of the British government. Here, it is significant to remember that London 
had seen its influence increasing in Constantinople after the Young Turk revolution. 
Prompted by economic and geopolitical considerations, Great Britain was determined 
to maintain the best possible relations with the new Ottoman administration and keep, 
wherever possible, the Ottoman Empire away from the German zone of influence. 
The British government, therefore, was very hesitant to concur in the resolution of 
the Cretan question. Grey had no desire to alienate the Young Turks and put 
Britain's recently-retrieved paramount position in Ottoman affairs in jeopardy just to 
satisfy Cretan and Greek nationalist aspirations.76 
74 G.D.D. vo1.3 p.395 
75 Italy and Russia supported Cretan union with Greece as the only final solution to a "wearisome 
and expensive problem". The French government was the most fervent advocate of this disposition, 
for Paris saw in the settlement of the Cretan question a medium for pleasing the Greek government 
and thus securing privileged French position in the economic and military affairs of Greece. As far 
as the Central Powers were concerned, according to a report from the British embassy in Athens 
dated 23 October 1908, their agents in Greece had already assured the Hellenic government that 
Vienna and Berlin would raise no obstacles to Cretan union with Greece. On the Italian and 
Russian stance see F.O. 881/9492 Rome Embassy to F.O'/2l-l1-1908/no.7l/Egerton to Grey, 
Morning Post, 24-5-1909. On the French attitude: F.O. 800/50 Paris Embassy to F.O./3l-10-
1908IBertie to GreylPrivate and F.O. 800150 Paris Embassy to F.O.l5-12-1908IBertie to 
GreylPrivate. On the German and Austrian thesis: F.G. 881/9398 Memorandum on the Affairs of 
CreteiForeign Officell-1-19091KiImamock to Grey and Aforning Post, 24-5-1909 
76 Such was the pro-Ottoman disposition of the British administration. that Grey contemplated the 
ceding of Cyprus to Turkey in case he concluded a good understanding with Constantinople. Grey 
was convinced that the Cyprus Convention of 1878 was an "anachronism" that had caused many 
Greece's Macedonian Policy 138 
----------------~---------------------------------
It had been really unfortunate for Crete that the accentuation of the political crisis on 
the island had coincided with growing naval antagonism between England and 
Germany and their conflicting strategic interests in the region. Crete's strategic 
importance for the control of Eastern Mediterranean and the Suez Canal was thus to 
become a serious impediment to its emancipation. As expected, London and Berlin 
had shown a special interest in the key Cretan port of Suda Bay; one of the most vital 
naval bases in the Mediterranean. 
The British estimated that by prolonging the stay of the European (and British) 
troops and upholding Ottoman rights in Crete they would be able to maintain a 
valuable asset in the island and consolidate the Anglo-Turkish friendship. On the 
contrary, Germany, a non-Protecting Power, supported the military evacuation of 
Crete and its annexation by Greece as the best medium to prevent Suda Bay 
becoming a British base with Ottoman approva1.77 
Eventually, on 26 July 1909, the four Protecting Powers decided to withdraw their 
troops from the island. Having assured the Porte that the Sultan's sovereign rights in 
Crete would be respected, the Powers announced that European vessels would 
remain in Cretan waters to protect the Turkish flag and the local Moslem population 
from the Cretan nationalists. This development, followed by the attempted hoisting 
of the Greek flag in Canea, increased the tension between Greece and Turkey and 
resulted in a C.U.P. boycott against Greek goods as well as to the deterioration of 
the position of the Ottoman Greek communities. 
problems to Britain. F.O. 800/50 Foreign Office to Paris Embassy/29-.10-1908/Grey to Bertie and 
F.O. 800/50 Paris Embassy to F.O.l24-11-1908/Bertie to Grey/ConfidentIal 
77 F.O. 800/51 Foreign Office/8-6-1909/Grey to CambonlPrivate, G.D.D. vol.3 pp.393-394 and 
EAEUB&po B'lJ..Ja, 14-2-1909 
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6.8 The Second Phase of the Greek Struggle in Macedonia. The IIuveAATtVloC; 
OPyuvo)(jTt and Its Activities78 
Although Greece desired an improvement :in her relations with the Ottoman Empire, 
by the end of the summer of 1908 the Hellenic political establishment began to 
understand that the likelihood of reach:ing an understand:ing with the new Ottoman 
regime appeared more remote than it had been initially anticipated. 79 
The grow:ing disappointment of the Greek administration respect:ing the new political 
situation in Turkey came to coincide with the conviction of certain Greek circles that 
the kingdom should not totally abandon its revolutionary activities in the neighboring 
country. Experienced political and military figures such as Dragoumis, Souliotis-
Nikolaidis and the leader of the Macedonian Committee Colonel of Artillery Danglis, 
constantly urged the Theotokis government to set up a new, wider and more 
efficient, national organization upon the old Greek underground network in Turkey. 80 
It was the intensification of Bulgarian-Macedonian activity and the first unequivocal 
indications of the Unionist nationalist tendencies that finally forced the moderate 
Greek government to give way to that pressure. By September, the Greek F.O. had 
authorized Colonel Danglis to design and establish the new revolutionary structure 
under the name Ilav8AA17vloq OpyavO)CY17 (Pan-Hellenic Organization-P.O.). 
Its principal concern was to unify under an articulated leadership all patriotic forces 
inside and outside the country for the implementation of the Hellenic national 
program in all sections of the "unredeemed brethren" in the Ottoman Empire.8! 
There were two key considerations that influenced the shaping of the new P.O. 
strategy: first, the desire of the P.O. leadership to establish its revolutionary 
apparatus across Epirus, Macedonia, Thrace, Aegean sea and Asia Minor; second, 
the urgent need to prepare the Greek communities for the contingency of Greek-
78 Greek lIDdergrmmd activities in European Turkey after the July revolution have regrettably 
attracted limited historical attention. GolIDariS has conducted the only well-researched study on this 
question so far. GOUNARIS (1984, pp.ll3-l24) in SOCIETY FOR MACEDONIAN STUDIES, 
ed., (1987) 
79 LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 88.1.3/General Consulate of Salonica/41l7 -8-l908/no. 790lKanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis 
80 GOUNARIS (1987, p.118) 
81 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-P.O'/AthensIRegulations of the P.O./Article lIundated document 
without classification number, F.O. 88119531 Athens Embassy to F.O./I-4-1909/no.461E1liot to 
Grey 
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Turkish armed conflict and the counteraction of the Bulgarian-Macedonian 
activities. 82 
The operational center of this organization was the Athenian General Headquarters 
under the supervision of Colonel Danglis and his leading group -Kafandaris, Benakis, 
Sklavounos, Triantafilidis, Spiliotis, Vardas, Volanis, Karavitis and Zymvrakakis. On 
a structural level, the P.O. had been divided into regional, district and local branches. 
In a short time, the General Headquarters sent military officers, civilian agents and 
administrative staff to Monastir, Salonica, Serres, Kavala, Smyrna and 
Constantinople. Their mission was to reorganize and utilize the "special offices" of 
the Greek consular authorities to become the real bases of P.O. propaganda.83 
It is clear that without the secret support of the Greek government the ambitious 
plans of the P.O. leadership could have never been put into practice. The supreme 
command and the various P.O. branches relied on state assistance for funds, men, 
war material and military experts. Furthermore, even though Athens officially 
rejected any accusation correlating the Greek authorities with any revolutionary 
organization, in secret the Greek F.O. had instructed its diplomatic agencies in the 
Ottoman Empire to facilitate the P.O. activities. 
The Greek legation in Constantinople, in particular, had established close links with 
the P.O. Greek archival sources state that the legation and Souliotis's 
Constantinople Organization were constantly engaged in the purchase, transportation 
and distribution of large quantities of arms and ammunition for the armament of the 
Greek populations in the Aegean and Asia Minor. 84 
By early 1909, despite the striking lack of specialized military personnel and the strict 
Ottoman surveillance, the P.O. had succeeded in creating an elementary revolutionary 
infrastructure in the major centers of Epirus, Macedonia, Tbrace and Asia MinOr.85 
82 LA.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-P.O.lAthens/281l0-6-1909/General Headquarters to F.O./Danglis to 
Mavromihalis. See also note 80 
83 LA.Y.E.l1909IFile Consular Reports-P.O. Activities/AthensIl1l4-7-1909/General Headquarters to 
Amissos Branch, LA.Y.E.l1909IFile D-4.2.2/Kavala ConsulateIl6129-3-1909/noAIEpaminondas to 
Danglis . _ 
84 LA.Y.E.l1909IFile Consular Reports-P.O. Activities/Constantinople LegatlOnl24/7-)-
1909/no.205/Special Office to General Headquarters, LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 91.2lConstantinople 
Legationl24/6-11-1908/Gryparis to Baltazzisrrelegraphic/without classificati~n munber 
85 G.S.A.lA.T.V.l1909IFile 3IMonastir ConsulateI2012-4-1909/no.226/Speclal Office to General 
Headquarters and LA.Y.E.l1909IFile D-4.2.2/Kavala Consulatell 6/29-3-1 909/noAiEpaminondas to 
Danglis 
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Between January and June 1909, the P.O. orgaillzed and carried out a range of 
underground regional activities: armament of the Greek populations; dissemination of 
national propaganda among the local communities; the formation of small band units; 
establishment of intelligence network; the collection of information respecting 
Ottoman military installations and strategic targets. 86 
However, the General Headquarters were far from content with the creation of a 
basic revolutionary apparatus. Colonel Danglis was convinced that in so far as the 
Greek government continued to view the P.O. as an ''underground orgaillzation" to 
which the official state should extend limited fmancial and material aid only, it was 
impossible for the P.O. to evolve into a pan-Hellenic revolutionary movement. He 
was truly convinced that this inherent P.O. deficiency could not be overcome unless 
the private P.O. became more "official" and was attached to the Greek P.O. Danglis 
did not appear to envisage the P.O. as a political or civilian association which 
functioned independently from the Greek government but as a clandestine "official" 
orgaillzation with mission to serve Greek foreign policy where the conventional 
departments of the Greek F.O. were unable to take action. 
In May 1909, Danglis submitted to the Greek government his scheme for the 
formation of a Special Department within the Greek F.O. This Department would 
undertake to satisfy P.O. demands for personnel, funds, arms, intelligence and 
operate as a secret liaison channel between the orgaillzation and the Athens 
administration. Danglis's project, in addition, envisaged the division of the Special 
Department in two separate offices: the Office of unredeemed Hellenism and the 
Office of Hellenic diaspora. The Office of unredeemed Hellenism was the most 
important as it would shoulder the responsibility of outlining, directing and 
promoting the Hellenic national program in Turkey. It would be so orgaillzed as to 
incorporate four sub-sections: the division of Ottoman Hellenism, the division of 
86 The P.O. operational plan provided the disruption and destruction of the Ottoman communication 
system in the event of a Greek-Turkish war. To this end, the General Headquarters sent instructions 
to its military agents in all major Macedonian cities to take all necessary steps in order to be r~dy to 
attack and sabotage key Ottoman targets like railway connections, tunnels, roads and bndges. 
I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile Consulates-3/Athens/25/7-6-1909/no.364/General Headquarters to Macedonian 
Departments and I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile Consular Reports-P.O. Activities/Athens/l/14-7-1909/General 
Headquarters to Amissos Branch 
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Church and Education, the Press division and the division for the study of Economic 
issues and developments. 87 
Danglis's proposals, however, fell on deaf ears. The Greek government was ready to 
procure underground assistance to a private revolutionary mechanism but it was 
unable and unwilling to put its relations with the Ottoman Empire at stake for the 
sake of an extremist and highly-opportunistic policy. Indeed, Athens feared that a 
possible disclosure of the interconnection between the Greek F.O. and the P.O. could 
lead Greek -Ottoman relations to a rapid deterioration or worse armed conflict, from 
which Greece, being the weak side, had for the time being much to lose and nothing 
to gain. 
For its part, the Ottoman administration had been aware of the increasing Hellenic 
propaganda activity in Turkey-in-Europe since the fIrst months of the new year. The 
failure of the local authorities to uncover the existence of the P.O. network, however, 
had led the Ottoman officials to draw erroneous conclusions as regards the real 
Greek intentions underlying the apparent revival of their underground activity. 
The Ottoman political leadership felt that the resumption of Hellenic propaganda was 
dependent on the Cretan question. Halil Bey, the Minister of the Interior in the Hilmi 
Pasha Cabinet, shared the opinion that the Greek government was determined to 
incite a general insurrection in Macedonia in order to divert Ottoman attention from 
Crete, in the event that the Greek army was deterred from occupying the island after 
the withdrawal of European troops.88 
Only on 1 July 1909, when the Ottoman authorities in Monastir accidentally found in 
the possession of the secretary of the local Greek Consulate Merentitos and his 
associate Manousos classifIed documents about the P.O. underground network and 
its revolutionary activity in Macedonia, did Constantinople realize the magnitude of 
the issue.89 The disclosure of the P.O. put the Hellenic administration in an extremely 
embarrassing position. Athens' fIrst reaction was to profess its absolute ignorance of 
87 LA.Y.E.l1909/File AAK-P.O.l Athens/28/1 0-6-1909/no.260/General Headquarters to Foreign 
Office/Danghs to Mavromihalis 
88 LA.Y.E.l1909/File AAK-AlMinistry of the Interior to General Administration of Salonical4/17-S-
1909lHalil Bey to Danish Bey and LA.Y.E.l1909/File AAK-AiCommittee of General Inspection to 
General Administration of Salonical7/20-2-1909/Mahmud Shevket Pasha to Danish Bey 
89 I.A.Y.E.l1909/File Consulates-2/Monastir Consulate to General Hedaquarters/1/14-7-
1909/Manousos to Zymvrakakis, LA.Y.E.l1909/File Consulates-2/General Consulate of 
Salonical4/17-7-1909/no.530/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis and LA.Y.E.l1909/File Consulates-
2/General Consulate of Salonical13/26-7 -1909/no.S64/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis 
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the existence of the organization and rebuke these "irresponsible" activities stemming 
from private quarters which contravened Greece's official foreign policy of friendship 
with the neighboring country. Hence, in an attempt to avoid a premature conflict 
with the Ottoman Empire over the P.O. question, on 13 July 1909, the Greek F.O. 
recalled to Greece all military and civilian agents serving in Turkey-in-Europe and 
severed every connection with the P.O. 90 
90 LA. Y.E.I 1909IFile Consulates-21 Athens to Macedonian Consulates/5118-7 -1909/no.5~~/Balt~zzis 
to Consuls, I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile Consulates-2lAthens to General Co~sulate of Salomcaf13/_h-7-
1909/no,468lBaltazzis to Papadiamantopoulos and I.A.Y.E/1909IFile AAK-AI Athens/26/9-1 0-
1909/General Headquarters to Military Officers of Macedonia, Epirus and Thrace 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE SERBO-ALBANIAN CONNECTION IN MACEDONIA 
7.1 The Serbs and the Constitutional Movement in Macedonia 
The Turkish revolution produced a general feeling of optimism in the Serb kingdom. 
On the outset, the people and the press, regardless of political affiliation, hailed the 
C.D.P. undertaking to work for the establishment of a liberal regime in the Empire 
for all Ottoman subjects, Moslems and Christians. Soon however, the initial euphoria 
gave way to more composed and realistic positions. Since the Berlin Congress, the 
key question in Serbia's Ottoman strategy had been the protection of the interests 
and welfare of the Serb populations in Macedonia and the inducement of a Serb 
nationalist program in Old Serbia, Kosovo and Monastir. The Serb political 
leadership was convinced that the overwhelming developments in Turkey should not 
change those fundamental principles of Serbia's Macedonian policy. 
On the other hand, the Velimirovic Cabinet had decided to follow a moderate policy 
toward the C.D.P. and the new regime, at least until Ottoman intentions for 
Macedonia took a clearer shape. To advance Serb political aspirations in Macedonia, 
to strengthen the local Serbo-Macedonian element and to elect as many Serb deputies 
as possible in the Ottoman elections, the Velimirovic government reasoned that the 
most propitious way was to remain on good terms with Constantinople and the 
Young Turk Committee. 1 
As a consequence, the Serb government did its utmost to convince the Ottomans that 
Belgrade desired honest cooperation with Young Turkey. The immediate dissolution 
and withdrawal of the Serb revolutionary bands from Macedonia was the first good-
will gesture in that direction on the part of Belgrade. Within this process of building 
confidence between the two countries, a week after the Turkish revolution, 15 Serbo-
Macedonian band leaders visited the Ottoman minister Fethy Pasha in Belgrade. 
I I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade Legation/9/22-9-1908/no.126/ Argiropoulos to Baltazzis and 
I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade Legation/2/15-8-1908/no.l 05/Delyannis to Baltazzis 
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The Serbo-Macedonian leaders reassured the Ottoman official that they were 
planning to return to Macedonia and work toward the success of the new Young 
Turk regime. Furthermore, in the second half of August, nearly 500 Serb officials, 
deputies, scientists and journalists traveled to the provincial Macedonian capitals of 
Uskub and Salonica where they fraternized with local C.U.P. supporters.2 
In the first week of August, the Serb government stated in Skupstina its official point 
of view in regard to the new political situation in the Ottoman Empire. The new 
Foreign Minister Milovanovic, although he underscored that the main criterion for 
the assessment of the Young Turk movement would be its future political activity and 
stance, expressed the thorough satisfaction of the Belgrade government with the 
pacification of Macedonia. The Serb official nevertheless, did not fail to point out 
that Belgrade would welcome any attempt on the part of the Ottoman authorities to 
reform the Macedonian administration and introduce certain measures which might 
ameliorate the position of the Serbo-Macedonian population. In raising this latter 
point, Milonavovic essentially affirmed that Serbia had not lost her profound interest 
in Macedonian matters and the Young Turk attitude toward the Serbo-Macedonian 
populations was bound to influence Serbo-Ottoman relations. 
Objectively, the consolidation of the Young Turk movement in Ottoman politics and 
the professed commitment of the Committee to respect the rights of all nationalities 
and reform the country from within did not seem to endanger Serb policy in 
Macedonia. Far from it. The Serb political leadership was aware that on the eve of 
the Young Turk movement the situation in Macedonia had been explosive. Serbia 
rightly suspected that the visible inability of the Ottoman administration to deal with 
the Macedonian question and the growing intervention of the Powers in the province 
laid the groundwork for the political secession of Macedonia from the Ottoman 
Empire. In that case, Macedonia would either become autonomous or would be 
partitioned between the Balkan national states. 
Yet, for the time being, both alternatives seemed extremely pernicious to Serb 
interests. Belgrade held no illusions that an autonomous Macedonia would most 
likely have the fate of Eastern Rumelia and on these grounds it strongly opposed that 
2 LA.Y.E.! 1905/File 92.2/Belgrade Legation/7/20-S-190S/no.4133/Delyannis to Baltazzis and 
LA. Y.E.! 1905/File 39.4/General Consulate of SalonicaJ/l3/26-S-190S/no.777/Kanellopoulos to 
Baltazzis 
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scenano. On the other hand, if partition came about overnight, Serbia, still not 
powerful enough to claim and acquire her long-coveted stakes in the provinces of 
Kosovo and Monastir, would inevitably lose the largest part of these sub-regions to 
Bulgaria and Greece. 3 
The Serb government espoused the opinion that before the kingdom was strong 
enough to embark on a more "aggressive" Macedonian policy any alteration in the 
local status quo could ruin its Macedonian aspirations. In suspending the immediate 
resolution of the Macedonian question the Young Turk movement had made an 
unexpected gift to Serbia: it gave her invaluable time for economic recovery and 
military reorganization. When, after few years, the Macedonian question would be 
ripe for a thorough solution, the Serbs could seek and gain aggrandizement in 
Kosovo and Monastir under far better conditions. 
From this perspective, it seems clear that to the extent that the Unionist revolution 
had prevented Ottoman authority in Macedonia from collapsing and had preserved 
the unstable status quo in the region it served Serbia's Macedonian strategy. The 
dramatic Balkan developments during the first week of October 1908 nonetheless 
forced Serbia to temporarily put the question of Macedonia in the background and 
concentrate all her efforts in dealing with the far more important annexation crisis. 
7.2 The Annexation Crisis and Its Impact on Serbo-Ottoman Relations 
Vienna's decision to annex Bosnia-Herzegovina dealt a major blow to Serbia. 
Indeed, not only it ruined Serb national aspirations for aggrandizement in those 
provinces but it placed the territorial integrity, economic development and political 
independence of the landlocked Serb kingdom at the mercy of Austria. 
Understandably, the Serb government felt that the annexation of Bosnia and the 
rumored Austro-Bulgarian collusion had introduced a new order in Balkan affairs. 
According to the Serb point of view, Austria-Hungary had now become the key 
power in the Balkans while the Serb kingdom was condemned to exist uneasily 
between the Dual Monarchy and ambitious Bulgaria. It was under these extremely 
3 F.O. 881/9353 Belgrade Embassy to F.0./6-8-1908/no.57 la' Reilly to Grey and I.A.Y.E./1908IFile 
92.2/Belgrade Legation/9/22-9-1908/no.1261 Argiropoulos to Baltazzis 
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difficult clrcumstances that the Velimirovic government had undertaken to oppose 
the Austrian fait accompli in Bosnia and defend Serb political interests in the region. 
Shortly after the annexation, the Serb political establishment declared that the 
kingdom would never accept the Austrian coup in Bosnia unless it received sufficient 
territorial compensation on the Serbo-Austrian border, economic concessions and an 
outlet to the Adriatic sea. In opposite case, Belgrade was threatening war. Whatever 
illusions the Serbs might foster that they could obtain territorial concessions from 
Austria-Hungary were dissolved a week before the end of October. On 22 October 
1908, the Austrian minister in Serbia Count Forgach declared that although Vienna 
did not nourish warlike tendencies against Serbia it was determined to make no 
territorial advances to Belgrade and in the end if "Serbia continued to cry out for war 
she would certainly have it.,,4 
The unyielding Austrian stance led the Velimirovic Cabinet to realize that without 
foreign diplomatic and military support Serbia would have either to capitulate to 
Austrian demands and stipulate to mere financial compensation or resort to 
hostilities. It was at this juncture that the kingdom sought to reshape its strategy 
with regard to the annexation crisis. To end diplomatic isolation, the Serb 
administration had decided to approach the Entente. Meanwhile, it had already 
entered into secret negotiations with the Porte in order to conclude a Serbo-Turkish-
Montenegrin military convention against the Austro-Hungarian threat. 
In late October, in an attempt to secure British and Russian backing, Milovanovic and 
Pashic paid a visit to London and St. Petersburg respectively. Although the British 
and Russian officials acknowledged that Austria's policy in Bosnia had injured Serb 
stakes in the region and had violated the international conventions of 1871 and 1878, 
they were very reluctant to pledge their support to any kind of Serb territorial 
aggrandizement. In particular, when Milovanovic informed Grey of his government's 
intention to pursue the acquisition of a territorial strip through Bosnia-Herzegovina -
the plan being to form with Montenegro a strong barrier to Austrian aggressiveness -
he was told that there was little Britain could do to uphold Serb aspirations. 5 
4 F.O. 88119492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O.l27-10-1908/no.78/Whitehead to Grey . 
5 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade Legationl20/2-11-1908/no.167/Argiropoulos to BaltazZls. See 
also: DJORDJEVIC (1970, p.347) 
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By the first week of November, even the traditionally pro-Slav Russian government 
had sent specific instructions to its agent in Belgrade Sergejev to warn the Serbs that 
they should remain at any rate pacific. Indeed, Sergejev made clear to the Serb 
leadership that no continental Power was disposed to engage itself in an armed 
conflict with Austria-Hungary merely to defend Serb territorial claims in Bosnia. The 
only initiative that the Entente was contemplating to undertake over the Serb 
question was to attempt to persuade Austria-Hungary to adopt a more conciliatory 
attitude towards Belgrade and settle the dispute peacefully even without a 
conference. 6 
The second aspect of Serbia's Balkan strategy (the military alliance with the Ottoman 
Empire) was by no means less important. Serbo-Ottoman talks, which had started in 
mid-October, continued for the ensuing two months, not however without significant 
difficulties. In the beginning of the negotiations both countries seemed keen to form 
a pact in order to counter the alleged Balkan understanding between Austria-Hungary 
and Bulgaria. 7 
Thus, in the first three weeks, the talks between the high-ranking Serb envoy 
Novakovic and the Ottoman leadership in Constantinople had reached a satisfactory 
stage. By the end of the first week of November 1908, the Novakovic-
Nouradoughian Effendi talks had produced certain tangible results. A few days later, 
the secretary of the Serb F.O. Spalaikovic revealed to the British minister Whitehead 
a draft Serbo-Turkish military convention with the Serb positions. 
The Serb draft made reference to "all issues of a complete military agreement", in 
case one of the signatory parts was attacked. Specifically, it arranged: the number of 
troops that each part would undertake to put in the battle field; the obligation of the 
6 F.O. 88119492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./1O-l1-1908/no.82IWbitehead to Grey. It was hardly a 
coincidence that the Sergejev warning came shortly after the visit of the Serb special envoy Pashic in 
St. Petersburg. The Serb ex-Premier had communicated to Izvolsky that so long the Powers did not 
sanction the annexation of Bosnia Serbia would do nothing; but, if they did, Serbia and Montenegro 
would declare war on Vienna. This St. Petersburg could not allow to take place. Russia, who owing 
to her bad economic and military situation had been seriously perturbed by the prospect of going to 
war with Austria-Hungary over Serbia, was deteIIDined to restrain the bellicose Serbs by all means. 
F.O. 88119492 St. Petersburg Embassy to F.O.l29-1 O-1908/no.482INicolson to Grey. See also F.O. 
88119492 Foreign Office to St. Petersburg Embassy/1 O-11-1908/no.360/Grey to Nicolson 
7 Unofficially, since mid-October, the two leading members of the Serbo-Macedonian Committee 
Nousic and Stanojevic had held discussions with the Young Turk Committees of Salonica and 
Constantinople to work out a Serbo-Turkish understanding over the annexation crisis. In the end. 
however, this initiative did not produce any concrete agreement. I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 118.2/General 
Consulate of Salonica/24/6-11-1908/no.1 044/Papadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis 
Serbo-Albanian Connection ------------~~~----__________________________ 149 
two parts to reaclllng a common understanding before launching an offensive 
campaign or making peace; the equal division of spoils, territorial and monetary, 
following an allied victory [articles 1-6]; finally, it stipulated that the five-year 
military convention, which would be put in force after ten days, should be kept secret 
[article 8]. 
These articles provided a plausible basis for a Serbo-Turkish understanding but it was 
the controversial article 7 which delineated the Serb claims on the questions of 
Bosnia and Macedonia that was to incur the most controversy. The article 7 stated 
that: "the two signatory parts bind themselves not to accept any solution of the 
question of Bosnia-Herzegovina without having come to a mutual understanding on 
the issue and that the Ottoman Empire engaged to grant facilities to Serb religious 
and educational institutions in its dominions and to Serb commerce and means of 
communication to Ottoman seaports."s 
The content of this article indicated that the Serb government had no intention of 
signing any convention that would not secure the Serb positions on the question of 
Bosnia. It is also important that the Velimirovic Cabinet, though preoccupied with 
the annexation crisis, had not abandoned Macedonia. On the contrary, the Serbs 
sought to interrelate their participation in the military alliance with the concession on 
the part of the Porte of Serb commercial facilities in Ottoman seaports and 
preferential treatment for Serbo-Macedonian spiritual and secular institutions. 
These Serb suggestions concerned the Ottoman political community. 9 
Understandably, Constantinople could never accept a stipulation that would make 
any future arrangement between Austria and the Ottoman Empire in Bosnia 
dependent upon Serbia's consent. To make matters worse, the Ottoman 
administration had also come up with an important amendment. The Kiamil Pasha 
government had decided to introduce a new clause hostile to Bulgaria into the 
military convention. The Ottoman amendment stated: 
"Any territory conquered by the allies after a victorious campaign against Bulgaria 
shall be divided in such manner that Turkey shall obtain the eastern and Serbia the 
8 F.O. 88119492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O.lIO-11-1908/no.25/Whitehead to Grey/Telegraphic and 
F.O. 88119492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O.l25-11-1908/no.90IWhitehead to Grey 
9 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l12-11-1908/no.362/Lowther to Grey 
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western portion. In case a war indemnity is obtained, it shall be equally divided 
between the two countries.dO 
It is not difficult to understand one of the motives underlying this Ottoman diplomatic 
manoeuvre. In the minds of the Ottoman officials the pact with Serbia and 
Montenegro was closely connected with the Bulgarian question. By the first week of 
November, the Sublime Porte had been convinced that Vienna did not intend to 
attack Turkey-in-Europe and, more importantly, that there was no political 
agreement between Austria and Bulgaria over the Balkans.11 As a result, the Kiamil 
Pasha Cabinet believed that a tripartite Serbo-Turkish-Montenegrin alliance would 
complete Sofia's Balkan isolation and force the Bulgarian government to comply 
with Ottoman economic demands.12 
While the Serbo-Turkish negotiations had reached a critical point, the Serb provision 
for Bosnia and indeed the Ottoman amendment complicated the situation. The Serbs, 
whose chief object had been to use the pact with the Ottoman Empire against 
Austria,13 were far from willing to accept a provision that essentially transformed the 
convention into a prominently anti-Bulgarian alliance. Furthermore, since the Serb 
Cabinet knew that the Western Powers would never allow the dismemberment of 
Bulgaria and the re-subjugation of Christian populations to Ottoman rule, it had no 
real intention of joining a coalition that aimed exclusively at the submission of 
Bulgaria. 
The Serb political leadership envisaged a tripartite convention with the Turks and 
Montenegrins as the first step toward the establishment of a Balkan coalition against 
Austria-Hungary. In this coalition, Bulgarian participation was an essential 
component. Sensibly, Belgrade felt that if it agreed with the Ottoman amendment it 
would destroy the dream of forming a powerful anti-Austrian Balkan League: 14 an 
ambitious political project that had found many advocates even within the Ottoman 
Empire and the Young Turk Committee itself. 15 
10 F.O. 88119492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./13-11-1908/no.24IWhitehead to Grey/Telegraphic 
II F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./5-11-1908/no.386/Lowtherto Grey/Telegraphic 
12 Refer to chapter 5. ..
13 I.A.Y.E./1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade Legationl4117-11-1908/no.188/Argrropoulos to BaltazZlS 
14 F.O. 88119492 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./13-11-1908/no.24IWhitehead to Grey/Telegraphic 
15 The c.u.P. supported the establishment of a Balkan Federation with the participatio~ of all 
Balkan states under the leadership of the Ottoman Empire. This idea was probably discussed 
between the Unionist delegation under Ahmet Riza Bey and the Serb political leadership during the 
brief stop of the Young Turk leader in Serbia (the delegation was on a tour in European capitals) on 
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The Ottoman policy of directing the tripartite military pact against Bulgaria did not 
stir opposition in Serbia only. Great Britain and Russia, the Entente Powers most 
directly engaged in the annexation crisis, strongly objected to a Balkan understanding 
between the south Slav states and the Ottoman Empire that would not include 
Bulgaria. The two Powers had good reasons to suspect that in case Bulgaria was 
alienated in that manner she would most likely turn for support to Austria-Hungary 
and the Central Powers camp. Such a development was bound to undermine the 
effectiveness and usefulness of the anti-Austrian Balkan bloc and place Vienna in a 
commanding position in the Near East. 
Throughout November therefore the British and Russian governments had been 
striving to persuade the Ottomans to abandon their anti-Bulgarian designs and come 
to terms with the Malinov administration. In particular, the British spared no effort 
in urging the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet to work out an understanding with Sofia. 16 
Similarly, when on 5 November 1908 the Grand Vizier asked Zinoviev, the Russian 
ambassador in Constantinople, if Russia would support a military alliance between 
Serbia, Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire, Zinoviev replied that "Russia would do 
nothing in that direction". 17 
By the end of November 1908 the Serbo-Turkish-Montenegrin military pact had 
made very little progress, the Serb provision for Bosnia and the Ottoman amendment 
were the main impediments in the negotiation process. Indeed, the prospect of a 
Serbo-Turkish understanding seemed to water down when two events rekindled the 
entire affair: the mission of Balkan Committee18 in Constantinople in the first week of 
31 October 1908. I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade Legation/4117-11-1908/no.188/Argiropoulos to 
Baltazzis 
16 F.O. 88119492 Foreign Office to St. Petersburg Embassy/9-11-1908/no.587/Grey to Nicolson. 
British sources suggest that Germany also favored a direct Turco-Bulgarian understanding. Berlin 
seemed to prefer a reconciliation between Sofia and Constantinople than leave the settlement of the 
Bulgarian question to a European Conference. F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./9-
11-1908/no.389ILowtherto Grey 
17 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./6-11-1908/no.751ILowtherto Grey 
18 Formed in 1903, the Balkan Committee was a well-known British lobby with special interest and 
knowledge of Balkan affairs. Being pro-Bulgarian and rather Turcophobic, it consisted of 
influential British personalities like the Buxton brothers, Westlake, Boyle, Bourchier, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury and its opinions were carefully considered by the Foreign Office and the 
British press. Since its foundation, it had supported the belief that the best way to resolve the 
Macedonian question was by granting political autonomy to the provinces of Salonica, Monastir and 
Kosovo. 
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December 1908 and the second stop of the Young Turk delegation under Ahmet 
Riza Bey in Serbia. 
The mission of Balkan Committee attracted great attention in Ottoman capital for it 
was seen as evidence of the revived Anglo-Turkish political friendship. During the 
few days of its stay in Constantinople the directorate of the Balkan Committee did its 
utmost to impress on the Ottoman leadership the urgent need for the formation of a 
united front between the Ottoman Empire and the south Slav countries (including 
Bulgaria) against Austria-Hungary and Germany. 
Buxton, its president, seeking to obliterate the potential sources of dispute between 
Turkey and the Balkan Slav states came forward with a radical plan for the peaceful 
and simultaneous settlement of the two most important and vexed Balkan questions: 
Bosnia and Macedonia. Buxton argued that, under these conditions, the most 
prudent policy for the Ottomans would be to reach an understanding with the Balkan 
Slav countries. In this context, the Ottoman administration should proclaim 
Macedonian autonomy under a Moslem Governor General and try, with the support 
of the Balkan Slavs, to establish an autonomous Bosnia-Herzegovina in which 
Ottoman suzerainty would be respected. 19 
The Ottoman administration was partly receptive to Buxton's plan. From the 
Ottoman standpoint, naturally, the idea of granting political autonomy to Macedonia 
was out of the question. The Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha nevertheless, did not raise 
any objection to Bosnia becoming autonomous under a Moslem Governor.20 On this 
point, Ottoman and Serb policies in Bosnia coincided. During bilateral talks, the 
Velimirovic Cabinet had informed the Ottoman government that Serbia would uphold 
a similar disposition in the political status of Bosnia in case her efforts to acquire 
territorial compensation in that province met with failure. 21 
At the same time, the Unionist delegation, returning from its European mission, made 
a second stop in Serbia.22 After having exchanged views with the Serb Foreign 
Minister on the Bosnian crisis, Ahmet Riza Bey gave an interview to the Russian 
19 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.1IConstantinople Legationl20/3-12-1908/no.l189/Gryparis to Baltazzis 
20 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l26-1O-1908/no.710ILowther to Grey 
21 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 118.1IConstantinople Legationl20/3-12-1908/no.1189/Gryparis to Baltazzis 
22 Here, it should be stressed that the European diplomatic mission of the c.u.P. deputation had 
neither the approval nor the authorization of Kiamil Pasha Cabinet. The Grand Vizier viewed this 
mission as a further attempt of the Committee to assert its peculiarly independent role in Ottoman 
politics. 
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newspaper Slovo (Speech), which was reprinted in Serb paper Politika. The Young 
Turk leader stated that the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, apart from being a 
tremendous blow to the Slavs, had placed Austria in such advantageous position in 
the peninsula that Turkey could hardly imagine. He further claimed that only if 
Bosnia-Herzegovina was granted autonomous status and the Serb kingdom was 
given access to the Adriatic sea through some territorial aggrandizement in the two 
provinces could the regional balance of power be restored. "Y oung Turkey, 
concluded Ahmet Riza, turns a sympathetic eye to the Slavs and not the Austrians 
(proof of this was the Ottoman embargo), who have imperialistic designs for the 
south Balkans.,,23 
In the end, neither the Balkan Committee's intervention nor the Unionist diplomatic 
strivings sufficed to salvage the negotiation process and bring about a Serbo-Turkish 
alignment. By mid-December, Austria had decided to commence negotiations with 
the Kiamil Pasha Cabinet over the pecuniary compensation that she would pay to the 
Porte in return for abolishing Ottoman rights in Bosnia. The Austrian initiative 
satisfied the Ottoman administration and in conjunction with the leaking out of the 
projected Serbo-Ottoman pact compelled the Porte to discontinue the secret talks 
with Serbia. 
From this point onwards and until the eventual solution of the Bosnian question in 
the spring of following year, the Serb kingdom vainly struggled to vitiate the Austrian 
coup in Bosnia-Herzegovina and obtain territorial compensation. In the end of 
March, when Vienna exerted unbearable pressure on Belgrade to abandon its 
territorial ambitions for Bosnia and settle for mere economic concessions or face the 
Austrian armies in the battle field, Serbia, abandoned by Great Britain and Russia, 
had no conceivable alternative but to give way. 24 
The annexation of Bosnia consolidated the Austro-Hungarian geopolitical supremacy 
in central Balkans and buried Serb aspirations for territorial aggrandizement in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina. As an outcome, the Serbs realized that the only real scope for 
potential territorial expansion lay in the Ottoman-Macedonian vilayets of Kosovo and 
23 I.A.Y.E.l1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade Legation/30/13-12-1 908/no.21 2/ Argiropoulos to Baltazzis. 
LA. Y.E.l1908IFile 90.3/Uskub Consulate/23/5-1-1909/no. 700/Baraklis to BaltazzislPolitical 
24 BRIDGE (1 972b, pp.128-34) 
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Monastir. From this point onwards the Macedonian question was to return to the 
forefront of Serb political strategy and foreign policy. 
7.3 The Formation of Serbo-Macedonian Political Organizations and the 
Question of Ipek Patriarchate 
It is true that the Serbo-Macedonians saw in the termination of the paramilitary strife 
and the dissolution of the Macedonian bands in July 1908 a positive development for 
their future position in the region. The Serb nationalists had come to terms with the 
idea that they were still far from securing a dominant position in the highly-disputed 
districts of Old Serbia, Kosovo and Monastir, by means of paramilitary activism and 
ecclesiastical-educational propaganda. 
When the Young Turk Macedonian movement broke out, the entire Serbo-
Macedonian militia numbered only 160 men. More importantly, Serb efforts for the 
establishment of an Independent National Church in Macedonia had borne no results 
due to the stubborn opposition from the Porte and the Greek Patriarch. 
Consequently, since the Serbo-Macedonian clerical class did not enjoy the same 
status and privileges with the Patriarchist officials a considerable part of the Serbo-
Macedonian communities continued to remain within the spiritual zone of influence 
of the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate. 
Under these unfavorable conditions, the Serbo-Macedonian leaders and the Belgrade 
government were rather content to see the Unionist revolution arresting the 
Bulgarian and Greek activities and postponing a premature - at least for Serbia -
resolution of the Macedonian question. 25 Following the establishment of the 
Constitutional regime in Turkey, Serbia's Macedonian policy was to focus on two 
vital issues: the formation of Serbo-Macedonian political associations and the re-
institution of the medieval Serb Patriarchate ofIpek.26 
25 F.O. 881/9353 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./6-8-1908/no.57/0' Reilly to Grey 
26 The origins of the Serb Patriarchate of Ipek date back to 1219. Until 1346 it had the status of an 
Archbishopric when, at the Conference of Uskub, the Serb Emperor Stefan Dussan, the Bulgarian 
Patriarch of Tumovo and the Archbishop of Ochrid resolved to elevate the Archbishopric of Ipek to 
the status of a Patriarchate. The Patriarchate of Ipek was officially recognized by the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate in 1375, when relations between Serbia and the Byzantine Empire became very 
friendly. The Ottomans had abrogated the Ipek Patriarchate in 1'+59. Nearly a century later. in 
1557, the Grand Vizier Sokolovic, a Serb, re-instated the Ipek Patriarchate including the bishoprics 
of Nish, Uskub, Geni-Pazar, Bosnia, Herzegovina, Kjustendil, Samokovo, Prizren and Ouzitsa. In 
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As far as the Serbo-Macedonian political clubs were concerned, these were founded 
with the encouragement and material support of the Serb government in an attempt 
to compete with the Bulgarian, Greek and Albanian clubs and further the economic 
and political interests of the local Serbo-Macedonian communities. The most well-
known Serbo-Macedonian Constitutional association was the Organization of 
Ottoman Serbs. 
It was established in the capital of the Kosovo vilayet Uskub in October 1908 under 
the leadership of the ex-voevoda Radenkovic. Based mainly on the support of the 
Kosovar Serbs, the society succeeded in setting up branches across the Macedonian 
provinces and publishing the newspaper Vardar. Among its undertakings was to 
counteract the emerging Albanian nationalist movement in Kosovo. In reality, the 
Serb Constitutional association espoused a moderate attitude toward the new 
Ottoman regime and strove to remain on good terms with the Young Turk 
Committee. 
During the annexation crisis, the Organization of Ottoman Serbs, as Malcolm argues, 
had set up links with the Serb nationalist society Narodna Odbrana (National 
Defense).27 Formed on 21 October 1908, the Narodna Odbara aspired to unite all 
national forces in the country against Austrian aggressiveness and form revolutionary 
bands which would be sent to disturb Bosnia and Macedonia.28 
Meanwhile, in an apparent effort to put the Serbo-Macedonian communities on an 
equal ecclesiastical status with the Greek -Patriarchists and the Bulgarian-Exarchists, 
the Velimirovic government sought to raise the issue of the Ipek Patriarchate. 
During the Serbo-Ottoman negotiations over the military pact, the Serb 
administration found the opportunity to set forward its ecclesiastical claims. By mid-
December 1908, the Greek legation in Belgrade had ascertained that among the basic 
aims ofNovakovic's mission in Constantinople was to elicit Ottoman consent to the 
restoration of the ancient Ipek Patriarchate. 29 
At the same time, papers in Serbia proper and Macedonia devoted a series of articles 
to the same question. In the first week of December, an article appeared in the 
1766, the Ipek Patriarchate merged with the Ecumenical Patriarchate and hence fell tmder the 
spiritual authority of the Phanar. E.A.l1908/KH111-12-1908/no.49/pp.1-2 
27 MALCOLM (1998, p.243) 
28 DJORDJEVIC (1970, pp.352-3), BRIDGE (1972a, pp.312, 321) . 
29 LA. Y .E.I 1908IFile 92.2/Belgrade Legation/3/ 16-12-1908/no.215/ Argiropoulos to BaltazZls 
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Serbo-Macedonian organ Vardar setting out the Serb POSItIOns on the re-
establishment of the Ipek Patriarchate. The author argued that for many centuries the 
Serbo-Macedonian popUlations, owing to the lack of their own independent 
ecclesiastical institution, had been compelled to remain under the spiritual tutelage of 
the Ecumenical Patriarchate. Exploiting their influential position in Macedonian 
religious and cultural affairs, the Greek Patriarchist officials, as well as their recent 
Bulgarian Exarchist colleagues, had tried to suppress the pro-Serb national sentiment 
of the Serbo-Macedonian populations in order to draw them into the Hellenic or 
Bulgarian camp. Under a free Constitutional regime, the author concluded, the 
Ottoman administration should re-institute the Ipek Patriarchate thereby extending to 
Serb communities in Macedonia the same ecclesiastical privileges enjoyed by Greeks 
and Bulgarians. 30 
The determination of the Serbo-Macedonians to struggle against their unfavorable 
ecclesiastical status in Macedonia and reafftrm their pro-Serb national tendencies 
became clear in the first convention of the Organization of Ottoman Serbs. It took 
place in Uskub during the last week of February 1909. The representation of the 
provincial Macedonian capitals Uskub, Monastir, Salonica was fairly poor (three 
schoolmasters). Most of the delegates came from other towns and districts. 
The Serbo-Macedonian convention passed 16 political, ecclesiastical and economic 
resolutions. The content of the political resolutions was moderate and did not harm 
Ottoman susceptibilities. The third political resolution was very important. It called 
the C.U.P. to use the term 'Serb' when referring to Ottoman Serbs instead of 'Rum', 
in an implicit manifestation of Serb claim for recognition of a separate Serb 
nationality in the Ottoman Empire. The fourth resolution condemned Austria's 
annexation of Bosnia and Bulgarian appropriation of Eastern Rumelia as acts 
violating international treaties and mutilating the territorial integrity of the Ottoman 
Empire. The fifth provided for "the consolidation of friendly relations between the 
Balkan peoples and the preparation by this means of a solid basis for their free 
development.,,31 
30 E.A.l1908/KH111-12-1908/no.49/pp.I-2 
31 P.RO. F.O. 19512328 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonica/2-3-1909/Satow to 
Lamb/enclosure no. 1 
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Among the ecclesiastical resolutions, the sixth requested the ''unrestricted extension 
to the Serb Metropolitans of the ecclesiastical privileges enjoyed by the Greek 
Metropolitans", whilst the ninth reiterated the old Serbo-Macedonian demand for the 
appointment of a Serb Metropolitan in the district of Diber-Veles. The last resolution 
appertaining religious matters, the tenth, called the Ottoman authorities to abrogate 
the Macedonian ecclesiastical settlement of 1903 and leave the local Macedonians 
free to chose whether they would have Serb, Bulgarian or Greek schoolmasters and 
priests. 32 Indicative of the Serbo-Macedonian representatives' intent to maintain a 
good climate with the Young Turk regime was the exclusion of any reference to the 
subtle question of the Ipek Patriarchate. 
Since poor economic conditions in Macedonia had the same negative effect upon all 
its inhabitants, regardless of their national, religious or political affiliations, the 
economic program of the Serbo-Macedonian associations was not much different 
from that of the Bulgarian Constitutional clubs. As expected, the widespread demand 
for distribution of lands and agricultural reform in Macedonia dominated the 
economic agenda as well as the resolutions of the Uskub convention. The twelfth 
resolution demanded that the Ottoman government put an end to the Albanian 
practice of appropriating Serbo-Macedonian properties and lands and appoint a 
Commission to remedy this situation and restore estates and lands to their legitimate 
owners. 
The thirteenth resolution impressed upon the Ottoman administration the urgent need 
to facilitate the strivings of the Macedonian peasantry for purchasing lands and 
properties from the powerful land-owners. In doing so, the civil authorities would 
contribute to the improvement of economic and living conditions in Macedonia and 
the establishment of "an independent peasant class in conformity with the 
Constitutional principles." Resolutions fourteen and fifteen laid emphasis on the 
peasants' claim to access the funds of the Agricultural Bank to avoid money-lending 
under onerous terms and the implementation of the 'Sefer Law', which regulated the 
labor relationship between the powerful landowners and their peasants (chiftjis) to 
diminish the growing exploitation of the peasants by their wealthy employers. 33 
32 Ibid. 
33 Ibid. 
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In brief, in purely political terms, the attitude of the Serbo-Macedonian communities 
and leadership in regard to the Unionist regime was moderate and cautious. On the 
other hand however, following the Bulgarian and Greek pattern, the Serbs even 
amidst the Bosnian crisis were more than reluctant to narrow down their new 
Macedonian struggle to mere political methods and entirely abandon their 
paramilitary activities in the vilayets ofKosovo and Monastir. 
7.4 The Re-activation of the Serbo-Macedonian Revolutionary Bands 
It is true that in the early stages of the Constitutional regime the official Serb 
government and the Serbo-Macedonian leadership refrained from any actions that 
might be considered hostile to the Young Turks. Nevertheless, despite the 
dismantling of the Serbo-Macedonian bands and the attempted alignment between 
Serbia and the Ottoman Empire during the annexation crisis, the Serbo-Macedonian 
communities were hesitant to support the Unionist efforts for the internal 
rehabilitation of Turkey. Like the Bulgarians, the Serbo-Macedonians believed that a 
revived Ottoman Empire could frustrate the implementation of the Serb nationalist 
program for expansion in Old Serbia, Kosovo and Monastir.34 Moreover, apart from 
the brief interval during the Turkish revolution, Serbo-Macedonian irregular activism 
had not been entirely vanished. Since September 1908, certain Serbo-Macedonian 
bands had resumed their activities in Kosovo vilayet, and in particular, in the districts 
ofPalanka, Perlepe and Kiuprulu. 
Those departments had always been at the center of the Serbo-Bulgarian controversy 
over Macedonia due to their disputed ethnic composition and the inability of the local 
communities to designate their national affiliation. The primary objective of the 
Serbo-Macedonian revolutionary bands was to intimidate the Bulgarian communes in 
Kosovo and force them to accept their incorporation into the Serb political sphere of 
influence. Toward this end, Serb band activity did not confine itself to the traditional 
methods of terrorism, coercion, inroads and imposed contributions. Using material 
resources from Serbia proper the Serb cetniks sought, in many cases successfully, to 
34 MALCOLM (1998, pp.239-40), DAKIN (1966, p.389) 
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rally the sympathies of the poor Macedonian populations by means of bribery and 
pecuniary allowances. 35 
Serb revolutionary activity in the province of Kosovo, though mild and sporadic 
when compared with the period 1906-1908, did not cease in 1909. Far from it. At 
the time of the April counterrevolution under the leadership of Sokolov, Skopliantse, 
Markov and Dovisevski, Serb paramilitary and political propaganda had spread 
across the northern parts of Kosovo, including the provincial capital Uskub, and had 
made its presence felt even in the province ofMonastir.36 
While the Serbs concentrated their efforts against the Kosovar Bulgarians, the 
Albanian nationalist movement in the Macedonian vilayets of Kosovo and Monastir 
was steadily growing. 
7.5 Early Albanian Political Activities in Unionist Macedonia 
Among all Macedonian ethnic groups, it was the Albanians who participated most 
actively in the Young Turk movement. To secure the collaboration of the Albanian 
element before the revolution, the Committee had undertaken certain commitments 
towards the Albanian leaders from the provinces of Janina and Kosovo. The C.U.P. 
promised to respect traditional Albanian privileges, allow the establishment of 
Albanian educational institutions, recognize an independent Albanian language and 
maintain the traditional state practice of recruiting ethnic Albanians to the Ottoman 
gendarmerie. 37 
The Ottoman Albanians hailed the Constitutional change with enthusiasm, the sole 
exception being the Moslems of Scutari and Kosovo, who tended to see in the Young 
Turk bid for Ottoman unity and equality a threat to their privileged position in local 
Albanian affairs. It is important to stress however, that although the Albanian 
nationalists had pledged to back the Constitution they made abundantly clear to the 
35 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAKlSofia Legationl22/4-2-1909/no.73/Zalokostas to Baltazzis, P.RO. F.O. 
195/2328 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/8-2-1909/Edmonds to Lowther, F.O. 
881/9503 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/26-12-1908/no.169ILamb to 
Lowther and P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonical20--l-
1909/Satow to Lamb 
36 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Uskub Consulate to General Consulate of Salonical20--l-1909/Satow to 
Lamb and LA.Y.E.l1909IFile AAKlSofia Legationl22/4-8-1909/no.562/Zalokostas to Zografos 
37 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 97.3.IIGeneral Consulate of Janina/15128-7-1908/no.39I1Agonakis to 
Baltazzis/pp.2-3, LA. Y .E.I 1908IFile 97.3.11 Argirokastro Consulate/291l1-8-1908/no.161IMalekos 
to Baltazzis 
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new rulers of Turkey that they were still determined to continue their struggle for 
political autonomy within the Ottoman Empire.38 According to Agonakis, the Greek 
Consul-General in Janina, a large number of Epirote Albanians officials had vowed to 
uphold the Albanian national idea above their vows to the Ottoman Constitution. 39 
As the Young Turks busied themselves with more practical and urgent issues such as 
the establishment of the Committee in the Albanian districts and the pacification of 
the region they did not seem, for the time being, to take into serious consideration the 
significance of the Albanian commitment to political autonomy. During the initial 
stages of the post-revolution era, the Unionist Committee strove to disseminate its 
political propaganda by organizing branches in the Albanian-dominated regions of 
Macedonia and Epirus. Furthermore, on 11 August 1908, the Committee began talks 
with the Albanian notables in Argirokastro respecting the suppression of Albanian 
brigandage activity and the termination of the state of lawlessness and anarchy in the 
region. 40 
In the meantime, the Albanian leaders took steps to establish political clubs and issue 
Albanian journals in the major cities of the country. Among these associations the 
most influential were the clubs of Mona stir, Uskub, Sa10nica and Constantinople. By 
the end of the year, a large number of Albanian clubs had been set up in Macedonia 
but it was the Monastir society, under the leadership of Fehim Bey Zavalani, that 
emerged as the recognized center of Albanian political activism. Certainly, the 
Albanian Macedonian societies did not have a ''uniform program" as each of them 
had sought to adjust its positions in local conditions and necessities. However, the 
leading clubs' principal intention was to work for "Albanian cultural development" 
and the advancement of Albanian political aspirations. 41 
In October, the annexation crisis and the declaration of Bulgarian independence 
drove the Albanian element to support Young Turkey and uphold the Ottoman 
38 SKENDI (1967, p.344) . 
39 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 97.3.lIGeneral Consulate of Janina!15/28-7-1908/no.3911Agonakis to 
Baltazzis/pp.3-5 . 
40 LA.Y.E.l1908IFile 97.3.lIArgirokastro Consulate/29/11-8-1908/no.l61/Malekos to BaltazZlS, 
I. A. Y.E.I 1908IFile 97.3.1/ Argirokastro Consulate/5/ 18-8-1908/no.164/Malekos to Baltazzis 
41 For details on the formation, membership and activity of Albanian clubs in Macedonia and 
Epirus: LA. Y.E.I 191 OlFile AAK-Ie/ Argirokastro Consulate/20/2-8-191 O/no.24 7/Halkiopoulos t.o 
Zografos, LA. Y.E.l191OIFile AAK-Ie/General Consulate of Janina! 18/31-8-191 O/no. 793/ Ago~akis 
to Zografos, I.A.Y.E.l191OIFile AAK-Ie/Monastir Consulate/15/28-10-1910/no.940/Mavroudis to 
Kallergis, SKENDI (1967, pp.346-50) 
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embargo against Austria. The Albanian leadership feared that the strengthening of 
Bulgaria might incite Serbia, Montenegro and Greece to seek territorial 
compensation in the Macedonian vilayets of Kosovo and Monastir as well as in 
Epirus. The Albanian nationalists had also laid claim to these areas, considering them 
to be part of Albania. 
In the second week of October, the Albanian club of Constantinople made clear to 
the Porte and the British embassy that it vehemently opposed the disintegration of 
Turkey-in-Europe and Slav or Greek territorial enlargement. To soothe those fears, 
the Grand Vizier Kiamil Pasha assured the Albanian Constantinople leadership that 
the Ottoman administration was resolved to make no territorial concessions either to 
the Slavs or the Greeks.42 
Until October 1908, the incompatibility of Unionist policies with the Albanian 
national program, though conspicuous, had not irretrievably damaged Turco-
Albanian relations. In the following months however, new developments were to 
create a rift between the two ethnic groups and add to Macedonian controversy. 
7.6 The Monastir Congress and the Convention of Tepeleni 
The construction of a separate Albanian identity was of crucial importance to the 
Albanian nation-building process. Cultural affirmation therefore, became the main 
priority for the Albanian leadership. Seeking to unify the Albanian tribes by means of 
detaching the Orthodox Christian and Moslem Albanian communities from their pro-
Greek and pro-Turkish affiliations respectively and to stir the national awareness of 
the Albanian people, the Albanian nationalists raised the demand for the recognition 
of an Albanian language. 
On the initiative of the Monastir association, a pan-Albanian Congress was held in 
that city between 14 and 22 November 1908. In the Congress, 50 delegates from the 
Albanian provinces participated representing all different creeds: Moslems, Christian 
Orthodox and Catholics. Leading figures of the Albanian national movement such as 
the president of Salonica club Midhat Frasheri Bey, Fehim Bey Zavalani and Sotir 
Peci, the editor of the American-Albanian newspaper Kombi (Nation). were present. 
42 I.A.Y.E.l1908/File 97.3.2/General Consulate of Janina/7/20-10-1908/no.5925/Agonakis to 
Baltazzis, F.O. 881/9492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l14-11-1908/no.777/Lowtberto Grey 
Serbo-Albanian Connection 
------------------------_________________________ 162 
Since the principal preoccupation of the Congress was to "adopt a common alphabet" 
for all Albanians, the Congress became known as the "alphabet Congress". Other 
issues like the leadership of Albanian clubs and the translation of the Koran into 
Albanian were also discussed. C.U.P. members participated in the Congress but few 
addressed it. 
On the focal alphabet question, a Committee was elected with the task of presenting 
its suggestions to the delegates. The Committee put forward two alternatives: one 
based on the Constantinople alphabet, including mixed Latin and Greek characters 
and another Latin-based alphabet. The Congress resolved that both be adopted and 
introduced in Albanian educational institutions. Regarding the issue of the 
supremacy among the Albanian political societies, the delegates opted for Monastir. 
Their main intention was to keep the center of the Albanian struggle away from the 
influence of the Salonica C.U.P. and secure its proximity to the Albanian-inhabited 
areas. 43 
The Monastir Congress's resolution to adopt an alphabet with Latin characters 
evoked anxiety to Greek Orthodox and Moslem Albanian clergy. The Orthodox 
clergy opposed the substitution of Greek language by a purely Albanian language in 
Albanian Orthodox churches and schools as it would result in the diminution of its 
spiritual influence on the Albanian Orthodox communities. 44 On the other hand, in 
the Kosovar Albanian districts of Diber and Prishtina, the conservative Moslem 
clergy dismissed the new alphabet as "infidel", propagating the introduction of the 
Arabic, the alphabet of the Koran. 45 
At the time, the Young Turk Committee did not seem to pose any obstacles to the 
use of an independent Albanian language in the Albanian-populated areas. Following 
the October crisis, the Committee's Albanian policy was to secure Albanian support 
for the Unionist regime and pacify the troublesome Albanian-Macedonian 
departments. However, this strategy underestimated the most important parameter in 
the Albanian question: Albanian nationalism and the Albanian bid for autonomy. 
43 F.O. 88119492 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l4-12-1908/no.827/Lowther to Grey/enclosure 
no.1, SKENDI (1982, p.255) . 
44 I.A.Y.E.l1909/File AAK-NKoritsa to ConstantinopleI17/30-3-1909/no.1325IMetropolitan 
Gervasios to Ecmnenical Patriarch 
45 Ibid. MALCOLM (1998, p.239) 
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On 4 February 1909, on a C.U.P. initiative, an Albanian convention was organized in 
Tepeleni with the participation of representatives from the vilayet of Janina. In an 
attempt to gain Albanian sympathy and backing, the C.U.P. raised the question of the 
Hellenic expansionist program in Epirus. The Committee guaranteed the territorial 
integrity of Albania and called the Albanian leaders to collaborate against the Greek 
threat. 
The Tepeleni gathering however seemed to take an unpleasant tum for the Unionists 
when, according to Italian Consul-General in Janina, Stranieri, a number of Albanian 
notables "put forward a demand for the autonomy of the Albanian provinces." This 
initiative was seen favorably by many Albanian Bektashis but failing to obtain the 
support of the Christian Orthodox delegates and the representatives of Berat, 
Elbassan and Loushnia, it yielded no practical result. 46 
In the end, the Tepeleni convention approved the formation of Albanian Epirote 
bands to face the Greek Epirote revolutionary movement and prevent the Albanian 
Orthodox communities from falling under the influence of Hellenic propaganda. But 
its most salient characteristic was that the claim for Albanian autonomy had been 
raised once again. 
7.7 The Emergence of Albanian Revolutionary Movement in Macedonia 
No sooner had the Constitutional forces established their power in Macedonia than 
an Albanian "reactionary" movement emerged in northern Macedonia. The Unionist 
bid to introduce western institutions in the Empire and promote equality and unity 
among the various Ottoman ethnicities had concerned the Moslem Albanians, many 
of whom had a traditional, and in certain cases personal, attachment to the Hamidian 
regIme. 
In the first half of August 1908, the Albanian Moslems of Jakova, led by Hasan 
Slako, rose against the new Young Turk regime. At the first stage of their rising, the 
rebels forced the local Ottoman administrative, judicial and police authorities out of 
the district declaring that henceforth "they would be governed by the Religious Law." 
Another Albanian anti-Young Turk movement broke out in Ipek during the same 
46 P.Ro. F.O. 19512328 General Consulate of Sa Ionic a to Constantinople Embassy122-2-1909/Lamb 
to Lowther 
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month and despite the C.U.P. initiative to dispatch a Commission to quiet local 
grievances, the Albanian element manifested its opposition to Young Turkey. 
In November 1908, the situation became more serious when the powerful Albanian 
chieftain Izza Boletini, to whom Sultan Abdul Hamid had given the title of Bey and 
the leadership of his Albanian guard since 1902, incited a new round of disturbances 
in the district of Mitrovitsa. His success in rallying around him notorious Albanian 
brigands like Hasan Hussein of Budakovo and Rustem Kabash was of little practical 
importance so long as a strong Ottoman force marched into Mitrovitsa and 
suppressed the anti-Constitutional movement.47 
In the meantime, Albanian nationalists began to distance themselves from the policies 
of the Young Turk Committee. Following the July revolution, the C.U.P. had shown 
no tendency to support provincial decentralization and strengthen local governments, 
much less to grant political autonomy to peripheral ethnic groups. Unionist strategy 
therefore, ran contrary to the political aspirations of the Albanian nationalist centers. 
Since the end of summer, the Albanian nationalists set up underground revolutionary 
committees in order to bring about the unification of the Albanian people and built an 
independent Albanian identity. According to Skendi, the secret committees were 
formed in Uskub, Jakova, Diber, Monastir and Constantinople and usually operated 
under the cloak of the Albanian clubs.48 
Initially, the clandestine Albanian societies confined their national struggle to 
spreading cultural propaganda by establishing schools, newspapers, clubs, raising the 
language question and cooperating with Vlach and Bulgarian-Macedonian activists 
against the Greeks in the regions of Monastir and Epirus. Therefore, until the 
counter-revolution of April 1909, the Albanian disturbances, predominantly in 
northern Macedonia, occurred on the instigation and with the active participation of 
local chieftains and band-leaders like Izza Boletini and his followers. 49 
47 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/6-2-1909/Lamb 
to LowtherlMemorandum on Macedonian Events in 1908 
48 SKENDI (1967, p.353) 
49 I.A.Y.E.l1909/File AAK-AlMonastir Consulate/5118-3-1909/no.213lDimaras to Baltazzis, P.RO. 
F.O. 19512328 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/5-2-1909IHeathcote to Lowther. 
P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/30-3-1909/Lamb 
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Such was the case in the second half of March 1909, when three Ottoman battalions 
were sent to Kosovo vilayet with a mission to suppress the irregulars of Izza Boletini 
and Hussein Dats of Diber and restore Ottoman administrative and military control 
over the districts oflpek and Jakova.50 
These Albanian activities, apart from keeping the region in turmoil, were only the tip 
of the iceberg. It was during the April of 1909, that the first major Albanian 
insurrection broke out in northern Macedonia; the prelude to a series of Albanian 
revolts destined to bring about the collapse of Ottoman Macedonian authority in the 
summer of 1912.51 
50 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonica/19-3-1909/Satow 
to Lamb/enclosure no.1 
51 Refer to chapter 9. 
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CHAPTER vm 
THE POLITICS OF 'OTTOMANIZATION' IN MACEDONIA 
1909-1911 
8.1 The Politicization of Ottoman Army and the Committee of Union and 
Progress 
The suppression of the counter-revolution in April 1909 by the Macedonian Army 
was a turning-point in Ottoman political history. The utter defeat of the anti-Unionist 
forces consolidated the Young Turk Committee as the most influential political body 
in the country and legitimized the establishment of a Unionist parliamentary party 
(C.U.P.). The decision of the Committee and the Chamber to restore the Hilmi Pasha 
Cabinet to office had nevertheless failed to clear the picture in Ottoman politics, for 
the arrival of the Macedonian Army in the capital had complicated the situation. The 
most important corollary of the April counter-revolution was that it brought the 
Ottoman military into the political arena. 
Although the military party allowed the civil bureaucrats of the Porte and the Young 
Turk Committee to control the government, Mahmud Shevket Pasha's first actions 
indicated the tendency of the Army to engage itself actively in political affairs. 
Shevket Pasha, by appointing himself Inspector-General of the three European army 
corps (I,II,III Ordus) became the most powerful figure in the Empire. What was 
more, in order to secure public order and prevent future internal convulsions the 
military put the country under martial law which was administered by Shevket Pasha 
and his Staff. In establishing martial law and excluding the Cabinet and the Chamber 
from its administration, the Army managed to restrain the civilian authorities' power 
and '\leto any measures it disapproved". 1 
The Young Turk Committee was visibly concerned with the growing interference of 
the Ottoman Army in politics. For the time being though the Committee had no plans 
to precipitate a clash with the Army. Following the April coup, c.o.P. policy was to 
I AHMAD (1969, pp.47-9, 55), ZURCHER (1993, p.l 04) 
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strengthen its position in the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet and the Parliament and at the same 
time attempt to contain the political activism of Shevket Pasha and his militarists. To 
this end, the C.U.P. sought to pack the administration and the government apparatus 
with its members and supporters. Unionist intentions became more clear in July 1909 
when the Committee forced Ferid Pasha to resign from the Ministry of the Interior. 
Talat Bey succeeded him and with Cavit Bey, the Minister of Finance, increased the 
Committee's representation and influence in the Cabinet. 2 
At the same time, the Unionists tried to vest the Chamber, their political stronghold, 
with more powers at the expense of the Monarch and the Cabinet. By revising 
certain Constitutional articles the new C.U.P. parliamentary party deprived the Sultan 
of his right to control the composition of the entire Cabinet, restricting his jurisdiction 
to the appointment of the Grand Vizier and Sheih-ul-Islam.3 Under the new 
Constitutional disposition the appointment or dismissal of the Ministerial Council 
became contingent upon Parliamentary ratification. In case the Cabinet and the 
Parliament held different positions in questions of domestic or foreign policy the 
latter was to prevail. As an outcome, owing to Unionist efforts, the Chamber 
managed to extend its political role and authority in Ottoman matters vis-a-vis 
traditional policy-making centers such as the Palace and the Cabinet.4 
There is little doubt that during the second period of the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet in office 
(May-December 1909), the C.U.P. had been powerful enough to restrain the 
executive authority of the Palace and the Cabinet. However, in dealing with the 
military party of Mahmud Shevket, which had rallied the support of many Young 
Turk officers the Committee's civilian branch was to have a far more difficult time. , 
The C.U.P. was aware that so long as the responsibility for the working of martial 
law continued to lie in the hands of the Army and not the civilian authorities (Cabinet 
or Parliament), the military was to remain the ultima ratio in the country and 
Mahmud Shevket Pasha military dictator.5 
Despite their resentment at the political activism of the military the Unionists did not 
oppose the establishment of martial regime. On the contrary, in these extraordinary 
2 AHMAD (1969, pp.SO-3) 
3 ZURCHER (1993, p.l OS) . 
4 F.O. 88119858 Memorandum Respecting the New Regime in Turkey/Forelgn Office/16-5-
1911lKnatchbull-Hugessen to Grey, AHMAD (1969, pp.59-60) 
5 F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy/3-1-191O/no.3/Major Tyrrell to Lowther 
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conditions, the Young Turk Committee recognized its value as the only effective 
preventive measure against a future anti-Unionist counterrevolution. Furthermore, 
the C.U.P. aspired to utilize the martial regime to promote its centralizing and 
nationalist policy. This policy had two distinct poles: the suppression of liberal 
opposition in the Chamber of Deputies, the administration, the press and the country 
as a whole; second, the implementation of the Unionist nationalist program of 
'Ottomanizing' all non-Moslem ethnic groups in the Empire. It was a state-
sponsored policy intending to attack the constitutionally established political and 
spiritual rights of the non-Moslem ethnic groups and enforce on them a collective 
Ottoman identity. Although part of the Unionist centralizing and nationalist 
tendencies had been revealed in the period between the July revolution and the April 
counterrevolution, the actual commencement of the 'Ottomanization' politics should 
be placed after April 1909 reaching its peak in the next two years. 
In Ottoman-held Macedonia, the implementation of this political experiment was 
based on three key factors. First, in the employment on the part of the 
Constantinople government and the Young Turk Committee of strict legislative, 
administrative and military measures. Second, in the settlement of Moslem 
immigrants from Bosnia-Herzegovina and Eastern Rumelia in the Christian-
dominated Macedonian districts. Third, in the organization of Moslem-Macedonian 
bands and the emergence of a revolutionary movement among the Moslem 
population. 
8.2 Legislative, Administrative and Military Measures 
In summer 1909, the Committee embarked on laying the legislative foundations for 
the promotion of its 'Ottomanization' experiment. Its paramount position in the 
Chamber facilitated the passing of a large number of important bills. In the second 
half of 1909, the Parliament voted, among others, the Law concerning the 
Conscription of non-Moslems and the Association Law. The Law for the prevention 
of Brigandage and Sedition was put in force by the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet without 
being sanctioned by the Chamber. 
On 5 November 1909, the Hilmi Pasha government issued a firman enacting the 
enrollment of non-Moslems in the army. The Conscription Law, in essence, provided 
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for the homogenization of the non-Moslem recruits ill the Moslem-dominated 
Ottoman armed forces. Therefore it was vehemently opposed by the Greek, Slav, 
Armenian and Jewish ethnic communities. It was not long before the Committee and 
the leaders of the non-Moslem communities clashed over the conscription issue. 
Retorting to the C.D.P. accusations that the Greeks obstructed the non-Moslem army 
recruitment and undermined the Conscription Law, the Greek Patriarch Joachim III, 
supported by the Chief Rabbi Haim Nahum Effendi, argued that the Greeks would 
not oppose that measure providing that all ethnic groups acquired the same status in 
the Ottoman army. To this effect, the Greek Patriarch requested that the non-
Moslem recruits should be allowed to have their own priests, perform their religious 
tasks, serve in separate units in their native districts and register in the Ottoman 
military academies to become officers. 6 
For many reasons the Ottoman administration refused to satisfy those demands. The 
Ottomans feared that the presence of independent non-Moslem military units in the 
army could develop in a threat for the internal security of the country. Besides, the 
Moslem recruits objected to the participation of non-Moslems in the Ottoman armed 
forces on religious grounds. The likelihood that this problematic coexistence 
between Moslem and non-Moslem troops might undermine the fighting spirit and 
capability of the army had seriously perturbed the Ottoman political and military 
establishment. 7 
As for the non-Moslem recruits themselves they had no real desire to join the army 
and serve among numerous Moslems whilst the few thousands who finally enrolled 
did so to avoid paying the heavy exemption military tax bedel-i-askeri. According to 
Ottoman Macedonian military authorities, the III Army corps was expected to recruit 
for 1910 8,000 non-Moslems, of whom 1,800 would serve in Constantinople.s For 
the vilayet of Salonica, in particular, 1617 Christians and 1444 Jews were selected to 
join the Tertib-I-Evvel (service with colors) and 119 Christians and 166 Jews were to 
join the Tertib-I-Sani (active reserve).9 In sum, owing to the limited Christian 
6 F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l14-1-1910/no.14/Lowther to Grey 
7 Ibid. 
8 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/5-3-191 OlLamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassyil4-3-
1 91 O/Lamb to Lowther 
9 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/5-3-1910ILamb 
to Lowther 
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enrollment in the Ottoman army the application of the Conscription Law did not 
make a serious impact on the situation in Macedonia. 10 Tbis was not however the 
case with the Association and Brigandage Laws. 
The Association Law forbade the various nationalities to set up political societies or 
clubs with an ethnic character. Clearly, its execution stirred a great amount of 
discontent among the Macedonian Christians. In their eyes, the Ottoman authorities' 
resolution to outlaw the operation of the ethnic political associations and close down 
the existing Christian clubs was an unequivocal attempt to restrict their constitutional 
freedom and strip them of their right to oppose the Young Turk regime by political 
means. 11 
On the other hand, by the time that the Association Law was put in force on 16 
August 1909, the anti-Committee trends within the Christian Macedonian clubs had 
increased substantially in any case. In the most powerful Christian Macedonian 
organization, the Bulgarian Constitutional League,12 the Unionist failure to initiate 
agrarian reform, settle the ecclesiastical question and improve living and regional 
conditions in Macedonia had increased the influence of the most nationalist 
elements. 13 
In the outset, it seemed that the Ottoman authorities would not face serious problems 
in implementing the Association Law in the three Macedonian provinces. In 
Monastir, for example, when in mid-November the vali Halil Bey announced to the 
leaders of the local Greek, Albanian and Serb political clubs that their associations 
were to close down, the latter, although frustrated, complied without causing trouble. 
The only non-political clubs that continued to function in the city of Monastir were 
10 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/22-1-1910/Geary to 
Lowther. It is indicative that the maximum enrollment, which took place in Adrianople, resulted in 
the conscription of 2,169 Christians only. F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l14-1-
191 0/no.14ILowther to Grey 
11 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople EmbassyI22-11-1909/Matthews to 
Lowther 
12 In November 1909, the Bulgarian-Macedonian Constitutional Union numbered roughly 10.000 
members. P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyI24-11-
1909lLamb to Lowther 
\3 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-NGeneral Consulate of Salonica/19/l-9-1909/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Callergis/Second Congress/pp.3-7 and P.RO. F.O. 19512329 General Consulate of Sa10nica to 
Constantinople Embassy/14-9-1909/Acting General Consul Satow to Lowther 
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the International and the Military, those associations being predominantly Turkish 
and all their members C.U.P. supporters.14 
Unlike the Greek, Serb and Albanian clubs, the Bulgarian Constitutional associations 
did not seem very keen to follow the trend and meet the Unionist demand for 
immediate dissolution. The Ottoman authorities' decision to suppress the Bulgarian-
Macedonian branches of Monastir and Pedepe in the end of November 1909 
activated the League. Instantly, Karayovov traveled to Constantinople and sought to 
reach a compromise with the C.U.P. The Macedonian leader made an attempt to 
persuade the Unionists to adopt a more conciliatory attitude towards the 
Constitutional League, which "had worked consistently and sincerely for the 
maintenance of order and the establishment of a better administration. ,,15 
But no such concession was forthcoming on the part of the Unionist Committee. The 
Unionists had been always inclined to believe that the Constitutional associations 
were connected with Sofia and that it was through the Constitutional League that the 
Bulgarian government had been advancing its national propaganda and expansionist 
aspirations in Macedonia. 16 No wonder that the C.U.P. viewed Karayovov's mission 
with real mistrust and wished to see him and his group "severing all connections with 
Macedonian politics.,,17 
In the first week of December, the Salonica Central Headquarters of the Bulgarian 
Constitutional clubs, following a tumultuous convention, sent a circular to the 
remaining Macedonian clubs instructing them to discontinue their operations. 18 The 
Bulgarian-Macedonian nationalist faction, however, had no intention of capitulating 
easily. In December 1909, during Karayovov's absence in Constantinople, it 
14 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/22-11-1909/Matthews to 
Lowther. It is true that the Greek association of Monastir and its leader Valavanidis requested from 
the vali to permit the operation of the club under the name IIOAITl1COq Ivv&cy/-wq (Political 
League), but, as expected, the Ottomans refused to satisfY the Greek request. P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 
Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/2-3-1910/Geary to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 
Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/22-1-191 O/Geary to Lowther 
15 F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l28-12-1909/no.998/Marling to Grey 
16 Sandanski, prompted by his incessant rivalry with the Bulgarian clubs and Sofia, had also exerted 
his influence on the Young Turks in order to convince them that the clubs were mere instruments of 
King Ferdinand "working for Macedonian annexation to Bulgaria." F.O. 88119624 Constantinople 
Embassy to F.O.l31-1-191OILowther to Grey/Annual Report on Turkey for the Year 1909/enclosure 
no.l 
17 F.O. 88119717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l28-12-1909/no.998IMarling to Grey 
18 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate ofSalonica to Constantinople Embassy/6-12-1909/Lamb 
to Marling 
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gathered momentum in the League. Guerov, editor of the clubs' official publication 
Otechestvo (Fatherland)19 launched through this journal a campaign against the 
Committee's Macedonian policy. 
Karayovov's decision to return from Constantinople, dismiss Guerov and postpone 
the publication of the Otechestvo came too late to prevent the Ottoman authorities 
from outlawing the Bulgarian political associations, suppressing their offices and 
banning the Otechestvo. Indeed, using the Press Law, they indicted Karayovov and 
Guerov for "publishing villainous and seditious statements against the government 
and the nation." On 31 January 1910, the two Bulgarian-Macedonian leaders were 
sentenced in absentia to two months imprisonment and a fine of thirty Turkish 
pounds. Their flight to Bulgaria before their trial marked the dissolution of the 
Bulgarian-Macedonian Constitutional Union. 20 
If the Association Law had sharpened the discontent of the Macedonian Christians 
toward Young Turkey, the implementation of the Band Law in Macedonia was to 
lead the local nationalities and the Unionists into thorough estrangement and 
confrontation. On 27 September 1909, the Hilmi Pasha Cabinet put in force the 
Band Law based on the Constitutional article 36 'as a measure of urgency for the 
safeguard of the state.' The Band Law, which having not been sanctioned by the 
Chamber was an essentially unconstitutional law, 21 aimed at the repression of brigand 
activism and the liquidation of the Macedonian bands. 
The Band Law stated that local authorities and the population of a locality were to be 
hold responsible for the emergence of band activity in their district. Participation in a 
band incurred the death penalty and in case one member of a family joined a band, the 
authorities had the right to confiscate the family's property and exile its members. 
The Band Law provided for the formation of special Investigation Commissions 
(Istitlat Commissionou) and the establishment of courts martial in the provincial 
Macedonian centers. 
19 This biweekly journal was published in Salonica and enjoyed a circulation of 3,000-6,000 papers. 
20 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate ofSalonica to Constantinople Embassy/l-2-1910/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/8-2-
1910/Lamb to Lowther, F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/15-2-1910/no.88/Lowther to 
Grey 
21 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/3-12-1909/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/24-11-
1909/Lamb to Lowther 
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The five-member Investigation Commissions were composed of local judicial. 
military, gendarmerie and police officials. Having at their disposal strong military 
detachments and almost unrestricted freedom of action, the Commissions did not 
hesitate to employ exceedingly harsh measures in their struggle against the Christian 
bands. Stringent police surveillance, intensive espionage activity, persecution, 
extortion and, often, deportation of the co mit adj is , relatives, forcible disarmament. 
assassinations of former-band leaders by Moslem irregulars,22 intimidation of local 
populations were the most formidable weapons of the Investigations Commissions in 
their campaign to eliminate Christian Macedonian oppo sition and implement the 
'Ottomanization' policy. 23 
Apparently, the most successful Macedonian Commission was that of Mona stir under 
Adjutant-Major Fuad Bey, gendarmerie commandant of Koritsa. During November 
and December 1909, it had forced three strong Christian bands, which had been 
active in the districts of Servia, Grevena and Kirtchevo, to surrender to the local 
authorities. 24 
Christian resentment against the Band Law stemmed predominantly from the 
question of Christian disarmament. Aided by old spies of the Hamidian regime, the 
Investigation Commissions proclaimed martial law in the Macedonian towns 
demanding the instant disarmament of the Christian popUlations -a procedure from 
which the local Moslem communities and the immigrants from Bosnia and Bulgaria 
were exempted. It is certain that the Investigation Commissions and their military 
22 By the end of January 1910, well-known Bulgarian and Greek ex-band leaders like Mitsko, Vassil 
and Papazoglou had been killed by Moslems in Kirtchevo, Uskub and Salonica re~;pectively. The 
most spectacular assassination however occurred on 13 January 1910 in a Florina cafe, when two 
Moslems killed the notorious Bulgarian voevoda Tzole of Banitsa in day-light. It was the 
unwillingness of the Ottoman authorities to identifY and arrest the assassins that led the local 
Bulgarians justifiably to believe that the incident had been instigated by the Young Turk 
Committee. P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/16-1-191 O/Geary 
to Marling. See also note no.21 
23 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/17-12-1909/Matthews to 
Marling, F. O. 881/971 7 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/18-1-
191O/no.11/Lamb to Lowther, F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/4-1-
1910/no.6/Lowther to Grey, I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-AiGeneral Consulate of Salonical2417-12-
1909/no.872/Papadiamantopoulos to Mavromihalis 
24 The other members of the Monastir Investigation Commission were: Major Niazi Bey, Fakri Bey 
(former police inspector and kaimakam of Resna), Saadeddin Bey (gendarmerie co~andant of 
Monastir) and Assim Bey (police director of Monastir). P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastlr Consulate 
to Constantinople Embassy/29-11-1909/Matthews to Lowther and P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General 
Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/ 18-1-191 O/Lamb to Lowther 
The Politics of 'Ottomanization' 
----------------------------___________________ 174 
detachments tended to accompany Christian disarmament with the use of excessive 
violence, tortures, intimidation and ruthless inquisitorial methods. 
In the southern parts of Kosovo vilayet, in Monastir vila yet and in the kazas of 
Y enidje-V ardar and Ghevgeli of Salonica vilayet Turkish repression reached the 
proportions of unspeakable cruelty. In a protest against this unbearable situation, 
Father Lade, a Bulgarian vicar from the district of Ishtip, committed suicide. Such 
was the Ottoman authorities' misconduct in the disarmament question that the 
Christian ethnic groups began to contemplate the formation of a united anti-Turkish 
front and the full reactivation of their Macedonian revolutionary committees. 25 
Yet, it was the institution of courts martial that made the implementation of the Band 
Law tantamount to the establishment of martial law in the three Macedonian 
provinces. These bodies, manned by high-ranking judicial and military officials and 
vested with extraordinary jurisdiction and powers, soon developed in the supreme 
authorities in the vilayets of Salonica, Monastir and Kosovo. According to the new 
Ottoman penal code, a Macedonian court martial had the power to inflict heavy 
sentences and even capital punishment on those defendants who had been found 
guilty of being implicated in band activities. 
Theoretically, this measure was equally directed against Moslem as well as Christian 
bandits, but, in fact, the vast majority of the individuals standing trial were Christians. 
Procedure-wise, the function of these judicial bodies was very suspect. Contrary to 
the reassurances of the Ottoman officials, the courts martial convened in secrecy and 
the defendants were neither allowed to engage legal support nor to communicate 
with their next-of-kin. 
It should be stressed that the Macedonian courts martial proceedings did not always 
result in convictions. In fact, a large number of accused Christians were [mally 
acquitted. By the end of 1909, 108 Christians stood trial before the Salonica court 
martial. Out of them, 89 were exonerated, 9 were sentenced to three years' hard 
labor, 3 to four years, 4 to five years and three to life imprisonment. 26 
25 P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyI12-6-191 OlLamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/20-8-
1910lLamb to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 Monastir Consulate to Co~tantinople Embassy:9-1 0-
1910/Geary to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 General Consulate of Salonica to ConstantInople 
Embassy/ 11-11-191 OlLamb to Lowther 
26 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyI18-1-191 O/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy24-11-
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The execution of Band Law produced a two-fold effect in Macedonia. First, due to 
the severity in its application it temporarily led to the diminution of Christian 
Macedonian band activity. Second, it helped to enhance the irreconcilable racial 
differences between the Christian and Moslem communities and added to Christian 
hostility against the Ottoman government and the Young Turk Committee. 
To the vast majority of Macedonian Christians it seemed as if the repugnant rule of 
the old Hamidian establishment had suddenly revived in the form of an arbitrary and 
nationalist Unionist regime. In the end of 1909, a state of intimidation and complete 
terror reigned over the Christian-populated districts of Macedonia and the relations 
between Young Turks and Macedonian Christians reached their worst point ever.27 
8.3 The C.D.P., Moslem Immigration to Macedonia and the Formation of 
Moslem Macedonian bands 
If the year 1910 witnessed an unprecedented deterioration in the position of the 
Ottoman Christians, this was primarily the result of the C.U.P. nationalist 
commitment to suppress any opposition to its regime and forcefully 'Ottomanjze' the 
non-Moslem ethnic groups. 
On 28 December 1909, the Hussein Hilmi Pasha Cabinet was forced by the Unionists 
to resign. The new Grand Vizier Ibrahim Hakki Pasha, a senior Porte official and 
ambassador in Italy, sought from the start to reduce the Committee's meddling with 
1909ILamb to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople 
Embassy/3-12-1909/Lamb to Lowther, F.O. 881/9717 Sofia Embassy to F.O'/16-2-
191 0/no.18IFindlay to Grey. By the end of January 1910, the only case resulting in the imposition 
of death sentence by the Salonica court martial was that of the Bulgarian-Macedonian voevoda 
Dinka. The Dinka affair however had an explicit political connotation. The Bulgarian-Macedonian 
voevoda, even after the Y Olmg Turk revolution, had been operating with his band in the northern 
districts of the Salonica vilayet as a counterpoise to Sandanski's local influence. Dinka's band had 
been manned by sympathizers of the Bulgarian Union of Constitutional clubs and for that reason 
Sandanski assisted the Ottoman authorities to eliminate the band and arrest Dinka and his followers. 
On 26 January 1910, the Salonica court martial convicted Dinka to death, whilst 5 of his men 
received life sentence and 2 fifteen-years imprisonment. Despite the statement of the Ottoman 
Foreign Minister Rifat Pasha that the authorities intended "to make an example of Dinka", Dinka's 
conviction was a Young Turk concession to Sandanski, whose personal regime in the northern 
departments of the Salonica vilayet was threatened by the presence of a rival political band. P.RO. 
F. O. 1 95/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/2 7 -1-1 91 OlLamb to 
Lowther, F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/28-1-1910/no.9/Lowther to Grey, F.O. 
881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./30-1-191 O/no.ll/Lowther to Grey 
27 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/29-11-1909/Matthews to 
Lowther, F.O. 881/9717 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/18-1-
191 O/no.ll /Lamb to Lowther 
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the government and bring the administration of the martial law under the control of 
central government. His decision to appoint Shevket Pasha Minister of War was the 
most significant element in the composition of the new Cabinet. 
This important development conferred the nominal control of the martial law upon 
the Hakki Pasha government but its original administration was never removed from 
the hands of Shevket Pasha and his military party. The principal characteristic of the 
new Ottoman administration was not any more the rivalry between the Hakki Cabinet 
and the C.U.P. for political predominance but the consistent efforts of the military 
party8 to establish its position as a major decision-making body in Ottoman affairs.29 
In the meantime, during the same period, C.U.P. popUlarity among the Moslem as 
well as the non-Moslem popUlations declined. The C.U.P. had failed to promote 
inter-ethnic unity and introduce radical reforms in the Ottoman administration as well 
as the socio-political institutions. It was however the C.U.P. decision to uphold the 
martial regime that had alienated a large section of Ottoman society from the 
Committee. In April 1910, during a parliamentary debate concerning the Unionist 
attitude on the question of the martial law Lutfi Fikri Bey, a prominent liberal deputy, 
accused the Committee of having used the stage of siege "to override all the laws and 
set up an arbitrary form of Government. ,,30 
At a time that the anti-Unionist movement was steadily growing in the Ottoman 
Empire, the emergence of factionalism among the Monastir, Salonica and Adrianople 
Committees further undermined the internal position of the C.U.P. Quarrels over 
supremacy in the organization or the management and allocation of funds seriously 
threatened the unity of the movement and strained relations between the European 
Committees. It was in this difficult situation, that the Unionist leaders Halil Bey, 
28 In the Hakki Cabinet, equaling the civilian Unionist party of Talat Bey and Cavit Bey, the 
military group had also two representatives: Shevket Pasha and the Minister of Navy Real-Admiral 
Ha1i1 Pasha. 
29 F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/16-1-191 O/no.27 !Lowther to Grey, F.O. 881/9858 
Memorandum Respecting the New Regime in Turkey/Foreign Office/16-5-1911lKnatchbull-
Hugessen to Grey 
30 F.O. 881/9811 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l14-2-l911lLowther to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 191O/enclosure no.l, P.Ro. F.O. 19512357 General Consulate of Salonica to 
Constantinople Embassy/3-3-19l0ILamb to Lowther. In May 1910, in a conversation. wi~ the 
British ambassador Lowther, Mahmud Shevket Pasha commented on the c.u.P. connectton ill the 
Ottoman administration: "The Committee is a body of irresponsible and inexperienced young men 
styling themselves the Committee of Union and Progress who thwarted as ~uch ~s they assisted the 
government." F.O. 881/9858 Memorandum Respecting the New Regime III Turkey/Forelgn 
Office/ 16-5-1911IKnatchbul1-Hugessen to Grey 
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Talat Bey and Cavit Bey traveled to Macedonia in August 1910. Attempting to 
reconcile the feuding Young Turk branches and forge Unionist solidarity Talat Bey 
sought to reassure the Salonica C.U.P. that: 
"We have a majority in the House of Representatives and all attempts to oppose us in 
the Parliament have miserably failed. The Cabinet is essentially in the hands of the 
Committee and will continue to be controlled by us. The army is solidly ranged in 
our support and any talk of danger on the part of our friends entirely lacks 
foundation. " 
The mission of the three Unionist political leaders however failed to restore the unity 
between the European branches and reaffirmed the deadlock. 31 Adding to the gravity 
of the situation, a considerable number of Young Turk officers of the Uskub, 
Monastir and Salonica branches started to withdraw their support from the Talat-
Cavit civilian group and align themselves with the military party of Mahmud Shevket. 
In November, the growing frustration within the Macedonian army over Unionist 
policies moved the Military club of Uskub to address a proposal to the Salonica 
Military club for a 'joint secession" from the Young Turk Committee. The chief 
cause for this conversion lay in the officers' disappointment over the practice of the 
civilian cadres of occupying many privileged positions in the civil administration and 
the central government thus "reaping the fruits of a victory (i.e. restoration of 
Constitution) which the Army alone secured. ,,32 
Such was the complicated situation in the movement when in November 1910 the 
Third Annual Young Turk Congress convened in Salonica -the center of the C.U.P. 
31 F.O. 881/9860 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/28-8-1910/no.38/Geary to 
Lowther, F.O. 881/9860 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./6-9-1910/no.635/Lowther to Grey. It 
appears that the question of Ottoman policy with regard to Bulgaria had become an additional point 
of dispute between the European Unionist Committees. Two months after the Talat-Cavit mission, 
in the Third Young Turk Congress lkhsan Bey held that the Salonica C.C. of the c.u.P. had been 
profoundly convinced that a diminution of the repressive measures against the Bulgarian-
Macedonian element was necessary to avoid, at this stage at least, a premature armed confrontation 
with Bulgaria. On the other hand, the Monastir and Adrianople c.u.P. strongly objected to the 
suggestion of the Salonica Committee. Due to their geographical proximity with Bulgaria, the 
Monastir and Adrianople c.u.P. had grown increasingly apprehensive of Bulgarian expansionism 
and not only continued to treat the local Bulgarian populations very badly but spurred the Salonica 
c.u.P. to practice a more aggressive policy vis-a-vis the Bulgarians. P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 
Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/3-12-191 O/Geary to Marling. 
32 F.O. 881/9860 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/25-10-1910/no.36:Geary to 
Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonical15-11-
1910/Hough to Lamb, P.RO. F.O. 195/2381 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/30-4-
1911/Geary to Lowther 
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power- to discuss developments in the country and the movement as well as to 
outline the future Committee political course of action. The Congress busied itself 
with the election of a new C.C. and the elaboration of its political resolutions. 
First, the delegates elected the Central Bureau of the C.U.P. It consisted of: Kiasim 
Nami Bey, Fadi! Bey, Kerim-Effendi-Zade Tewfik Bey, Celal Bey, Sami Bey, Said 
Bey, Tewftk Rushdi Bey, Hifzi Bey. Three eminent Unionist cadres, Dr. Nazim Bey, 
Eumer Naci Bey and Ayub Sabri, were appointed representatives of the Salonica 
C.C. to Constantinople. 
Afterwards, the proceedings of the Congress focused on the elaboration of the new 
resolutions. These called for: the disarmament of the Macedonian Christians, save 
the frontier Albanian clans: the suppression of Bulgarian agitators, teachers and 
priests; the settlement of Moslem immigrants in Macedonia; the pursuit and 
punishment of Christian comitadjis; the strengthening and development of Ottoman 
armed forces to stifle the Christian propaganda in Macedonia and Albania and 'crush 
the Bulgarian and Greek aspirations'; the 'suppression of all new parties and liberal 
ideas'; the introduction of the Turkish language in all Ottoman educational 
institutions; the dissemination of pan-Islamism across the country, the new motto 
being 'the caliph was the head of the nation, other nationalities were a negligible 
quantity': the continuation of Turkey's friendship with the Alliance without however 
alienating the Entente; finally, the eventual abrogation of the capitulatory system in 
the country?3 
The Third Young Turk Congress was one of the most important in the period under 
review on the grounds that its political resolutions embodied and exposed the most 
extreme nationalist and chauvinistic Unionist tendencies. Internally, on the one hand, 
to secure the Committee's commanding political position in the Parliament and the 
central government, the Salonica Congress resolved to wipe out the growing liberal 
movement in the interior and pursue more intensely the "Ottomanization" policy. 
The introduction of Turkish in all Ottoman schools and the politicization of Islam 
intended to serve this very policy. On an international level, the nationalist Unionists 
would attempt to avoid a premature armed confrontation with the Balkan Christian 
33 F.o. 88119811 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.ll-l-2-1911lLowther to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 1910/enclosure no.I. P.R.o. F.o. 19512359 Monastir Consulate to 
Constantinople Embassy/3-12-1910/Geary to Marling 
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states, ill particular Bulgaria and Greece, before the country completed the 
reorganization of its armed forces. As regards the relations with the European 
Powers, the Committee although treasuring Ottoman friendship with the Triple 
Alliance would observe a non-alignment policy and work for the abolition of the 
capitulations. 
As the Unionist regime steadily assumed a more distinctly nationalist and military 
character during 1910, its 'Ottomanization' policy was most likely to intensify. In 
Macedonia, apart from the legislative, administrative and military measures, the 
C.U.P. had already set out to favor Moslem settlement in Christian-dominated areas 
and instigate the emergence of a revolutionary movement among the Macedonian 
Moslems. 
The Unionist immigration project provided for the transportation of compact Moslem 
populations from Bosnia, Eastern Rumelia, Serbia and Russia (muhajirs) and their 
swift settlement in the "sensitive" Macedonian districts bordering on Bulgaria and 
Greece.34 The main attempt in that direction had begun on 17 March 1909, when on 
the initiative of Dr. Nazim Bey an Association had been set up in Salonica for "the 
purpose of encouraging and assisting the Moslem immigration from Bosnia and 
Eastern Rumelia to Macedonia." Leading Ottoman officials like Ismail Bey, 
president of the Salonica municipality, Hasan Riza Pasha, commander of Artillery of 
the III Army corps, Ahmet Effendi Kapanci, a wealthy Donme,35 actively supported 
this demanding effort.36 
The main responsibility for directing and implementing the immigration project rested 
with the Salonica-based Central Immigration Commission, which was presided over 
by the vali and the District Commissions which had been formed in each Macedonian 
kaza. To encourage the immigration movement, the Ottoman Chamber voted a sum 
of 200,000 Turkish pounds and the Ottoman administration undertook to satisfy 
promptly the urgent needs of the settlers for farms, com-seed, oxen and agricultural 
equipment. 
34 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-NGeneral Consulate of Salonica/no.238/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/undated 
35 Jew who had converted to Islam. 
36 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-NGeneral Consulate of Salonica/no.238/Papadiamantopoulos to 
Baltazzis/undated. F.O. 881/9531 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l30-3-1909/no.224/Lowther to 
Grey, F.O. 881/9351 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embass~/2-l-3-
1909/no.381Lamb to Lowther 
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Serious difficulties impeded the smooth materialization of this ambitious immigration 
scheme. Among the main reasons for its eventual failure was the incompetence and 
ineffectiveness of the Ottoman administration. In theory, the Ottoman government 
was expected to allocate properties, supplies and pecuniary assistance to the Moslem 
settlers immediately after their arrival in Macedonia but on many occasions it had 
failed to fulfill its commitments. 
As a result, many thousands of Moslem settlers, demoralized and exhausted, were 
crowded into Macedonian inns, mosques and other impromptu reception centers in 
the provincial capitals of Uskub and Salonica, remaining there for a considerable 
period of time before they were finally settled. To make matters worse, poor living 
conditions and non-existent sanitary provisions in these large concentration centers 
caused mass-spreading diseases raising the death rate of the settlers to 20% in the 
province ofKosovo. At the end of May 1910, the overall number of Moslem settlers 
in Kosovo province did not exceed 3,000 whilst 120 had requested the assistance of 
the Austrian vice-consulate in Uskub to return to Bosnia.37 At the same time, the 
Moslem immigrants, in particular those of Bosnian descent, had their own share of 
responsibility for this lamentable situation. The majority of Bosnian Moslems was 
finally settled on Macedonian farms but being "a pastoral race and not agriculturists" 
they found it difficult to adjust themselves in new living and working conditions. 38 
True, during the Third Young Turk Congress the leader of the Unionist 
parliamentary party Halil Bey claimed that 12,000 Bosnian Moslems had settled in 
Macedonia,39 the bulk of them in the kazas of Uskub, Kiuprulu, Osmanie, 
Kumanovo, Ishtip (Kosovo vilayet) and the kazas of Djumaja, Kirtchevo, Yenidje-
Vardar, Petritch, Ghevgeli and Katerini (Salonica vilayet).4o Even so, the outcome of 
the Moslem immigration project was a huge disappointment for the Young Turk 
37 P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 General Consulate ofSalonica to Constantinople Embassy/27-5-1910/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/l 0-12-
191 O/Lamb to Marling 
38 P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/3-12-1910/Geary to 
Marling, P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 General Consulate of Salonica to Constnatinople Embassy/I 0-12-
1910/Lamb to Marling, P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of 
Salonical 14-1-1 911IHough to Lamb 
39 In the end of 1910, British consular reports from Uskub and Salonica raised that figure to 17,000. 
40 The largest Moslem settlement in Macedonia was established in Lefterohori, Katerini kaza, near 
the Greek frontier, numbering 5,000 people. P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 General Consulate of Salollica 
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Macedonian Committees. The [mal number of Macedonian settlers did not suffice to 
change the ethnic map in the Christian-dominated areas in favor of the Moslem 
element and certainly did not justify the large sums the central government had 
invested in the scheme. 
Another important aspect of the Unionist Ottomanization policy was the formation of 
Moslem Macedonian bands. The Macedonian Young Turk Committees encouraged 
and supported the armament of the local Moslem popUlation (while the forcible 
disarmament of the Christians continued) and the formation of armed Moslem 
partisan groups became more obvious in the summer of 1910, when the Christian 
revolutionary organizations resumed their activities in Macedonia. The explicit 
directive of the Third Young Turk Salonica Congress for the prompt suppression of 
the Macedonian bands and Christian propaganda in Macedonia and Albania gave a 
new boost to this current. As a result, during the last three months of the year a 
considerable number of Moslem bands were formed in the vilayets of Salonica, 
Monastir and Kosovo. 
The Unionist Committees did not confine themselves to extending financial and 
material support to these Moslem partisan units. They, facilitated and coordinated 
cooperation between the Moslem comitadjis, Albanian or Turkish, and the Ottoman 
security forces- gendarmerie and police. This key practice raised the operational 
capability of the Moslem bands dramatically as they possessed invaluable information 
about the virtual location and forces of their targets. These targets were basically 
Bulgarian and Greek former-band leaders or, alternatively, members of the Christian 
revolutionary committees. In many cases, Moslem partisans were engaged in 
terrorist raids against Christian Macedonian villages on which they levied taxes and 
monetary contributions. 
In mid-November 1910, under the supervision of Merkez, kaimakam ofUskub, and 
the Captains of gendarmes Cemal Effendi and Aziz Effendi six Moslem Albanian 
bands were formed in Kosovo. In addition, in the first months of 1911, Moslem 
bands made their presence felt in Florina kaza of the Monastir vila yet. 
The real center of the Moslem Macedonian band activity however was the province 
of Salonica, especially the kaza of Langada. The Young Turk kaimakam of Langada 
kaza Celal Bey backed by the local chief of police Salih Effendi had organized by the 
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end of 1910 a strong force of 200 Moslem partisans. This large detachment, led by 
brigands such as Hasan Tsaouch, Kadi Moustafa, Veli Ferhad, Hussein Pehlivan and 
Mehmet Pardo, carried out inroads on Bulgarian and Greek villages, intimidated the 
local populations and assassinated Greek and Bulgarian former-band leaders.41 
By completing the armament of the Moslem Macedonian popUlation and supporting 
the underground activities of the Moslem bandits the Ottoman administration and the 
C.U.P. intended to thwart the resumption of Christian Macedonian revolutionary 
practice, stir the national sentiment of the Moslem Macedonians and either eliminate 
the Bulgarian and Greek political agitators or force them to leave Macedonia.42 
All in all, the formation of Moslem bands was not only an implicit manifestation on 
the part of the Unionist Committee of its evident inability to contain the 
recrudescence of Christian Macedonian revolutionary action. More importantly, it 
was an indisputable indication of the C.U.P. being transformed into a nationalist 
organization never hesitant to use lawless means to achieve its political ends and 
implement its 'Ottomanization' policy. The new Unionist practice had far-reaching 
consequences for the Macedonian question. It led to the aggravation of the Albanian 
question and the encouragement of the inter-Balkan rapprochement. Its most 
immediate aftermath, though, was the recrudescence of Christian-Macedonian 
revolutionary activity. 
8.4 Resumption of Christian-Macedonian Revolutionary Activity 
The worsening conditions in Macedonia and the Ottoman attempts to denationalize 
and intimidate the Christian populations led to the reactivation of the Macedonian 
bands. By mid-summer 1910, Bulgarian partisan units had resumed their propaganda 
activities in the Rumelian provinces. Headed by the well-known Bulgarian voevodas 
Alexandrov, Tsausov, Apostol and Tsemopeev the Bulgarian comitadjis were active 
41 During October and November 1910, 8 Macedonian Greeks had been ~ed by Moslem bands. 
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in the districts of Ishtip, Monastir, Y enidje-Vardar and Strumnitsa.43 The Bulgarian-
Macedonian bands exerted pressure on the Macedonians to retain their aIlllS, 
attacked Moslem Macedonian immigrants and carried out bomb outrages against key 
Turkish railways and governmental buildings. As far as the Committee was 
concerned, the recrudescence of paramilitary propaganda had been instigated by 
Bulgaria. In late August 1910, in the Tanin, Hussein Cahit openly accused the 
Bulgarian government of extending fmancial and material assistance to the M.R.O. 
bands through the Bulgarian consular establishments in Macedonia.44 To make 
matters worse for the Ottoman Macedonian authorities, Sandanski had refused to 
comply with the Ottoman orders and disarm his Serres militia. According to Sofia, 
the Macedonian leader controlled a small army of2,000-3,000 well-trained men, who 
were fully capable of provoking serious disturbances in the northern districts of the 
Serres sanjak.45 In mid-March 1911, the British agent in Monastir, Geary, reported 
that the clandestine armament of the local Bulgarian population continued and 
according to his information, in the province of Monastir alone "there were 20,000 
rifles in Bulgarian hands." By the summer of 1911, 20 Bulgarian bands were active 
in the three Macedonian vilayets. Meanwhile, Greek bands resumed paramilitary 
operations in the province of Salonica and southern Epirus, under Xanthopoulos, 
Tsekouras, Bellos, Tsoudodimos (Salonica vilayet), captain Firtinas and Potetsis 
(Epirus).46 
The most important characteristic of the Christian revolutionary activity nevertheless 
was that the bands, particularly the Bulgarian and Greek, refrained from attacking 
each other. In certain cases, they agreed to coordinate operations against the 
Ottoman regime.41 Throughout the autumn the situation became more grave. In the 
first week of December 1911, a series of bomb explosions disturbed Macedonia. On 
3 December 1911, a M.R.O. bomb exploded in a Moslem mosque in Ishtip killing 4 
43 P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/l 0-8-191 OlLamb 
to Lowther 
44 F.O. 88119860 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./3-9-1910/no.622/Lowther to Grey 
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47 Refer to chapter 1 O. 
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Moslems and wounding 4 others. During Moslem reprisals, 28 Bulgarians were 
killed and more than 100 were injured.48 
The "politics of terror", which was intended to bring about European intervention, 
was practiced once more at a full scale level, pushing Macedonia into chaos. 
48 P.RO. F.O. 195/2382 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Co~~ulate of Salo~cal5-12-191 ,1;~OU~1 
to Lamb, P.RO. F.O. 195/2382 General Consulate of Salomca to Constantmople Embassy 4- L-
1 91 I/Lamb to Lowther 
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CHAPTER IX 
THE ALBANIAN-TURKISH RIFT. FROM THE DISTURBANCES OF 1909 
TO THE REVOLTS OF 1911-1912 
9.1 From Diber to Elbassan. Deepening the Turco-Albanian Rift 
The spring of 1909 found the Albanian Macedonian districts in a state of insurrection 
and political turmoil. The Albanian Kosovars refusing to abandon their traditional 
privileges and conform to the Constitutional provisions for general tax-payment and 
conscription had risen against the Ottoman authorities in Jakova, Mitrovitsa, Ipek 
and Diber. In April 1909, the Ottoman government sent a strong force under Lt.-
General Cavit Pasha to put down the Albanian insubordination and restore order in 
the region. 1 
While the army of Cavit Pasha marched into northern Macedonia to face the rebels 
events in Constantinople complicated the Albanian problem. Although a number of 
Constantinople Albanians had supported the liberals of Ismail Kemal Bey in their 
anti-Young Turk movement the Macedonian Albanians remained perfectly passive. 
On 22 April 1909, when it became evident that the Unionist forces would emerge 
victorious a delegation of Uskub Albanians, who had been concerned about the 
future of the Sultan and their compatriots in the capital, met with the Young Turk 
Committee in Salonica. Having received assurances on the part of the C.U.P. that 
neither the Sultan's life nor the personal safety of those Albanians who did not 
participate in the movement was in danger the U skub Albanians and the Committee 
agreed to include in the Salonica C.C. cadres from the provinces of Monastir and 
Kosovo. 2 
If the Young Turks were inclined to avoid taking preventive measures against those 
liberal Albanians who had abstained from the counterrevolution that was not the case 
1 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonical8-4-1909/Satow to 
Lamb. For information on Cavit Pasha's military operations see: I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-
AlGeneral Consulate of Salonical1 O/23-5-1909/no.370IPapadiamantopoulos to Baltazzis 
2 P.RO. F.O. 195/2328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/25-l-1909/Lamb 
to Lowther 
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for those who had been actively engaged in it. The C.D.P. suspected that the leading 
figure of the Liberals Ismail Kemal Bey, who had fled to Greece to save his life, 
might try to incite an Albanian movement against the Committee in the province of 
Janina whence his political influence remained strong. To avert a second Albanian 
insurrection, this time in Epirus, the Salonica Committee apparently induced the 
president of the Salonica Albanian club Midhat Frasheri Bey to address a telegram to 
the Albanian political societies in Berat (Ismail Kemal Bey's constituency), Elbassan, 
Avlona and Argirokastro discouraging them from giving their support to local or 
foreign agitators. 3 
In the meantime, Cavit Pasha's troops were unable to overcome the strong 
opposition of the Albanian insurgents in the mountainous districts of Jakova, Ipek 
and Diber. The unsuccessful outcome of Cavit's military operations in Macedonia in 
conjunction with the conciliatory policy of the vali of Monastir Fahri Bey and many 
Albanian deputies (in particular the influential Hasan Bey Prishtina) forced the 
Ottoman administration to moderate its attitude toward the Albanian insurgents. In 
mid-May 1909, the Ottoman Cabinet withdrew Cavit Pasha's army to southern 
Macedonia and entered in talks with the Albanian leaders. 
Constantinople authorized the vali of Monastir Fahri Bey to conduct these 
negotiations and he succeeded in concluding a besa with the Albanian Kosovar tribes 
persuading them to remain peaceful for the next three months. Fahri Bey estimated 
that in this period he could either reach a thorough understanding with the Albanians 
putting an end to their grievances or, if diplomacy failed, reorganize the Ottoman 
forces as to undertake more effectively a second campaign in northern Macedonia.4 
The Albanians of Kosovo, on the other hand, had plans of their own. The punitive 
military expedition of Cavit Pasha and his repressive methods against the insurgents 
had aroused the Albanian population and stiffened its opposition to the Ottoman 
regnne. On 10 July 1909, the leaders of the Albanian Kosovar tribes met in the 
district of Jakova and affirmed that Turkey's Albanian policy was most 
unsatisfactory. More significantly, the Albanian tribesmen declared that the Ottoman 
3 P.RO. F.O. 19512328 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/26-4-1909/Lamb 
to Lowther 
4 P.RO. F.O. 195/2329 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/22-5-1909/Geary to 
Lowther 
The Turco-Albanian Rift 
--------------------------_____________________ 187 
adnrinistration's practice of dealing with the Albanian question by military means had 
alienated Albanian sympathies from the Young Turk Committee and had added to the 
gravity of the situation. Denouncing the chiefs who had yielded to the army of Cavit 
Pasha the Kosovar leadership agreed to resist, even by force, any attempt on the part 
of the central government to resume its Macedonian military operations. 5 
To dinrinish the anti-Unionist movement in the Albanian districts of Macedonia and 
further its political program in the region, the Young Turk Committee organized an 
Ottoman Albanian Constitutional Congress in Diber on 23 July 1909. Representing 
all Albanian races, 315 delegates from the vilayets of Salonica, Monastir, Kosovo, 
Janina, Scutari attended its proceedings. The critical point of the Diber Congress 
was the formation of a Commission that supported the Unionist political positions 
and, despite firm opposition from Albanian nationalists, passed 'primary' and 
'secondary' resolutions favorable to the C.U.P. regime and its Albanian strategy.6 
The 'primary' resolutions referred to: a reassurance on the part of the Albanians that 
they would avoid working for the establishment of an autonomous Albanian 
province; the Albanian national bid to uphold the Constitutional regime; Albanian 
concurrence that the Ottoman Constitution was totally compatible with the Islamic 
religion; Albanian recognition of the Ottoman right to put the Albanian military 
contingents under the control of the Ministry of War and sent them to serve 
whenever required, in case the Ottoman Empire faced a foreign military menace; the 
Albanian undertaking to supply the necessary military forces for the suppression of 
any internal secessionist movement; the pledge of the Albanian tribesmen to conform 
with the institution and implementation of the Conscription Law in their lands. 
The 'secondary' resolutions called for: the construction of railways in the Albanian 
regions to end their geographical isolation and contribute to the improvement of local 
economic and living conditions; the establishment of Moslem educational institutions 
in Albania with the task of developing the Moslem religious consciousness and 
traditions; the use of Latin or Turkish alphabet in Albanian schools; the establishment 
5 P.R.o. F.O. 195/2329 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate ofSalonical16-7-190Q'Satow to 
Lamb 
6 Exploiting the large number of Albanian delegates, the C.U.~. set about the n?min.a?on of ~ :unall 
number of delegates in the Commission (8 from each vilayet). This dispOSItIOn facilitated 
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of a Moslem University in Albania; the obligation of the Ottoman military authorities 
to designate in time the specific number and classes of the Albanian recruits as to 
ensure regular conscription; the appointment of public functionaries in Albanian 
provinces with good knowledge of Albanian traditions and culture; the settlement of 
the frontier dispute between the Ottoman Empire and Montenegro; the extraction of 
the Albanian and Vlach Orthodox Christians from the jurisdiction of the Ecumenical 
Patriarchate and their subordination to the Ministry of Education; the formation of 
"mixed commissions" in the main Albanian and Macedonian provincial centers similar 
to the Salonica Ligue de Paix et d' Entente (League of Peace and Entente).7 
In Diber, the Unionist Committee won an undisputed political victory. It is clear that 
the Committee managed to obtain this manifestation of unity between Young Turks 
and Albanians at a price of a few promises on the subject of Albanian education. 
Among them, the most significant was the Young Turk pledge to set up educational 
institutions in the Albanian regions and allow the use of Latin alphabet in the 
Albanian schools. On the other hand, the Albanian tribesmen had made far more 
important concessions. They consented not to raise the question of Albanian 
autonomy and support the Constitutional regime. Stressing the threat from Slavic 
and Greek expansionism the Committee had also persuaded the Albanians to comply 
with the new conscription regulations. In sum, in Diber the C.U.P. had shown that 
the fundamental element in its Albanian policy was to prevent Albanian self-
government, maintain the Albanian provinces within European Turkey and extract 
from the Albanian people taxes and troops to combat the Slavic and Greek 
irredentism in southern Balkans. 
Yet, Young Turk satisfaction at the success in Diber was short-lived. Within less 
than a month after the Diber Congress, the tension between the northern Albanian 
tribes and the local Ottoman Macedonian authorities resurfaced, when 8,000 
Albanians gathered in Ferisovic to demand the release of Izza Boletini and other 
7 The Ligue de Paix et d' Entente was set up in Salonica by Faik Bey, a Young Turk ~pporter, ~th 
the aim to work for the unity and welfare of the various nationalities in Macedoma. On Diber 
resolutions: LA.Y.E.! 191 O/File AAK-IE>/Monastir Consulate/29/ll-8-l909/no.596/Oimaras to 
Kallergis/General Resolutions of the Ottoman Albanian Constitutional Congress in Diber, P.Ro. 
F.o. 195/2329 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/30-7-1909/Geary to Lo\\ther. P.RO. 
F.O. 195/2329 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/4-8-l909/Geary to Lowther, P.RO. 
F.O. 195/2329 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/6-8-l909/Lamb to 
Lowther 
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Albanian chieftains, who had been arrested during the Kosovar uprising. Certain 
conciliatory attempts made by the mutessarif of Prishtina met with failure and the 
continuous Albanian upheaval brought the region back to the state of unrest and 
disorder. In mid-August, therefore, the army of Cavit Pasha was again ordered to 
advance into northern Macedonia. Determined to pacify the region and gain for 
himself the title of 'conqueror of Albania' Cavit Pasha launched ferocious attacks in 
Kosovo destroying many villages and repressing the Albanian population.8 The 
incessant Albanian Macedonian disturbances and the second military campaign of 
Cavit Pasha in Kosovo indicated that the alleged Turco-Albanian solidarity, so keenly 
declared by the C.U.P. in Diber, had been shattered. 
It was under these conditions that the Albanian nationalists held a Congress in 
Elbassan between 2 and 8 September 1909. In the Elbassan Congress, Christian 
representatives from Albania, Epirus and Macedonia participated while the Albanian 
Moslems refused to attend. The chief purpose of the Congress was to promote unity 
between the different Albanian tribes and creeds, primarily between the Christian 
Orthodox and the Roman Catholics, and work for the cultural and educational 
development of the Albanian people. 
Since in the minds of the Albanian leadership the cultural affirmation of the Albanian 
people was pivotal in its struggle for national emancipation, the Congress busied 
itself with the questions of the Albanian language and education. In regard to the 
first issue, the delegates selected the Elbassan dialect as the most suitable basis for 
the elaboration of a "common Albanian language". This was to some extent a symbol 
of Albanian unity, since the district of Elbassan was located in the middle of the 
Albanian lands and its dialect was equally known to the Christian Orthodox and 
Catholics. On the issue of education, the Congress resolved to establish a Teachers 
Academy in Elbassan. The Academy would educate and produce Albanian teachers, 
who would be employed in Albanian schools. A Koritsa-based Commission 
(Perparimi) was also appointed to raise funds for the operation of the Elbassan 
Academy. The Albanian political association of Monastir, which was recognized by 
the delegates as the central headquarters of the Albanian associations, undertook to 
8 P.RO. F.O. 195/2329 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/2.+-8-1909/Lamb 
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"introduce the Albanian language in all Albanian schools".9 The Elbassan Congress 
revealed certain key features of the Albanian national struggle. First, the Albanian 
movement suffered from a striking lack of unity and the process of national 
awareness had not made the same progress among the various Albanian tribes and 
creeds. The refusal of the Albanian Moslems even to attend the Congress and the 
anxiety of the Albanian leadership to mend the rift between the Christian Orthodox 
and Catholics provided enough evidence to that effect. In addition, during the 
Congress it became visible that although the Orthodox Albanians, the educated 
Mirdites and the Roman Catholics of Scutari in the southern and central Albanian 
regions had come to terms with the concept of Albanian nationalism, this did not 
seem to be the case with the isolated Albanian clans and the fanatical Moslems of the 
northern Albanian lands. Io Secondly, the Albanian nationalists began to estrange 
themselves from the Unionist Committees and their 'Ottomanization' policies. 
Encouraging the development of an independent Albanian language and inducing the 
gradual 'Albanization' of the educational system in the Albanian provinces, the 
Albanian nationalists demonstrated their opposition to their forcible 'Ottomanization' 
and at the same time reaffirmed their enduring resolve to construct a separate 
Albanian national identity. 
9.2 Radicalizing the Albanian question. The Insurrection of April 1910 and the 
Military Expedition of Tourgut Pasha 
The decision of the Albanian patriotic leadership in Elbassan to work for the cultural 
affirmation of the Albanian people and the prolonged state of turmoil in the Albanian 
Macedonian districts concerned the Ottoman government. While the long-term aim 
of the Ottoman administration and the Unionist Committee on Albanian affairs 
remained the suppression of Albanian autonomist trends and the gradual 
"Ottomanization" of the Albanian provinces, their more immediate target was to 
prevent another Albanian insurrection and restore tranquillity and order in the region. 
9 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile D-4.31F0reign Office to Avlona Consulate/l8/l-1 0-1909/no.670 lJKallergis. to 
Nikakis, P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople EmbassyI23-9-1909/ ActIng 
vice-consul Matthews to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastir Consulate to Constantmople 
Embassy/6-1O-1909/Matthews to Lowther, SKENDI (1967, p.382) 
10 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/6-1O-1909/Matthews. to 
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To this end, the Ottoman Cabinet took energetic measures in the following months. 
By the end of 1909, in virtue of the laws on Association, Press and Bands, the 
Ottoman Macedonian authorities abolished the Albanian political clubs (the Monastir 
society continued to function under Unionist surveillance but it was precluded from 
becoming active in political affairs), suppressed the Albanian newspapers and, more 
importantly, initiated the disarmament of all Albanian tribes, save the Albanian 
clansmen bordering on Montenegro. 
The initiative of the Ottoman administration and the Unionist Committee in depriving 
the Albanian tribesmen of their ancient prerogative to carry arms stirred up great 
discontent among the entire Albanian people. They saw this act as an attempt of the 
Ottoman regime to attack their traditional rights and customary way of living. In 
February 1910, when the Unionists, supported by some Moslem Albanians, decided 
to introduce the Arabic rather than the Latin alphabet in all Albanian schools, 
Albanian indignation spilled over. ll In protest against the Unionist policy in Albania 
and, in particular, on the alphabet question two impressive Albanian demonstrations 
were held in the strongly nationalist centers of Koritsa and Elbassan during the last 
week 0 f February 1910.12 It is important that, for once, in the Koritsa and Elbassan 
rallies all Albanian races participated, including Moslem Albanians. This unusual 
display of unanimity between the different Albanian tribes and creeds indicated that 
C.U.P. influence on the Albanians had declined and the Albanian nation began to 
envisage the formation of a ''united front of opposition" to Ottoman authority.13 
The growth of anti-Turkish Albanian sentiment and the threat to the implementation 
of 'Ottomanization' in the Albanian provinces caused the Ottoman authorities to take 
alarm. In the second half of March 1910, the pro-Unionist vali of Kosovo Mazhar 
Bey submitted to the central Ottoman administration a project with his views and 
proposals on the Albanian problem. 
In order to restore order and pacify the Albanian districts, Mazhar Bey suggested that 
the Ottoman authorities should undertake to collect the taxes in arrears, register the 
II P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/18-2-1910iGeary to 
Lowther, I.A.Y.E.l191 01 AAK-IE>lMonastir Consulate/16/1-3-191 0/no.150/Dimaras to Kallergi.s 
12 Albanian attendance reached 12,000 in Koritsa and 7,000 in Elbassan. The c.u.P. trIed to 
organize a cOlmter-demonstration in Elbassan supportive of the Arabic alphabet, but this venture 
boiled down to an insignificant gathering of 300 Unionist sympathizers. 
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Albanian population, nullify the military use ofkules (fortified towers) and proceed to 
the conscription of Albanian recruits. To ensure the effective implementation of 
these measures and overcome any armed Albanian resistance, the civil authorities 
should be accompanied by a strong military force. In the end, Mazhar's project was 
accepted by the Ottoman State Council but disquieting news from Kosovo about a 
second Albanian insurrection moved Constantinople to precipitate its activities. I4 
By the end of March 1910, the situation in Kosovo had become very serious as the 
Albanian districts of Prishtina, Ipek and Prizren had revolted against Ottoman rule. 
The Albanian activists had also resumed their attacks on the local civil authorities and 
security forces. On 1 April, the mutessarif of Ipek Ismail Hakki Bey and the military 
commandant Major Rushdi Bey were ambushed and fired on by Albanian nationalists 
in Ipek. The attack, which resulted in the death of Rushdi Bey and the slight 
wounding ofHakki Bey, was only the prelude to the ensuing crisis. In the following 
three weeks, the Kosovar Albanians raised an army of several thousand men and 
marched towards the urban center of Prishtina to declare their forceful opposition to 
the state regulations on general tax-payment, conscription, general Albanian 
disarmament and the language question. Is The inability of the local Ottoman 
garrisons to face the Albanian insurgents forced the provincial administration of the 
Kosovo vilayet to put the districts of Ipek, Prishtina, and Prizren under martial law. 
In mid-April 1910, the Albanian insurrection spread across the Kosovo vila yet and it 
was evident that the Ottoman authorities had lost control of the situation. 
As the Hakki Pasha Cabinet, under pressure from the Unionist Committee, orgaillzed 
another campaign in Kosovo, on 14 April 1910, the Albanian notables assembled in 
Prishtina to coordinate their movement and designate their future activities. The 
product of the Prishtina convention was admittedly moderate. The Kosovars decided 
to appeal to His Majesty the Sultan stating that if the Ottoman government abolished 
martial law in the region, re-examined the question of Albanian taxation and 
pardoned the insurgents, they would lay down their arms and end the insurrection. 16 
14 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate ofSalonical19-4-1910/Hough 
to Lamb 
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Lowther 
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To these Albanian proposals the Ottoman administration turned a deaf ear. Resolute 
to stifle the Albanian armed resistance and promote the 'Ottomanization' of the 
Albanian people, the Ottoman political leadership had already transferred to Shevket 
Pasha's Ministry of War the authority and responsibility to solve the Albanian tangle. 
This development was a turning point in Turkey's Albanian strategy. By abandoning 
its traditional practice of understanding and collaboration with the Albanian element 
and fully militarizing the Albanian question, the Ottoman administration ruined the 
prospect of a Turco-Albanian collusion in Balkan affairs thereby paving the way for 
much more serious disturbances in the Albanian provinces in the near future. I7 
The Ottoman Ministry of War appointed General Tourgut Pasha commander-in-chief 
of the new Albanian military campaign with the mission to collect overdue taxes, 
carry out a census, impose military service, disarm the Albanian tribesmen and arrest 
all outlaws. I8 In the meantime, the Albanian Kosovars, who had been mobilizing the 
male population of Prizren and Jakova, mounted a force of 8,000 men, led by Idris 
Seferi Bey Ghilan, to face the superior "army of reforms" of Tourgut Pasha in the 
vital prizren-Ferisovic highroad. 
On 22 April 1910, the first major Turco-Albanian armed collision took place along 
the prizren-Ferisovic highroad. After a 24-hour fight, having failed to overcome the 
strenuous Albanian resistance, the Turkish troops withdrew with severe losses whilst 
a second Albanian contingent attacked the rear of the Turkish army in the Katsanik 
defile impairing its railway communication and supplies.
I9 
Despite these initial successes, the future of the Albanian Kosovar movement looked 
bleak so long as the insurrection did not spread to the Monastir vilayet and Albania 
proper. The powerful Monastir Albanians considered the April rising as an attempt 
on the part of the Kosovars to retaliate against the Turks for the punitive expeditions 
of Cavit Pasha in 1909. In any case, they were convinced that until the Great Powers 
17 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Sa Ionic a to Constantinople EmbassyIl7--l-1910/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonica!28--l-
1910/Hough to Lamb, P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople 
Embassyll 0-5 -19101Lamb to Lowther. See also note 16 
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recognized the C.U.P. misrule in Albania and Macedonia no Albanian revolutionary 
movement could succeed.20 In the Albanian mainland, the influential class of Beys, 
the only administrative and political authority capable of organizing an Albanian 
uprising, was still reluctant to endanger its privileged position in local affairs for a 
premature armed struggle against the Ottoman authorities with uncertain results. 21 
The failure ofTourgut's army to dislodge the Kosovars from their defensive positions 
and strike a decisive blow against the Albanian insurrection compelled the Minister of 
War Shevket Pasha to assume control of the situation. To supervise the conduct of 
military operations and deal with the Albanian insurgents Shevket Pasha went to 
Uskub on 9 May 1910.22 
In mid-May, Mahmud Shevket Pasha met with the Albanian notables of Prizren in the 
government building of that town. Surprisingly, in an attempt to compromise with 
the Albanians, Mahmud Shevket stressed that the state policy in Albania did not 
intend to attack the Albanian population but to terminate the state of lawlessness and 
pacify the region. Although no final agreement was reached in Prizren, the Albanian 
notables gave way on the questions of census, the surrender of outlaws like Izza 
Boletini and disarmament (in case of emergency the Ottomans were to return the 
arms to their Albanian owners). For his part, Shevket Pasha assured the Albanian 
delegation that the government would not increase Albanian taxation and -so the 
Prizren chiefs were led to believe- that he would conduct "an official, impartial 
enquiry respecting the state of Albanian affairs and the Albanian positions.,,23 
In parallel with the intervention of Shevket Pasha the Young Turks sought to exploit 
the aggravation of the Cretan question in order to divert the attention of Albanian 
public opinion and leadership from the Kosovar uprising to the Cretan convulsions.24 
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24 Following the Cretan elections of March 1910, a new Cretan Assembly wa~ fonned on 9 May. 
However, another political crisis erupted in the island when the Moslem deputIes. refused to follow 
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On 14 May 1910, the Salonica Committee organized a local open-air demonstration 
to protest for Greece's policy in Crete and the infringement of Ottoman sovereign 
rights in the island. On this occasion, the Salonica C.U.P. sent a telegram to the 
"mayors and ulema of Ipek, Prishtina, Jakova, Ghilan and Prizren." The Macedonian 
Unionists urged the "heroic and noble Albanian brethren not to occupy at this 
juncture the attention of the Government and the Army ( ... ), to incline their heads to 
the fit and proper demands of the Government ( ... ) and protect the sacred rights of 
the Fatherland. ,,25 
The apparently conciliatory attitude of Shevket Pasha and the Unionist manouevre to 
stir the patriotic sentiment of the Albanian people by pointing to the Cretan crisis 
appeased the Albanian Kosovars. Thus, even though an Albanian contingent 
remained in the district of Drenitza the Albanians from Ferisovic and Ljuma laid 
down their arms. The Albanian insurrection seemed to end as suddenly as it had 
started seven weeks before.26 
9.3 Turkish Repression in Albania 
At the end of May 1910, the Albanian insurrection had been practically terminated. 
On 1 June, the army of Tourgut Pasha occupied the Albanian stronghold of Jakova, 
forcing those tribes that had not given up the struggle to retire in the mountainous 
districts of western Jakova. As soon as the uprising ended and the Turkish troops 
re-established Ottoman military and civil authority in the rebellious districts, the 
Albanians began to fear that they had been deceived by Shevket Pasha's promises and 
the Unionist manifestations of Turco-Albanian racial solidarity. 
In fact, the Ottoman regime had little sympathy for Albanian claims on the questions 
of education, language, taxation, conscription, the construction of railways, 
improvement of communal infrastructure and amelioration of living conditions in the 
Albanian provinces. On the contrary, aspiring to crush the last enclaves of Albanian 
armed resistance and eliminate the menace of another Albanian revolt next spring, the 
25 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyIl5-5-191 O/Lamb 
to Lowther 
26 P.RO. F.O. 195/2357 General Consulate of Sa Ionic a to Constantinople EmbassyIl8-5-1910/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 Uskub Vice-Conculate to General Consulate of Salonica/ 18-5-
1910/Hough to Lowther 
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Ottoman administration went on to practice a repressive and nationalist anti-Albanian 
policy. 
During the first week of June, Tourgut Pasha initiated the full-scale disarmament of 
the Albanian tribes and launched a real pogrom against the Albanian notables and 
Beys. Proclaiming martial law in the rebellious districts and using brutal measures 
the troops of Tourgut Pasha took possession of 20,000 rifles and arrested a 
considerable number of Albanian leaders. The most prominent amongst them. Haci 
Musa Mustaphitch, the bairaktar of Orahovitsa, (he had a reputation of being a close 
associate of Izza Boletini) and the president of the Uskub Albanian club Bekir 
Suleiman Effendi, were sent to the Ferisovic court-martiaL27 In July and August, the 
Ottoman administration radicalized its Albanian attitude. Whilst a strong force under 
Shevki Pasha and Osman Pasha continued military operations in the districts of 
Ljuma and Diber to liquidate the last Albanian insurgents, the Ottoman Cabinet 
suppressed the remaining Albanian journals and educational institutions. In the ftrst 
half of July, the Ottoman authorities, on account of the initiative of the Monastir 
Albanian journal Baskim I Kombit (Union and Nation) to publish a strongly anti-
Unionist article, outlawed the Baskim and sent the influential ex-president of the local 
Albanian club Fehim Bey Zavalani to the court-martial ofUskub, inflaming Albanian 
public opinion in Monastir and Elbassan.28 
To make matters worse, the Ottoman government banned the teaching of the 
Albanian language in public schools. But the anti-Turkish sentiment of the Albanian 
population culminated in August, when the Monastir provincial administrative council 
ordered the closing of Albanian educational institutions in Koritsa and Elbassan, 
including the Teachers' Academy and the Perparimi. 
Outlining the Albanian approach respecting the Unionist policy in Albania a Catholic 
Albanian wrote in Kortsa, an Albanian nationalist organ, in the first week of August: 
"The Young Turk government, instigated by chauvinist and nationalist ideas, has 
embarked upon a repressive policy against those ethnic groups which are not 
27 P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 General Consulate ofSalonica to Constnatinople Embassy/-l-6-1910/Lamb 
to Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonical8-6-
19101H0ugh to Lamb 
28 P.RO. F.O. 195/2358 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/6-7-191 O/Geary to Lowther 
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Turkish. Inasmuch as the Albanians are included in that category, the Ottoman 
administration decided to wipe out the Albanian nation and name. The new ideas and 
policy of the Turkish Cabinet became clear as soon as its members demonstrated in 
the Ottoman Chamber their hostile tendencies on questions such as the Albanian 
alphabet, the Albanian education and language, the prohibition of Albanian societies 
and the removal of Albanian civil servants and administrative cadres from Albania. 
Lately, in order to totally subdue the Albanian people and promote Turkish 
chauvinism the Ottoman administration has attempted to denationalize southern and 
destroy northern Albania. ,,29 
In the autumn, in order to strike the last decisive blow to the Albanian movement the , 
Ottoman government ordered Tourgut Pasha's army to march towards Scutari 
vilayet. During its advance across the Albanian hinterland the Ottoman expeditionary 
force devastated a considerable number of Albanian villages and relentlessly 
persecuted the Albanian leadership, forcing the peasant Albanian popUlation to seek 
refuge in the hills. In an explicit effort to humiliate the class of Albanian Beys the 
troops arrested thirty Beys in Tirana and drove them in chains to Elbassan. By mid-
October, Tourgut Pasha's "army of reforms" entered the provincial capital of Scutari 
terminating its military operations in Albania. 30 
Although a success from the military point of view, on political grounds, the Albanian 
campaign of Tourgut Pasha amounted to a complete failure. Young Turk policy of 
militarizing the Albanian question, repressing the Albanian population, persecuting its 
natural leadership and "devastating instead of developing a part of their own 
Empire", poisoned Turco-Albanian relations and created an irreconcilable racial and 
political schism between the Ottoman regime and the Albanian people. 
Indeed, if Cavit Pasha's campaigns in 1909 had undermined the basis 0 f the Turco-
Albanian collaboration, the punitive expedition of Tourgut Pasha put the last nail in 
the coffin of the traditional understanding between the two ethnic groups. 
Henceforth, the Albanians would attempt to coordinate their struggle for national 
29 Cited in I.A.Y.E.l191OIFile AAK-IE>IMonastir Consulate/27/9-8-1910/no.674IDimaras to 
Kallergis/enclosure no.2. See for details I.A.Y.E.l191OIFile AAK-KlMonastir ConsulateI12~25-8-
191O/no.727IDimaras to Kallergis, F.O. 881/9860 Monastir Consulate to ConstantInople 
Embassy/3-9-191O/no.41/Geary to Lowther, SKENDI (1967, pp.388-9) 
30 P.R.O. F.O. 195/2359 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople EmbassyI11-10-19J()lGeary to 
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assertiveness with the anti-Turkish policies of the Balkan Christian countries. As 
Edith Durham, a British journalist with experience in Albanian affairs, remarked 
"since September 1910, the Albanians vowed to give neither men nor money to help 
keep the Turks in Europe.,,31 Furthermore, the Ottoman military operations in 
Albania convinced the Moslem Albanians, who so far had regarded the Albanian 
national movement with reticence, if not antipathy) that the Turco-Albanian 
coexistence was an impossibility. The only way for the preservation of the Albanian 
race now lay in an understanding between the Albanian Moslems and Christians. 
From this standpoint, paradoxically, the campaign of Tourgut Pasha contributed to 
the unification of the Albanian people and propelled the process of Albanian nation-
bUilding. 32 
9.4 Albanian Exodus to Montenegro and the Revolutionary Activity of the 
Albanian Central Committee 
The conclusion of Tourgut Pasha's military campaIgn ill October 1910 left the 
Albanian lands in a state of devastation and terror. The cattle, homes and properties 
of the local Albanian tribes had been destroyed by the troops or confiscated by the 
authorities. Since mid-October, to escape Turkish oppression and demonstrate their 
hostility to the Ottoman regime, the Albanian Malissor tribes33 Hotti, Gruda, Skreli, 
Retsi, Ura Streit Shiala, Klementi, Kastrati began to flee to neighboring 
Montenegro.34 
Montenegro, which had been fostering expansionist designs on the vilayet of Scutari, 
did not refuse to provide sanctuary to the Malissor refugees. The Montenegrin King 
Nicholas discerned in the flight of the Albanian tribes, which were used by the 
Ottoman government as frontier guardians against Montenegrin aggressiveness, a 
31 P.RO. F.O. 371/1228/03467 Cairo to General Consulate ofTrieste/3-3-1911IDurham to Spence 
32 I. A. Y.E.l191 OlFile AAK -K/ Argirokastro Consulate/2/15-9-1910/no.390IHalkiopoulos to 
Kaliergis, I. A. Y.E.l191 OlFile AAK-JE>I Argirokastro Consulate/20/2-8-191 0/no.24 71Halkiopoulos to 
Kaliergis, F.O. 881/9860 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/3-G-1910/no . ..l1/Geary to 
Lowther, P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/11-10-1910/Geary 
to Lowther 
33 The Catholic Matissor tribes resided between lake Skodra and the frontier with Montenegro. 
34 P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/12- 10-
1910lLamb to Lowther. It is interesting that the Albanian Malissors, when they were told that "if 
they fled to Montenegro they would have to pay taxes and give military service thl'IC replied that 
tlley would pay taxes to anyone who is against the Turks." P.RO. F.O. 3711l22S i 03-l67 CalIo to 
General Consulate ofTrieste/3-3-1911IDurham to Spence 
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clear chance to reconcile with the Albanians and weaken Ottoman defense in the 
regIOn. Reasonably, the presence of many thousand Albanian tribesmen in 
Montenegrin territory aggravated the climate between Cettigne and Constantinople. 
During the last two months of 1910, the Ottoman government, supported by the 
Austrian legation in Cettigne, exerted pressure on the Montenegrin Cabinet to 
support Albanian repatriation. Moreover, in an attempt to lure the Malissors to 
return in their homes, the Ottoman authorities pledged to reduce Albanian taxation 
on military service, appoint non-Moslem officials in the Catholic Albanian 
departments and compensate the Albanian clansmen for their damaged and 
confiscated properties.35 
It was the combined Ottoman and Austrian diplomatic pressure and the inability of 
the Montenegrin Cabinet to assume the heavy economic cost of maintaining such a 
large number of refugees in the country that induced Montenegro to force the 
Albanian tribes to return in their lands. As a consequence, in mid-December 1910, 
the tribes of Rotti, Gruda, Kastrati had been repatriated but the powerful Klementi 
clansmen remained in Montenegro dismissing the Ottoman assurances.36 From 
Montenegrin territory, those recalcitrant Albanians communicated to the Ottoman 
government a memorandum with their demands, stressing that before Constantinople 
met them they would not return to Albania. Having expressed their profound 
dissatisfaction with Turkey's Albanian policy, the Albanian mountaineers demanded: 
general amnesty for all Albanian political convicts; freedom for Albanian education, 
press, language and alphabet; re-opening of Albanian schools; all state officials 
appointed in Albania to be ethnic Albanians; public revenues from Albanian taxation 
to be invested in Albania for construction of roads, railways, etc.; encouragement to 
foreign investments in Albania and establishment of commercial, agricultural 
institutions and Agricultural Bank.37 
The situation in the southern Albanian lands was equally explosive. The campaign of 
Tourgut Pasha and the massive Albanian exodus to Montenegro had roused the local 
Albanian communities affording the Albanian C. C. the opportunity to accelerate its 
3) P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/28-12-
1910/Lamb to Marling 
36 Ibid. 
37 P.RO. F.O. 195/2359 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople EmbassyIl8-12-1910/Geary to 
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underground activities from its revolutionary strongholds of Koritsa and Elbassan. 
Indeed, following the suppression of the Kosovar uprising, the Albanian C.c.. while 
consistently working for the unification of the Albanian Moslem and Christian tribes. 
started to lay the groundwork for a general Albanian revolt against Ottoman rule. 
Aspiring to mobilize the entire Albanian people for the forthcoming national struggle, 
by January 1911, the Albanian C.C. had elaborated the "Regulations for the 
formation of branches of the Committee throughout Albania". The Albanian 
nationalists seemed however hesitant to commence a new revolt immediately. 
Precedence should be given to the armament of the Albanian tribesmen from 
Austrian-held Bosnia and the sanjak as well as to the establishment of a thorough 
revolutionary network across the Albanian lands. At the same time, in an attempt to 
mount pressure on Young Turkey to meet its demands, the Albanian C. C. held secret 
negotiations with the Bulgarians and Greeks to coordinate their course of action 
against the Ottoman regime. 38 
9.5 The Malissors' Rising of March 1911 
Albanian plans for military reorganization and internal preparation were nevertheless 
to be annulled by the eruption of the Malissors insurrection in March 1911. On 25 
March, the Albanian Malissor tribes Rotti, Gruda, Kastrati. Klementi and Shiala, 
supported by Kosovars and a small number of Bulgarian partisans, organized a revolt 
in the province of Scutari. During the first skirmishes with the relatively small and 
badly-organized local Turkish garrisons, the Malissors were successful. Unable to 
offer any military resistance to the advancing insurgents the vali of Scutari Bedri 
Pasha mobilized the local Moslem population by circulating false rumors that a 
Montenegrin contingent had attacked the Turkish garrisons. Although this inept 
move on the part of Bedri Pasha almost provoked an armed collision between the 
Scutari Moslems and the Malissors it rendered the position of the vali untenable as 
soon as the Moslems found out that they had been sent to fight not Montenegrin 
invaders but Albanian rebels. 39 
38 P.RO. F.O. 195/2381 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople Embassy/6-5-191l/Geary to Lowther 
39 P.RO. F.O. 37111228/03467 Podgorica to General Consulate of Trieste/4-5-1911lDurham to 
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The Ottoman government, aware of the gravity of the Malissor movement, appointed 
Tourgut Pasha vali of Scutari and began to concentrate strong forces in the region. 
On 11 May 1911, Mahmud Tourgut Pasha called the Malissors to "lay down their 
arms in five days and obtain pardon" but the Malissor notables turned down the offer. 
It seems that the Malissor leadership still hoped that their rising might provoke an 
Albanian catholic revolt which would receive support from the neighboring Balkan 
states and Austria-Hungary. 
It is true that the Albanian C.C. had been working toward this direction. As soon as 
the Malissors rose, the Albanian nationalists urged the Moslem and Christian 
tribesmen to participate in the armed struggle and encouraged the Albanian Monastir 
Committee to organize revolutionary bands in the province. In the first week of May, 
the Albanian C.C. issued a declaration to "Public Opinion and the Young Turk 
Government" demanding the unification of the provinces ofScutari, Janina, Monastir, 
Kosovo in a single Albanian vilayet. 40 
Furthermore, since the beginning of May, the southern Albanian leaders Dr. Hakki 
Shemseddin Effendi of Koritza, Ibrahim Dervish Bey, Kiamil Bey and George Vissou 
had been disseminating the idea of an Albanian national movement among the Beys of 
Koritsa, Ko Ionia , Lesovic and the local Albanian o fficials. 41 In mid-June 1911, a 
strong southern Albanian band was formed under the leadership of Hakki Bordja and 
Vangelis Gjika and began its propaganda activity around the district of Koritsa. 
Soon, Albanian nationalist leaders like Themistoklis Germenji, a Christian from 
Koritsa and Spiros Bellkameni from Florina, organized new Albanian partisan units in 
the south. 
Meanwhile, the Albanian C.C. sought to obtain material and political support from 
Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia. Despite the favorable disposition of the Balkan states 
towards the anti-Turkish Albanian struggle no concrete agreement derived from these 
negotiations. 42 
It was less the accentuation of the Albanian question and more the visible threat of an 
Ottoman onslaught against Montenegro that caused Russian diplomatic intervention. 
40 P.RO. F.O. 195/2381 Monastir Consulate to Constantinople/6-5-191I1Geary to Lowther, P.R.O. 
F.O. 37111229/03467 Podgorica to General Consulate ofTrieste/26-5-19111Durham to Spence 
41 P.RO. F.O. 195/2382 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassyll-7-1911/Lamb 
to Marling 
42 Refer to chapter 1 O. 
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On 25 May 1911 the Russian government, perturbed by the transportation of 
unusually large Ottoman forces in the borders with Montenegro, threatened the Porte 
that if it attacked on Montenegro, it would have to face Russia. The Russian 
warning, coupled by the initiative of Austria-Hungary to advise the Ottoman Cabinet 
that "cooperation with Albania and not constant warfare should be the aim of a 
sensible Turkish policy", forced the Hakki Pasha Cabinet to adopt a more 
conciliatory attitude toward the Albanian insurgents. 43 
In June, the Ottoman administration and the Unionist Committee made a dual attempt 
to come to terms with the Albanians. Between 11 and 15 June, the Ottoman regime 
tried to use the Sultan's visit in Kosovo in order to stir the religious fanaticism of the 
Albanian people to the sacred person of the Sultan and demonstrate the indivisibility 
between the Turkish and Albanian element. To avoid Albanian convulsions during 
the Sultan's Macedonian visit the Grand Vizier Hakki Pasha informed the influential 
Albanian deputy Hasan Bey Prishtina that the Ottoman government" had resolved to 
reconcile the Albanians and take into consideration the great pending questions: 
language, taxation, conscription and the development of the country.,,44 
On 24 June 1911, the Ottoman minister in Montenegro Saadreddin Bey commenced 
negotiations with the Albanian Malissor leadership. In this first round of discussions, 
it became clear that the Ottoman Cabinet was disposed to grant important 
concessions to the insurgents, providing that they would terminate the rebellion and 
return to their lands. Initially, the Malissors faced the Ottoman peace offer with 
profound suspicion but they did not refuse to examine the Ottoman proposals. 
Finally, on 2 August 1911, under pressure from the Montenegrin Cabinet (Cettigne 
had been alarmed by the massive number of Albanian refugees),45 the Albanian 
Malissors concluded an agreement with Saadreddin Bey. The Ottoman concessions, 
43 KONDJS (1976, pp.52-3). By mid-June 1911,40,000 Turkish soldiers had been transported in 
the province of Scutari driving thousand Albanians to seek again refuge in Montenegro. P.RO. 
F.O. 37111229/03467 Podgorica to General Consulate ofTrieste/4-6-1911IDurham to Spence 
44 I.A.Y.E.l1910/File AAK-J8/Uskub ConsulateI29111-6-191l!no.179/Tzounis to Gryparis. 
I.A.Y.E.l1910/File AAK-J8/Uskub Consulate/7/20-6-191I1no.192/Tzounis to Gryparis. P.RO. F.O. 
195/2381 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonical 19-6-19111H0ugh to Lamb. 
P.RO. F.O. 195/2381 Uskub Vice-Consulate to General Consulate of Salonical26-6-191I1Hough to 
Lamb 
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which it is important to remember were restricted to the Malissor tribes only. were: 
amnesty; re-opening of Albanian schools with permission to use the Albanian 
language and the Latin alphabet; reduced taxation; exemption from disarmament; 
military service in Albania; economic reforms. 46 
The August agreement between the Ottoman government and the Albanians marked 
the end of the Malissors' insurrection but it did not settle the Albanian question. On 
the contrary, intensive preparations were being made by the Albanian C.C. and the 
Albanian tribesmen for a new armed confrontation with the Ottoman regime. On 28 
August, the Italian and Austrian agents in Avlona, Facentis and Kraous, expressed 
the opinion that a much more serious revolt would break out in Albania next spring.47 
9.6 The Albanian Revolt of 1912 
On 29 September 1911, Italy declared war on Ottoman Empire over Libya. Upon 
the commencement of hostilities in northern Africa, the Hakki Pasha Cabinet 
resigned. The new Said Pasha administration strove to cope with the crisis but this 
was a very demanding undertaking. The African war also rendered the position of 
the Committee more precarious. As a consequence of the establishment of the 
military regime and the implementation of the 'Ottomanization' policy, the C.U.P. 
had lost a considerable part of its influence on the military, the central government 
and the country as a whole. Adding to Unionist embarrassments, the Italian attack 
and invasion in Ottoman-held Libya exposed -for a second time since the Near East 
crisis of 1908- the Unionists' inability to fulfill their chief commitment: the protection 
of the territorial integrity of the Empire. 
To make matters worse, the Liberals strengthened their position in the interior. On 
21 November 1911, the party of Liberty and Entente was established (Hum~vet ve 
ltti/a! Firkasi). It was led by ex-Colonel Sadik. Damat Ferid, Riza TewfIk and Ismail 
Hakki Pasha. The Liberty and Entente lacked a clear political platform but. as it was 
successful in rallying all those discontented elements which opposed the Unionist 
46 P.R.O. F.O. 37111230/03467 Podgorica to General Consulate of Trieste/26-6-19111Durham to 
Spence" P.R.O. F.O. 37111231103474 Podgorica to General Consulate of TriestcI2-8-1 l)l II Durh am 
to Spence, I.A.Y.E.l1911IFile 21.8.lISofia Legationl27/9~8-19111no.979/Panas to 
Gryparis/enclosure: Bulletin of Bulgarian Telegraphic Agency from Cettlgne 2-.8~ 1911 . 
47 I.A.YE.l1911IFile 34.1.lIAvlona ConsulateI11124-8-19111no.399Naslhou to Gr\pans. 
LA. YE.l19111File 34.1.11 Avlona Consulate/291l1-9-19111no.430Nasiliou to Gryparis/Political 
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regime, it had assumed a predominantly anti-C.U.p. character. Its principal goal was 
to overthrow the C.U.P. regime and gain power.48 
A liberal victory at a by-election in Constantinople in December and the continuation 
of the African crisis forced the Unionists to resort to the ballot. In the electoral 
battle, the C.U.P. campaign was based on its predominance in the state apparatus as 
well as on intimidation, fraud and violence. As a result, Unionist representation in 
the Chamber managed to exceed 95%. On 18 April 1912, the new Chamber of 
Deputies began its proceedings. 49 
In Albania, meanwhile, things seemed to take an ominous turn for Constantinople as 
the Turco-Italian war had encouraged the Albanian nationalists. They felt that an 
Italian attack on Turkey-in-Europe could force the Ottoman administration to grant 
concessions to the entire Albanian people and further Albanian political aspirations. 
In particular, the Moslem Albanians of Kosovo demanded that the Said Pasha 
Cabinet extend to them all the prero gatives that had been conceded to the Malissors 
in August 1911. 
On 18 February 1912, to inspect regional conditions, to quiet Albanian grievances 
and elicit Albanian support for the C.U.P. in the elections, the Unionist Minister of 
the Interior Haci Adil Bey traveled to northern Macedonia and thence to the province 
of Scutari, heading a Reform Commission. This initiative coincided with 
governmental efforts to improve the communal infrastructure in certain Albanian-
inhabited districts. 
However, the mission of Haci Adil Bey yielded no practical results. Unable to come 
to terms with the local Malissor notables and refusing to meet the leader of the 
Mirdites Prenk Doda Pasha,50 the Unionist Minister failed to reach an understanding 
with local Albanians and "grasp the meaning of the Albanian question". In fact, while 
48 AHMAD (1969, pp.97-9) 
49 F.G. 881110280 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/17-4-1913/Lowther to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 1912/enclosure no. I. KAY ALI (1995, pp.265-286). . 
50 The Ottoman government suspected that Prenk Pasha nourished revolutIOnary t~ndenCles and 
therefore Haci Adil Bay declined to meet him. As a protest against the reluctance of the Otto~an 
Minister to see him, Prenk Pasha resigned from his position as the leading representatIve ot thl' 
Mirdites, rousing the anti-Ottoman sentiment of his fellow clansmen. Cons~quently. thl' Mmlitl's 
stated that they -and all other Christian tribes- "desired to sever all connectIOns W1~ th~ TurkIsh 
Parliament." See: P.RO. F.O. 37111481103474 Scutari to General Consulate of Tneste!3-4-
1912lDurham to Devinson 
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he was on his way back to Constantinople, a major Albanian revolt broke out in the 
Macedonian province ofKosovo.51 
On 3 May 1912,3,000 armed Moslem Albanians from the areas of Jakova and Ipek 
attacked local Ottoman troops demanding equal rights with the Malissor tribes. 
Three weeks later, the movement had spread in Mitrovitsa and Uskub. But worse 
was yet to come for the Ottoman Cabinet and the Committee. As the Albanian 
attacks on the Ottoman authorities escalated in Macedonia, an underground 
organization, the "Savior Officers", was coming into being in Constantinople. Their 
aim was to end military interference in Ottoman political affairs and restore a 
legitimate form of government. In essence, this group operated as the military wing 
of the liberal opposition and had sympathizers in the Macedonian army.52 
Apparently, it was this secret group that instigated a series of military mutinies in the 
Macedonian army. On 29 May, military desertions occurred at Ferisovic and by the 
end of June 1912, a large contingent of the 49 th Monastir Regiment, headed by Tayar 
Bey, abandoned its barracks and united with the Albanian insurgents. This series of 
mutinies caused great disarray in the Macedonian army, undermining the Ottoman 
authorities' attempts to deal with the Kosovar rising, which, in the meantime, had 
spilled over into the southern and western regions of Albania. In mid-June 1912, 
Mirdites and Malissor tribesmen joined the Albanian movement. On 21 June, these 
forces trapped an entire Turkish division in north-western Albania and marched 
toward Scutari. 
These serious developments in Macedonia and Albania rendered the position of the 
Said Pasha Cabinet untenable. On 17 July 1912, Said Pasha resigned and four days 
later a new, pro-liberal Cabinet was formed under Gazi Ahmet Muhtar Pasha. The 
Ottoman attempt to mollify Albanian public opinion by sending a Commission to the 
region to explore the Albanian demands was too little and too late. 
51 F.O. 881110280 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l17-4-19131L0\\'ther to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 1912/enclosure no. 1. P.Ro. F.o. 37111481113474 Scutari to General Consulate 
of TriesteI14-3-1912IDurham to Spence. See also previous note. 
52 Later, the British Embassy in Constantinople reported certain rumors, according. to which the pro-
liberal Macedonian officers had entered into negotiations with the leader of the M.R.O. Matov. 
However, I did not find any evidence supportive to this claim. F.O. 881/10280 Constantmople 
Embassy to F.O.l17-4-1913lLowther to Grey/Annual Report on Turkey for the Year 1912/enclosurc 
no. 1 , AHMAD (1969, p.l 06) 
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On 29 July 1912, the united Albanian mainland tribes demanded from the Sublime 
Porte the establishment of an Albanian autonomous province in the provinces of 
Janina, Scutari and the Albanian-inhabited western sanjaks ofKosovo and Monastir. 53 
An independent Albanian National Assembly was to be set up to deal with local 
pro blems and fmancial affairs. 
On 9 August 1912, the Moslem Kosovars presented their own package of demands in 
a 14-point programme. It claimed: recognition of an Albanian nationality; creation of 
a united Albanian vila yet to be governed by a devolved administrative system in 
conform with local necessities; senior officials appointed in Albania were to be either 
ethnic Albanians or persons with a good knowledge of the area, the language and the 
people; judicial, civil and economic public functionaries to be ethnic Albanians; 
freedom to apply customary law in the Albanian districts; Albanian military service to 
take place in Albania; introduction of Albanian language in local schools; freedom to 
carry arms; the impeachment of the Hakki Pasha and Said Pasha Cabinets for their 
Albanian policies; dissolution of Chamber of Deputies and holding of new elections. 54 
The Ottoman Cabinet did not reply instantly and the Albanian-Macedonian tribesmen 
marched into Prizren and Uskub. By mid-August 1912, these towns had fallen into 
Albanian hands and the insurgents had established their position throughout northern 
Macedonia and the Albanian mainland, threatening to advance on Salonica should the 
government fail to comply with their demands. On 18 August 1912, the Ottoman 
administration gave way. The Sublime Porte accepted the Albanian demand for the 
establishment of a united Albanian autonomous province in the vilayets of Janina, 
Scutari and the western sanjaks of Mona stir and Kosovo. 
To the Christian Balkan states, the establishment of a strong Albanian province in 
areas which they coveted was unacceptable. It was the threat of losing these regions 
to the Albanians that spurred the Balkan states to precipitate their activities and 
resort to the use of force against the Porte. This exhibition of inter-Balkan solidarity 
and strong resolve was neither spontaneous nor circumstantial. It was the product of 
a long process of reconciliation and agreement between Bulgaria, Serbia, 
53 KONDIS (1976, pp.7--l-5) 
54 VLACHOS (1954, pp.223-4) 
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Montenegro and Greece~ a process which had started as early as the spring of 1909 
under the aegis of Russia. 
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CHAPTER X 
THE EMERGENCE OF THE BALKAN LEAGUE. ITS ORIGINS AND 
ESTABLISHMENT 
Russia had emerged from the Near East crisis humiliated with her Balkan prestige at 
an extremely low ebb. To raise its influence among the Slav Balkan countries, to 
prevent Austrian expansionism in Macedonia and secure its interests in the Straits the 
Imperial Russian government decided to encourage a political understanding 
between the Slav Balkan countries with a view to create a Balkan Alliance. Although 
a similar scenario had been advocated by Russia and England during the Balkan crisis 
as the ideal barrier to Austria,l at present the Russians did not seem to have any 
clear-cut ideas as to what would be the most pertinent way to bring about this 
combination. 
On the question of the Balkan League, two trends were apparent within the circles of 
the Russian F. O. The first trend, favored by Prime Minister Stolypin and the assistant 
Foreign Minister Charikov, urged the advisability of a close collaboration between 
the Balkan Slavs and the Ottoman Empire. The second current, which was expressed 
by Foreign Minister Izvolsky and senior diplomats like Sementovski-Kurillo and 
Hartwig, considered this impracticable and supported the establishment of a Balkan 
Slav Alliance, in which Greece could also participate, excluding Turkey? 
Temporarily, the views of the Russian Foreign Minister seemed to prevail and from 
the second half of spring 1909 the implementation of this scheme was to become one 
of the principal considerations of Russia's Balkan policy. 
10.1 Building a Serbo-Bulgarian Entente in 1909 
In the original Russian project for a Balkan Alliance the fundamental element was an 
understanding between Serbia and Bulgaria. In the spring of 1909, Serbo-Bulgarian 
relations were far from good. The dispute over the Macedonian provinces of Kosovo 
and Monastir and the paramount impression in Belgrade that throughout the 
1 Refer to chapters 5 and 7. 
~ ROSSOS (1981. pp.8-16), lELA VICH (1991. p.228). THADEN (1965. pAO) 
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annexation crisis Sofia had been supporting Austria had clouded the atmosphere 
between the two Slav neighbors. 
It was the kingdom of Serbia that made the first move to overcome mutual mistrust 
and normalize bilateral relations. In mid-April 1909, in a clear endea\"or to end her 
Balkan isolation and strengthen her economic and political position vis-a-vis Austria-
Hungary, Serbia approached Bulgaria with a proposal for a commercial agreement, 
similar to the Customs Union of 1905. On 15 April 1909, the Serb representative in 
Bulgaria Simic sought to explore the views of the Bulgarian Premier Malinov 
regarding the prospect of a "close Serbo-Bulgarian entente", the commercial 
agreement being a part of it. 
Although Malinov was not unreceptive to the Serb suggestion, he reserved his stance 
until Belgrade provided a more definite proposal on the basis of this understanding 
and its "immediate object".3 At a time that the negotiations with the Sublime Porte 
on the final settlement of the independence question continued the Bulgarians tended 
to believe that a rapprochement with Serbia could consolidate their diplomatic 
position. 
The settlement of the Bulgarian question at the end of May 1909 and the intention of 
the Bulgarian Cabinet not to alienate Austria by aligning with Serbia seemed to 
shelve the issue of a Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement. But not for long. In mid-June 
1909, while Malinov visited Vienna to confer with the Austrian Foreign Minister 
Aehrenthal on the new situation in the southern Balkans, the Bulgarian Minister of 
Commerce Liaptchev gave an interview to the Sofia correspondent of the Austrian 
paper Neue Freie Presse on the rumored Serbo-Bulgarian entente. Liaptchev denied 
that secret negotiations were being carried on between Sofia and Belgrade for a 
political understanding but he expressed the opinion that a renewed Customs Union 
could promote bilateral trade and economic cooperation. To allay Austrian anxieties, 
the Bulgarian Minister stressed that if a Customs Union was to be agreed it would 
strictly confined to commercial, non- political, issues.-t 
Whatever the views of the Bulgarian officials on the issue of an understanding with 
Serbia might be at the time, in the summer of 1909 Sofia had been much more 
interested in its relations with the Porte. Bulgaria had gained her political 
3 B.D. vo1.9(l) pA. F.O. 881/9531 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./13-t-1909/noA3/Whitchcad to Grc~ 
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independence but her expansionist aspirations in Macedonia and Thrace had not been 
fulfilled. At this juncture, the principal dilemma of Bulgaria's Ottoman policy was 
detente or war. 
Certainly, the weakening of Ottoman authority in Europe -a result of the Balkan 
crisis, the aggravation of the Albanian and Cretan questions and the worsening of 
Macedonian conditions- had increased Bulgarian aggression. 5 These warlike 
tendencies however Sofia had decided to restrain at least until the European Powers 
withdrew their support from Young Turkey. In the meantime, the Malinov Cabinet 
professed its reluctance to join any regional alliance which was directed against 
another country and manifested, through the newly-appointed Bulgarian minister in 
Constantinople Sarafov, its desire for the establishment of friendly relations with the 
Ottoman Empire. 6 
By mid-summer, the Aehrenthal-Malinov talks and certain rumors regarding an 
alleged understanding between Austria and Bulgaria in the Balkans produced a very 
disquieting effect on Russia. The Russian F. O. and Izvolsky suspected that Austria 
and Bulgaria might conclude a pact to attack Turkey-in-Europe jointly using her 
internal convulsions as a pretext. This scenario was anathema to Russia's Balkan bid 
to protect her interests in the Straits and keep Austria away from Macedonia. Foe its 
implementation might secure for Bulgaria a large part of Macedonia and proximity to 
Constantinople and the Straits and for Austria-Hungary control over the rest of 
Macedonia and the strategic port of Salonica.7 
Alarmed by this prospect the Russian government instructed its representatives in the 
Slav Balkan countries to propagate the idea of a south Slav alliance. More 
importantly, on 24 October 1909, lzvolsky signed an agreement with his Italian 
counterpart Tittoni at Raccogini. The Russo-Italian agreement guaranteed Italian 
interests in Libya and, as far as Rome was concerned, legitimized the Russian claim 
for "the opening of the Straits to Russian warships.,,8 It also referred to the intention 
4 LA. YE./1909IFile AAKlSofia Legationl8121-6-1909/no.4211Simopoulos to Baltazzis 
5 In his conversation with AehrenthaL Malino\' stated that "should the unification of Crete with 
Greece come about this development would ine"\itably lay the groundwork for the materialization of 
Bulgarian national aspirations in Macedonia." Treme, 8121-6-1909. (The e:\.1ract of the T'reme is to 
be found in I.A.YE.l191OIFile A.3/Sofia Legation). See also: B.D. \'01.9(1) p.18 
6 LA.YE.l1909IFile AAKlSofia Legationl8/21-7-1909/no.522/Zalokostas to Baltazzis and also 
LA. Y .E.l1909IFile AAKlSofia Legationl23IS-8-1909/no.566/Zalokostas to Zografos 
7 B.D. vol. 9(1) p.39 
8 JELA VICH (199 L p.225) 
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of the two Powers to follow the "principle of nationality in the development of the 
Balkan states, excluding all foreign domination" in case the Balkan status quo was 
disturbed. 
On 4 November 1909, outlining the significance of the Raccogini agreement for the 
Balkan national states, Izvolsky wrote to his agents in Serbia, Montenegro and 
Bulgaria that the common intent of the two Powers was to guarantee the independent 
existence of the Balkan states, secure them against foreign aggression and contribute 
to the process of inter-Balkan understanding. 9 
The Russian support for a Balkan Alliance and the apprehension of Austria moving 
into Macedonia encouraged the rapprochement between Serbia and Bulgaria. In the 
autumn of 1909, it became clear that the two south Slav states had started to 
contemplate the termination of their racial confrontation in Macedonia and that the 
climate in Serbo-Bulgarian relations had considerably improved since the end of the 
annexation crisis. A few days before the visit of King Ferdinand to Serbia in mid-
November,lO the Serb Foreign Minister Milovanovic stated that ''Bulgaria and Serbia 
had drawn closer and an entente was possible and workable."ll 
For the time being however, the Serb political leadership considered that an 
agreement with Bulgaria could consolidate Serbia's position vis-a-vis Austria but it 
should not, at least for the moment, be used against the Ottoman Empire. So long as 
Serb commerce and war material passed through Ottoman territory and the Danube-
Adriatic railway had not been constructed, Belgrade was in no position to alienate 
Constantinople. As Simic had pointed out to Sofia, for Serbia a bilateral entente 
should be based on the common agreement that the two states were to "pursue a 
clear, honest and non-aggressive policy toward the Ottoman Empire". 12 
A decisive factor in the Serbo-Bulgarian understanding was the gradual estrangement 
between Sofia and Vienna. Since the end of the annexation crisis there were signs 
that Austria-Hungary and Bulgaria no longer held similar views on the situation in the 
9 GARDIKAS-KATSIADAKIS (1995, pp.42-3) 
10 Ferdinand's visit, although itself devoid of political importance, stirred popular enthusiasm in 
Serbia as it was seen as a further indication of Serbo-Bulgarian rapprochement. LA YE.l19091FIie 
AAKlSofia Legationl28110-11-1909/no.808/Zalokostas to Mavromihalislenc1osure no. 1 
11 See previous note and I.A.YE.l1909/File AAKlSofia Legationl20/2-11-1909/no.789/Zalokostas to 
Mavromihalislenc1osure no.2 
12 I. A. Y. E.I 1909 /File AAKlSofia Legationl20/3 -12 -1909 Ino. 850lZalokostas to Ma\Tomi halis. F. 0 
881/9717 Belgrade Embassy to F.O.l5-1-191O/no.3/Whitehead to Grey 
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Balkans. While Sofia had resolved to follow a policy of non-alignment and concealed 
aggressiveness toward Constantinople, Austria favored the maintenance of the 
Balkan status quo working for cooperation with Young Turkey and particularly 
Romania; the principal enemy of Bulgaria in the north. 13 
At the end of December 1909, King Ferdinand visited Vienna. 14 In his meeting with 
Aehrenthal the Bulgarian ruler stated that the question of Austro-Bulgarian relations 
had placed him in a difficult position at home for in public opinion, the military and 
the government there was a clear and traditional pro-Russian sentiment but no pro-
Austrian orientation. Ferdinand went on to recognize that the implementation of the 
Bulgarian national program in Macedonia was dependent on Austrian consent but he 
did not fail to point out that the recent pro-Turkish attitude of Vienna had profoundly 
concerned the Bulgarian political establishment. Aehrenthal, avoiding any comment 
on the Austrian attitude respecting Bulgaria's expansionist aspirations in Macedonia, 
stressed that the practice of Vienna in the Balkans was to preserve the status quo by 
upholding Ottoman rule in Europe. 15 
Given Serbia's bad relations with the Dual Monarchy and her apprehensions of 
Austro-Bulgarian collusion in the Balkans, the removal of Bulgaria from the Austrian 
orbit pleased the Belgrade government, rendering a Serbo-Bulgarian understanding, 
under Russian auspices, a more plausible eventuality. Equally, Bulgaria, while 
fearing at least as much as Serbia an Austrian descent on Macedonia, concluded that 
so long as Vienna supported the status quo in the region and aligned itself with 
Constantinople and Bucharest, an Austro-Bulgarian collaboration was out of the 
question. As a result, the idea of an entente with Serbia gained significant ground in 
Bulgarian capital. 
The Ottoman Empire had been watching these Balkan developments and especially 
the striking improvement in Serbo-Bulgarian relations with increasing suspicion. On 
the initiative of the AJbanian deputy from Argirokastro Mufid Bey, the new situation 
13 LA.YE./1909IFile AAKlSofia Legationl23/5-8-1909/no.566/Zalokostas to Zografos. 
LA. YE./19091File AAKlSofia Legationl2013-12-1909/no.850/Zalokostas to Ma\Tomihalis. See 
also: BRIDGE (1972b, pp.147,149) . 
14 Possibly influenced by the Russian embassy in Sofia, Ferdinand ,:ent to Vienna almost com'mced 
that Austria-Hungary nourished ex-pansionist designs for Macedorua. Aem:enthal denIed that such 
was the case. F.o. 881/9717 Vienna Embassy to F.O./5-1-191O/no.l/Cartwnght to Grey 
15 F.O. 881/9717 Vienna Embassy to F.O./5-l-191O/no.lICartwright to Grey. F.O. 88119717 Vienna 
Embassy to F.O./8-1-191O/no.5/Cartwright to Grey. F.O. 88119860 Vienna Embassy to F.O.l2-9-
191 O/no. 50lCartwtight to Grey 
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in the Balkans and the threat to European Turkey from a south Slav alliance was 
discussed in the Chamber of Deputies on 27 November 1909. Mufid Bey asked the 
Ottoman Foreign Minister Rifat Pasha ''whether the government had taken measures 
in view of the imminent formation of an anti-Turkish alliance of the Slav Balkan 
states and whether, given the aggressive speeches in the Bulgarian Sobranje, the 
government had prepared for a Slav attack ... ,,16 
The news from Macedonia was also disquieting as the local Ottoman authorities had 
ascertained that the Serbs had recently withdrawn their educational propaganda from 
Salonica vilayet to Bulgarian-Macedonian benefit, in return for a free hand in 
Kosovo. Behind this move, the Porte discerned the first step toward the eventual 
delimitation of zones of influence between the two Slav nationalities in Macedonia. 17 
Even more alarming were the reports of the Ottoman legation in Sofia. In December, 
Paprikov declared in the Sobranje that the key determinant of Turco-Bulgarian 
relations remained the welfare of the Bulgarian-Macedonians. Whereas, in regard to 
Serbia, he remarked that the Malinov administration desired "honest and SIncere 
relations" with the neighboring kingdom. 
The statements of the Bulgarian Foreign Minister perturbed the Ottoman minister in 
Sofia Mustafa Assim Bey. Like the Ottoman Cabinet and the Committee, Assim Bey 
resented Sofia's tendency to interfere in Macedonian affairs. He was truly convinced 
that in so far as Bulgaria continued to foster expansionist aspirations against Turkey-
in-Europe the likelihood of the two countries coming to terms was virtually non-
existent. I8 
To investigate the progress of the Serbo-Bulgarian entente, the Unionist Minister of 
Finance Cavit Bey paid a visit to Belgrade in the last week of December 1909. In 
their talks with the Unionist official, the Serb leaders strove to assuage the fears of 
the Porte concerning the recent rapprochement with Sofia. On 26 December 1909, 
Milovanovic assured Cavit Bey that the Serb strivings to ameliorate the climate with 
Bulgaria aimed exclusively at eliminating the sources of tension between the two Slav 
neighbors and had no anti-Ottoman character. The Serb Minister went as far as to 
16 F.O. 881/9717 Constantinople Embassy to F.O./31-1-191O/no.S6/Lowther to Grey 
17 P.RO. F.O. 195/2330 General Consulate ofSalonica to Constantinople Embassy/2-l2-1909ILamb 
to Lowther, P.RG. F.G. 195/2330 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/9-12-
1909ILamb to Marling 
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claim that "Serbia would not take part in any Balkan entente or coalition which was 
directed against Turkey, or in which she was not also associated.,,19 
Although strategic and commercial considerations forced the Serb Cabinet to remain 
on good terms with the Ottoman Empire, Serbia shared Bulgaria's consternation at 
the worsening conditions in Macedonia, much more so following the implementation 
of the 'Ottomanization' policy in the provinces ofKosovo, Monastir and Salonica. 
Indeed, by the end of 1909 it was clear that the Macedonian policies of the two 
Balkan Slav countries coincided at two points. The first was that under the Unionist 
regime the position of their fellow-countrymen in Macedonia was threatened. The 
second was that, in view of the Unionist nationalist commitment to denationalize the 
Macedonian Christians, the Serbo-Bulgarian dispute over Macedonia should cease 
and give way to a strategy of reconciliation and understanding between the 
Macedonian Slavs and their metropolitan countries. 20 
10.2 The Greco-Bulgarian Rapprochement 
By the beginning of 1910, a considerable degree of mutual confidence between Sofia 
and Belgrade had been restored. Significantly, there were also certain, though hazy 
at the time, indications of an attempted Greco-Bulgarian rapprochement. 
Despite the predominant belief in Greek historiography that the process of entente 
with Bulgaria commenced in 1910, Greek archival sources indicate that the first 
attempts in this direction had been made in the summer of 1909. In June 1909, the 
accentuation of the Cretan question and the urgent need to consolidate its diplomatic 
position toward Young Turkey directed the Theotokis Cabinet to seek an 
understanding with Bulgaria. 
On 12 June, following instructions from Athens, the Greek representative in Bulgaria 
Zalokostas conveyed to General Paprikov the desire of the Greek government to end 
the Greco-Bulgarian racial contlict in Macedonia. Reassuring Paprikov that Athens 
was willing to contain its Macedonian nationalists, the Greek representative inquired 
the Bulgarian official what were the views of Sofia on this question and whether the 
18 I.A.Y.E./1909IFile AAKlSofia LegationJ26/9-12-1909/no.863/Zalokostas to MaHomihalis. F.G. 
88119717 Sofia Embassy to F.O'/22-1-191O/no.1IFindlay to Grey 
19 F.O. 88119717 Belgr~de Embassy to F.O./5-1-191O/no.3/whitehead to Grey 
20 Ibid. F.G. 88119717 Foreign Office to Rome Embassy/29-1-191O/no.9/Grey to Rodd and F.G. 
88119717 Vienna Embassy to F.O./6-2-191O/no.19/Cartwright to Grey 
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Malinov administration would put a restraining hand on the anti-Greek activity of the 
Bulgarian-Macedonians. 
To these Greek overtures, Paprikov was initially receptive. Taking into consideration 
the Unionist attacks against the religious and educational privileges of the Christian 
nationalities and the deteriorating situation in Macedonia, the Bulgarian Minister 
stated that the termination of the Macedonian controversy between Greece and 
Bulgaria was desirable and could pave the way for a Greco-Bulgarian 
understanding. 21 
During June and July 1909, the Greek legation continued to discuss the question of 
bilateral reconciliation with the Bulgarian leadership but the military revolution in 
Athens on 28 August 1909 by the ''Military League" blurred the political atmosphere 
in Greece?2 The ensuing instability in Greek politics in conjunction with Sofia's 
tendency to work out an entente with Serbia first interrupted the Greco-Bulgarian 
rapprochement. However, it is interesting that in the following months the racial 
antagonism between the Greek and Bulgarian communities in Macedonia did 
diminish, if it did not end. 23 
By summer 1910, though little had been achieved in the direction of a Greco-
Bulgarian entente through the official political and diplomatic channels, the process 
of bilateral reconciliation had made far more significant progress between the local 
Bulgarian and Greek populations in Macedonia. To resist the C.U.P. commitment to 
denationalize the non-Moslem nationalities, the two large Christian Macedonian 
communities had shown a clear inclination to set aside all their previous 
disagreements and disputes and collaborate against the common menace. This 
informal understanding was expressed in the striking diminution of their racial rivalry 
during the winter; the practice of the Bulgarian and Greek bands of operating in more 
or less designated areas thereby avoiding clashes; and the amicable settlement of the 
ecclesiastical disputes by the native Bulgarian and Greek populations, 
21 I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAK-5/Sofia Legationl16/29-6-1909/no.490/Zalokostas to Baltazzis. The 
semi-official organ of the Bulgarian government I/reme also reaffinned that the Greek legation had 
sounded out Paprikov on the prospect of a Greco-Bulgarian rapprochement and that Sofia· s response 
had been favorable. I.A.Y.E.l1909IFile AAKlSofia LegationilO/23-7-1909/no.529/Zalokostas to 
Zografos. I. A. Y .E.I 1909IFile AAKlSofia Legationill/24--7 -1909/no. 572/Zalokostas to Zografos. 
22 See: DERTILIS (1985) 
23 P.Ro. F.o. 195/2359 General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/22-11-
1909ILamb to Lowther 
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notwithstanding that in July 1910 the Ottoman Parliament voted a Law regulating 
church and school differences in Macedonia. 24 
The inter-communal reconciliation In Macedonia benefited the political 
rapprochement between the two countries. In August 1910, the tendency of the two 
Balkan countries to work together to defend the interests of their co-nationals in 
Turkey and advance their national aspirations was reflected in two events: the 
unusual collaboration of Bulgarian and Greek parliamentary groups in the Ottoman 
Chamber of Deputies and the renewed negotiations between the Athens and Sofia 
governments on the Macedonian question. 
Urged on by the worsening situation of Christian nationalities in Turkey the 
Bulgarian and Greek deputies, backed by their Armenian and Albanian colleagues, 
submitted two memoranda to the Hakki Pasha government containing their positions 
on the guarantee of the minority privileges and the well-being of all Christian ethnic 
groups in the country. In a rare display of Greco-Bulgarian political solidarity, the 
two memoranda (the Bulgarian was submitted on 19 June while the Greek on 28 
August) espoused almost identical views and put forward similar claims. 
Characteristically, they requested: the termination of Ottoman interference with the 
religious, educational and communal institutions of the Christian ethnic groups; 
equality of the Christian communal institutions' degrees with those awarded by the 
Ottoman public schools; Christian recruits to serve in their native provinces and be 
admitted to Ottoman military academies to become officers; the establishment of a 
Supreme Administrative Council, under the Grand Vizier, with mixed composition 
and the task of examining the grievances of the local nationalities respecting the 
attitude of public functionaries and punishing corrupt and incompetent 
administrators' the elaboration and enactment of a new electoral law, whereupon , 
universal suffrage and proportionate representation of the minority nationalities in the 
Ottoman Parliament as well as in provincial councils would be secured. 
The Hakki Pasha Cabinet refused however to take the Bulgarian and Greek proposals 
into consideration on the grounds that the deputies should refer these questions to the 
Parliament rather than to central government. 25 
24 F.G. 881/9811 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/14--2-1911/Lm\'ther to Grey/Annual Report on 
Turkey for the Year 1910/enclosure no.1 
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In the meantime, Greece and Bulgaria worked for the conclusion of an understanding 
in Macedonia. On 25 August 1910, the Bulgarian agent in Athens Dobrev presented 
to the Greek F.O. a scheme for delimitation of zones of influence in Macedonia and 
the repair of schism between the Patriarchate and the Exarchate. In these conditions 
though, the Greek Cabinet considered that a binding agreement with Sofia in 
Macedonia would be premature. Athens seemed to suspect that an understanding at 
this stage with the more powerful Bulgaria might amount to the restriction of Greek 
claims in Macedonia. 
Sensibly, the Greek government favored a cautious rapprochement with Bulgaria and 
felt for the time being, that a preliminary consensus in Macedonia which could 
improve the climate between the two counties and lay the groundwork for a more 
definite agreement would be sufficient. Later, having reorganized her armed forces 
and strengthened her diplomatic position, Greece would be able to enter into 
negotiations with Bulgaria on the delimitation of spheres of influence in Macedonia 
without running the risk of compromising her interests in the provinces of Salonica 
and Monastir. 
Therefore, Kallergis's26 counter-proposals were far less radical than Dobrev's. The 
Greek scheme provided for: the ceasing of racial confrontation in Macedonia; the 
development of the cooperation between Greek and Bulgarian deputies in the 
Ottoman Parliament for the promotion of Christian welfare; and the need to play 
down the ecclesiastical issue by referring it to Patriarchist and Exarchist religious 
leaderships. 
On 27 October 1910, Paprikov informed the new Venizelos government27 through 
the newly-accredited Greek minister in Sofia Panas that Kallergis's proposals had 
been accepted. Eventually, following many decades of mutual hostility and bitter 
strife over Macedonia, the first Greco-Bulgarian agreement had been accomplished
28 
~5 F.G. 88119860 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/29-8-191O/no.611lLowther to Grey. VLACHOS 
(1954. pp.208-9) . . . 
26 Kallergis had been appointed Foreign Minister in the DragoumIs Cabmet m Jan~ary 1910. 
~7 The Venizelos Cabinet took office on 18 October 1910, succeeding the Dragounus goyemmcnt 
~8 GARDIKAS-KA TSIADAKIS (1995. p.48) 
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10.3 The Turco-Romanian Understanding and Its Impact on the Making of 
Balkan League 
The Hakki Pasha Cabinet was very apprehensive about the secret diplomacy of the 
Christian Balkan countries and their apparent tendency to act in collusion to 
safeguard the status of their 'unredeemed brethren' in the Ottoman Empire as well as 
to promote their nationalist programs at the expense of Turkey-in-Europe. To 
counteract a south Slav alliance and consolidate its position in the Balkans, the 
Ottoman leadership began to contemplate an alignment with Austria and her Balkan 
ally Romania; an alignment which had been constantly advocated by the German-
trained Ottoman military group of Shevket Pasha but did not coincide with the 
civilian Unionist party's foreign policy of being on good terms with both the Triplice 
and the Entente?9 
A community of geo-strategic and commercial interests between the Ottoman Empire 
and Romania rendered a bilateral understanding on political, and possibly military, 
grounds attainable, if not imperative. Both countries opposed Bulgarian and Russian 
expansion. In addition, they had a long tradition in commercial partnership since the 
entire external Romanian trade necessarily passed through the Straits and the 
Ottoman market had attracted the largest share of Romanian exports. 30 
In the spring of 1910, Turco-Romanian relations entered a more intimate phase. 
Exploiting the visit of its War Minister in Constantinople in April 1910, the Romanian 
government suggested that, in view of their common interests in the region, the two 
countries should proceed to complete a political agreement and military convention. 
Claiming that Bucharest was able to mobilize 300,000 men in case of war, the 
Romanian Minister stated that Turkey could obtain invaluable political and military 
profits from an agreement with Romania and alignment with the Triple Alliance. Yet, 
he pointed out that such a development was dependent upon the non-existence of a 
Serbo-Ottoman pact. 31 
Apparently, the idea of a Turco-Romanian convention was further elaborated during 
the visit of the Grand Vizier Hakki Pasha to Bucharest in May and his meeting with 
King Charles. However, even though these talks did not produce any concrete 
29 I.A.Y.E.l1910IFile r 2.3/Constantinople Legationl5/18-8-191O/no.1280/Gryparis to Kallergis 
30 F.G. 881/9860 Sofia Embassy to F.O.l23-9-191O/no.I22lFindlay to Grey 
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agreement, by the end of summer 1910, western diplomatic circles were convinced 
that the Ottoman Empire and Romania had arrived at an "oral understanding" to act 
in collusion, in case a regional crisis erupted?2 
Significantly, on 23 September, the Romanian Cabinet through its semi-official organ 
L ' Independance Roumaine (The Romanian Independence) openly admitted that the 
recent rapprochement with Turkey was aimed at the consolidation of the Balkan 
status quo and the dissuasion of the geopolitical enlargement of Bulgaria. The 
Ottoman administration was in perfect accord with these Romanian views. In one 
instance in early October, though, contravening the official practice of the Ottoman 
F.O. of referring generally on the extent and limitations of Turco-Romanian entente , 
Assim Bey was straightforward. He said to his British counterpart in Sofia Findlay: 
"if Bulgaria were to attack Turkey the Romanian army would attack Bulgaria".-'"' 
The Turco-Romanian rapprochement put the Balkan Slav countries and Russia on 
alert. The Serb Cabinet, despite its efforts to appease public opinion and the 
opposition press by playing down the importance of the Turco-Romanian 
rapprochement and arguing that friendly Serbo-Turkish relations guaranteed Serbia's 
territorial integrity, was very suspicious and fearful. In the minds of Serb officials, 
Austria's Balkan ambitions lay beneath Turco-Romanian entente. It was the Dual 
Monarchy, not Romania, which according to Milovanovic had succeeded "in drawing 
the Ottoman Empire much nearer to the orbit of the Triple Alliance" placing the 
31 LA YE.l191OlFile r 2.3/Constantinople LegationlI912-5-191O/no.386/Gryparis to Kallergis, F.G. 
88119860 Belgrade Embassy to F.O.l20-9-191O/no.64IBarclay to Grey 
32 LA YE.l19101File r 2.3IBerlin Legationl2517 -1l-191O/no. 606ffheotokis to Dimitrakopoulos. 
LA YE.l191OlFile r 2.31L0ndon LegationlI911-11-191O/no.8811Gennadios to Dimitrakopoulos, 
F.G. 881/9860 Sofia Embassy to F.O.l12-10-191O/no.129IFindlay to Grey. There is no convincing 
evidence that Austria-Hungary had played an energetic role in the Turco-Romanian understanding. 
However, since Romania was an ally of the Triplice, it is almost certain that Vienna was aware of 
the entire affair and had given its tacit approval to it. In October 1910, Aehrenthal stated to the 
Hungarian Foreign Affairs Committee that although Bucharest had denied the existence of a Turco-
Romanian convention a source which intended to stir trouble in the Balkans (i.e. Russia) had 
, 
circulated these rumors in order to undermine the efforts of the Hakki Pasha Cabinet to secure a 
loan at the French money market by pointing to Turkey's entente with Romania: the Balkan ally of 
Central Powers. Germ~ny also shared the opinion that behind the circulation of the Turco-
Romanian understanding lied the Russian government. LAYE.l191OlFile r 2.3Nienna 
Legationl21/3-11-191O/no.532/Streit to Dimitrakopoulos, LA YE.l19101File r 2.3IBerlin 
Legationl23/6-1O-191O/no.526ITheotokis to Kallergis, LAYE.l191OlFile r 2.3lBerlin 
Legationl22/5-1 0-191 0/no.3623ffheotokis to Kallergis 
33 LAYE.l191OlFile r 2.3IBucharest LegationlI4/27-9-191O/no.2731l0ulianos to Kallergis. 
LA.YE.l191OlFile r 2.3/Constantinople Legationl31/13-9-1910/no.352~/Gryparis to 
Dirnitrakopoulos, F.o. 88119860 Sofia Embassy to F.O.l12-1O-191O/no.129IFindlay to Grey. F.G. 
881/9860 Constantinople Embassy to F.O.l21-9-1910/no.1981L0"ther to Grey 
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kingdom of Serbia "between the hammer and the anvil". 34 Therefore, the Serb 
government felt that the only way to consolidate Serbia's position in the Balkans was 
by concluding an entente with Bulgaria. 
Since the Turco-Romanian understanding had a predominantly anti-Bulgarian 
character it evoked anxiety in Sofia. Aware of Romania's territorial designs for 
Bulgarian-held Dobroudja, the Malinov administration discerned in the Turco-
Romanian collaboration a formidable deterrent to the materialization of its 
Macedonian aspirations and, more importantly, a direct threat to Bulgarian 
independence. At this juncture, Sofia decided to revise its entire Balkan policy, the 
pivotal element of which was not any more the conservative strategy of non-
alignment but the active preparation of a political entente and military alliance with 
Serbia, Montenegro and eventually Greece, under the aegis of Russia. 
It is within this context that the official Bulgarian feelers to Greece for an 
understanding in Macedonia on 25 August 191035 and Ferdinand's important visit to 
Cettigne on 21 August should be examined. Ottoman reports from Montenegro and 
Bulgaria concurred that, whilst in Cettigne, Ferdinand reaffirmed the excellent 
relations between the two states and dwelt with King Nicholas and the Serb Prince 
Alexander upon the possibility of forming a tripartite Balkan Slav alliance to 
counteract the projected Turco-Romanian axis. It appears that in these talks the 
three Slav leaders agreed that an inter-Balkan understanding had become a necessity. 
The product of this meeting was communicated to the Russian F. 0.36 
By the end of the summer, the Imperial Russian government had become convinced 
that Turkey and Romania, under the influence of Vienna, had arrived at a verbal 
agreement concerning the situation in the Balkans. Sazonov, who had succeeded 
Izvolsky in September, believed that the essence of this entente was that if Bulgaria 
mobilized to attack Turkey, Romania would deploy her armies across the Bulgaro-
34 F.G. 881/9860 Belgrade Embassy to F.O.l20-9-1910/no.6-1-lBarclay to Grey. The last statement 
belongs to Izvolsky. B.D. vo1.9(l) p.175 . . . 
35 It is true however that owing to Greece's military weakness. Bulgana was stIll heSItant to 
conclude a military convention with Athens. Thus, when on 7 August 1910 the Greek government 
sent Colonel Frantzis, a military attache, in Sofia to explore the prospect of a Greco-Bulganan 
collaboration in the event of a Greco-Turkish war, the Bulgarian leadership refused to discuss the 
issue. F.G. 881/9860 St. Petersburg Embassy to F.O.l3-9-191O/no.2-1-8/0' Beirne to Grey 
36 I. A.Y.E.I I 91O/File r 2.3/Constantinople Legationl18/1-10-1 9 1O/no. 1 655/Gryparis to 
Dimitrakopoulos. I.A.Y.E.l191O/File r 2.3/Sofia LegationllOI23-1O-l91O/no.6lllZalokostas to 
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Romanian border. Fearing that the south Slav states would be encircled between 
Austria, Romania and Turkey, Russia's Balkan policy focused on establishing a south 
Slav Balkan Alliance and encouraging Greece to join this coalition. 
Sazonov's plan, at its original phase, provided for the thorough reorganization of the 
Balkan states' armed forces amounting to 600,000 men. Following a short period of 
time, the Balkan countries should proceed to set aside their Macedonian controversy 
and conclude military conventions. On 1 October 1910, in an explicit attempt to 
clarify its intentions for the Balkans the Russian government warned Young Turkey 
through the columns of Novoye Vremya that "the surrender into Ottoman hands of 
Bulgarian, Serb, Montenegrin or Greek territory is an impossibility. ,,37 
The fact that the pro-German Ottoman military party tended to steer the Ottoman 
Empire towards the Triplice rather than the Entente, induced the Russian Imperial 
government to recognize the strategic importance of the Greek factor and pursue the 
participation of Greece in the Balkan League. Conversing with Psychas, the Greek 
charge d' affaires in St. Petersburg, Sazonov impressed upon the Athens government 
the need to accelerate its military preparations, stating that the Balkan status quo 
might be preserved for a period of 1-2 years and if within this time Greece had not 
been prepared "for all eventualities" then it would be too late for her. 38 
Instead of consolidating the regional status quo and containing south Slav 
expansionism the informal entente between Bucharest and Constantinople oriented 
the Balkan Slav states, notably Bulgaria and Serbia, to form a counter-combination, 
in which, as Russia argued and Sofia inclined to agree, the participation of Greece 
was of crucial strategic importance. 
10.4 The Establishment of the Balkan Alliance 
In Greece the advent of the first Venizelos government to power on 18 October , 
1910 marked an important, though at that time elusive, turn in Greece's Balkan 
Dimitrakopoulos, F.O. 881/9860 Cettigne Embassy to F.O'/2~-1O-191O/no.43IBeaumont to Grey. 
F.G. 881/9860 Belgrade Embassy to F.O./6-10-1910/no.70fPaget to Grey . 
37 LAYE.l191OIFile r 2.3/S1. Petersburg LegationlI7/30-9-191O/no.628fPsychas to Grypans. F.G. 
9860 S1. Petersburg Embassy to F.G.N-1O-191O/no.273/0' Beirne to Gre~> F.G. 88119860 S1. 
Petersburg Embassy to F.O.l2-1O-191O/no.400/0' Beirne to Grey. Xovoye r remya. 18/1 October 
1910 . 
38 Ibid. LAYE.l191OIFile r 2.3/St. Petersburg Legationl211~-10-191O/no.639fPsychas to Grypans. 
F.G. 881/9860 St. Petersburg Embassy to F.O.ll-1O-191O/no.398/0' Beirne to Grey 
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policy. When he formed his first administration, Venizelos was convinced that the 
nationalist policies of Young Turkey against Christian nationalities would result 
sooner or later in a collision between the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan national 
states. In the mind of the Cretan statesman therefore, the prospect of Greece's 
alignment with her south Slav neighbors had emerged as the most appropriate way to 
defend Greek interests in the Ottoman Empire and promote Hellenic national 
aspirations in Crete, Macedonia and Epirus. 39 Temporarily, though, since the Greek 
program for military reorganization had not been completed, good relations with the 
Sublime Porte remained an advisability. 
In 1911, the preparatory steps and behind-the-scenes diplomatic efforts intended to 
bring the kingdom of Greece and the south Slavs closer began to pay dividends. The 
original implicit indication of inter-Balkan solidarity came in the end of March 1911, 
when the Albanian Malissors revolt broke out. It is important to underscore here 
that, although Greek and Slav nationalist programs in Epirus and Macedonia 
conflicted and overlapped with the Albanian bid for the creation of an autonomous 
Albanian province, all Christian Balkan states adopted an attitude of sympathetic 
benevolence towards the Albanian movement. 40 
Being less a product of common geopolitical perspectives in the region and far more 
a circumstantial display of Balkan unanimity, the Balkan Christian states' benevolence 
to the Malissors struggle in north Albania had however its own distinctive 
significance: it exhibited the opposition of the Slav states and Greece to Young 
Turkey. 
39 ROSSOS (1981, p.47). See also: SVOLOPOULOS (1992) 
40 As it has been already pointed out, Montenegro provided material support and sanctuary to the 
Malissors, anticipating to gain some profit from the Albanian disturbances. Serbia, although 
opposed to the establishment of an autonomous Albanian province under Austrian protection, 
recognized that the continuation of the Albanian turmoil could be a valuable instrument to test the 
Balkan attitude of Austria-Hungary and Italy. Bulgaria supported the Malissors' revolt for it 
undermined Ottoman authority in Europe. In fact, Sofia encouraged cooperation between the 
Bulgarian-Macedonian committees and the Albanian rebels. As far as the Greek administration was 
concerned, in so far as the Albanian revolt did not spill over in Epirus which Athens regarded as a 
Greek territory and confined itself to northern Albania. it was "illing to uphold it. On Montenegrin 
assistance to the Malissors see chapter 9. On Serb position see: HELMREICH (1969. p.45) and 
MALCOLM (1998, p.243). For the Bulgarian stance: P.R.O. F.O. 19512382 General Consulate of 
Salonica to Constantinople EmbassyI20-7-1911lLamb to Marling, P.RO. F.O. 195/2382 General 
Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/3-12-1911fLamb to Lo\\1her. On the Greek 
thesis: I.A.Y.E.l1911lFile 34.1.11F0reign Office to Prefecture of Corful2~1:'-()-
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These developments had an impact in Macedonia. In July 1911, it was rumored 
among the Ottoman authorities that in mid-June representatives of the Bulgarian, 
Albanian and Greek Macedonian revolutionary organizations had secretly gathered in 
Djumaja to coordinate their paramilitary activities against the Ottomans. Even 
though there is no convincing evidence indicating that such a meeting did really take 
place, it is clear that by that time the Balkan Macedonian committees avoided inter-
racial clashes and began to direct their operations against the Ottoman regime. 
" ... it seems to be admitted on all hands that some sort of agreement has been arrived 
at and it is the intention of the Greek, Albanian and Bulgarian bands to operate in 
more or less clearly designated areas and with the object not, as in 1903 -1907, of 
exterminating each other but of conjointly making things difficult for the Turkish 
administration and if war should break out, facilitating the enemy's operations by 
harassing the Ottoman troops and impeding their communications" remarked a 
British report from Salonica on 20 July 1911. 41 
During the second half of 1911, the process of inter-Balkan understanding made 
great progress. On 29 September, the Italian attack on Tripolitania unveiled the 
vulnerability of the Ottoman Empire to foreign aggression. Since the Libyan war 
raised the specter of an Italian onslaught on Turkey-in-Europe, the new Said Pasha 
Cabinet ordered the mobilization of the Ottoman army in the province of Adrianople. 
More importantly, in early October 1911, the Russian ambassador in Constantinople 
Charikov put forward a projected convention to the Ottoman government providing 
for the opening of the Straits to Russian warships. In return, Russia would guarantee 
Turkey's position in the district of Constantinople and the adjacent territories. 42 
At this juncture, the Bulgarian political establishment realized that the time for 
decisive measures had come. The pro-Russian Geshov-Danev coalition, in office 
since March 1911, began to work systematically for the establishment of a complete 
Balkan alliance system. In the first week of October 1911, the Bulgarian agent in 
Rome Rizov received instructions to go to Belgrade in order to discuss the question 
of alliance with the Serb leaders. In a short time, Serbo-Bulgarian talks focused on 
41 P.Ro. F.o. 195/2382 General Consulate ofSalonica to Constantinople Embassy/20-7~1911ILamb 
to Marling. In a later report however, in December, Lamb 'Hote that t~ere were no llldicatlO~s of a 
concrete agreement between the Bulgarian. Albanian and Greek conuruttees. P.Ro. Fo. 19:-12382 
General Consulate of Salonica to Constantinople Embassy/3-12-1911ILamb to Lo\\1her 
42 B.D. \'01. 9(1) p.312 
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Macedonia, the perpetual apple of discord between the two south Slav states. Rizov 
informed the Milovanovic Cabinet that Bulgaria no longer insisted on the indivlsibilitv 
of Macedonia. Thus, Sofia had decided to enter into negotiations with Belgrade 
respecting the delimitation of "spheres of influence" in the provinces of Kosovo, 
Monastir and Salonica. 
On such occasions, diplomats and politicians tend to present their maximum claims 
first, which, if not accepted, they intend to reduce during the course of the 
negotiations until they obtain what they consider a favorable and workable 
agreement. During the Serbo-Bulgarian negotiations this "normal procedure" was 
followed. Rizov suggested that Serbia should acquire the region lying between her 
borders and the U skub vilayet. On the other hand, the Serb leadership demanded the 
Macedonian districts of U skub, Veles, Perlepe, Kirtchevo and Porech.·B This 
disagreement led the negotiations to deadlock. Rizov's mission nevertheless, laid the 
groundwork for a Serbo-Bulgarian understanding over Macedonia. 
On 11 October 1911, Geshov met with Milovanovic in Serbia in utmost secrecy. In 
this meeting the two Balkan statesmen arrived at an agreement for the conclusion of 
an alliance "in principle". However, owing to their inability to designate their 
respective Macedonian zones of influence, they decided that the "contested region" 
extending from the Rhodope mountains in the east to Skadros mountains in the west 
should be subject to Russian arbitration. 
Partitioning Macedonia between the Christian Balkan countries was unpopular with 
the Bulgarian-Macedonian revolutionary organizations. They argued that autonomy, 
not partition, should be the principal objective of Sofia's Macedonian strategy. In 
view of the Macedonian opposition in Bulgaria, the Geshov administration reviewed 
its stance. Sofia had no illusions that unless it managed to include in the Bulgarian 
zone the largest parts of Kosovo and Monastir, the understanding with Serbia would 
founder in the vehement reaction of the Bulgarian-Macedonian nationalists.~~ Thus, 
Geshov resumed negotiations with Belgrade. 
43 DJORDJEVIC (1970, p.361) 
44 While the refractory Macedonian committees in Bulgaria seemed prepared to exchange the 
abandonment of their dogma of Macedonian integrity and autonomy only for ~ lion's shar~ in the 
provinces of Kosovo, Monastir and Salonica, the position of the Serb reyolutI~nary orgamzatIons 
was more pragmatic. Formed in May 1911. the Uyedinyenye iii Smrt (Umo~ or Death), the 
successor of the Narodna Odbrana. fayored an alliance "ith Bulgaria and unconditIOnally supported 
the Serb government's efforts in this direction. "The Black Hand", as this organization was widcly-
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In the Serb camp, the question of Macedonia had also divided the political leadership. 
Pashic raised strong objections to the Milovanovic Cabinet's tendency to concede so 
much Macedonian territory to Sofia. He envisaged the Serbo-Bulgarian alliance as 
an instrument for Serb expansion to the Morava valley and north-central Macedonia; 
a solid basis for dominating central Balkans. Premier Milovanovic, apprehensive of 
Austrian designs, believed that Serbia should pursue an outlet to the Adriatic sea and 
use the alliance with Bulgaria to check an Austrian move in N ovibazar or 
Macedonia. 45 
Therefore, when he met with the Bulgarian delegation in Paris in November, the Serb 
Premier agreed to accept the acquisition of "the western bank of the Vardar river"; 
the eastern was to be ceded to Bulgaria. Based on this understanding but without 
having resolved the critical question of the "contested zone", Serbia and Bulgaria 
signed a secret Treaty of defensive Alliance on 13 March 1912. 
Serbia was to obtain Old Serbia and a large part of Scutari province, the north-
western region of the Rhodope mountains. Bulgaria was to incorporate the area 
stretching from her border to the Skadros mountains and Ohrid as well as the region 
lying east of the Struma river. This arrangement however, left in dispute the area 
between lake Ohrid, the Skadros mountains and Rhodope mountains. The signatory 
parties agreed that the final partition of this region would be decided in future 
negotiations between the two states. Failing to reach an agreement, the question was 
to be submitted to the Russian Tsar for arbitration, whose decision would be binding 
and mandatory for both parties.46 
Concluding an agreement with Serbia was the first pole of Sofia's Balkan policy. 
The second was an understanding with Greece. Like the other Balkan capitals, 
Athens had followed developments in Libya with increasing concern. F acing an 
impeding regional crisis, the Greek Premier Venizelos was determined to take action 
to advance Hellenic aspirations in European Turkey instead of remaining a passive 
spectator. In the first week following the commencement of the African war, 
Venizelos wrote to Rangabe, the Greek representative in Crete: 
known, cooperated with the Belgrade government and carried out ~dergroun~ actiyities in Old 
Serbia and Kosovo. its goal being to paye the way for a Serb attack m Macedoma. HELMREICH 
(1969, pp.41-4) 
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"It is impossible to foresee the developments of the present crisis and we have stated 
that in case that Balkan peace is to be disturbed, the government reserves its stance 
to act in accord with our interests.,,47 
Greece, nevertheless, could not embark on a forward policy in the southern Balkans 
by herself. To end diplomatic isolation, to exert pressure on the Porte to respect the 
rights of non-Moslem populations and secure Greece's position against all 
eventualities,48 the Greek government decided to approach Bulgaria with a proposal 
for common action in case of Turkish attack. On 16 October 1911, after having 
received instructions from the Greek P.O. the Greek minister in Sofia Panas 
communicated the Greek plan to Geshov. Its substance was that Greece was fully 
prepared to help Bulgaria in case she suffered a Turkish attack, providing Bulgaria 
committed herself to acting similarly should Greece be attacked by Turkey. 
F or two reasons the Greek offer was unacceptable to the Geshov Cabinet. 
Influenced by the Russian Embassy in Sofia, Geshov had already given precedence to 
working out an understanding with Serbia rather than Greece. In addition, Sofia 
suspected that any bid on its part to support Greece in the event of a Greco-Turkish 
armed conflict might encourage Athens to instigate serious disturbances in Crete 
thereby provoking Ottoman aggression. As an outcome, Bulgaria could be driven 
into a conflict with the Porte over Crete. On the other hand, the Geshov Cabinet had 
no plans to fully alienate the Greeks. For it feared that in such a contingency Greece 
might seek an understanding with 'anti-Slav powers like Austria-Hungary, Romania 
and the Albanians' .49 
In early February 1912, using Bourchier -the Times Near East correspondent and a 
highly-esteemed personality both in Athens and Sofia- as trustworthy mediator, 
Geshov secretly informed Venizelos that the Bulgarian administration would 
welcome any new Greek proposals for a Greco-Bulgarian convention. It took the 
Greek government two and a half months to elaborate its alliance proposals. Finally, 
on 27 April 1912, Panas presented a Greek alliance scheme to the Bulgarian leaders 
which provided: reciprocal obligation of the two parties to extend military support to 
46 B.D. vo1.9(2) p.lOll, CRAMPTON (1983, p.407) 
47 Cited in VLACHOS (1954, p.263) . _ ( . 
48 LAYE.l1911lFile 21.8.lIAthens to Constantinople LegatlOnJ29/12-1O-1911/no.2)969/Grypans 
to Alexandropoulos 
49 HELMREICH (1969, p.74). ROSSOS (1981. pp.49-50) 
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each other in case of Ottoman attack; constant Greco-Bulgarian collaboration for the 
protection of their co-nationals' rights in the Ottoman Empire; the Sofia Cabinet 
would undertake to observe an attitude of "benevolent neutrality" if war erupted 
between Greece and Turkey on account of the Cretan deputies being accepted in 
Greek National Assembly; the treaty of alliance was to remain valid for a period of 
three years and could be extended for an extra year. 50 
Greek proposals made no reference to the issue of Macedonian partition. According 
to Gardikas-Katsiadakis, contrary to his Financial Minister Koromilas's contention 
that Athens should seek a concrete demarcation of spheres of influence in Macedonia 
with a view to preventing Sofia claiming the whole of Macedonia, Venizelos had no 
intention of concluding any binding territorial agreement with the more powerful 
Bulgaria at this stage. 
Greece being the weak side in the negotiations, he believed, Sofia would acquire the 
largest parts of the Macedonian vilayets of Salonica and Monastir irretrievably 
ruining Hellenic aspirations for expansion in these departments. The Greek Premier 
advocated that the principle of de facto occupation of Macedon ian territory should be 
applied and a definite partition agreement be left for the future. 51 
The Bulgarian leadership hesitated to accept the Greek alliance project. The Geshov 
Cabinet considered the inclusion in the convention of an explicit provision concerning 
the implementation of articles 23 and 60 of Berlin Treaty in Macedonia and Thrace as 
an essential precondition for signing the treaty. Clearly, Bulgaria mounted pressure 
on Athens to accept Macedonian autonomy. This, however, the Venize10s Cabinet 
was unwilling to do. In the end, the Athens government, perturbed by the Italian 
occupation of Dodecanese during the second half of April 1912 and anxious not to be 
isolated from the Balkan Allies, decided to meet Sofia half-way. 
Greece would not insist on the partitioning of Macedonia while Bulgaria was to 
abandon her claim for the establishment of Macedonian autonomy by means of 
articles 23 and 60. Sofia was asked to consent that any demands on the part of the 
two allied states for the introduction of administrative reforms in Turkey-in-Europe 
would neither amount to autonomy nor to be confined to Macedonia and before they 
were put forward to the Sublime Porte they should have been sanctioned by both 
50 KARDIKAS-KATSIADAKIS (1995, pp.99-100) 
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parties. The Bulgarian government agreed to this suggestion and on 29 May 1912 
Greece and Bulgaria signed the defensive Treaty of Alliance. 52 
Bulgaria's Balkan strategy had nevertheless an additional -third- aspect: an agreement 
with Montenegro. While the negotiations with the Serbs and the Greeks had been 
painfully difficult and long-lasting owing to the Macedonian imbroglio, the prospect 
of an entente with Montenegro involved much less contention for the small kingdom 
did not nurture aspirations on Macedonia. Cettigne though fostered ambitions for 
Scutari vilayet. Informed of the Serbo-Bulgarian Alliance Treaty and keen to join the 
Slav coalition the Montenegrin leadership was unlikely to raise obstacles to Sofia. 
Preliminary talks between Sofia and Cettigne began in early June 1912 in Vienna, 
where both Balkan rulers were on official visits. In a short time, Danev and Rizov 
agreed with the Montenegrin Prime Minister Martinovic to jointly commence 
hostilities against Turkey at the most propitious moment. Further, Bulgaria pledged 
to financially support Cettigne's military operations. 53 
In the summer of 1912, Ottoman authority in Europe had reached the verge of 
collapse. The Turco-Italian conflict had drifted from northern Africa to the Aegean 
sea and on 23 July an Italian squadron tried to force the Straits. Frontier incidents 
between Ottoman and Montenegrin or Bulgarian troops became more and more 
frequent. Adding to the seriousness of the situation the Bulgarian-Macedonian 
revolutionary organizations had intensified their activities. On 1 August 1912, two 
bomb explosions devastated the center of the Kosovar village Kotchana killing 18 
Bulgarians, 4 Moslems and 2 Jews. Outraged by the terrorist attack, a Moslem mob 
massacred 40 Bulgarians and wounded 120 while the local Ottoman authorities did 
nothing to restrain the malefactors. 54 
Yet it was the Alb ani an-Macedonian revolt that dealt the decisive blow to Turkey's 
, 
European authority. Unable to deal with the armed Albanian movement and faced 
with large-scale military mutinies in the Macedonian army, the Ottoman 
administration had succumbed to the rebels. On 18 August 1912, the new Ghazi 
Ahmet Muhtar Pasha Cabinet accepted their demand for the creation of an Albanian 
51 KARDIKAS-KATSIADAKIS (1995, pp.98-9) 
52 ROSSOS (1981. pp.50-1) 
53 HELMREICH (1969, pp.86-7) 
54 F.o. 881110280 Constantinople Embassy to F.O'/17-4-1913/Lowther to Grey/Annual RCIX?rt on 
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_B_a_Ik_a_n_Al _ Ii_a_nc_e ______________________________________________ ~~29 
autonomous province in the vilayets of Janina, Scutari and the Albanian-dominated 
sanjaks of Mona stir and KoSOVO. 55 
This project had the support of Austria-Hungary. Part of Aehrenthal' s Balkan 
legacy, which the new Austro-Hungarian Foreign Minister Count Leopold von 
Berchtold had fully espoused, was the prevention of Serbia obtaining access to the 
Aegean and the Adriatic seas or territory in Macedonia by supporting the 
establishment of a strong Albanian province and possibly allowing Bulgarian 
expansion to central Macedonia. An Albanian province, Austrian policy-makers felt, 
could develop on an outpost of Vienna's influence in the region. 56 
However, Vienna knew that the creation of a united Albanian province was anathema 
to Balkan national states, which, given Turkey's Balkan entanglements, were likely to 
disturb the status quo by attacking Turkey-in-Europe. To avert this looming danger, 
on 13 August 1912, Berchtold addressed a circular to the Powers inviting them to 
impress upon the Porte the need to extend "the principle of decentralization" not only 
to Albania but also to Macedonia and Thrace. The Austrian circular sought to 
discourage Balkan aggressiveness stressing that the Porte should be given time to 
carry out the necessary reforms in provincial administration. 57 
In the Christian Balkan capitals, Austrian declarations as well as the strong warnings 
of France and Russia against the disturbance of the regional status quo had little 
effect, not least after the disquieting tum of the Albanian question. War fever was 
running high in all Balkan countries. On 26 August 1912, the Bulgarian leadership 
gave the green light to Cettigne to begin hostilities with the Ottoman Empire at the 
most opportune time. 
Throughout September, the Balkan states were negotiating fervently on the terms of 
the military conventions. Eventually, on 5 October 1912, Greece and Bulgaria signed 
a military convention. Next day, Serbia and Montenegro followed them. At the 
eleventh hour, while the Ottomans had already put their Thracian forces on a war 
footing and the Balkan Allies were issuing decrees of mobilization, the Powers 
attempted to avert the war. On 8 October 1912, Montenegro commenced hostilities 
with the Porte. 
55 Refer to chapter 9. 
56 KONDIS (1984, pp.377-387) 
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On the same day, Russia and Austria-Hungary informed the Balkan capitals of the 
Great Powers' intention not to recognize any change in the status quo. On 10 
October, the two Powers communicated a note to the Porte respecting the 
introduction of reforms in Turkey's European provinces based on article 23 of the 
Berlin Treaty. 58 
Yet, the Balkan powers were determined to take the war path. On 13 October 1912, 
they addressed the Sublime Porte demanding: "ethnic autonomy for all nationalities in 
the Ottoman Empire; Christian admission to civil administration in Christian-
populated areas; equality between Christian and Moslem schools; an official 
guarantee that the Ottoman administration would not allow Moslem immigration in 
Christian districts; the Christian recruits to provide military service in their native 
provinces; reorganization of the Ottoman gendarmerie by Swiss or Belgian 
instructors; in Christian-inhabited areas the nomination of European valis who would 
be assisted by local counselors; the creation of a Supreme Council, under the Grand 
Vizier, with Christian and Moslem participation to supervise these reforms.,,59 
The Ottoman administration dismissed the Balkan ultimatum. On 1 7 October 1912, 
the Ottoman government declared war on Serbia and Bulgaria. On the following 
day, the Athens Cabinet entered the war against the Porte. Two months later, 
Ottoman authority in Europe was confined to the area around Constantinople. 
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The Young Turk revolution was a catalyst for the Macedonian question. On 24 July 
1908, the absolutism of the Hamidian regime had eventually come to its end. The 
prospect of the establishment of a liberal Constitutional and Parliamentary system 
which would respect all Ottoman ethnicities led to the dissolution of the Christian 
Macedonian bands and the pacification of the most troublesome region in the 
Balkans. With the victory of the Young Turk Macedonian forces the key concept of 
national-political egalitarianism and inter-ethnic unity (Osmanlilik) seemed to return 
to the forefront of Ottoman political life. 
Within this atmosphere of general rejoicing and optimism, the Young Turks declared 
the continuation of the European condominium in Macedonia unnecessary. The 
Young Turks believed that they were fully capable of reforming the country from 
within, the driving force in this campaign for internal rejuvenation being "Ottoman 
subjects" rather than the Great Powers. Acknowledging the failure of the 
Macedonian reform project -save the gendarmerie- and anxious to avoid straining the 
relations between themselves on account of their conflicting Macedonian policies and 
interests, the Powers raised no objection to leaving the Ottomans to put their house 
in order. The crucial question now was whether the Young Turks possessed the 
resolve and ability to fulfil their principal political commitments: the termination of 
foreign interference in Ottoman affairs, the protection of the territorial integrity of the 
Ottoman Empire, the promotion of inter-ethnic unity and the institutional reform of 
the country. 
By April 1909, when the abortive counterrevolution movement broke out in the 
capital against the C.U.P., it had become apparent that the Unionists were incapable 
of coping with this herculean undertaking. The Committee's attitude on the 
important issues (Ottoman education, non-Moslem conscription, proportionate 
representation of all nationalities in peripheral administration and central government, 
the agrarian question and the labour movement) indicated that it lacked the vision to 
introduce radical institutional reforms into the Ottoman socio-political edifice. 
Furthermore the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the declaration of Bulgarian 
, 
independence were severe blows to the Unionist bid to defend Ottoman territorial 
integrity and sovereign rights. 
During an internal debate about provincial decentralization, the two major Young 
Turk currents, the liberals and the centralists, collided. The liberal tendency stood for 
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administrative devolution, guarantee of the minority groups' privileges and salvation 
of the ailing Empire by promoting inter-ethnic unity. The centralists suspected that 
the application of administrative devolution in the Ottoman provinces, in particular 
those dominated by non-Moslem populations, would encourage non-Moslem 
separatism and dissident nationalism thereby instigating the disintegration of the 
Ottoman Empire. For the centralists, the formation of a strong, efficient and 
westernized administrative system seemed the best way to improve local government, 
restrain centrifugal forces and forge Ottoman unity. Local questions could be raised 
by provincial deputies and be dealt with in the Parliament. 
In the First Annual Young Turk Congress, the centralist current -expressed by C.U.P. 
leaders like Talat Bey, Enver Bey, Rahmi Bey, Ahmet Riza Bey- gained the upper 
hand forcing leading liberal figures like Prince Sabaheddin or Ismail Kemal Bey to 
remain in the background. Liberal opposition however was not eclipsed from the 
Parliament or from segments of Ottoman society. 
A strong Parliamentary majority was also a key precondition for controlling Ottoman 
affairs. Although it is true that often many deputies who had been elected under the 
Unionist banner did not hesitate to distance themselves from C.U.P. directives, the 
pro-Unionist parliamentary group remained the most influential in the Chamber. That 
the Unionist influence on the Chamber was strong became visible during the vote of 
no confidence against the Kiamil Pasha government. Following the introduction of a 
Constitutional regime, the Committee was the most influential organisation in the 
Ottoman Empire but its power was neither unlimited nor indisputable. Apart from 
the liberal opposition, policy-making centers such as the Palace and the Sublime 
Porte still enjoyed considerable influence over the army, the civil administration and 
the country as a whole. 
Lacking administrative ability and experienced leadership, the Unionists allowed the 
Porte officials to form a Cabinet and run the country. Nominally, the c.U.P. was a 
non-political, non-governmental, body committed to protecting the Constitution. In 
reality, having established itself in the Chamber of Deputies and maintaining strong 
connections with the three European armies, the C.U.P. controlled the Empire behind 
the scenes. Prominent Porte officials such as Kiamil Pasha and later Ibrahim Hakki 
Pasha resented the Unionist tendency to interfere in the executive and sought, albeit 
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unsuccessfully, to end it. Hence, this system of "dual leadership" entangled Ottoman 
politics in the period under review. 
The Unionist factor had been closely linked with the Macedonian question. It was 
during the reform period that the Young Turks had managed to establish themselves 
in the Macedonian provinces of Salonica, Monastir and Kosovo and obtain 
experience and knowledge of local matters. It is certain that even after the revolution 
the bases of Unionist power continued to lie in Macedonia. 
F or their part, exploiting the European presence in Macedonia and the diminution of 
local Ottoman authority, the Balkan states had struggled to promote their 
Macedonian aspirations by means of religious, cultural and paramilitary propaganda. 
Recently, Albanian nationalists had also embraced this practice but it was their 
privileged position in the Ottoman civil administration and security forces that gave a 
boost to their struggle. To all those Balkan nationalists, the Young Turk declaration 
that the revolution had settled the Macedonian question seemed unfounded. 
Bulgaria was truly convinced that the only viable solution to the Macedonian 
question was the establishment of an autonomous status in the three provinces. 
Furthermore, the Bulgarian political establishment viewed the prospect of Ottoman 
revival with alarm. A strong and reformed Turkey would not only repel Bulgarian 
expansionism but it could also develop into a constant threat to Bulgarian 
independence. Obtaining full political independence seemed the most appropriate 
way to cement the country's position vis-a-vis Young Turkey. 
Had it not been for the Unionist insistence on working out an understanding with 
Vienna on Bosnia first and the accentuation of political rivalry between the Kiamil 
Cabinet and the C.U.P., the "Bulgarian question" might have been settled much 
sooner than it was. During the Turco-Bulgarian dispute, the Bulgarian government 
thought it advisable to avoid injuring Turkey's Macedonian susceptibilities, opting for 
a policy of reconciliation with the Porte. The specter of Sofia's Balkan isolation, 
which had emerged during the Serbo-Ottoman negotiations, and the threat of Austria 
moving into Macedonia seem to be the factors that influenced the Bulgarian 
leadership to espouse this policy. 
Not that the Bulgarian government had abandoned its Macedonian struggle. This 
was left to the Bulgarian-Macedonian revolutionary organizations and the Exarchate 
to carry out. The incompatibility between the M.R.O. dogma of ~lacedonian 
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autonomy and the centralist tendencies of the C.U.P. forced the Bulgarian element to 
rely on the formation of Constitutional associations for the promotion of its political 
program. However, so long as the political elite in Constantinople considered these 
societies instruments of Bulgarian nationalism, the Bulgarian-Macedonian efforts 
were bound to fail. 
The Unionists always~ had closer ties with Sandanski's independent M.R.O.-Left. In 
fact, Sandanski had actively supported the Young Turk movement and shortly after 
the revolution he went as far as to renounce the dogma of Macedonian autonomy. 
Soon, nevertheless, the conservative and pro-bourgeois C.U.P. policies frustrated the 
M.R.O.-Lett. Its leaders inclined to see the Macedonian question from a socialist 
rather than a nationalist point of view. To them, its emergence had been the product 
of the chauvinist and capitalist policies of the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan states. 
Its resolution was to derive only from the eventual reconciliation and social struggle 
of the lower Macedonian strata, regardless of religious or national attractions. As far 
as the Bulgarian Exarchate was concerned, its attempts to acquire an equal status 
with the Greek Patriarchate failed, primarily on account of Ottoman reluctance to 
allow the growth of the Exarchist influence in Macedonia. 
In Greece, expectations that the numerous and prosperous Ottoman Greek 
communities could develop into the driving force in the Ottoman Empire under a free 
Constitutional regime, utilising their economic strength and cultural superiority, soon 
ran high. True, the Greek Cabinet desired to cooperate with the new rulers of 
Turkey. In its attempt, however, to bring about the final settlement of the thorny 
Cretan question and promote a junction between the Ottoman and Greek 
Macedonian railways, the Athens Cabinet relegated the Macedonian question to the 
background. Unfortunately for Hellenic nationalist aspirations, this strategy damaged 
Greece's position in Macedonia. Socio-political developments in the region and 
divisions within the Greek-Macedonian leadership impeded Athens's efforts to regain 
momentum in Macedonia. 
The fundamental conflict of political and regional interests between Greece and 
Young Turkey was revealed when the Near East crisis broke out. Greek military 
support was indispensable to Ottoman defence in Macedonia but even this strategic 
necessity did not suffice to bring the two neighbours closer. The Greco-Ottoman 
rapprochement did not materialize. This was primarily the result of the Ottoman -and 
Conclusion ______________________________________________________ ~235 
indeed the Unionist- tendency to view cooperation with the kingdom of Greece in the 
narrow context of repelling south Slav expansionism and preserving the Balkan 
power equilibrium. Real convergence of political interests was lacking. 
This was also the case with the Greek Ecumenical Patriarchate and the Young Turks. 
The Unionist declarations for equality among all ethnic groups in the Ottoman 
Empire seemed to lay the groundwork for the eventual demise of the millet system. 
Had this been fulfilled, the Ecumenical Patriarchate would have lost its privileged 
position in Ottoman Orthodox spiritual and communal affairs. Hence, the 
Patriarchate distrusted and opposed the C.U.P. regime. 
Progressively, the Greek leaders grew more suspicious of the anti-Christian Unionist 
attitude. Official Ottoman attacks against the bases of Greek influence in Macedonia 
-the Metropolitan Patriarchist sees and the Greek consular institutions- and the partial 
resumption of Greek-Macedonian revolutionary activity suggested the return of the 
Macedonian question to its original context of inter-ethnic strife. Altogether, by the 
spring of 1909, Greece's faith in the political merit and potential of the C. U. P. had 
broken down. 
True, the Young Turk revolution had prevented Ottoman Macedonian authority from 
collapsing under the combined pressure of Christian revolutionary propaganda and 
the increasing European-imposed reforms. For the Serb kingdom, this development 
was not unwelcome on the grounds that it did not run contrary to its Macedonian 
strategy: the prevention of Macedonia becoming autonomous or being partitioned 
between the Balkan states at a moment that Serbia was unprepared for such a 
development. 
During the Near East crisis, the Austro-Hungarian syndrome left Serbia little room 
for political manouevring in Macedonia. Under these conditions, the short-term 
targets of Serbia's Macedonian policy was to obtain preferential treatment from the 
Porte for Serb commercial and cultural institutions in Macedonia as well as a 
concession for the reinstitution of the medieval Serb Patriarchate of Ipek The long-
term objective of Serbia however, remained territorial aggrandizement in the vilayets 
ofKosovo and Monastir. 
Following the April 1909 counterrevolution, the engagement of the Ottoman armed 
forces in politics rendered the Young Turk regime more military and nationalist. The 
Committee, although it saw a serious threat to its own political predominance in the 
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politicization of the army, for reasons of sheer political expediency. did not hesitate 
to uphold the military regime. A more military and less liberal regime sen-ed the new 
Unionist practice of neutralising the dangerous liberal opposition and restricting the 
constitutionally established political and cultural rights of the non-!\10slem ethnic 
groups (,Ottomanization'). Unionist leaders believed that this policy would solidify 
the Committee's position in domestic politics, contribute to the establishment of an 
effective and centralist system and discourage the secessionist tendencies of the non-
Moslem Ottoman nationalities. The Third Annual Young Turk Congress' resolutions 
subscribed to the further elaboration of this political strategy. Thus, the introduction 
of the Turkish language in all Ottoman educational institutions and the politicization 
of Islam featured right next to the C.U.P. bids for suppression of Ottoman liberalism 
and reaffirmation of the non-Moslems' reaya status. Apparently, in the Unionists' 
point of view, to survive politically and develop materially, Young Turkey should rely 
on her Turkish cultural heritage and Moslem religious identity. 
The effect of the new Young Turk policy on Macedonia was by no means negligible. 
Ottoman discrimination, intimidation and oppression against local Christians coupled 
by Moslem immigration to Macedonia and the instigation of anti-Christian Moslem 
political terrorism provoked irreparable damage to Christian-Ottoman relations. All 
in all, Unionist 'Ottomanization', both as ideological concept and political practice, 
was ill-conceived, out-of-date and impracticable and, therefore, bound to fail. As 
Karpat put it: "it was a belated attempt after more than 400 years of tolerance 
towards the Balkan nationalities to denationalise the Balkan peoples, who had by 
1908 consolidated in terms of economy, culture, religion and military enough to 
withstand such an onslaught. ,,} 
Furthermore, the 'Ottomanization' policy undermined the previous c.U.P.-Albanian 
collaboration. Unionist centralization was in conflict with the Albanian commitment 
to autonomy. In the Diber Congress it became evident that the Committee's 
Albanian strategy was to retain the Albanian provinces within Turkey-in-Europe and 
use the Albanian manpower to counteract Slav and Greek expansionism. Instead of 
opting for a policy of understanding with the Albanians by granting them reasonable 
I KARPAT (1975, p.293) 
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conceSSIons on the issues of language, education, taxation and conscription the 
Unionist regime attempted to fully militarise the Albanian question. 
In doing so, Young Turkey failed to take into account the very essence of the 
Albanian question: Albanian nationalism. Turkish warfare and repression convinced 
even the Moslem Albanians, who were far less nationalist than their Christian 
compatriots, that salvation lay in the unification of the Albanian tribes and incessant 
struggle against the Ottoman regime. Although it is still debatable whether all 
segments of the Albanian people had come to terms with the nationalist concept, the 
Albanian revolts of 1911-1912 almost succeeded in creating an autonomous Albanian 
provlllce. 
As the Unionist regime grew more military and nationalist in the period 1909-1912, 
the Balkan national states' Macedonian policies underwent very important changes. 
For decades, Macedonia had been the major impediment to an inter-Balkan entente. 
Nonetheless, continuous Ottoman encroachments against the Christians' political and 
spiritual rights, the apprehension of an Austrian advance southwards and the active 
Russian diplomatic support to a Balkan Alliance necessitated the termination of the 
Serbo-Bulgarian conflict over Macedonia and encouraged the rapprochement 
between the two south Slav countries. 
In 1910, Constantinople's tendency to align itself with Bucharest in order to contain 
south Slav irredentism prompted the political leaders in Sofia and Belgrade and their 
Russian patrons to acknowledge Greece's strategic value for the effectiveness of the 
Balkan League and pursue her participation in it. During the same year, the revision 
and redefinition of the Christians' Macedonian policies were in part reflected in the 
ceasing of their inter-racial confrontation and in part in their inclination to collaborate 
against Unionist autocracy. Underlining these key developments in the changing 
shape of the Macedonian question, Lowther remarked in his report for Turkey for the 
year 1910: "The Young Turk regime threatens to unite against itself all the elements 
that nothing else would bring together.,,2 
The process of inter-Balkan understanding accelerated in the period 1911-1912, as 
consecutive Albanian revolts and the commencement of the Turco-Italian African war 
weakened Turkey's European authority and undermined her international position. 
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At this juncture, unable to reach an agreement on the delimitation of their 
Macedonian 'spheres of influence', Bulgaria, Serbia and Greece decided that, for the 
moment, the dismemberment of Turkey-in-Europe should take precedence over the 
final division of the Macedonian spoils, which could be postponed until the victory of 
the Balkan coalition. However, this disposition 00'1. the seeds of future dissension (J 
between the Allies and basically became the factor responsible for the eventual 
dismantling of the Balkan Alliance system. True, Balkan military might was to bring 
about the collapse of European Turkey but due to the Allies' conflicting Macedonian 
interests and claims it was unlikely to contribute to the settlement of the Macedonian 
question. 
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